When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model

Hdl Handle:
http://hdl.handle.net/10545/575936
Title:
When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model
Authors:
Stupple, Edward J. N. ( 0000-0001-8545-9504 ) ; Ball, Linden J. ( 0000-0002-5099-0124 ) ; Evans, Jonathan St. B. T.; Kamal-Smith, Emily
Abstract:
When the validity of a deductive conclusion conflicts with its believability people often respond in a belief-biased manner. This study used response times to test the selective processing model, which views belief-bias effects as arising from the interplay between superficial heuristic processes and more rigorous analytic processes. Participants were split into three response groups according to their propensity to endorse logically normative conclusions. The low-logic, high belief-bias group demonstrated rapid responding, consistent with heuristic processing. The medium-logic, moderate belief-bias group showed slower responding, consistent with enhanced analytic processing, albeit selectively biased by conclusion believability. The high-logic, low belief-bias group's relatively unbiased responses came at the cost of increased processing times, especially with invalid-believable conclusions. These findings support selective processing claims that distinct heuristic and analytic processing systems underpin reasoning, and indicate that certain individuals differentially engage one system more than the other. A minor amendment is proposed to the current selective processing model to capture the full range of observed effects.
Affiliation:
University of Derby; Lancaster University; University of Plymouth; University of Derby
Citation:
When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model 2011, 23 (8):931 Journal of Cognitive Psychology
Publisher:
Taylor and Francis
Journal:
Journal of Cognitive Psychology
Issue Date:
Dec-2011
URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10545/575936
DOI:
10.1080/20445911.2011.589381
Additional Links:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/20445911.2011.589381
Type:
Article
Language:
en
ISSN:
2044-5911; 2044-592X
Appears in Collections:
Centre for Psychological Research

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorStupple, Edward J. N.en
dc.contributor.authorBall, Linden J.en
dc.contributor.authorEvans, Jonathan St. B. T.en
dc.contributor.authorKamal-Smith, Emilyen
dc.date.accessioned2015-08-25T11:14:06Zen
dc.date.available2015-08-25T11:14:06Zen
dc.date.issued2011-12en
dc.identifier.citationWhen logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model 2011, 23 (8):931 Journal of Cognitive Psychologyen
dc.identifier.issn2044-5911en
dc.identifier.issn2044-592Xen
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/20445911.2011.589381en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10545/575936en
dc.description.abstractWhen the validity of a deductive conclusion conflicts with its believability people often respond in a belief-biased manner. This study used response times to test the selective processing model, which views belief-bias effects as arising from the interplay between superficial heuristic processes and more rigorous analytic processes. Participants were split into three response groups according to their propensity to endorse logically normative conclusions. The low-logic, high belief-bias group demonstrated rapid responding, consistent with heuristic processing. The medium-logic, moderate belief-bias group showed slower responding, consistent with enhanced analytic processing, albeit selectively biased by conclusion believability. The high-logic, low belief-bias group's relatively unbiased responses came at the cost of increased processing times, especially with invalid-believable conclusions. These findings support selective processing claims that distinct heuristic and analytic processing systems underpin reasoning, and indicate that certain individuals differentially engage one system more than the other. A minor amendment is proposed to the current selective processing model to capture the full range of observed effects.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherTaylor and Francisen
dc.relation.urlhttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/20445911.2011.589381en
dc.rightsArchived with thanks to Journal of Cognitive Psychologyen
dc.subjectBelief Biasen
dc.subjectDual process theoryen
dc.subjectDeductionen
dc.subjectCognitionen
dc.subjectReasoningen
dc.subjectBiasen
dc.titleWhen logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing modelen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity of Derbyen
dc.contributor.departmentLancaster Universityen
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity of Plymouthen
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity of Derbyen
dc.identifier.journalJournal of Cognitive Psychologyen
All Items in UDORA are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.