Diplomacy and the Politics of fear: The 21st Century Challenges to the Theory and Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations

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PAPER 2:

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PREVENT STRATEGY WITHIN UK COUNTER TERRORISM AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS, COMMUNITIES AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

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Abstract

Prevent – the strategy – has become embedded in counter terrorism policy in the UK since 2007. It was reviewed and re-written in 2011 and has taken on even greater significance at the level of addressing questions of how to challenge and prevent ‘radicalisation’ in the context of managing security in the nation? This paper examines the tensions associated with the Prevent strategy and its legacy in the UK since 2007. It will explore the juxtaposition of policy making, which on one hand sees the means-ends solutions of avoiding further instances of terrorism at all costs, set against a potential community-based and local authority engagement model that foregrounds safeguarding against radicalisation and extremism in all its forms as a priority when working with communities across the country. There are apparent tensions in the emphasis of implementation and deliver of this strategy, which continue to challenge perceptions against the growing strengthening of fears associated with the erosion of civil liberties. The paper argues for a significant change in awareness of the behaviours and attitudes associated with ‘radicalisation’ and suggests policy could better reflect practice as we move through the second decade of the century.

Keywords: Prevent; terrorism; radicalisation; safeguarding; policy; identity; education.
**Introduction**

‘Prevent’, as one area of four within the UK CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy (Home Office, 2003) has been criticised, misconceived, misunderstood, often times communicated without clarity of purpose beyond the reading of the physical strategy document (Home Office, 2007, 2011) and open to a range of interpretations. Since 2007 it has been criticised by academics, the media and press, policy makers and members of civil society, not least by significant figures in Muslim communities (see House of Commons CLG Committee (2010) and Home Affairs Select Committee (2012) reports). Such criticism, ironically, has also been levelled at the first version of the Prevent Strategy (2007) (Prevent 1) by the former Home Secretary (and now Prime Minister) Theresa May in the Forward to Prevent 2 (2011) in which she states:

The Prevent programme we inherited from the last Government was flawed. It confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with Government policy to prevent terrorism. It failed to confront the extremist ideology at the heart of the threat we face; and in trying to reach those at risk of radicalisation, funding sometimes even reached the very extremist organisations that Prevent should have been confronting.

This paper seeks to bring the context, background and implementation of Prevent and the ever-shifting landscape of counter-terrorism in the UK into focus in 2016. The current response academically has seen various iterations of academic attention since the pilot years of 2006 until 2014. In the last two years however, there has been less direct academic engagement with Prevent with a few exceptions: (O’Toole *et al.* 2016; Quartermaine, 2014; Saeed & Johnson, 2016; Thomas, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016).

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1 CONTEST includes four strategic elements: Pursue (Policing and state Intelligence Services MI5, MI6, with potential criminal justice outcomes), Prevent (counter terrorism options to stop or prevent individuals, being drawn into radicalisation/ extremism outside the criminal justice system), Protect (directed at infrastructure protection across the nation, includes transport, power, borders - ports and airports, and contingencies in towns and cities to reduce risks of terrorist attacks) and Prepare (in the event of terrorist incidents that cannot be stopped; mitigating potential harmful fallout, in cost to human life and minimise damage to infrastructure).

2 The limitations of space in the production of this paper will result in an overview of the historic legacy of the Prevent Strategy, the detail of which can be seen in the articles cited, but only presented here in summary.
There is no logical explanation for fewer articles on the subject, suffice to think because of the rise of Islamic State it has shifted attention in many social science disciplines and it is still early in academic terms to see the results of recent manifestation from Syria and Iraq. The other issue of major significance (in counter-terrorism terms) that directly impacts on the Prevent Strategy, is the ‘Statutory Duty’ enacted in 2015, which does, like Islamic State, require our attention.

The paper will argue that, in line with Cantle and Thomas (2015) and Thomas (2015, 2016) broader education in the classroom that involves non-stigmatising values led citizenship and anti-extremism educational projects through which teachers are empowered and have confidence to deliver difficult topic areas is not insurmountable, and is preferable in support of youth engagement with the Prevent strategy. However, unlike Thomas (2014, 2015, 2016) and Ragazzi (2014) the author would like to suggest that the flaws of Prevent 1 (responsible for most of the critique of the strategy) are being put behind us at policy level and being recognised by the current government, who appear to be seeking a greater collaborative approach and potentially more meaningful partnership with Muslim communities and other stakeholders (see Middle East Eye [online] - Home Affairs Select Committee Report Aug, 2016) compared with early years manifestations. This may not however necessarily change some areas of public opinion, especially if rebranding not reconceptualising the strategy is the outcome?

This study draws on a review of academic literature between 2006 and 2016, spanning ten years from pilot programmes addressing the ‘Prevention of Violent Extremism’ to date. The study works by summarising the impact and shift in policy and strategy in the UK in relation to Prevent 1, and 2 and in the context of Islamic State’s emergence and its interpretation of religiously-inspired radical forms of Islam. It considers the impact of Islamic State on Prevent 2 in the UK. Within the review of academic studies are significant empirical works (Kundnani, 2009, 2012; Millings, 2013; Mythen, 2012; Pantazis & Pemberton,
2009; O’Toole et al 2013, 2016; Thomas, 2014) that help in consideration of how evidence at grass roots level connects with the thesis that academically, many authors are grounding their work in past flaws of early Prevent 1? It asks if too little attention is being given to the details of the shift towards widening professionalization post the 2015 implementation of the duty on Prevent. This includes how best to grapple with problematic concepts like ‘radicalisation’, both at the level of accumulating important knowledge that could impact on the safeguarding of individuals (under the duty) and at the level of dispelling myths that Muslim communities are both ‘risky and at risk’ (Heath-Kelly, 2013) in a prior homogenisation of collective religious and cultural identities which has occurred in unhelpful ways.

**Tensions, Academic and Societal?**

Broadly and in summary, the main critiques of Prevent between 2007 and its review by the former coalition government in 2010; what Thomas, (2014) calls Prevent 1, and its re-writing in 2011(Prevent 2), fall into four areas:

1) An over emphasis on Muslim communities and individuals creating a ‘suspect community’, including allegations of ‘spying’ or using Prevent as an intelligence gathering tool and/or form of discipline curtailing Muslim social and cultural capital (Birt, 2009; Heath-Kelly, 2013; Martin, 2014; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Thomas, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016). Here the levels of scrutiny were described as disproportionate to the level of threat and ignoring other forms of extremism including a resurgent far-right; 2) specifically targeted funding for Muslim communities creating ‘resource envy’ (DCLG Committee, 2010) from other communities of minority and majority ethnicities; 3) much of the community development work within Muslim communities (between 2007-2010) appears to have been associated with Prevent 1 (counter-terrorism funding). Funding was provided to mainly conservative, or traditional Muslim leaders/groups which reinforced generational tensions and created divisions in communities; and 4) local authorities and the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) responsible for the funding at
that time (2007-2010) appear to have conflated community cohesion on one hand with counter terrorism on the other, which resulted in confusion both within and across Muslim communities, civil society broadly and within state agencies (police, local authorities and government departments).

In 2011 the revised version of Prevent (Prevent 2) redefined both its content and the government department taking control of the agenda; now hosted by the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) within the Home Office. As a result there were some significant shifts in emphasis and Prevent 2 attempted to implement solutions to earlier criticism (outlined above). What followed was the adoption of many (if not all) of the recommendations of the coalition government’s 2011 review, which was based on evidence to earlier Parliamentary committees, which had examined the value and efficacy of Prevent between 2009 and 2011 and root causes for violent radicalisation between 2010 and 2012.

Criticism of Prevent 2 however shifted emphasis with that of the strategy. In other words, concerns about the securitisation and policy contradiction of the cohesion agenda (Ragazzi, 2012, 2014; Thomas, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016) was shaped around a discourse that saw funds reduced for Prevent work and a tightening of access to resources, which had until that point been provided with little monitoring or accountability. In addition, Thomas (2016) claims the Prevent Statutory Duty in 2015 increased the securitisation threat through its unnecessary influence in the state education sector (Thomas, 2016), broadly impacting on Schools, Colleges and Higher Education Institutions (Thomas, 2015, 2016; Saeed & Johnson, 2016). References continued to ‘suspect communities’ under Prevent 2, through a so-called essentialising approach to Muslims in the nation. This idea has its origins in Hillyard’s early thesis, (1993) and is reflected in Pantazis and Pemberton’s (2009) comparison of former Irish dissidents.

3 The conflations of these apparently opposed ideas (community cohesion and counter terrorism) will be discussed later in the paper.
being the ‘old suspects’, and Muslims under Prevent, being the ‘new suspects’ that replaced the Irish. In addition Heath-Kelly suggests that Muslims are seen as both ‘risky and at risk’ (2013). Greer’s (2010) rebuttal of the ‘suspect community thesis’ however, adds to a rich debate about how and to what extent is the empirical evidence both sufficient and specifically evidencing serious questions of generalising ‘Muslims as suspects’. He also critiques the idea of Muslim ‘material discrimination’ – influencing extremism, and as a consequence, challenges the credibility of the idea that Muslims are the subject of wholesale ‘securitisation’. This raises a question we will address later - is the evidence sufficiently robust, is it representative, has it the validity in sample terms and what can we legitimately claim about responses from research populations?

To add to the already vexed debates about securitisation of Muslim communities, in 2013/14 we saw the rise of Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq. This was foreseen by security and intelligence services, but its impact domestically came much later. As Hewitt (2007) points out the security and intelligence services were playing catch up, as had been the case in the late 1990s when the emphasis moved from the IRA to international terrorism by the early 2000s. According to Hewitt that ‘was no easy matter’ (2007:94), nor was the shift from Al Qa’eda (AQ) to IS in Iraq and the subsequent concern it created among security officials and government. The tensions in Iraq played out between Sunni and Shia militants under Abu Musab al Zarqawi (forming Islamic State in Iraq) from 2003, and affiliating with AQ in October 2004 (Stern and Berger, 2015) was a sign of things to come.

In so far as translating the impact of IS to UK domestic life is concerned, specifically, challenging western liberal democratic values and importing transnational terror to UK shores, little was known at the level of policing about IS. Even less was known about its potential draw to many young people and families prepared to leave the UK to travel to Syria and/or Iraq. The reinforcing of a traditional historic model of Muslim civil society through the historic Caliphate, despite how it was set up and the implications of IS
taking violence to an extreme level, did not deter those who saw an opportunity they could not foresee, by staying at home. As a consequence the Prevent 2 legislative upgrading of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, 2015 (CTS - bringing about the Statutory Duty) was hastened along on the back of significant numbers travelling to Syria and Iraq between 2014-2016 - reported by the BBC as 850 travellers to date (BBC News database, 12th Aug, 2016). Of those approximately half have returned to the UK, while more than 200 have died, been convicted or remain in Syria or Iraq. Known deaths are currently at 66, convictions 64 and believed to still be in Iraq or Syria 81.

The ‘Digital Caliphate’ as it became known (Atwan, 2015) created a new and pervasive threat to national security under Prevent 2. The threat manifest in untold numbers of people having access to IS recruitment through social media platforms in everyday use, like for example: Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and one-to-one digitally encrypted platforms like Whats App, Ask fm, kick it etc. The threat from IS and the Caliphate ideal created a significant shift in attention for Prevent Police Case Management (PCM) and Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) officers, which for a time almost eclipsed concerns about AQ and continues to be the persistent threat according to the state. This additional complexity only added to even greater tensions in relation to civil liberties, as now the surveillance question on social media outlets, web-based services and one-to-one messaging was firmly in the spotlight.

What Does Prevent 2 ask us to consider?

Prevent 2 in 2011 explicitly states in ‘Guiding Principles; a Framework for Prevent’: that it addresses all forms of terrorism, prioritising against the greatest level of threat; it will not spy on or condone spying on anyone in community, stating:

“Prevent must not be used as a means for covert spying on people or communities. Trust in Prevent must be improved” (Prevent, 20116 [3.15]).

It will not fund extremists; it will protect freedoms of speech, but requires appropriate challenge to extremists (including non-violent extremists), and on the question of integration has this to say:
Prevent depends on a successful integration strategy. But integration alone will not meet Prevent objectives. And Prevent must not assume control of or allocate funding to integration projects, which have a value far wider than security and counter-terrorism: the Government will not securitise its integration strategy. This has been a mistake in the past (Prevent, 2011:6 [3.14]).

Prevent 2 objectives state:

Within this overall framework the new Prevent strategy will specifically: [1] respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it; [2] prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and [3] work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address.

On the face of things and based on the explicit response addressed above to previous criticism, Prevent 2 would appear to be making good (in large part and on paper) its previous misgivings, which are challenged and criticised by a number of academics cited in this paper (see list above). This making good does not however exonerate overzealous policing or the inappropriate use of power or influence in addressing the objectives or guiding principles. The strategy as written is extant and has not been altered since 2011. In addition to the previous Prevent 1 version, Prevent 2 makes three fundamental changes in face of its critics: 1) It explicitly draws a line in the sand on secrecy, stating it will only work to intervene or offer advice and support overtly, transparently and with the knowledge and consent of the individual’s it works with; 2) It will only work in the non-criminal space, that is, in order to prevent criminalisation though the criminal justice system (CJS). For this to work individuals must cooperate by agreeing to work with either formal or informal intervention providers (subject to the Channel multi-agency referral process, or informally outside it). Prevent will, through counselling and other support seek to work with individuals to keep them out of the CJS; and 3) emphasises local authority Prevent co-ordinators (many of whom are taking a lead) and multi-agency function, both in relation to Channel referrals and local level community engagement.

Prevent’s 2007-2010 legacy however, seems to carry the weight of academic
and other research participants critical opinions beyond the early period and to date. This raises the question, how widespread are these reported early misgivings in relation to the strategy and its implementation and are they being substantiated by the later Prevent 2 version of the strategy? Prevent 2, as presented above, has documented its intention to change, learning from the previous mistakes. We will come back to this question and the representation issue that flows from it later, but first let us consider the one substantive change to Prevent 2 - the implementation of the Prevent Statutory Duty in 2015.

There are significant changes brought about in the move that saw Prevent take on a statutory function relative to the implementation of the Statutory Duty for Prevent under new legislation (The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, 2015). Prevent Duty Guidance (2015) states:

Our Prevent work is intended to deal with all kinds of terrorist threats to the UK. The most significant of these threats is currently from terrorist organisations in Syria and Iraq, and Al Qa’ida associated groups. But terrorists associated with the extreme right also pose a continued threat to our safety and security (Prevent Duty Guidance, 2015:6).

The guidance under the new duty sets out where the threats are likely to come from and takes a ‘risk-based approach’ in addressing the sector specific requirements for the ‘specified authorities’, which includes: Local Authorities, Police, Prisons and Probation, Schools, Further and Higher Education and Health. There are seven broad areas covered by the duty, which include, 1) Leadership, 2) productive cooperation, 3) staff understanding radicalisation and training in relation to risk/vulnerability, referral (into Channel or other programmes), 4) differentiating extremism from terrorism, 5) obtaining support, knowledge of challenge, 6) ICT safety and 7) monitoring and inspection, described as follows:

[Under the heading of ‘leadership’] establish or use existing mechanisms for understanding the risk of radicalisation; ensure staff understand the risk and build the capabilities to deal with it; communicate and promote the importance of the duty; and ensure staff implement the duty effectively.

Demonstrate evidence of productive co-operation, in particular with local Prevent co-
ordinators, the police and local authorities, and co-ordination through existing multi-agency forums, for example Community Safety Partnerships.

Frontline staff who engage with the public should understand what radicalisation means and why people may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism as a consequence of it. They need to be aware of what we mean by the term “extremism” and the relationship between extremism and terrorism.

Staff need to know what measures are available to prevent people from becoming drawn into terrorism and how to challenge the extremist ideology that can be associated with it. They need to understand how to obtain support for people who may be being exploited by radicalising influences.

All specified authorities subject to the duty will need to ensure they provide appropriate training for staff involved in the implementation of this duty. Such training is now widely available (Prevent Duty Guidance, 2015: 6-8).

Additionally, statutory workers need to know about Information sharing protocols monitoring and inspection by a sector specific inspector, for example, OFSTED in schools-based education, or HEFCE in the higher education sector.

In principle much of what is required for compliance under the ‘duty’ appears to build on existing mechanisms within sectors, but assumes some prior knowledge, which is not always present in relation to Prevent more broadly. The need to risk assess and action plan and create some sense of partnership working (productive cooperation) with local Prevent coordinators (steering groups) or local authority equivalents in Community Safety, should not be too onerous a demand against existing safeguarding risk assessments. However, there are some ‘specified authorities’ under the ‘duty’, for example, schools, where an implicit response by the Department for Education (DfE 2015a, 2015b, 2015c) includes advice/guidance on safeguarding and Prevent and how to connect British Values with the Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural Development of children and young people (SMSC). In so doing foregrounding SMSC defined by British values against the definition of extremism in the statutory duty (and in Prevent 2).
The definition of extremism is defined as:

vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. Including calls for the death of members of the armed forces at home or overseas (Counter-Terrorism & Security Act, 2015).

The definition is too vague, requires a largely subjective test, and presents an unacceptable conclusion – that active or vocal opposition to democracy, rules of law, individual liberty or tolerance etc., equals extremism? This removes any context or consequence for exactly what constitutes vocal or active opposition, and in that sense appears unhelpfully arbitrary. In practical terms, it is unworkable for educationalists that cannot be expected to make judgements based on the definition above, and it will undoubtedly receive legal challenge at some future point in time.

However, in so far as developing experiential learning experiences around democracy, rules, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs is concerned, and setting aside the extremism question for a moment, this definition does inculcate democratic and cohesive elements within it, given its universal potential to be applied to all. From the perspective of a fourfold model around which to develop SMSC this would, under any other circumstances provide a useful starting point for teachers in thinking about the background to citizenship teaching and learning experiences, using the principles of spiritual, moral, social and cultural development. The author would like to suggest in principle, that it could also form the basis for some of the more difficult and necessary debates that need to take place among educators and pupils in relation to radicalisation, its causes and concerns for all in schools and communities.

There are however other issues reflected in what the Prevent Duty requires of professionals in ‘specified authorities’ including schools. From the perspective of managing risk, identifying best practice and under the duty of care to those under eighteen years in school, it presents a safeguarding dilemma. If the inference is that to make a decision about a pupils
physical and/or psychological well being is premised on ‘who is in vocal or active opposition to fundamental British Values’ – vis-à-vis the four elements of the definition above, is this something that teachers (including their designated safeguarding leads) can make a call on? Do they have the knowledge, skills and judgement to address these, now safeguarding aspects under the duty, relating to questions of radicalisation/extremism or moving into or out of terrorism? Having delivered a bespoke form of Prevent training to more than 1000 teachers in Derby and Derbyshire schools in the last three years, the author would say not.

Thomas (2016) raises very important issues in relation to education and the need for a wider level of open citizenship-based engagement with what he describes as ‘anti-extremism education’, using a human rights-based model in which more open debates without fear of sanction can take place. He states:

Only through such citizenship education, with a human rights framework at its core, will young people be equipped with the individual and peer group resilience to examine and reject ideologies that promote hatred and violence (Thomas, 2016:184).

The author supports this idea, together with wider teacher training. Thomas (2014) also criticises Prevent 1, for attempting then failing to address the needs in education. It should be recognised that the statutory duty has changed the landscape irrevocably (subject to Parliamentary intervention), and the call for safeguarding training to be delivered with a national footprint put out by the Department For Education in the summer of 2016, is an indication (a year on from the advent of the Statutory Duty) of the lack of planning and foresight, by government to manage the teacher training aspects. Too few teachers have the knowledge, or confidence to develop open debates and ‘anti-extremism education’ and we should acknowledge (in line with Thomas, 2016) that by not learning the lessons of previous ‘white racist’ issues in our schools, allowed them to be driven underground. It would equally be an error not to correct the lack of educational engagement with the difficulties presented by extremism regardless of how unpalatable such
views might be (Phillips, Tse & Johnson, 2011).

Implications for Policy Makers
Communities and Law
Enforcement

The criticisms and questions raised by many academics, some policy makers, law enforcement and members of the public reflects the on going discussion about the efficacy and practicality of a forward thinking counter-terrorism policy framework in which Prevent, as pointed out by Pantucci (when talking about counter-terrorism strategies) raises the security versus civil liberties question, stating:

Unlike dictatorships or other authoritarian regimes, democracies are inherently fluid and must be responsive to their public’s demands, meaning that the parameters of the debate on where we draw the line between civil liberties and public protection is also likely to be a fluid one (Pantucci, 2010: 265).

Critiques of the operationalisation of Prevent 2, as opposed to its policy position on paper, appear to be raising further questions, many of which are addressed in the literature covered in this paper, but often not incontrovertibly. For those who suggest Prevent is unworkable and needs a strategy change as the only solution, what does the alternative look like? Is then Prevent 2 a bridge too far for post-industrial UK liberal democracy or has it been misconceived, confused with Pursue (in counter-terrorism terms) and associated with legislative tightening of government policy to impact terrorist threats (in the criminal justice context) to its detriment?

The only substantial material change to Prevent 2, cannot be played down and the implications of the enactment of the duty under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTS) will continue to raise debate about it’s implementation, and as discussed above specifically, in how it impacts on education. There are similar conversations to be had about the duty’s impact on the other ‘specified authorities’ - health, local authorities, prisons and the police themselves. Prevent 2 has seen no updating or rewriting since 2011. In reviewing the critique presented earlier in relation to Prevent, the Prevent 2 Guiding Framework apparently addresses these criticisms directly, e.g. securitisation, spying and cohesion (described as integration).
strategy’s claims are however disputed by Cantle and Thomas (2015), Cockburn (2007), Davies (2008), Kundnani (2009) and Thomas, (2012, 2014, 2015, 2016). This raises other important policy related questions - is Prevent driving community cohesion out of local authority agendas (Cantle and Thomas, 2015; Thomas, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016), or has that idea been arrested and reverted in the current landscape? Thomas (2016) suggests multiculturalism is alive and well and cohesion is a new form of multiculturalism and not its death. If that is the case, given the current community development agenda at local authority level it would appear to embrace social cohesion, regardless of central government’s steer on this.

The author also contends that the impacts on multi-culturalism of Prevent 2, are today, less of a ‘policing multiculturalism’ (Ragazzi, 2014) on the basis that Police Prevent Case Management (PCM) within regional Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs) has seen significant tightening of budgets and refocusing of strategy. In many cases officers have been removed almost completely from educative awareness raising (East Midlands Regional PCM), and even supporting Home Office core deliverables - WRAP 3 (Workshop for Raising Awareness of Prevent). This seeming withdrawal is mainly associated with a shift in emphasis from Chief Police Officers Council due to the Islamic State risk and threat that has seen PCM resources increasingly used for collating and assessing Channel referrals (within a multi-agency context) and/or for disruption purposes.

While being far from a perfect solution Prevent 2, may, as Thomas (2014) suggests be seeing an ‘end in sight’ finding a new trajectory in 2016, with calls for a review in Parliament (as yet unpublished Home Affairs Select Committee report, Aug 2016) stopping short of removing the statutory duty, but taking account of a wider professionalization and subsequent rationalisation of the earlier debates, flaws and problems. The emphasis would be to focus on a broader public need to understand ‘radicalisation’ despite its academic ambivalence and training and counselling in more targeted ways being a possibility (Middle East Eye [online] Aug, 2016).
The evidence of a necessity to better train professionals can be seen in the potential impacts of the Prevent Duty on Local Authorities, Health, Education, the Police, Prisons and Probation Services. The Multi-Faith Centre at the University of Derby led a bespoke multi-agency training programme in the East Midlands for the last three years, called ‘Bringing Prevent to the Public Space’. The Centre worked with frontline staff across the sectors described above. That training reveals evidence from participants of professional needs to better understand the concepts associated with terrorism in all its forms and specifically far right extremism (a feature in the locality); to examine pathways towards terrorism, which is reflected in the lingua franca of ‘radicalisation’ and to better understand the mundane nature of everyday experience that influences individuals. Peter Neumann (2012 [online]) describes “the three common denominators that we know about [describing] how people radicalise [using] – grievances, ideology and mobilisation” and where each is influenced and influences the other. To deal with these influences requires a situational response from professionals; a response that by necessity, requires a deeper knowledge than can be provided by WRAP 3 training. Many of these professionals will be expected to support individuals and they may be called upon to make decisions based on their knowledge of safeguarding against radicalisation. In addition the community and voluntary sector are also raising questions about the significance of cohesion and how it fits with the implementation of Prevent?

These everyday and often mundane aspects of life create and shape our thinking, development and connectivity/interaction, with those to whom we feel we belong at a personal and collective level and with those we oppose and many layers of acceptance, tolerance and indifference along life’s journey. They include racism/discrimination, ideologies of politics/religion and belief, secularising society, disillusionment, disassociation, disadvantage, exclusion, belongingness identity and the vexed topic of radicalisation.
The idea of radicalisation is often challenged (Thomas, 2014, 2015, 2016). It may be seen as muddying the water between understanding terrorism and the pathways leading to and from terrorism. The topic of radicalisation is not made any easier as terrorism itself has over one hundred definitions and remains one of the most contested topics in the study of political violence. However, if you seek to remove radicalisation conceptually form the language that describes the process over time (short or long) the author can only describe that which does not clearly breach the Terrorism legislation as ‘non-terrorism’. This appears unhelpful if you are trying to make sense of any pre-emptive preventative model to avoid the ‘non-terrorist’ becoming the terrorist. As a complex process radicalisation is just as likely to be manifest in everyday conversation with your friend in the gym, as it is through social media, hate preachers or speakers on You Tube and elsewhere. Radicalisation assumes and can consume those who see grievance/injustice, ideology and a way to mobilise (Neumann, 2012) how they feel. Unfortunately, like the baking of a cake, unless you have made one before you may be unaware (as are the state it seems) of what order the ingredients are mixed in, and whether the outcome is a so-called ‘radicalised individual’, as there are no parameters outside the legal tests by which to make the judgement. Radicalisation in the UK and Europe is associated with norms and values, and is subject specific, socially charged and difficult to articulate. It is often framed in Europe as the “rejection of key dimensions of modern democratic culture that are at the centre of the European value system” (Rabasa and Benard, 2015:3). This definition is not far from the UK version in Prevent 2, and associated ideas of democracy, rules, liberty and tolerance.

Conclusion
The paper has examined the critical contemporary conversation, which frames civil liberties against the background of national security. More questions than answers are ever likely to be the case in exploring an emotive and sensitive area like the implementation of a counter-terrorism strategy that has no parallel or equivalent, and has only been in place for ten years (including the pilot phase).
It was developed as the risk and threat unfolded and there is no denying it is fraught with mistakes, many of which however were identified in the early period of Prevent 1. Unfortunately, in the context of accuracy and on the face of the academic evidence examined here, authors of that literature are still citing the issues from the period 2007-2011 as emblematic of Prevent 2, (2011-to date). Is there a reason for this? Perhaps media stories, and the mainly Muslim public’s concerns of the earlier period (well documented by academics and Parliamentary Committees and Reviews) continue to reinforce Prevent in the public perception as ‘a tainted brand’ as Thomas (2014) suggests?

It seems Prevent 2 is unlikely to be treated any differently to Prevent 1 by its critics, even though there appears to be limited evidence, outside of the qualitative studies of relatively small numbers of participants reinforcing some of the specific community concerns. The media impact however cannot be underestimated and changing perceptions of a tainted brand is not easy to do. The impact of Prevent on individuals is likely to be based on the way people feel as a consequence of perceptions created by a number influencing factors, including collective memory. It could be argued that based on wider perceptions of Prevent as securitised by the state, and the influence of negative messaging that it is unlikely to change the way people appear to feel about it, particularly in Muslim communities. That is not to say that the criticisms of Prevent are unfounded, rather the opposite is likely to be the case, given the weight of potential evidence. However it would certainly help in assessing Prevent today, for a wider study to assist with quantifying and qualifying the critique and concerns by bringing together the literature with a national survey of communities and professionals in a wider study of public opinion.

The significance of such a study has only one precedent, in a weighted random sample study of Muslim public opinion, commissioned by Channel 4 for a documentary “What British Muslims Really Think?” in April 2016, (presented by Trevor Phillips - former Equality and Human Rights Commission chair). The programme was seen as controversial by some
(see Plunkett in The Guardian, 21st April 2016) but not by others (Dellingpole, The Spectator, 14th April 2016). The programme was premised on a survey that reflects as close a form of Muslim representation as any recent study has been able to undertake, and has more detail than many others (ICM, [online] 2015). ICM Unlimited carried out the survey face-to-face, using Muslim researchers, polling during two periods in 2015. The results were more about integration than being security specific, but implicitly provided a more contented position for those British Muslims surveyed than much of the academic literature reviewed here attests too (see ‘What British Muslims Really Think’ Channel 4, 10pm Wednesday 13th April 2016 and ICM Unlimited [online] ‘C4/Juniper Survey of Muslims’ 2015). Methodologically the survey focused on a sampling frame that adopted areas where 20% of the population were Muslim and sought a representative random sample of 1008 participants, described thus:

ICM[s] analysis shows that there are 2,014 LSOAs [Lower Super Output Areas 4] with a penetration of at least 20% Muslim residents, and that these areas cover c.1.4 million Muslims – or 51% of Britain’s Muslim population.

Results can be seen in greater detail at ICM Unlimited [online]. The headlines however, reflected in The Guardian, (Perraudin, 2016 [online]) suggest British Muslims are more likely to feel a stronger connection to Britain than the population at large (86% said this); and 91% who took part said they felt a strong sense of belonging in their local area; additionally 88% of those surveyed said Britain was a good place for Muslims to live. On this basis the call for a more detailed community-focused attitudinal survey that addresses integration, security (including Prevent) and discrimination should be a future aspiration for a more nuanced understanding of who is speaking for who, when it comes to reporting Muslim opinions.

We should ask ourselves, is Prevent today (in 2016), different to how it was conceived and delivered in its early years (2007-2011), and what a

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4 Lower Super Output Areas are geographical areas covering between 400 and 1,200 households.
democratic society might expect of governance at the political and executive levels given the context of the current global position and the UK’s relationship to transnational and domestic terrorism, including domestic aggressive forms of nationalism (and occasional violence) that play out in far-right rhetoric? Should a policy that sits as one part of a four part counter-terrorism strategy address, or seek to address, the overlapping and intertwined societal issues associated with and inclusive of many everyday aspects of life, that impact on the life choices of individuals (outlined above), or are there better ideas out there?

We should not however shy away from the challenge to accurately assess public and professional feeling, beyond where we are currently and we should certainly find more opportunities for open debate in formal and informal education for both children/young people and adults, in what Thomas and Cantle (2015) and Thomas (2015, 2016) refer to as “non-stigmatising values led citizenship and anti-extremism educational projects”.

There are a number of areas that should be examined in more depth in future papers, not least - impacts in Health, Education - including the FE and HE sectors, and what position do Local Authorities currently find themselves in, when considering the tension between Prevent and local community cohesion. Where too are the Police in this conversation and what are they planning in the context of managing Prevent 2; are they about to withdraw or reduce their involvement or increase their response? Finally, how do Muslims in 2016 feel about Prevent, what personal experiences do they have of the strategy or wider counter-terrorism policy, how do they know what they know about Prevent, and what influences their thinking about it?

By assessing in detail these specific areas where Prevent is currently functioning we may draw closer to a policy implementation that might more closely resemble the realities on the ground. Research can seek to influence government to better understand that set of realities and consider how policy can better shape life for future generations, where openness and difficult discussions in all forms of
educative experience (formal, informal and public) are the norm.

References


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