Hdl Handle:
http://hdl.handle.net/10545/611804
Title:
Legal coercion, respect & reason-responsive agency
Authors:
Lee, Ambrose YK ( 0000-0002-8955-2711 )
Abstract:
Legal coercion seems morally problematic because it is susceptible to the Hegelian objection that it fails to respect individuals in a way that is ‘due to them as men’. But in what sense does legal coercion fail to do so? And what are the grounds for this requirement to respect? This paper is an attempt to answer these questions. It argues that (a) legal coercion fails to respect individuals as reason-responsive agents; and (b) individuals ought to be respected as such in virtue of the fact that they are human beings. Thus it is in this sense that legal coercion fails to treat individuals with the kind of respect ‘due to them as men’.
Affiliation:
University of Oxford, Centre for Criminology
Publisher:
Springer
Journal:
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Issue Date:
2013
URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10545/611804
DOI:
10.1007/s10677-013-9486-4
Additional Links:
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10677-013-9486-4
Type:
Article
Language:
en
ISSN:
1386-2820; 1572-8447
Sponsors:
The Leverhulme Trust (ECF-2012-032); AHRC (AH/H015655/1)
Appears in Collections:
Research, Innovation and Academic Enterprise

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorLee, Ambrose YKen
dc.date.accessioned2016-06-06T13:24:43Zen
dc.date.available2016-06-06T13:24:43Zen
dc.date.issued2013en
dc.identifier.issn1386-2820en
dc.identifier.issn1572-8447en
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10677-013-9486-4en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10545/611804en
dc.description.abstractLegal coercion seems morally problematic because it is susceptible to the Hegelian objection that it fails to respect individuals in a way that is ‘due to them as men’. But in what sense does legal coercion fail to do so? And what are the grounds for this requirement to respect? This paper is an attempt to answer these questions. It argues that (a) legal coercion fails to respect individuals as reason-responsive agents; and (b) individuals ought to be respected as such in virtue of the fact that they are human beings. Thus it is in this sense that legal coercion fails to treat individuals with the kind of respect ‘due to them as men’.en
dc.description.sponsorshipThe Leverhulme Trust (ECF-2012-032); AHRC (AH/H015655/1)en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSpringeren
dc.relation.urlhttp://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10677-013-9486-4en
dc.rightsArchived with thanks to Ethical Theory and Moral Practiceen
dc.subjectLegal coercionen
dc.subjectRespecten
dc.subjectAutonomyen
dc.subjectEqualityen
dc.subjectReason-responsiveen
dc.titleLegal coercion, respect & reason-responsive agencyen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity of Oxford, Centre for Criminologyen
dc.identifier.journalEthical Theory and Moral Practiceen
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