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dc.contributor.authorYu, Yijun
dc.contributor.authorFranqueira, Virginia N. L.
dc.contributor.authorThan Tun, Thein
dc.contributor.authorWieringa, Roel J.
dc.contributor.authorNuseibeh, Bashar
dc.date.accessioned2015-05-26T14:38:12Zen
dc.date.available2015-05-26T14:38:12Zen
dc.date.issued2015-04-23en
dc.identifier.citationYu, Y. et al (2015) 'Automated analysis of security requirements through risk-based argumentation', Journal of Systems and Software, 106, pp.102-116. DOI: 10.1016/j.jss.2015.04.065en
dc.identifier.issn01641212en
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jss.2015.04.065en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10545/555820en
dc.description.abstractComputer-based systems are increasingly being exposed to evolving security threats, which often reveal new vulnerabilities. A formal analysis of the evolving threats is difficult due to a number of practical considerations such as incomplete knowledge about the design, limited information about attacks, and constraints on organisational resources. In our earlier work on RISA (RIsk assessment in Security Argumentation), we showed that informal risk assessment can complement the formal analysis of security requirements. In this paper, we integrate the formal and informal assessment of security by proposing a unified meta-model and an automated tool for supporting security argumentation called OpenRISA. Using a uniform representation of risks and arguments, our automated checking of formal arguments can identify relevant risks as rebuttals to those arguments, and identify mitigations from publicly available security catalogues when possible. As a result, security engineers are able to make informed and traceable decisions about the security of their computer-based systems. The application of OpenRISA is illustrated with examples from a PIN Entry Device case study.
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.relation.urlhttp://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0164121215000850en
dc.relation.urlhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0164121215000850en
dc.rightsArchived with thanks to Journal of Systems and Softwareen
dc.subjectStructured argumentationen
dc.subjectRisk assessmenten
dc.subjectSecurity analysisen
dc.titleAutomated analysis of security requirements through risk-based argumentationen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity of Derbyen
dc.identifier.journalJournal of Systems and Softwareen
html.description.abstractComputer-based systems are increasingly being exposed to evolving security threats, which often reveal new vulnerabilities. A formal analysis of the evolving threats is difficult due to a number of practical considerations such as incomplete knowledge about the design, limited information about attacks, and constraints on organisational resources. In our earlier work on RISA (RIsk assessment in Security Argumentation), we showed that informal risk assessment can complement the formal analysis of security requirements. In this paper, we integrate the formal and informal assessment of security by proposing a unified meta-model and an automated tool for supporting security argumentation called OpenRISA. Using a uniform representation of risks and arguments, our automated checking of formal arguments can identify relevant risks as rebuttals to those arguments, and identify mitigations from publicly available security catalogues when possible. As a result, security engineers are able to make informed and traceable decisions about the security of their computer-based systems. The application of OpenRISA is illustrated with examples from a PIN Entry Device case study.


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