Negations in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a heuristic–analytic conflict

Hdl Handle:
http://hdl.handle.net/10545/575927
Title:
Negations in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a heuristic–analytic conflict
Authors:
Stupple, Edward J. N. ( 0000-0001-8545-9504 ) ; Waterhouse, Eleanor F.
Abstract:
An experiment utilizing response time measures was conducted to test dominant processing strategies in syllogistic reasoning with the expanded quantifier set proposed by Roberts (2005). Through adding negations to existing quantifiers it is possible to change problem surface features without altering logical validity. Biases based on surface features such as atmosphere, matching, and the probability heuristics model (PHM; Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1995) would not be expected to show variance in response latencies, but participant responses should be highly sensitive to changes in the surface features of the quantifiers. In contrast, according to analytic accounts such as mental models theory and mental logic (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Rips, 1994) participants should exhibit increased response times for negated premises, but not be overly impacted upon by the surface features of the conclusion. Data indicated that the dominant response strategy was based on a matching heuristic, but also provided evidence of a resource-demanding analytic procedure for dealing with double negatives. The authors propose that dual-process theories offer a stronger account of these data whereby participants employ competing heuristic and analytic strategies and fall back on a heuristic response when analytic processing fails.
Affiliation:
University of Derby
Citation:
Stupple, Edward J. N., Waterhouse, Eleanor F. 'Negations in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a heuristic–analytic conflict' 2009, 62 (8):1533 The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
Journal:
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
Issue Date:
Aug-2009
URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10545/575927
DOI:
10.1080/17470210902785674
Additional Links:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17470210902785674
Type:
Article
Language:
en
ISSN:
1747-0218; 1747-0226
Appears in Collections:
Human Sciences Research Centre

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorStupple, Edward J. N.en
dc.contributor.authorWaterhouse, Eleanor F.en
dc.date.accessioned2015-08-25T10:50:59Zen
dc.date.available2015-08-25T10:50:59Zen
dc.date.issued2009-08en
dc.identifier.citationStupple, Edward J. N., Waterhouse, Eleanor F. 'Negations in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a heuristic–analytic conflict' 2009, 62 (8):1533 The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychologyen
dc.identifier.issn1747-0218en
dc.identifier.issn1747-0226en
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/17470210902785674en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10545/575927en
dc.description.abstractAn experiment utilizing response time measures was conducted to test dominant processing strategies in syllogistic reasoning with the expanded quantifier set proposed by Roberts (2005). Through adding negations to existing quantifiers it is possible to change problem surface features without altering logical validity. Biases based on surface features such as atmosphere, matching, and the probability heuristics model (PHM; Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1995) would not be expected to show variance in response latencies, but participant responses should be highly sensitive to changes in the surface features of the quantifiers. In contrast, according to analytic accounts such as mental models theory and mental logic (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Rips, 1994) participants should exhibit increased response times for negated premises, but not be overly impacted upon by the surface features of the conclusion. Data indicated that the dominant response strategy was based on a matching heuristic, but also provided evidence of a resource-demanding analytic procedure for dealing with double negatives. The authors propose that dual-process theories offer a stronger account of these data whereby participants employ competing heuristic and analytic strategies and fall back on a heuristic response when analytic processing fails.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.urlhttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17470210902785674en
dc.rightsArchived with thanks to The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychologyen
dc.subjectReasoningen
dc.subjectDual process theoryen
dc.subjectCognitionen
dc.subjectMatching biasen
dc.subjectDeductionen
dc.titleNegations in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a heuristic–analytic conflicten
dc.typeArticleen
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity of Derbyen
dc.identifier.journalThe Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychologyen
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