6.1 Context: Overviews of CityC and CountyC

6.1.1 CityC Overview

CityC is an organisation of approximately 8,000 FTE (Full-Time Equivalent) employees, and is a unitary council which is described by Johnson and Scholes (2001: 112) as follows:

'Councils responsible for the full range of services in their areas are called 'unitary' councils. These 'unitary' councils usually serve metropolitan areas and conurbations (with populations of around 40,000 or more).'

This means CityC provides all local government services within its City boundaries. These include education, social services, highways and transportation, arts and cultural events, refuse collection and recycling, and parks.

Like all local councils, CityC is a democratic organisation with in its case 51 councillors representing 17 wards. Council members are elected for four year terms. Elections take place three years out of every four, when a third of the Council is elected. The next 'fallow' year with no election will be 2009.

Currently the Council is composed of 14 Conservative members, 1 Independent member, 17 Labour members and 19 Liberal Democrat members.

The Council operates a Leader/Cabinet style of government with appointments being made to these positions by Council. The Council's policy framework and budget are set by Council but all executive decisions are taken by or on behalf of Cabinet. The councillors meet as a full council around
every six weeks. A limited number of items of business, such as approving the level of council tax, must be considered by the full Council.

Individual planning and licensing decisions are non-executive matters and decisions are taken by separate committees of the Council.

CityC also has 'Overview and Scrutiny', which acts as a check and balance on the Council Cabinet. Overview and scrutiny is a relatively new political management process that enables elected Members of local authorities who are not in the Council Cabinet to review and scrutinise matters affecting their city. Its main purpose is to hold decision-makers to account, ask questions to which members of the public might want answers, and help improve services for the local people.

Following a Capita/I&DeA report in 2001 in which CityC were criticised for a lack of strategic planning, in 2003 the Council introduced its 'Building for Excellence' strategic change programme. The programme was reviewed in July 2006 and this 'Final 2.0' version of the strategy can be seen in Appendix 19. It was this 'Change Management Strategy' that began the Council’s formal relationship with 'Business Process Reengineering' (BPR).

### 6.1.2 CountyC Overview

CountyC is an organisation of approximately 23,000 FTE (Full-Time Equivalent; 38,000 employees overall), covering the whole of its county with the exception of the eponymous city, and they work with a second tier of local government – district and borough councils – to manage services for the community. There is also a network of elected parish and town councils, which often run most of the local services, such as community halls, cemeteries and allotments. In the 'City' there is no two-tier arrangement and all services within the city are run by one council – see above, 'CityC Overview'.
The key departments within CountyC are the Chief Executive's Office, Corporate Resources, Cultural and Community Services, Children and Younger Adults, Environmental Services, and Adult Social Services. Like all local councils, CountyC is a democratic organisation which in this case has its elections every four years with council members elected for four-year terms. The last election of CountyC Councillors took place in May 2005 and the next election will take place in May 2009.

Following the 2005 elections the Council is composed as follows: Labour seats – 38; Conservative seats – 15; Liberal Democrat seats – 10; and Independent seats – 1.

The Council operates a Leader/Cabinet style of government where the Cabinet agrees policy formulation across all services, sets targets and monitors the council's performance. It considers and decides on major organisational changes, recommends corporate and service plans to meetings of the full Council, monitors revenue and capital budgets, prepares budgets and reviews progress on major capital schemes and service developments. All Cabinet members meet regularly with appropriate Chief Officers to agree service area policy within the framework set by Cabinet. The full Council meets every six weeks to deal with major corporate policy issues.

There are also a number of committees who take decisions on separate aspects of business and these may advise the cabinet or full council where appropriate.

The cabinet is responsible for the overall business of the council and is subject to scrutiny in all it does through its four Improvement and Scrutiny Committees. Overview and scrutiny is a relatively new political management process that enables elected Members of local authorities who are not in the Council Cabinet to review and scrutinise matters affecting their city. Its main purpose is to hold decision-makers to account, ask questions to which
members of the public might want answers, and help improve services for the local people.

The council's own website states, 'We are committed to continuous improvement to the way we work and the services we provide,' yet it will be seen from this study that there was no evidence of this as a culture.

6.2 Stage 1 – Discovery/Exploratory

This first stage of data collection was to establish, in broad terms – through a variety of means – who was doing what, where and why they were doing it, and, to some degree, how they were approaching BPR/SRD. These included:

- access to documentation;
- interviews with Council Change Managers, Training & Development personnel and others;
- observation of meetings;
- participation in training events;
- questionnaires with project leaders.

6.2.1 CountyC

In CountyC's case an initial questionnaire (see Appendix 7) was used to gain an insight into the current, at that time (i.e. pre-BPR training), level of understanding of BPR and other change/quality mechanisms, why they were involved in the programme, and their perceptions as to why CountyC were adopting this method of (relatively) radical change. This was, on reflection, as much a learning opportunity for me as it was a data-gathering exercise, in that it provided some further insights into the pitfalls of inadequate questionnaire design (Saunders, et al., 2000). For example, 'claimed knowledge' of (e.g.) BPR, TQM, Benchmarking, etc., is not the same thing as 'knowledge', and there was no real opportunity (nor any actual requirement) to 'test' that knowledge. However, the exercise did provide a grounding for a pre-
understanding of the 2006 cohort of CountyC's Service Redesign (SRD) trainees.

In this case also, I was part of the teaching team on CountyC's initial BPR/Service Redesign (SRD) training programme (approved by CountyC in April 2004), from September to December 2004, and was scheduled again to repeat this from May to July 2006. Because of this a positive and co-operative relationship had already been established between myself and the UoD teaching team, and CountyC's training manager and Change Management Team (CMT – set up in 2001, as part of the Council's 'Putting People First' programme). Once the research had been authorised (by the Chief Executive, 4th May 2005) and commenced, it was agreed with CountyC that I would be granted 'access' to the 2006 cohort of (18) SRD trainees in order to carry out this research. I was also given similar access to all relevant (but not confidential) documentation within CountyC, and the primary liaison was to be via the Head of Change Management, and his HR manager.

One key item of this documentation was CountyC's Service Redesign/Project Management manual (Feb. 2004) – including the training documentation (prints of overhead transparencies – OHTs) on 'Module 1: Introduction to Process Mapping' – available to all employees via the council's intranet, and within which the council's apparent reluctance to use the term 'BPR' (or 'reengineering') was less than consistent. For example, on the OHT titled 'From Functional to Process View', it states quite clearly, 'Successful re-engineering requires a shift from function to process.' Also, later, under 'Process Mapping Survival Kit – Glossary of Terms', the definition for 'Business Process Re-engineering' is given verbatim as Hammer and Champy's (1993: 32):

"The fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical measures such as cost, quality, service and speed."
Further, and later in the same document, there was a page entitled 'Business Process Reengineering (BPR) – Consultancy Challenge Methodology', and its 'Introduction' used either term almost equally:

'As part of the Change Management Programme and Putting People First, departments are initiating a series of extensive service re-design (SRD) projects in order to improve services and access to those services, and take advantage of enabling projects.

Formal training in BPR and Visio is being provided through the Council's out-sourced training contract. Consultancy support will also be available to aid staff as they carry out SRD projects, and to transfer skills.

Consultancy support will also be required in a more formal challenge/review role. This will be required to ensure that the deliverables are as optimal as possible in terms of customer-focus, efficiency, re-engineering and service delivery.'

However – and this will be returned to later under Analysis – the Service Redesign Project Definition/Initiation documentation clearly focused the proposer's 'High-Level Objectives' on to three, key, 'Corporate Objectives':

- Improving Access;
- Seamless Services;
- Improving Services.

* Note: this was in line with the CountyCs' aim to 'exploit' its new website.

And, for example, under the first of those (above), the four individual 'Objectives' were:

1. % of services where 'Call [County]' is 1st point of contact
2. % of relevant services e-enabled by Dec. 2005 (BVPI 157)
3. % of enquiries resolved at 1st point of contact
4. % of services consistently provided across primary access channels
This appeared to indicate that any 'service redesigning' (i.e. projects) would be focused towards moving (and 'improving') 'access' to services into the County Council's new call centre.

In terms of 'efficiency, re-engineering and service delivery' (above), the Council's 'Performance Management' plan for '2005-2009' stated that it was expecting improvements in 'the efficiency of what we do' as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main measure</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>04/05</th>
<th>05/06</th>
<th>06/07</th>
<th>07/08</th>
<th>08/09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Efficiency gains through the year</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>£9.68M</td>
<td>£19.36M</td>
<td>£29.04M</td>
<td>tbc*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Target to be confirmed by central government.

It was from this information baseline that this research commenced within CountyC.

6.2.2 CityC

CityC's route towards undertaking Business Process Reengineering (BPR) can be summarised and calendarised as follows*:

1999 'Best Value' introduced:
   - Best Value Reviews
   - Best Value Performance Plans

2000 Best Value Reviews piloted:
   - EFQM Model used
   - 'Performance Plan' published

2001 Best Value Review Programme:
   - Eight Reviews per Year
   - Best Value Inspections Introduced

2002 Corporate Plan introduced:
• Vision, Priorities, Objectives
• Linked to Business Plans and 'Achievement & Development' plans

Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA):
• 'Good' Council
• Corporate Assessments/Service Assessments

2003 'Building for Excellence' (BfE) introduced, covering:
• Service Access
• Procurement
• People and Performance
• Accommodation
• e-[City's name] & Business Improvement
• ('Communication & Engagement' added in 2005)

2004 Service Access Review (SAR – 'Report to Cabinet'):
• Key Driver for Change
• Linked to most other Strategy Areas

CPA Re-Assessment
• 'Excellent' Council

Customer Service Strategy (CSS)

2005 Change Management:
• Change Management Team (CMT)
• Change Management Strategy

Business process Re-engineering:
• BPR Framework
• BPR Training
Improvement Programme
'[City name] Direct' (Call Centre)
CSS for Area & Neighbourhoods
CPA

2006 Corporate Restructure, plus:
- Change Management Toolkit
- Business Process Re-engineering
- Migration of Services into '[City] Direct' – 'Highways'
- Review of Building on Excellence (BoE)
  - Customer Service
  - Communication and Engagement
  - Procurement and Efficiency
  - Excellence and Learning
  - Organisational Performance
- Area and Neighbourhood Working
- Improved communication and engagement

2007 Building on Excellence (BoE) – delivering excellence
IDeA Peer Review – June
Corporate Assessment/Joint Area Review – October

2008 Responding to Corporate Assessment Findings
CPA replaced by 'CAA' (Comprehensive Area Assessments)

(* From a presentation by the Head of Change & Performance Management, February 2008)

Whilst the above shows events beyond the start of the research, it is primarily only an update of information that was available at the commencement in March 2005. Its usefulness is in showing some of the reporting regimes the Council has been subject to over the period (as have all others), their progress towards 'BPR' and beyond, and that 'BPR' made its first formal appearance in 2005, having been discussed in 2004. Evidence for this can
be found in a similar presentation (by the same person) in 2004, where the following appeared on one of the OHTs:

- Business Process Re-engineering:
  - Development of methodology
  - Integrate with current Best Value Toolkit

In late summer 2005 CityC engaged an external consulting group** to assist in building that 'BPR Framework' and carry out the initial training of what became informally known as the 'Pilot Group'.

(** Abbreviation 'MCS' to be used – as a generic 'Management Consulting Service'.)

Since my 'access' to CityC had been formally agreed since late 2004 (prior to my initial application), I was invited to attend various meetings between CityC's CMT and MCS, to observe the design approach, both by the consultants and the Council, and to be 'in at the start' of the process. This commenced with a 'BPR Training Set-up Meeting' on 16th August, 2005. Prior to that, in June 2005, a 'Chief Officer Group' (COG) document had indicated what would become a key driver in this approach to BPR: the document was entitled, 'Customer Contact Centre – Transfer of Front Line Services'. Para 7 of this document contained the statement:

'Each service area will be first subjected to a full business process re-engineering – BPR – review. This will be led by the new change management team (CMT) supported by external consultants who will work very closely with service department managers and staff.'

A 'Blueprint Workshop' then took place in September 2005, followed by a 'Review of the Draft BPR Toolkit' on 8th November, and a 'BPR Kick-Off Meeting' on 16th January 2006. As MCS moved on to their specific 'Highways' project these meetings were followed by an 'As-Is' meeting on 19th January, a 'Straw Man' meeting on 2nd February, and a 'To Be' meeting on 7th Feb. 2006.
Pilot Group training also took place early in 2006 and this cohort provided the basis for subsequent interviews, along with those with other senior managers and members of the CMT, plus two more from CityC's ALMO, 'City Homes'; 14 persons in all.

6.2.3 London Borough Council

In 2006 additional access was gained with a London Borough Council (LBC), following their presentation at a GovNet conference (June 26th) on their successes with BPR – interview with Council Leader and Director of Customer and Corporate Services on 28th July 2006. This was followed up only in terms of their later published outcomes.

6.2.4 Summary

By 2005 the two key organisations had formally embarked upon their own BPR/SRD-type change initiatives, as part of their wider change management programmes, and largely driven by central Government's need for financial savings and the 'e-Government' (contact centre) agenda. Both had begun to train cohorts of potential change-project leaders, who at that time in both organisations were expected, or expecting, to become involved in BPR-type change projects as a result.

6.3 Stage 2 – Projects – Analysis & Findings

Having established in Stage 1, in broad terms, who was doing what, where and why they were doing it, and to some degree, how they were approaching BPR, there followed a period of in-depth interviews with the participants of the respective BPR/SRD programmes in both LGOs.

In each case (Council), this stage continued until sufficient data was deemed to have been gathered; the indication of this being that 'no new information (was) forthcoming' (Lincoln & Guba, 1985: 202) from the projects/interviews. These in-depth interviews were all audio-recorded, then transcribed verbatim.
prior to review, correction and amendment, and full analysis using both the audio recordings and printed transcripts.

In CountyC; following the UoD-provided BPR (SRD) Training (May-July 2006) and the submission of the individual participants' 'Learning Through Work' (LTW) projects, interviews were held during Dec. 2006 and through to March 2007 with the bulk of the course participants (12 of 18), to provide additional feedback on those projects, and question them more deeply on their progress to date. I then moved on to broader and deeper issues surrounding SRD within their organisation, including the 'readiness' of the Council to embrace change at this more radical end of the Kaizen-BPR spectrum. The questions/interview structure focused on the CSF and key themes from the literature reviewed and research to date (see Appendices 8 & 9 for examples of semi-structured interview aide memoirs).

At CityC; following the cancellation of the second and third tranches of their planned BPR training, in-depth interviews commenced with senior CityC managers (Change Management, Training, Director/Chief Officer Group level), focusing on similar areas of their understanding of BPR, leadership issues, and again the 'readiness' of the Council to embrace change at this more radical end of the Kaizen-BPR spectrum. I then interviewed members of their 'Pilot Group' of BPR trainees from middle manager and non-manager levels (see Appendices 8 & 9 for examples of semi-structured interview aide memoirs).

'City Homes': A later opportunity arose regarding City Homes – a CityC 'Arms-Length Management Organisation' (ALMO) created to manage, maintain and improve its council houses and estates – where I was invited to a presentation on a 'process-based' change initiative, Thursday, 7th Dec., 2006. This opportunity was followed by others within this ALMO; e.g. to assist a BPR training day on 17th May 2007, subsequent observational involvement, and the chance to interview two participants.
6.4 Analysis Process Review Meeting

In December 2007 a full-day Analysis Process Review meeting was held to consider the interview analysis to date and distil the major themes. The team present at this session, apart from myself, were the Director of Studies, the Second Supervisor, and a mature and very experienced Senior Lecturer, who had also recently become a fellow 'PhD student' as he was embarking (Jan' 2008) upon a study of 'Lean (Systems) Thinking', which has considerable synergies with BPR itself.

By then (Dec' 2007), each of the transcripts from the in-depth interviews with participants from both LGOs had been listened to again, twice, to further improve the accuracy and completeness of the transcripts, and to allow the researcher to gain more familiarity with each interview. These had then been considered thematically, using those key a priori themes from the literature, and allowing also, posteriori, the emergence of others through case analysis.

On the day, the discussion covered Nigel King's (1994) work on template analysis (Cassell & Symon, 1994: 14-36), and since this had effectively been achieved by the 'themed cards' completed from each interview, these were used as the source material for the subsequent discussion. It was also agreed to stick to the original 'staged' structure of the write-up, as per Methodology section 5.12, Data Presentation, p. 221.

The original 'template' was discussed at length and an exercise then undertaken to validate this analysis using a large 'whiteboard'. All members took one or two transcripts each and checked these through, and found majority agreement with the researcher's (my) own themes, the highlighted sections and extracted quotations. There were, understandably, some very occasional additions, but generally there was agreement, giving credibility to the process to date. The key 'themes' were captured on the whiteboard, whence a distillation process reduced these to the significant groupings which would become the basis of this Stage 2 analysis/write-up. These 'groupings'
were captured photographically (see Appendix 13), as follows (sub-themes in no particular order):

1. BPR/SRD: Definition(s); Understanding; 'Degrees'; 'Readiness'

2. Case for Action/Drivers: Gershon; Costs/Savings; 'Top-down'; Call-Centre; Legislation; Customers/Stakeholders; Failing processes; Efficiencies (BVPs); Solution-driven; Competition; Customer Service

3. Leadership: Examples (+ve & –ve); Communication; SMT Commitment

4. Change: Strategic Links/Vision; Change Management issues – Attitudes, Behaviours, Culture; Resistance and Fear (DREC); 'Deep' Change

5. Context & Culture: Public Sector; Local Government (LGO); (the) 'City Way'; Cultural 'drag' & 'baggage'; Structure & Organisation; Hierarchy; Teamwork; Constraints; Unions; '4-Star' Council

These 'sub-themes' provide the order and structure for the analysis to follow.

6.5 Analysis 1: BPR/SRD

6.5.1 BPR – Understanding (Definitions), and its Implementation

The first of the a priori 'sub-themes' to be examined from within the outputs of these interviews was '(The) concept of BPR – its 'Understanding' (in terms of definitions) and its 'Implementation', and it was noted that there was 'no shortage of 'guidance' on how to approach BPR' in the literature. However, even though it is relevant that this 'guidance' was inconsistent and varied, it is not the key issue. The overall aim of this research is: 'to investigate the experiences and perceptions of Local Government practitioners whilst introducing BPR', and the key issue therefore is whether or not any such
'guidance' was sought, assimilated and adhered to by these LGOs whilst learning about, planning and implementing BPR.

This overall aim is supported by the primary research objectives:

- to identify and critically evaluate empirical research evidence on BPR, with particular emphasis on practice in the public sector; and,
- to investigate the adoption of BPR within the range of change management practices in two selected local authorities;

As has been stated previously, the conclusions from much of the literature, were that 'senior managers failed to adequately understand the implications of undertaking fully a BPR-type intervention, in terms of their required involvement and commitment, that their roles and organisational structures might be challenged, and even their very existence?' (see Lit. Rev., 'The concept of BPR – its 'Understanding' and its Implementation', p. 79). This has been largely supported by the research with an almost hierarchical inversely-proportional range of understanding, with apparently more accurate perceptions of BPR and its implications being evident amongst those closer to the BPR work-face and who had been through the training, than those further away, or who hadn't.

Early in each interview all participants were asked to provide their own definition of BPR by completing the sentence – 'BPR (Business Process Re-engineering) is defined as...'. These were subsequently tabulated – see Appendices 14 & 15 – and the candidates were then asked to draw out any 'key words' from those personal definitions, without which this 'thing' would not qualify as 'BPR'. It was stressed that this was 'not a test', although some saw an element of that as they tried to recall previous definitions from training sessions.

As might be expected, no 'definition' matched the one provided by Hammer and Champy (1993: 32), and few of the 'key words' even approximated to the
four emphasised by those protagonists (ibid: 32-36): 'fundamental', 'radical', 'processes', and 'dramatic'. Where, however, Hammer and Champy emphasised 'processes' as the 'most important' word in their definition (ibid: 35), 3 respondents from CountyC and 5 from CityC included this in their own choices (see Appendices 16 & 17 for 'Key Words' tables), albeit that this word was a 'given' in the first part of the sentence. The only other occurrence of one of those 'four' was 'radical', from a CountyC respondent, as shown below.

Nonetheless, whilst no one definition approximated to the original from Hammer and Champy, nor exhibited those key words, many did indicate a reasonable understanding of the principles involved, as the following examples from CountyC, CityC and CityHomes, respectively, will show:

**CountyC:**
'BPR (Business Process Re-engineering) is defined as...

- ...radical redesign of methods and ways of working to continually improve process and practice.
- ...stripping down a business process and rebuilding it from scratch to achieve the results that are required.
- ...the process of moving an organisation from its current state or position to another desired state, ensuring the change aligned to the vision, aims and mission of the organisation.
- ...taking an as-is process, breaking down all the functions with 'operational' staff and then looking at potential efficiency gain, to produce a re-defined process ensuring full support & buy-in from senior managers & operational staff.

**CityC:**
'BPR (Business Process Re-engineering) is defined as...

- ...redesigning how people and resources are organised to achieve better or improved results that align with the organisation's strategic intent or mission.
• ...a structured review of processes with a view to delivering service improvement & efficiency.

• ...a structured methodology to assist in 'mapping' where the business/service is now, to help assist in 'mapping' where ideally we want to be i.e. more effective/efficient service.

• ...unravelling existing processes within an organisation and developing new more efficient ways to undertake the tasks.

• ...changing processes, structures and (possibly) personnel to ensure we meet customer needs in an efficient and flexible way.

**CityHomes:**

'BPR (Business Process Re-engineering) is defined as...'

• ... rethinking what & why we do what we do, & the way we carry out our day jobs.

As previously stated, these and the remainder can be found in Appendices 14 & 15.

Certain key words, above, can be recognized – 'continually improve'; 'stripping down ... and rebuilding'; 'taking and as-is process...(etc.)' – but there is confusion and inconsistency, suggesting very wide and different approaches to implementation and lack of understanding of BPR/SRD. Some of this almost inevitably relates to the degree to which senior management have defined, been committed to and communicated 'BPR' throughout their respective organisations, and aspects of this will unavoidably overlap with another key theme – 'Reengineering Leadership and Communication' – to be covered later.

More revealing than the definitions above, however, are extracts from the fuller interview transcripts around the combined areas of 'understanding' and 'implementation' of BPR, including abuse or misuse of the term, examples (positive and negative) of which are given below:
County C:

- 'It's the – it's just the confusion – the confusion of – because I mean, that's one of the problems with BPR in organisations, why sometimes it gets a bad name and it – people perhaps don't pay it as much attention because it's not clearly defined what it is.' (FW)

- 'I think, the problem is that it's BPR that's got the bad name. ... BPR has traditionally, if you like, been known as, sort of, down-sizing, loss of jobs and that kind of stuff. It doesn't necessarily mean that – well, that's the sort of – a lot – the view people have of it, you know. That's what it conjures up in the mind.' (FW)

- 'And it can – it can be an outcome, but it has also been used quite a lot to deliver that outcome [e.g. 'downsizing']. ' (FW)

This 'confusion', somewhat surprisingly, was not helped by the Head of CMT's comment that BPR (or SRD) itself was not, in his view, 'radical'. When asked specifically, 'Do you see it as radical change?', he responded:

- 'No. Radical change to me means, outsourcing.' (HD/HoS/CMT)

Instead of seeing BPR at the extreme (or radical) end of a spectrum of approaches to change, his way of defining it was:

- 'I think we're talking about the whole range of stuff. I think we are; because, a lot of the redesigns, are, badged as redesigns, are very very tiny things really...' (HD/HoS/CMT)

This was in stark contrast to the view of his deemed 'No. 2', who, when asked if 'this thing called BPR (was) radical change, or is it, something else?' had responded quite clearly:

- 'For me, it's radical change.' (CS/CMT)
And, to be clear, when this person was asked to confirm that when using the term 'service redesign' (SRD) he was also referring to 'BPR', his answer was unequivocal:

- 'Yes.' (CS/CMT)

He was equally clear that this 'radicalness' covered 'all potential options':

- 'I would say no we ... identify all potential options, even if there's some subsequently that are ruled out for various reasons – whether that's finance, political reasons, economic reasons in terms of the county – but we identify the options.' (CS/CMT)

Similarly, his understanding of Hammer's (1990) 'Don't pave the cow paths' point was evident with:

- '...don't drop a, good system in on top of bad processes.' (CS/CMT)

(NB These two people had worked closely together for – and sat opposite each other for most of – the previous 5 years.)

When asked how 'convinced' he was of how well he really understood BPR, one CountyC candidate responded quite honestly:

- 'I'm not convinced I really do. I understand the logic of certain elements of it.' (MP/LM1-2)

There was also at least one example in CountyC of positive 'Redesign' where the word 'radical' came out, along with apparently quantifiable benefits:

- 'So I suspect it is probably quite a radical – radical Service Redesign and they're also, now doing a very radical Service Redesign for, transactions, personnel transactions, which is really going. They're looking at saving anything up to 150 jobs.' (M-E/LMs1-2)
CityC:

With an example of the thematic 'overlap' mentioned above, one 'Head of Service' (HoS) commented that BPR was just 'too hard':

- 'Because it's too hard, but we got it wrong. What we should have been doing and this comes back to the training bits, but it comes back to senior management commitment, is getting together managers and saying, "We require you, to fundamentally review your service and see how it can be improved. The council has decided this is the methodology. There's your training. I'd like you to go on your training, talk to your team, come back to me, as your, your boss and agree with, agree with this plan by which this is going to happen, and when you're going to make your recommendations." Then we'd have had lots of people coming on the training, because managers would have been told, to learn a methodology, to use it, to report upon it and then take some action. And that's never -- that's never happened.' (EM/HoS)

This same participant (HoS), however, whilst disclaiming any actual depth of knowledge of BPR, clearly understood the need to not be 'constrained' by the past ways:

- '...why would you bother mapping it out if you – if you then don't want to be constrained, by the existing, map? I don't know. As you'll find out, I don't actually know a lot about BPR.' (EM/HoS)

...yet actually showing a more implicit understanding for a 'clean sheet' or 'clean slate' (Hammer, 1990; Hammer & Champy, 1993; Linden, 1993; Davenport, 1995) type of approach, with:

- 'I wasn't very happy with my definition by the way as, though I could, start again, but I mean, it's missing something about it -- it's missing the concept of, the remapping process being similar to a blank sheet of paper type of thing or forget, the constraint to start off with at these. Forget the constraints and the, the resources and the disposition of resources you have now and map it as it, should be if you had started from the beginning.' (EM/HoS)
This 'blank sheet' approach – at least in terms of understanding the concept, if not actually applying it – was echoed by an SMT member:

- If it was radical, we would be starting with a blank piece of paper and designing our structures around the customers, whereas we don't. ...from a council point of view, I think BPR implies transformation. (YH/SMT)

This, however, was clarified with:

- 'I don't really feel that in councils that we're big on transformational change. I think we talk about transformational change, so for me, what we're trying to do in the council, under the label of transformation, is Process Redesign, not radical business design. ... I don't think we do transformational change. I think we do incremental step changes that will eventually, if it's done consistently and, with an open mind, will lead to transformation, but it will take step change.' (YH/SMT)

Note here that whilst 'step' for many equates to 'transformational' change, in this case the context was 'incremental steps', or, 'step-by-step'. This person nonetheless perceived that what they were doing was 'BPR', and when questioned further gave 'City Direct' (the contact centre) as the 'purest' example, reinforcing this point with:

- '... it's trying to get, across the council, that when you're looking at the whole of your process, and you're reengineering the whole of your process, it is the end-to-end process that; you've not got this front and back office, and to -- to reengineer, you need to look at everything.' (YH/SMT)

However, whilst acknowledging we were dealing with perceptions, this respondent admitted to having had 'very few' conversations where it was clear that managers 'up and around' SMT/Chief Officer levels 'really understood' what 'end-to-end process reengineering' might mean, in terms of 'dramatic' change. Her own understanding of the need to design processes 'around the customer' was shown by the comment below, echoing also Seddon's (2007) view that 'structure is subordinate to process':

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'...instead of designing it around our organisational structures, [design the process] around what is real for the customer and that happens to you, me, everybody.' (YH/SMT)

A different CityC candidate (AP, HoS), was openly encouraged by the approach taken in the training for people to 'open' their minds to new ways of working:

- 'It was discussed in so much as; people were on the course were asked to embrace the idea of improving the service and, whatever that service might be and to try and almost stand back from it so, if this were to affect you, to try, and, not be too protective but to allow, some, real clear thinking and some, some openness to take over and, if there was a better way of doing it allow that to come out of the process, and not to stifle it.' (AP/HoS)

He commented positively on that need to 'stand back' and allow that 'real clear thinking' to underpin the improvement process:

- 'I don't think that that's something that we do. We never stop and have a look at exactly how things are done. We tend to make assumptions about how we think it's done, and then try and change it, so what we're actually trying to change isn't what, actually exists, and that for me was a very good point that came across in the course.' (AP/HoS)

A fellow course participant (BS) was also asked if there had been any 'expectation', following the BPR training, that delegates would then go away and seek out potential projects for 'reengineering', and it appeared there was no such expectation:

- '...not really, no I didn't think there was an expectation you would. No.' (BS/LM1-2)

And, whilst she had begun to apply the techniques locally at the request of her own HoS (see para' below – 'HJ'), there was not a Council-wide (or even cohort-wide) expectation to apply the techniques that had been taught:
'Only if — if the need arose for them to do it, then I think people would hope that, you know, people that were on the training would actually be able to use it if the need arose, but, if it didn't, then you know, they could — they could've learnt that two years ago and never actually have to apply it.' (BS/LM1-2)

This issue will be returned to later, under 'Drivers', but it also impacts upon the questions of leadership and commitment, given that training was commenced, but not then utilised, and subsequently cancelled through what the council called 'lack of demand'.

Unlike others — as will be seen elsewhere — 'BS' personally opined that senior management, however, did have a good understanding of the concept and implications of BPR:

- '...all the people that were involved with [line manager/HoS] and higher than [him], um, you know, I'm certain that they have a good awareness of what BPR is all about.' (BS/LM1-2)

(However, all of those 'higher people' could have simply been the change managers themselves, who came in for considerable praise.)

And, continuing that positive vein, BS spoke very highly of the two CityC Change Managers who had facilitated the [Highways Dep't] BPR exercise, and particularly of their own 'understanding':

- 'I think there's a, a very good understanding, particularly, I keep referring to [two names] — but to me I just think they are fantastic. I thought they were fantastic change managers.' (BS/LM1-2)

In truth, it might have been unfortunate were this not the case, as they had been recruited specifically for this purpose in late 2005.

Yet another CityC HoS (HJ) — although one who was actively involved in the external consultant-led, Highways Dep't, BPR initiative — was openly modest about what he perceived as his only basic understanding of BPR: 'I think I
would have said, I would have had the rudiments,...'. He was equally honest on the issue of why 'BPR' had been selected by CityC as one of their approaches to change, or perhaps, the lack of real clarity on the reasons for that decision and how they had, or rather had not, been communicated out:

- 'To be honest, John, that was never exp... – that was never explained to me.' ... 'I was led to believe that others were using it as well,' ... 'and there was an inference that, the private sector have used it with success and other councils are – are using it, and that's what we're going to use.' (HJ/HoS)

A participant who had been indirectly affected by, and therefore involved in, the same [Highways Dep't] BPR exercise was very clear about the process-wide scope of the concept:

- '...my minimum criteria would be that for it to be BPR, it would have to be, process-wide, not a component of the process.' (GJ/LM1-2)

Another CityC participant (SM), who had also been involved in the Highways Dep't exercise, hinted at a deeper understanding of the 'fundamental' nature of the change(s):

- 'I mean obviously the [Highways Dep't] example is – was – is a radical, change, I mean people, people's way of working was just totally different.' (SM/LM1-2)

She also showed a similar level of inspired enthusiasm as candidate 'AP', above, following the training, to dip her tentative toe in the waters of process improvement:

- '...what I was thinking for myself putting things into practice was that, maybe I could look at things that are just of significance to me, my processes and tasks, and sort of if you like get my L-plates on and have a look and think about, well you know, what can I do differently,...' (SM/LM1-2)

However, when asked where she thought BPR had 'come from', her answer was equally uncertain on this issue as that of her HoS:
...but on the issue of BPR as an 'enabler' — given adequate leadership from 'senior management' — she seemed personally quite clear as to its potential:

- 'If we had the opportunity, or the drive from the senior management team to do that, then it is ultimately... '...then, yes I think there would be some great savings to be made and I think it would be a really good opportunity...' (SM/LM1-2)

The most senior interviewee on CityC (Chief Officer Group), 'DP', was very clear on the 'quick and dirty' potential for early wins from BPR:

- 'I think a 'quick and dirty' examination and quick implementation of the solutions to get the thing moving, to a full-scale, business [analysis]...' (DP/SMT)

The necessity for strategic linking of BPR initiatives was understood by one CountyC participant, as evinced by:

- 'And to me it's about — BPR is about how you get from where you are, to a position of being able to deliver that vision.' (F-W/CMT)

...and this will be returned to later also.

The political (or organisational) sensitivity to the term 'BPR' per se was also an issue in CountyC, the larger of the two organisations, and this was confirmed to the training team personally in October 2004 by the Head of Change Management when, at one of our training sessions, he told us they preferred to use the term 'Service Redesign' (SRD), instead of 'Business Process Reengineering' (BPR), because the 'unions' would be less likely to object. This euphemistic sanitisation of BPR — perhaps the need to remove the 'rhetoric' (Jackson, 1996), or even 'violent rhetoric' (Grint and Case, 1998) — was further evinced by comments from interviewees:
"...to have brought that in saying, "Right, we're going to do BPR," to the organisation probably would have, you know, got a lot of people up in arms. The unions would have been saying, you know, across our dead bodies and all that kind of stuff, so the Service Redesign was a softer – it sounds softer, doesn't it, even when we say it here? It sounds a lot softer..." (F-W/CMT)

An example of 'cynicism' and 'false SRD' was brought out by one CountyC interviewee and in order to retain the context, the whole extract is shown below:

RT: There – perhaps the only other thing is, there seems to be a lot of talk about implementing a system and then doing Service Redesign, so for instance the – when SMS was going to happen, the idea was that we'd install it, and then we'd do a Service Redesign on how to use it. And the same with [product name] which is – I know you've heard of before. Stick it in and then we'll see how to, make it work, in the best possible way.

JC: Do you think that's, the right way around?

RT: No, not at all. I think lots of – in IT that happens a lot. People stick, solutions in and then try and make it work, rather than, identify, what's going on. So often you don't even need to buy anything or put anything in, in my experience. But it – there seems to be here that mentality of, "We'll buy it. We'll stick it in because then we'll have done something. And everyone will go 'ooh, great, there's a bit of activity,' and then we'll do a Service Redesign on it." I've heard that said several times.

JC: Would I be being too cynical then if I were to say, "Here's the solution. Let's implement it and then see what the problem was?"

RT: Yeah.

JC: Is that – am I being too cynical?

RT: That's not – no, you're not being too cynical. That's exactly what's been, articulated more than once.

JC: In different words?
This same participant, when questioned more closely as to the actual 'process' being used for her particular unit's improvement project (e.g. Six Sigma's 'DMAIC' process?), commented quite openly that there '...wasn't any, Service Redesign being used, in the — in the sense that you're saying,' and this was reinforced more potently with the revelation:

- 'But in the context of how it's written it, it's, to me, feels like, like it's made up, if you know what I mean? I know that's not very — and yeah, it's like it's been made up. The figures have been, twisted and, squashed and squished to, support, what somebody else wants, rather than it being, an objective look at how things work, and how things might be better.' (RT/Non-Mgr)

6.5.1.1 Summary

The evidence above on the concept of BPR, its 'understanding' (in terms of definitions) and its 'implementation', suggests considerable variation within and across both organisations, what Sotirakou and Zeppou (2004) called 'definitional inconsistencies'. The relevance of the examples may not be immediately apparent, but all these interviewees came across as conscientious people, not only willing but seemingly keen to talk openly and apparently honestly. Blanchard (1989) suggested that, "All people come to work wanting to have a good day. It's our job [management/leadership] to show them what a 'good day' looks like." And that is one of the key issues here; no-one appeared to know — or consistently know — what BPR 'looked
like. All those interviewed appeared capable of that understanding, in fact most had received some form of brief training (some of which UoD had delivered), yet, apart from a few individuals who might have been more closely involved with the respective LGOs' Change Management Teams (CMT) and their more high-profile projects (both involving call centres in some form), there was little evidence of any drive or communication from senior levels – whence that sponsorship, commitment and enthusiasm could reasonably be expected to emerge and be maintained – to provide any clarity as to what this 'thing' BPR is.

There was evidence of reasonable understanding of general principles, including some of the mechanics, but there was no evidence that any real 'guidance' about what this thing called BPR really was, nor any of consistent understanding across the board. Similarly therefore, nor was there any evidence of any action to maintain a consistent flow of positive communication throughout its implementation. There was some understanding that BPR implied 'transformation', but a resigned acceptance that 'councils' don't do that.

As will also be seen below and later, under 'Organisational Readiness' and 'Reengineering Leadership and Communication', there was clear evidence to suggest that some of those more senior people did not fully understand the concept of, nor potential implications for, undertaking BPR (in fact, a low understanding at SMT level), and you can no more communicate something you do not fully understand, than you can be fully committed to something you wouldn't want to do if you did.

6.5.2 BPR – 'Organisational Readiness', and 'Degrees' of BPR

The second set of the a priori 'sub-themes' to be examined from within the outputs of these interviews were the concepts of (Organisational) 'Readiness' (Hammer & Stanton, 1995a), and whether there might be 'Degrees' of BPR?
The thematic 'overlap' mentioned earlier will be apparent in this section, for example, where 'cultural' or 'contextual' issues could equally well be categorised within 'Organisational Readiness'.

The second item of documentation the participants were asked to complete was the Hammer & Stanton (1995: 86-88) 'Self-Assessment Diagnostic' — see Appendix 11 — and in its opening section, on 'Reengineering Leadership', they were each asked to state which 'leader' they had in mind whilst completing those first six answers. According to Hammer and Stanton, the 'minimum numbers' for each statement are those that they 'believe an organization should score before tackling reengineering – that is, prior to launching the effort'. No-one, in either of the organisations studied, had come across this or any other such pre-reengineering 'diagnostic' tool, yet a number of the participants commented after its completion that it would have been useful to carry out such an exercise prior to them embarking on their own reengineering efforts, e.g:

CountyC:

- 'you've got to be brutally honest, with yourself, when you're – you're doing these things. ...something like this'd certainly be useful. ... It would be useful.' (CA/LM1-2)

- 'I think they're very good. They're very good questions.' (MP/LM1-2)

CityC:

- 'Very thought-provoking.' (AP/HoS)

- '...that was quite illuminating though. It told me a lot of things that I vaguely knew but in a more coherent manner about why it's not working.' (EM/HoS)

- 'I wonder ... whether an organisation which is, committed to BPR, and which is sort of eighteen months down the road..., I suppose I'm thinking that it's a bit odd that it's not actually been done within the organisation already. ... I suppose I might have
expected something like that to have come around before now. The questions are all very relevant questions.' (HJ/HoS)

- 'I think it's interesting, you sort of realise, where your organisation lies as you're going through. You sort of realise, that, the actual, leadership isn't the problem, it's the – it's more around the, readiness of the organisation and, implementing it.' (SM/LM1-2)

**City Homes:**

- 'I think what would be a good way of doing it is if you gave it them, a questionnaire, the senior management team, the questionnaire before they start something, and then the same sort of questionnaire afterwards to see if they've changed, to see – to gain whether they really are ready for radical change or not. ... The questions are relevant.' (PB/LM1-2)

And perhaps more significantly:

- 'I think one of your challenging questions is, 'The entire senior management team shares the leader's enthusiasm for reengineering.' I think getting the whole of the senior management team on board would be a challenge?' (PB/LM1-2)

Table 6.1 (overleaf) shows the three 'section' totals from CityC, CityHomes and CountyC, together with the 'recommended minimum scores' (HSRS) from Hammer and Stanton (1995a: 89), whilst Table 6.2 (p. 258) shows the complete individual and combined results. An important point stressed by Hammer and Stanton is to note 'that the minimum recommended section score is larger than the sum of the minimum statement scores,' and that in their view this is because 'mere adequacy in each category is not enough to guarantee success; overall strength is what is needed' (ibid).

Another important point to be made here is that this is not, first, a 'statistical' study. The intended use of this 'Diagnostic' device is primarily twofold; a) to see if any such device had been either considered and/or used by either main organisation, and b) to explore its use and gain the participating organisations' respondents' responses to each of the twenty statements in relation to their own organisations and/or projects.
Table 6.1: Hammer & Stanton's (1995a) 'Self-Assessment Diagnostic',
Section Totals for CityC, City Homes & CountyC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation:</th>
<th>CityC (CMT)</th>
<th>CityC ('Pilot Group')</th>
<th>CityC (City Homes)</th>
<th>Overall CityC (Av'es)</th>
<th>CountyC</th>
<th>Averages</th>
<th>H&amp;S Rec'd Min' Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Reengineering Leadership</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Organizational Readiness</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Style of Implementation</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, whilst no 'causality' can be implied, some general observations might still be made from the results obtained, and these are supported elsewhere in this analysis:

- In each of the three sections, CountyC scored higher than CityC's 'overall' average, and this was more pronounced in section 2, 'Organizational Readiness'. One reason for both of these points might be that CountyC has been embarked upon formal training in Service Redesign (SRD) for at least the past four years (2004-2008), whence approximately 100 participants were formally trained, followed by at least an expectation that they would be either involved in, or commencing themselves, SRD projects. In contrast, CityC has carried out no further BPR training since its 'Pilot Group' in 2006, and none of those participants appear to have embarked upon any individual projects.

- In each section, the overall average scores for the combined organisations fall short of H&S's 'recommended minimum scores', with CountyC being closer than CityC in each section.

- CityC's 'Pilot Group' had a generally more positive view than CityC overall, notwithstanding CityHomes' (CityC's ALMO) higher score in
section 2, 'Organizational Readiness'. There were only two respondents from CityHomes, but they had very positive views about their own Change Managers and the 'willingness' of the staff themselves to embrace the change process after their UoD-delivered BPR training day, as the following two extracts show:

1. 'I think they showed it in the day. They went along with it. I think after it was explained to them, staff went along with it and I think they genuinely realised that there are duplications in the work they're doing in and this - they've got a new system coming in and this is an ideal opportunity. With one of the senior officers, retiring, this was an ideal opportunity... This is an ideal opportunity to look at what we're doing and -- and make it better.' (PB/LM1-2)

2. JC: But I need to come back to this question, please. Are the staff up for it? When you say the staff are up for change you know they were energised by that day because a) something's going to happen. A lot of this stuff that doesn't make sense, we can redesign it, change it, stop doing some of it, but that means next week I might have a different job. Are they up for it to that extent?

PB: I think so.

SH: I believe they -- yeah.

JC: So there's an enthusiasm even if they may be retrained and relearn and work out of -- in an -- or gain a new comfort zone, step out of the one they're in. You think the staff are up for that?

PB: I think so.

- The Pilot Group's higher score on 'Reengineering Leadership' is also interesting because, of the five respondents, only two were thinking of the same 'Leader' (CityC's Director of Finance), with the other three each thinking of an entirely different person. Perhaps, again, it might be because this one small group had been directly involved in the BPR
training, potentially influencing their views more positively of the organisation's various 'Leaders'.

Table 6.2: 'Organisational Readiness' Questionnaire – Combined

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>'Reengineering Leadership' Statements:</th>
<th>CityC (CMT)</th>
<th>CityC ('Pilot Group')</th>
<th>City Homes</th>
<th>CityC (Total)</th>
<th>CountyC</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>H&amp;S Rec'd Scores:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The leader of reengineering is a senior executive who is strongly committed to reengineering and who possesses the title and authority necessary to institute fundamental change.</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The reengineering leader truly understands the nature of reengineering and the magnitude of the change—organisational change in particular—that it entails.</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The reengineering leader has a vision he or she wishes to create and is able to express that vision clearly and simply in operational terms.</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The reengineering leader is ready and able to exercise leadership—through communications, personal behaviour, and systems of measurement and reward—in order to make reengineering succeed.</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The reengineering leader is prepared to commit both the organisational resources and personal attention that reengineering requires.</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The entire senior management team shares the leader's enthusiasm for reengineering.</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals: 17 | 22.4 | 17.5 | 19.3 | 20.3 | 19.8 | 24

258
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No:</th>
<th>Organisation: 'Self-Assessment Diagnostic' Statements:</th>
<th>CityC (CMT)</th>
<th>CityC ('Pilot Group')</th>
<th>City Homes</th>
<th>CityC (Total)</th>
<th>CountyC</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>H&amp;S Rec'd Scores:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The organisation as a whole recognises the need for reengineering and fundamental change.</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The organisation understands the nature of reengineering, including the fact that it results in multidimensional change that impacts processes, jobs, organisational structure, management responsibilities, etc.</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The organisation believes that the reengineering leader and the senior management team are truly committed to reengineering, and that this commitment will be long-lasting.</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The organisation has none of the complacency and arrogance that often follow a sustained period of success.</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>The organisation is free of the scepticism, mistrust, and ambivalence that often follow a program of downsizing or restructuring.</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The organisation has the financial and human resources needed to implement reengineering.</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Key staff organisations — human resources, finance, and information systems — are positive about the prospect of reengineering and capable of innovative response to its demands.</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>The organisation's experience with total quality management (TQM) has created an environment that is receptive to reengineering.</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It will be noted from the above that CityC's Pilot Group (having been through the BPR training) were more positive about their organisation's
'Reengineering Leadership', whereas they were less positive about the 'Readiness' of the organisation as a whole.

Both this group and the two CityHomes respondents were more positive regarding 'Style of Implementation', and whilst it is not clear why this might have been, by then (early 2007) both units had been exposed to their respective change managers, who in both parts of the organisation had come in for considerable praise, as the example below shows:

- '...it was handled fantastically. I haven't got a bad word to say about (the two change managers), they're just amazing. The way they steer people... and I thought they managed it fantastically.' (BS/LM1-2)

The charts overleaf show the results graphically for each council, along with the H&S 'Recommended' scores.
Apart from question 2, these results were all below the H&S 'Recommended Scores' (HSRS). Question 2 – 'The reengineering leader truly understands... etc.' – was skewed by two scores of '5', but both of these were where the 'leader' in question was either the line manager (HoS) of 'Highways', or one of the two change managers, who both came in for significant praise during interviews. Of the five scores at '4', four of those were the Finance Director (DP), and one, again, was a combination of the HoS 'Highways' and the same change manager. The lower scores were when the 'leader' was seen as someone less 'in touch' with the proceedings.

Organizational Readiness:

These results show a mixture of results depending, again, on the perspective of the interviewee. However, both councils' overall results were below the HSRS level, although – on average – CountyC was a clear half-mark above CityC on this theme.
Style of Implementation:

With one marginal exception, both councils were well below the HSRS levels on 'style of implementation', and on the overall average. In this area CountyC were noticeably no better than CityC, and the reason for this is the somewhat equal levels of praise that both councils' CMTs came in for. As a lesson itself, this lends support to other change management literature on such factors as (e.g.) communication and involvement.

Theme Totals:

* Themes:
  1. Reengineering Leadership
  2. Organizational Readiness
  3. Style of Implementation
Overall, both councils were short of the sum of minimum H&S total of '70' – CityC (55); CountyC (61) – although Hammer and Stanton (1995) make it clear that a total of '75' should be targeted, as, they say, 'mere adequacy in each category is not enough to guarantee success; overall strength is what is needed' (p. 89).

Perhaps reflecting the comment of the CityC respondent who suggested that, for them, reengineering was just 'too hard', Hammer and Stanton (ibid: 90) said:

"If you think these minimum scores are somewhat high and even intimidating, you are right. We never said it would be easy. The entrance requirements for reengineering are stiff."

In CountyC's case, the HoS/CMT cited one particular, but potentially very large, project as an example, perhaps, of the 'hardness' of this 'readiness' issue:

- "I was never, upset that that project, hasn't gone any faster than it has gone. Because I don't think the organisation is yet ready for it." (HD/HoS/CMT)

But he was equally clear that, in his view, one day they would be:

- "I think, eventually it will happen. It'll definitely happen. ... It will still go ahead." (HD/HoS/CMT)

His point was that it was not the project itself, but what he saw as the 'big cultural shift' that was required, and was pragmatic about the time it would take:

- "I knew it was going to take us a couple of years, to get into people's heads that there's a new, there's a new sheriff in town, there's a new way of working." (HD/HoS/CMT)
6.5.2.1 Summary

In terms purely of 'Organizational Readiness', CityHomes was the only unit that scored higher than Hammer and Stanton's (H&S) 'recommended minimum'. However, it must be remembered that in this case there were only two respondents.

Overall the average total score was well below the H&S 'recommended minimum', with the CountyC total scoring relatively higher than CityC's average total. This does not prove the validity of H&S' 'Self-Assessment Diagnostic', but the views of these organisations' participants were positive in this respect; many, for example, seeing it as 'very useful', 'relevant', 'thought-provoking'.

Combining the above outcomes with later stages of this analysis indicates that carrying out such a 'diagnostic' exercise, prior to embarking upon a major change initiative, followed then also by some of H&S' suggestions for improving those scores that fall short of their 'recommended' level, has the potential for increasing an organisation's likelihood of success in the change project.

6.5.3 'Degrees' of BPR

The term 'degrees' is here being used in the sense of a 'spectrum' of change 'radicalness' (Kettinger, et al., 1997), from kaizen or incremental change at one end, to BPR or radical change at the other. As stated in the Literature Review (p. 108), further weight was added to the concept of 'degrees', or this 'spectrum', by Hall, et al. (1993: 121), who stated:

'At one end of the spectrum were companies that redesigned the narrowest processes, usually a single activity within a single function, such as accounts-payable processes. Middle-of-the-road projects reengineered intrafunctional or cross-functional processes, such as new product development processes. And at the far end were companies that
redesigned one or more processes that comprised most of the critical activities in the business unit.  

Similarly, as previously, Chow-Chua and Goh (2000: 225) suggested quite firmly that 'BPR should complement TQM and is definitely not an alternative'; concluding their case with, 'BPR and CI should be viewed as complementary approaches, albeit at two different extremes of the change continuum,' and Al-Mashari & Zairi (2000: 31) said that 'BPR can be implemented at different scopes or levels,' suggesting that Chow-Chua and Goh's 'change continuum' represents a spectrum of initiatives that could range from CI at one end, to BPR at the other, and cover a number of 'different scopes or levels' in between.

This was pursued with a number of participants as opportunities emerged in the discussions. For example, one CountyC respondent openly talked of 'light, medium or deep service redesign', commenting that one particular initiative:

- '...will require deep service redesign because, at the moment it could be going across four departments to do each part of the chain and we're wanting to do it all.' (BH/LM1-2)

Also, from the same person:

- 'Light redesign would be us saying, "Well, okay, you know, let's look at what this service is about. Why are we transferring these people? What do you actually tell them when they get through? How can we break that down into, perhaps, six or seven common questions that we could easily have a script for here and answer them? So that's a little bit of service – light service redesign." (BH/LM1-2)

There are clear resonances here with Kettinger et al's (1997) 'Process Improvement' – 'Process Redesign' – 'Radical Reengineering' spectrum in increasing 'degrees' of what they term 'radicalness'.
The same person also commented on how this might change as the initiative began, in what others might call 'scope creep':

- 'Yeah, which is why I think even though some of the stuff on there only says light service redesign when we actually bring people in here and we sit down and start, you know, going over how we'll handle the calls for them, it very quickly develops into something more than it started out.' (BH/LM1-2)

Another CountyC participant, when discussing one particular project, commented:

- 'I think that what I've just described fits that exactly. It fits in the middle. In the middle of the spectrum.' (CA/LM1-2)

Someone else, perhaps again echoing Kettinger, said:

- 'My service redesign, in the scheme of things, wasn't hugely radical, I don't think. But in my role here, it has made a huge improvement' (PJ/LM1-2);

and later commented:

- Now, open and honest, I don't see this as too radical. ...as you say, it's not a huge, radical thing. It's not like going to change the world. It was just changing a process that made things a little easier for everybody. And it has done it. It has worked.' (PJ/LM1-2)

Another, commenting on CountyC's more modest initiatives, said:

- '...they're not the big hitters, so to speak, so they don't deliver the massive savings or the real, sort of visible – they don't have a massive visible impact.' (F-W/CMT)

Similar views emerged from CityC's participants. One, who had been directly involved in the Highways Dep't exercise, said quite clearly when asked to 'rate' the change:
"Well, really I would say ten ... because it's been radical change. The BPR process we went through has been a radical change.' (BS/LM1-2)

A Director-level participant (DP) said, 'I don't think there is one form of business process reengineering', whilst another at HoS level (EM) said, apparently quite scathingly:

- 'There was no decision to radically change anything. There's a lot of lip service going on here.' (EM/HoS)

A more lengthy response came from one of the change managers:

FB: Specifically in the change management strategy, there are four types of change explained, one of which is radical, one of which is evolutionary and incremental and it spells out that we're going for incremental.

JC: So that almost suggests that you're not going to be doing BPR then?

FB: Well, I'm not entirely certain I agree with the underlying premise that BPR is only radical change.

JC: Right. Okay. Why would you not agree with that?

FB: I think it could be change across a spectrum.

KC: Yes.

FB: It doesn't have to be completely radical. It could be incremental.

...then adding:

- 'If you are using the textual definition of BPR to be radical, then we are not using BPR in that way here.' (FB/CMT)

In a later interview the other change manager pursued this further with:
'I think that—from my perception, the council had been through a series of best-value reviews, probably not touching all of the council, but it probably got to the point where they realised that that slow—that was, going to be, a slow pace of change which wasn't going to, perhaps, meet the targets that they had....and wanted to see something more radical. I don't think they're really doing BPR. I don't think they're really doing anything particularly radical, they're perhaps somewhere in between.'

(KC/CMT)

Notwithstanding the desire not to 'lead' the questioning, when I asked their views on the possibility of this concept of 'degrees', they were unequivocally positive:

- '...different people, have, or had, their own opinion on what constituted BPR. So some would have a sort of like a very light approach to it and at the end of the day as long as the outcome was achieved, that's sufficient. Some people probably adopted a more sort of, more in-depth approach to it which is to say, "Right. If we're going to change it anyway, let's look at the whole shebang". ' (GJ/LM1-2)

He later clarified this with:

- 'They could look at the whole process, but adopt a—either a light or an in-depth approach...';

...then adding the qualifier:

- '...if you are only adopting a light approach end-to-end, then it's not BPR as I would understand it.' (GJ/LM1-2)
This same member of staff had been indirectly involved in the Highways Dep't BPR project, and when asked how 'radical' this had been, on a 'scale of 1 to 10', he replied:

- 'I would say, for the most part, it has been radical for the council. So it wouldn't — so if I was going to give it a score, I would err towards six or seven.' (GJ/LM1-2)

When he was then asked to hypothetically reposition this particular change within a private sector context, his 'radicalness score' was lowered to 'three or four.'

When the Head of Change Management was asked a similar question, regarding the possibility of such a range, he too confirmed this view:

- 'Probably, because I can't see us fundamentally doing everything as much as we did with [Highways Dep't].' (SG/HoS/CMT)

6.5.3.1 Summary

The public sector and, more specifically, local government perspectives are important here when reflecting on the research's overall aim of investigating the 'perceptions of Local Government practitioners whilst introducing BPR,' and its 'particular emphasis on practice in the public sector.' The results above make it quite clear that the public sector and, more specifically, the 'Local Government' contexts play a significant part in the 'perceptions' of those 'practitioners' interviewed. Rightly or wrongly — and as with 'Understanding', above — 'BPR' means different things to different people.

There was an acceptance of the concept of a 'spectrum' of approaches to change management, and generally that BPR was at the more radical end of that spectrum. On a scale of 1 to 10, BPR (or 'radical' SRD) would probably be 7+ to 10.
This possibility of 'degrees' of BPR might assist such organisations and their 'practitioners' to position their proposed, albeit semi-radical, change initiatives at a more attainable location on such a scale, and was pursued further in the data collection and analysis, using primarily Kettinger, et al's (1997) 'Project Radicalness Planning Worksheet'. The 'scale' in this worksheet is '1 to 5', and, as will be seen later, that the one council (of the two) that was more actively pursuing SRD projects, still only rated an overall average score that indicated not 'Radical Reengineering', but a much more modest level, or degree, of 'Process Redesign'.

6.6 Analysis 2: Case for Action/Drivers

This section will cover the 'case for action' – what Hammer and Champy (1993: 149 & 2001: 154) called the 'compelling argument for change'. It is what Hammer & Stanton said, 'lays out the business climate in simple, understandable terms and shows why the company must change,' and that, 'this argument must be clearly presented and passionately argued' (1995: 93/94; their emphasis).

In this context, it will consider such proffered driving factors as the 'Gershon' review; Costs/Savings; 'Top-down'; Call-Centre; Legislation; Customers and Stakeholders; Failing processes; Efficiencies (BVPs); Solution-driven; Competition; and Customer Service.

'Driver', in the context of BPR, means that 'dramatically persuasive argument, supported by evidence, that spells out the cost of doing anything short of reengineering' (ibid: 149). In other words, what was it that 'drove' these two organisations to opt for 'BPR' as a key part of their change management strategies? Both of the facilitating organisations had stated very clearly their intention to use 'BPR' (or 'SRD'), so what was their 'compelling argument' underpinning this decision? Why did they choose BPR?

For example, in CityC's 21-page 'Change Management Strategy' (2006), the terms 're-engineering' and/or 'BPR' are mentioned 13 times (plus 5 more in its
'Action Plan'). The first of their Strategy's nine bullet-pointed 'objectives' is, 'A compelling vision for action' – a clear hybrid of Hammer and Champy's (2001: 154) 'two essential messages,' what they called, first, 'a "case for action" and the second a "vision statement"'; – and CityC's third 'objective' is, 'Re-engineering processes to deliver efficient and effective services.' On that same page 'BPR' is defined as: 'the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to bring about dramatic improvements in the performance of services' (p. 14) – which is almost verbatim the Hammer and Champy (1993/2001) definition – but they don't say which 'services', why, or by how much. (NB Somewhat surprisingly the author of that Strategy document admitted he could not remember where he'd got that definition from: 'Oh, it probably came from a textbook somewhere."

Later, in the same document, as part of CityC's 'Infrastructure alignment,' they state also, and equally unequivocally, that:

- 'BPR and the use of technology will be key elements of helping the Council achieve the savings required as part of the Gershon efficiency agenda as well.'

It should be remembered that as part of Sir Peter Gershon's (2004) 'Efficiency Review,' the term 'efficiency' meant, or at least included, 'Releasing resources to the front line' (Chapter 2, p. 1/14), and its 'Overview' ('Stability, Security and Opportunity for All') 'sets targets and allocates resources up to 2007-08 in support of this objective.' These 'targets' included 'delivering over £20 billion a year of efficiencies across the public sector by 2007-08, a gross reduction of over 84,000 civil service posts and the relocation of 20,000 others out of London and the South East' (Chapter 1, p. 1/12). Nowhere in Sir Peter's 66-page report does he, for instance, differentiate between 'efficiency' and effectiveness' in any definitive sense. In fact he rarely uses the word 'effectiveness' without 'efficiency' also being in the same sentence. The most common differentiation is represented by, "Efficiency is doing things right; effectiveness is doing the right things," (widely attributed to the late Peter Drucker), but what Gershon does do, though, is to emphasise that these
proposed 'efficiencies' are likely to be gained through increased 'effectiveness', which is probably close enough.

Clearly, however, and as stated above, by '2007-08' — the fiscal year just ended — these 'objectives' should have been 'delivered.'

Separating out the organisations in this section will enable some clarity within the various categories of 'cases for action' and 'drivers', and the examples below will show some of the respondents' views from each Council, starting with the larger of the two, when they were each asked why 'BPR' was chosen.

6.6.1 Drivers for CountyC

6.6.1.1 Costs/Savings

This respondent (contact centre manager) was involved with one other person in a joint project entitled, 'The Redesign of the Advisory Booking Service', and was clear about 'cost' being its 'main driver':

- 'the main driver of this initially was that that department needed to save £20,000... I think, being honest, what initially drove this project is the need to save money in that department'; (BH/LM1-2)

and later:

- 'The problem they've got now is that the funding has gradually reduced and they knew it was going to be — it is going to be reducing by another £20,000 over the next few years. (JC: So that's why you were undertaking this?) That's the reason. Yes.' (BH/LM1-2)

The Head of CMT was able to reinforce this with details of the current financial year's cost-saving requirements:

- '...our budget this year, 2008/09 budget, is based on saving, something like £7.3 million — in efficiency gains;' (HD/HoS/CMT)
...commenting also on the corporate-wide nature of this 'responsibility':

- '...it is a corporate responsibility to make these savings, to deliver this programme, to improve what we do.' (HD/HoS/CMT)

The contact centre manager (BH), above, mentioned also a number of other drivers; for example; Competition; Legislation ('e-Government'); and Solution-driven approaches (e.g. their Call-Centre).

6.6.1.2 Competition

- '...there's been, a slight change, about because what the central government have now said is, well, anybody can put these courses on. It doesn't have to be your local authority, so now they're trying to fight against external private sector providers. Now they've got to sell themselves. They've actually got to market [CountyC's] Advisory Service.' (BH/LM1-2)

One further project team commented on how 'competition' was playing a greater part in driving action for change. In their case the project was to redesign the process of document 'searches', and primarily those requested by outside individuals or organisations because of the income source this provided, and competition was causing that income to fall:

- '...the net effect is a cash cow. However, over recent years, the graph – the graph for that income is steadily going down. It's being eroded because of something called personal search companies. Now, personal search companies are private companies that are allowed to deliver this service. ... their [each individual authority's] main driver is to stem the flow of the loss of income and there – and by improving their service, and therefore try and get the income back up again.' (F-W/CMT)

6.6.1.3 'e-Government'

- 'I think a lot of it was back because of e-government, people saying, well, central government saying, "We've got to be able to deliver these services electronically. We want authorities to give people easy access to services".' (BH/LM1-2)
6.6.1.4 Contact Centre-driven

Mentioned already, above, the then Head of Change Management reflected that CountyC's early reasoning for needing major process improvements was the 'use of technology', which specifically related to their recently introduced website and call centre:

- 'What we were doing back in 2004, was trying to exploit really what was the best way to use the technology. We were very keen to exploit a new website, a call centre, and all those sorts of things, and one of the things we thought we'd have to do was redesign everything we did, to get the benefit out of these things.' (HD/HoS/CMT)

What this did emphasise, however, and in antithesis to BPR's key principles, was that the 'call centre' came before the 'redesign'. He was asked specifically where the 'idea of a call centre' had 'come from', responding:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HD: Um... I think Chief Exec' and somebody went to Liverpool Direct...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JC: So you, you visited Liverpool Direct and you thought this is a good idea, let's have one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HD: That sounds like a good idea – we ought to try it. And we tried it and we had 6 seats to start off with.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The contact centre manager reinforced this view with:

- '...that's what prompted, improvements in the website and considerations by local authorities to have things like a contact centre. I was predominantly brought in to work with service redesign teams and to get more business into the contact centre. I was more the person who was, to go out and, encourage departments to let go of what they had traditionally done and to get it into the contact centre.' (BH/LM1-2)

Finally, however, this respondent commented on how projects had, albeit gradually, gained momentum and scale, and by showing evidence of the comment made above, provides a clear example of where they are 'releasing (more) people to the front-line' (i.e. her Contact Centre's 'front-line'):
...the departments themselves have said, "Actually, we had an 'other' category in there and we've been analysing that 'other' and we've now broke it down into another, six, areas which we'd like you to help with" (BH/LMI-2);

...so whilst this might not initially have been articulated as a 'driver', it was an example of an outcome which, however modest in its scale, did contribute towards a 'Gershon' objective.

The relevance of all the above as part of a range of 'cases for action', but perhaps especially the 'e-Government' agenda, was evinced by an item in The TIMES (2008: Feb. 19, p. 23), under the heading, 'Public sector reforms 'just the start":

'WESTMINSTER  Making GPs open surgeries at evening and weekends is "only the beginning" of necessary changes to the public sector, a minister will say today (Francis Elliott writes). Public workers must get used to offering services whenever people want them, Pat McFadden, who heads Labour's policy-making body, is to say.

"If government is really to deliver services which suit the public, there will have to be a lot more extended opening hours and weekend access than there is at present," according to the Business Minister. "Too often the public experience of accessing public service is to take time out to fit around how the service operates. It should be the other way round."

Mr McFadden, Tony Blair's former political secretary, will warn Labour it must develop policies that satisfy consumers grown used to accessing services on demand, often over the internet. In a clear call that Gordon Brown should campaign on policies to promote choice and competition in public services at the next election, he says Labour should embrace the "empowerment" technological change offers.'

Another respondent (CA), however, was quite clear as to his personal motivation for doing his own SRD project, saying; 'I'm desperate to get this piece of work finished... to actually get something concrete out of it,' yet with almost prescient accuracy regarding the McFadden comment above, added:

- 'It's about seizing on a technology because we recognise, that that was a means to deliver what we wanted.'
However, the 'driver' for this particular initiative perhaps falls more appropriately into the realm of 'Failing processes and Efficiencies', as he was equally clear that:

- 'the original need was a weakness that was pointed out in the way that we were, processing our information results';

and therefore that:

- 'much of the drive, for this was by myself and my colleague... Because we really recognised that there was a need to do this and picked [it] up and, and went with it.' (CA/LM1-2)

However, there was not all-round agreement that the 'e-ifying' of CountyC's systems was fundamentally changing anything for the better. One respondent commented, rather cynically, that the Call Centre was merely a 'veneer', albeit the real driving force:

- There's, e-ifying or whatever. And all we end up doing is adding another layer, to it. So we've not actually redesigned anything. We've just, added something else to it, if you know what I mean. It's the concept of having a call centre, might be – might be a shift in emphasis, so there's a little bit of redesign there, but the problem is the systems they look at, they can only – they can't really look at them. There's no – all it is, is a veneer, on top of the organisation that somebody can ring, and get access to any service.' (DC/LM1-2)

The Head of CMT was asked specifically to comment on this same point:

| JC: Is the call centre adding value or is it merely a 'veneer' between the customer and back office departments? |
| HD: Adding value, definitely. |

(He then proceeded to give an example of that value-add – see Appendix 18)

However, 'veneer' or not, both Councils were doing it.
6.6.1.5 Efficiencies/Gershon

One CountyC SRD grouping was very clear about the need to make 'savings':

- '...we were originally set up because of the Gershon efficiency savings that needed to be made within this department. ... So we've had a list of schemes, or a list of areas of work where we were asked to start looking at the current service and were there any ways of trimming it down making it work better, making it more efficient, et cetera, with the aim of making the savings, for Gershon.' (M-E/LMs1-2)

However, whilst Gershon (2004) was undoubtedly a 'Spending Review', the focus on required improvements in public services was made equally clear:

'The Government is committed to maximising efficiency within the public sector and reducing administration costs while continuing its ambitious programme of public service reform and delivery. Greater efficiency will enable the Government to release significant extra resources for front-line services such as schools and hospitals and deliver further improvements in the performance of the whole public sector' (Chapter 2, 'Efficiency').

Yet how this was being interpreted within (e.g.) CountyC was not perceived in the same way by this particular SRD team, moving the driver firmly back towards 'costs' and 'savings':

- '...we are moving away slightly from Gershon now because all – in the early days it was "Gershon savings, Gershon savings." It was thrust upon us all the time. It wasn't really about improvements. It was – it wasn't about diminishing the level of service, but it certainly wasn't about improving it either, it was about at least maintaining it at the level it was at, but making savings.' (M-E/LMs1-2)
6.6.1.6 Failing Processes

Whilst failing processes were not specifically identified as a reason for BPR's adoption within CountyC, their then Head of Change Management (recently promoted to Director of Transformation) saw it as a positive facilitator of change:

- '...it's the bit round the opportunity, and I suppose what I'm really saying there is, it's, the organisation saying we want to have a look at this, and it's worthwhile. ...I think BPR as far as I'm concerned gives us that opportunity to review. (HD/HoS/CMT)

6.6.1.7 Top-down

This small team (M-E, above) later emphasised, however, that those 'savings' were not gains made from SRD projects but, to again quote Mr McFadden, it was the 'other way round' - the need for 'savings' was the driver - as the following exchange indicates:

| JC: He's saying to you, "Do this,"? |
|---|---|
| ET: Yes. |
| MS: Yeah, based on the fact that he's already identified within that Gershon saving, "I need to save £300,000 here. So, go away and show me." |
| ET: And we have to then go away and try and do something to make those savings. |
| JC: So you've been given a project, the main driver of which is an arbitrary amount of savings within a specific area? |
| ET: Yes. |
| MS: Plucked out of the air. |
| ET: Yes. |
| JC: Is there even within that instruction to make those savings, there is no, problem...
As far as 'reengineering' is concerned, this apparently target-driven approach was not that recommended by Champy (1996: 35) when he emphasised:

'Reengineering, we remember, should be done from the outside in. We first ask, "What business results do we want in the market?"; then we ask, "What changes in our core work and management processes must we make to effect those results?"

Seddon (2007a: OHT 6) concurred that a Systems (or Process) Thinking approach is 'Outside-in,' and exactly the opposite to 'Top-down' (what he also calls 'Command and Control') thinking.

A combination of 'Top-down' and 'Contact Centre-driven' reasons was also provided by a further interviewee with:

- Yeah, it was basically the, assistant director of [department] that wanted that service taking into [the Call Centre], so he approached the change management team and I got the project. Yes, the Assistant Chief Exec', the Director of [department] made that decision.' (HS/LM1-2)

She clarified this by adding that the unit was already 'delivering a high-class service,' and that it was, 'a bit of a shock, really, to hear that they wanted it attempted to go into [the Call Centre].' She said it was going to be:

- '...a challenge to get it into [the Call Centre] to, continue to deliver that good quality service that a parent had received' ... because they (the project team), 'went in and saw that actually they've delivered a pretty damn good service.' (HS/LM1-2)

This suggests that in this instance there was no other 'case for action' than the top-down directive, but this same respondent, however, did state that this one was 'probably a one-off,' and that 'normally' her projects are:
"...usually services that have 'always done it this way' and, they need to be made more efficient and to get, into the 21st century with technology.'

As an example, she described a 'social services project' where multiple customer visits were part of the 'case for action' — in other words; 'failing processes', 'efficiencies' and 'customer service' — and that this project was:

- '...more complex because the information flows be... — go between the customer to the County Council, to the architects, and then to the District Councils and I found that you'd got about four different people going out to inspect the work at the end of it and all four of those were meeting the customer, and you — you know.... [JC: The customer thinks, "What's going off here?]" The customer's thinking, "Another appointment? You know, I've already had the environmental health inspector last week. Why do you need to...?". (HS/LM1-2)

In this case the driver was more clearly related to improvements.

Another interviewee implied a similar arbitrary connection between 'top-down' and 'costs/savings' as BPR's 'case for action,' when she said:

- 'Because it is, something that, we've been set a lump sum to save, it has to be broken down into areas where we can actually save it';

adding later the possible link between these savings, as the driver, and the importance also of BVP (Best Value Performance) and CPA (Comprehensive Performance Assessment) ratings:

- '...at the moment, I think it's, everybody wants change, as in savings, and that's the only change people are viewing at the moment... Gershon is one of them. Capping as such on, council tax, increases, so we're also, as a council seen as — or we are, one of the top five in the country and we want to stay there. And that is, about efficiency.' (PJ/LM1-2)

The potential conflict between some of these issues — 'improvements' and 'customer service' vs 'costs/savings' — was highlighted by a further contributor who said that, initially:
• "...it seemed as though the driver was to improve the users' experience and that—
that term was bandied about a lot... but as time's gone by it's been—it seems to
have changed massively from not being about the users at all to being about saving
money. And that—I think that's, confused a lot of people." (RT/Non-Mgr)

6.6.1.8 Solution-driven

This same employee then commented on how, after their preparatory work on
process improvement, she alleged that her manager had then 'imposed' a
solution, and for reasons that were not made clear to her:

• "... and that business case was going quite well. It was—it looked at, how things work
now, how things might work better, and it wasn't about a specific product, and then
suddenly [line manager's name] came along and went, "I want you to change—
change all of that and make it about a product that I want to get in which is Microsoft's
SMS." ... 'and then, he stepped in at the last minute and said, "I want you to change
that document and make it an advocate of SMS." (RT/Non-Mgr)

She said that this made little sense because they already had adequate
resources, if only they were used differently and more effectively:

• "...we've got most of what we need here already, it just needs to be, used in a
different way or, let's have some best practices in. I don't know why he stepped in
and said, "I want to buy SMS." (RT/Non-Mgr)

The suggestion that the 'solution' had been 'imposed' became clearer in the
subsequent dialogue:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JC: What did your fellow team members say to that?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TR: Everybody felt the same way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC: That...?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT: That SMS was the wrong way to go.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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JC: So six team members felt that that wasn't the best solution coming out of this...

RT: Yeah.

JC: ...project, this investigation, into the remote management of hardware and software?

RT: Yeah.

JC: But the project's sponsor, [line manager's name], was saying, "No, I disagree, I think, Microsoft SMS is the way to go and change the document to show that."

RT: Yeah.

JC: You're saying that?

RT: Yep.

(Note: for reasons of confidentiality, requested by the interviewee, this has not been 'triangulated' with the manager concerned.)

6.6.1.9 Legislation/New ways of working (i.e. partnerships)

With this same team Government pressure was also part of the range of forces driving action for change, and they saw this as an accumulation:

- '...it's a culmination, really, things like Gershon, things like the [October 2006] white paper telling us we've got to be more collaborative, we've got to make more savings. The only way we can make more savings now, is to work jointly, deliver more with less. The only way we can deliver more with less is joining up.' (F-W/CMT)

6.6.2 Drivers for CityC

CityC were at a different stage to CountyC on their approach to BPR, and training for BPR-type change, as it appeared to have arisen through a more emergent than strategic route. One such 'route' was from Environmental Health and Pest Control, through Revenues and Benefits (Rev's & Ben's) and Council Tax, and thence to the Highways Dep't, with a possibly incremental
scaling-up of their approach to BPR, increasing the scope each time as they learnt lessons from the previous exercise.

6.6.2.1 Failing Processes

With CityC the issue of 'failing processes' was at the forefront of some respondents' perceptions of their 'case for action,' as one identified:

- 'I think the way that we've targeted it is, those processes that are believed to be failing... in some way... that would be the driver for it.' (AP/HoS)

A more senior interviewee confirmed this further with:

- 'The driver for the, the [Highways Dep't] portion was that yes, it was acknowledged that the service was failing, in its customer contact component,' [and] 'I don't think if, if [Highways Dep't] wasn't broke I wouldn't pick that as a first service.' (DP/SMT)

He commented also that whereas (e.g.) Liverpool had taken a more 'hard-edged line' regarding the across-the-board implementation of their call-centre, CityC had adopted a more 'democratic' approach:

- 'We've tried - tried to do it through, persuasion and volunteers but also prioritisation of services that most could benefit from it' [and that] 'was the driver for why we based it around that [Rev's & Ben's].' (DP/SMT)

'Failing' or not, according to one SMT respondent elected members were also being 'persuaded' by their constituents that something needed to be done:

- 'Members were complaining because they were, in their surgeries, they were getting lots of complaints from customers. They were highlighting it to the senior management team who were, "Right, let's, move the problem," but what happened was... let's move the service, into [City'] Direct.' (YH/SMT)

However, on reflection this same person admitted:
• "What probably should have happened a step before that was some review of the processes while it, whilst it was where it was;" (YH/SMT)

...so the service might not have moved into 'City Direct' at all.

6.6.2.2 Competition/Customer Service Improvements

The same senior manager, above – citing an example from his 'previous authority' – acknowledged the additional 'case for action' with LGOs from the pressure for improvements in service brought about by 'competition' from outside providers:

• '...it was brought upon by the fact that the client for the service was seeing this sort of service emerging, in the private sector you know, in relating to building firms moving in that... Well, the driver was the fear of not being able to provide a competitive customer-led service, you know, in the future.' (DP/SMT)

6.6.2.3 e-Government

There was some lack of certainty where the drive to adopt BPR had originated, but the author of CityC's Change Management Strategy suggested a possible link with the 'e-Government' agenda with:

• '...from what I can recall, it probably came about because we were in discussions with Capita at that time about how they could support us in the implementing the contact centre, and they probably were advising – because certainly we had some failed attempts with [external consultant] to set up the BPR framework, so I would say that's probably where it came about from.' (SG/HoS/CMT)

He then linked this to the implementation of CityC's own 'contact centre':

• 'I'm trying to actually remember whether BPR was one of the recommendations that came out of the Service Access Review. There were plenty of recommendations in there, and I think one of them may have been that we, as part of customer service initiative, we would use business process reengineering* to, reengineer services into the contact centre. I'm sure that's the way it came about.' (SG/HoS/CMT)
* NB CityC's 'Service Access Review' does in fact state: 'It is thought that some business process re-engineering will be needed to achieve these goals' (2003, p. 35).

He went on to quote from the same 'Service Access Review' (SAR, 'Report to Cabinet', 2004) which stated:

- 'There is an urgent need for business process reengineering specialists within the council, and the work proposed under the Building for Excellence Programme should proceed as soon as possible. This needs to be closely linked to the government's modernisation and e-government targets and will be an integral part of delivering the council's vision for improved service access to customers' (p. 94, R25).

Following on from this SAR was CityC's Customer Service Strategy (CSS, 2006), which on p. 11 states:

- 'Changing our current processes will be the single biggest and far-reaching project of this Strategy. Business Process Re-engineering will provide the means by which processes are transformed in line with requirements in order to deliver services in new ways that meet customers' needs. Any financial savings arising from this change will be used to improve front line customer service' (CSS: 11);

...ending with a clear reference back to Gershon.

This fairly clearly demonstrates the intended link between making the required 'Gershon' savings and meeting one of the report's other objectives, that of 'releasing resources to the front-line'. However, when pressed on the actual origin of the decision to use 'BPR' as one of their 'strategic' options, the Head of Change Management admitted:

- 'Well it came from a variety of things and to an extent, if you go back a year or two years it was flavour of the month. Best value was out in a – in a way of reviewing services, but we still had to have a mechanism for review – reviewing services for improvement and our big – our big push was around the contact centre and to a sense still is, and BPR was seen as the – what we needed to go back to that basics of back-office processes, you know, we're going to take – we're not taking the rubbish that's being delivered out in some services there and bringing it in – of rubbish into
the centre. We're going to completely do it from scratch, review it, right back to fundamentals, if you like, and then bring it in.' (SG/HoS/CMT)

This 'big push ... around the contact centre' was something that would emerge time and again with CityC respondents, as one SMT member confirmed:

- '[City'] Direct, was definitely a recommendation to improve service access for the council, for customers to the council.' (YH/SMT)

6.6.2.4 Contact Centre-driven

As hinted above, and similarly with CountyC, the inception of CityC's contact centre ('City Direct') was perceived by many to be a key driver for their BPR initiatives:

- 'I mean, to me the whole Business Process Reengineering, came up because of City Direct'; (BS/LM1-2)

...reinforced with:

- '...they were given the project of, look, "We're going to have our contact centre and this is what we need bringing into it." So [the change managers] were then sent out to the various sections, to see what we did and how it was going to fit into the, concept of City Direct.' (BS/LM1-2)

This need to move services into City Direct was emphasised by a Highways Dep't manager who had been through that BPR exercise:

- '...basically everybody, that's got a frontline service, a hot line as we call it, will have to go through a reengineering process and move their first point of call out to City Direct.' (SM/LM1-2)

She also linked this, however, back to the need for 'efficiencies' and 'savings' which, Gershon or otherwise, were most probably central Government-driven:
...the thing behind it is efficiencies, needing to make efficiencies, and it's deemed that, the contact centre, is the best way for the organisation and for the public. I mean savings in -- I guess ultimately it'd be savings in -- in staff numbers. ...we're having to make, 10% cuts over the next three years. ... the government under (the) Gershon. ... we've had to hold our vacancies for the last year and the posts will be deleted. We're losing posts within our group.' (SM/LM1-2)

Her final comment after being asked:

- 'Are you losing people within your division because, you have become more efficient? Or are you losing people because you've got to make budget cuts?' (JC);

...hinted at the way some of these possible arbitrary 'cuts' might actually be acting in opposition to one of Gershon's objectives of 'releasing resources to the front-line':

- 'I think we're losing people because we're having to make budget cuts because we could do with more people, really, to provide a better service.' (SM/LM1-2)

6.6.2.5 Costs/Savings

Overall budget costs and savings appeared to be one of CityC's key drivers for the adoption of BPR (within its Change Management Strategy), as the Head of Change Management confirmed:

- '...one of the key drivers for change is now the fact that we have all been set a budget, we have all got to save 10% on our base budgets, over the next 3 years. We have 3½% savings this year. So every business unit, every department has got to find 10% savings. Now you have got to bear that in mind that is on top of 2 years of already of having people having to demonstrate that number, about 6%, so that is actually, I think BPR is going to start coming into its own because, people can no longer tinker at the edges of their budgets, they are going to have to radically think about how they are going to provide their services to be able to deliver it within that, tighter...' (SG/HoS/CMT)

The two (then newly-recruited) change managers were quite clear about the cost-saving drive for the implementation of any form of BPR within CityC:
‘This is just about cutting numbers, whether those be jobs or budgets’, [and] ‘The only reason we’re doing anything is to save some money’ (K-F);

...and there is of course considerable overlap here between the internal requirement for cost savings and the external drivers for efficiencies, especially Gershon.

6.6.2.6 Efficiencies/Gershon

One respondent who had been part of the BPR Pilot Group for training, and affected ‘by association’ with the Highways Dep’t initiative, felt that the Gershon requirements had brought about a ‘council-wide’ approach to BPR:

- ‘So my understanding of, what it was about this time last year was that the council had taken a conscientious decision to say, “This is something that is of use to us, we need to realise, a number of things through different pressures like, efficiency savings from Gershon and the like, and just basically obviously common sense in practice to try and achieve efficiencies and savings anyway, but when – particularly when you’ve got a specific target, is that something like this, takes on a greater urgency and that that urgency was recognised and hence somebody on high made a decision to say, “Right, we need a structured approach to BPR throughout the council.” So I think it was a case of saying, we know we’ve got pockets of knowledge, or pockets of ways of doing things. Let’s get it all together and structured and as a, organisation as a whole, have a definitive structured council-wide approach to BPR.’ (GJ/LM1-2)

However, he also has doubts as to whether he and his Pilot Group colleagues would be able to apply BPR in ‘real life’:

- ‘I think everybody, there, knew, what, the course was about. They understood it. There may have been a degree of, “Right. Okay. I understand this and I know this but am I really going to be allowed to apply this? If I went back now to my boss and said, ‘I think I could improve this but I need to, I need to do BPR work on it to be able to prove it one way or another to you or to actually affect the change,”’ I think there was, maybe, an element of cynicism about whether or not they would actually be able to apply it, real life.’ (GJ/LM1-2)
The Head of Change Management had few doubts, however, as to the effect of Gershon as a driver for change:

- 'But in terms of Gershon, we - I've just sat and done ours yesterday again, for about the third time, have got to deliver, 10%, cashable, efficiencies in the next three years. Three-and-a-half percent, in next year...' (SG/HoS/CMT)

6.6.2.7 Top-down - Solution-driven

One Head of Service (HoS) talked of BPR being 'in the wind', hinting that it was becoming the 'Fashion' (if not also 'Fad') at the time the adoption decisions were being taken:

- '...it was sort of like, in the wind and local authorities are some - some years behind the wider organisational curve, were - were talking a lot about, using BPR. ...we do, tend to be followers of, organisation and local authority fashion in that respect that things - you start hearing it more and more and then suddenly we've got to.' (EM/HoS)

This same HoS admitted that some of these questions were 'unearthing (his) deep vein of cynicism,' and this was possibly again apparent in his view of the 'Contact Centre-driven' approach that was being taken:

- '...our decision was, to appoint, three people who would, float around the council from service to service, BPRing them with one of the... with one of the outcomes being transference of the customer-facing elements of that service into 'City Direct', and then move serenely throughout the council doing that same thing. That was a model of, doing BPR to services rather than - rather than fully involving services in trying to realise the benefits of BPR as something that could help - they could use to help themselves improve.' (EM/HoS)

When asked how much 'will' there was to 'improve further' his view was that:

- '...radical change, is easily enacted in local authorities that are perceived as basket cases. It isn't easily achieved in local authorities that are seen to be basically discharging their core functions.' (EM/HoS)
But when questioned more specifically about CityC's commitment to 'radical change', he responded quite emphatically:

- 'There isn't one. There isn't one.' (EM/HoS)

This same 'top-down' drive was the view of the Highways Dep't HoS (above) who similarly linked his own BPR exercise to the need to implement the contact centre as a central Government initiative:

- '...they were committed to a call centre, or a contact centre, City Direct as it's now called, and, that was something that (his Director) felt very strongly about. I think there were, pushes from government, CPA and all that, you know, moving councils towards, having contact centres.' (HJ/HoS)

The 'CPA' link to this 'Contact Centre' driver was emphasised with his further perception:

- 'My understanding is that that's the case. I've never seen it written down or anything, but you know, I'm led to understand that councils that are implementing good contact centres are getting good marks on CPA. In the recent CPA 4-star announcement that we had, one of the reasons that we're improving strongly as I read was City Direct, the inspectors thought, this is good.' (HJ/HoS)

There is no inference here that this was a bad thing, but perhaps more that it was less the result of a strategic decision-making process than that of a kind of cloning of other LGOs, as he later indicated:

- '...it was presented very much as, "This is what organisations like [CityC] are doing."' (HJ/HoS)

This was re-emphasised by the Head of Change Management when he was pressed on the question of, originally, whose 'idea it was,' and he suggested he might have heard it at a 'conference,' but whilst the 'idea' had been reinforced by all their 'visits' to other Councils, ultimately it was him:
• 'I probably heard it at a conference or so. At a conference or, having all the visits we went over - we went and visited loads of councils when we were, doing the Service Access Review, so it would have been me. It wouldn't have come from anywhere else.' (SG/HoS/CMT)

The more recently promoted SMT member for Customer Services echoed the apparently precipitous way the adoption of BPR had been decided:

• 'I think my understanding of where they were coming from at the time, "Something needs to happen in the council." We needed an impetus for change and, an approach, was chosen off the shelf, and perhaps we didn't look into that into the depth that we should have done.' (YH/SMT)

However, having said that (this was Feb. 2008), the same person added that the need for CityC to be more 'radical' obtained perhaps more now than when the concept had initially been picked off that 'shelf'?

• 'I think the biggest challenge for this council now will be the financial position that we're in and that will start to reinforce the fact that we do need to radically review everything that we do.' (YH/SMT)

6.6.3 Summary

The overall theme, or 'case for action,' here is that of external pressures, and ultimately, even 'competition', is the result of Government action to either save money, improve services, or both. Clearly, Sir Peter Gershon's (2004) 'Spending Review', overtly or otherwise, has been a key driver in a number of areas, but it was apparent in both Councils that the need for budget cuts (or 'savings') was a more powerful lever than front-line service 'improvements'. A primary concern also, however – and this will be returned to later – has to be whether, in a number of cases at least, the claimed 'savings' would be 'real', that is to say tangible, in terms of being cashable, and serving to actually release 'resources to the front-line'?
Another issue is the oft-cited 'rhetoric vs reality' argument, where 'rhetoric' in this sense is:

'language designed to have a persuasive or impressive effect on its audience, but which is often regarded as lacking in sincerity nor meaningful content' (Oxford, 1998: 1591).

The distinction is made because we will return later to its more literal meaning of the 'art of effective or persuasive speaking or writing' (ibid), whereas here the more common pejorative usage is perhaps indicated by the Head of Change Management himself, despite being the author of CityC's Change Management Strategy (where 'reengineering/BPR appears more than a dozen times in its 21 pages), when he admits that:

- '...we can never pretend to be anything other than incremental change here because [I was] asked about business transformation, and I said "well we are nowhere near that in CityC".' (SG/HoS/CMT)

However, in 2008 (March 17th) CountyC's Head of Change Management stated that this 'drive' for improvement was set to continue and make even greater demands on the requirement for SRD or radical process improvement:

- 'But the other thing is that nationally, there’s an awful lot of push now, we call it BPI – business process improvement – well, not much difference exactly, but what they’re saying is our target for the authority for the next 3 years is to save something like £41million in cash... and they’re saying we should save 37% of that by redesigning what we do.' (HD/HoS/CMT)

Centrally-driven 'e-government' initiatives have played a key role in the adoption of call (or 'contact') centres for improving 'access' to services, but the logic has had more to do with 'industrial tourism' and top-down decision-making, than any 'fundamental rethinking' that had then resulted in the same objective need. For example, CityC's 'Service Access Review' – linked to 'e-government targets' – clearly stated within its strategy to use 'BPR':

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...a significant amount of Business Process Re-engineering – BPR will be required as part of the rationalisation of the hotlines, development of the mini-call centres and introduction of the integrated customer contact centre' (p. 80, 7.18).

And:

'The customer services strategy will require Departments, Business Units and employees to work in different ways. The rationalisation of hotlines, the introduction of the virtual call centre and ultimately the development of the integrated customer contact centre means that the Council needs to urgently review all the back office processes that will feed into these new ways of working.

Business Process Re-engineering is an area being addressed under the Building for Excellence programme and the outcomes of this review and the improvements being proposed emphasise the importance that corporate capacity should be developed as soon as possible to enable this work to start' (p. 91, 8.32 & 8.33).

In both organisations there was considerable evidence that many of the so-called BPR initiatives were contact centre-driven. That this – at least in CityC's case – had been mooted by that 'tourism' was evident in the same Review, where the principle may have been sound:

- 'The authorities visited had developed capacity by re-engineering existing processes. In some cases this had generated significant savings that had been re-invested into frontline services' (p. 56, 4.5.3).

It was unfortunate, therefore, that earlier in 2008 the main, influencing 'authority visited' (Liverpool) was named as, 'the worst performing council in the country, [the Audit Commission's latest report] awarding it one star – the lowest rating' (BBC News, 'Culture capital to 'basket case'? ', 1st June).

In CityC in particular 'failing processes' was cited as a key driver for (e.g.) the 'Highways'-to-'City Direct' initiative, although there was little evidence elsewhere, but that issue itself was seriously questioned by one senior manager in a good position to do so, with the speculative but quite rational possibility that, had the existing service been more properly resourced in situ,
it might, possibly, have stayed where it was. This begs the question that the solution may have been decided before the problem was truly identified?

There was some evidence that the choice of BPR was because it was; 'flavour of the month'/'in the mind'/'fashion' and an 'off-the-shelf' solution.

6.7 Analysis 3: Leadership

'Most reengineering failures stem from breakdowns in leadership.'
(Hammer & Champy, 2001: 111)

'In general, the concept of leadership in local government is relatively new.'
(Keen & Scase, 1998: 43)

That Leadership is a key issue in the successful implementation of reengineering can be of little doubt, as Al-Mashari and Zairi found in their (1999) study of the 'BPR implementation process: an analysis of key success and failure factors', where 'Committed and Strong Leadership' was the first of their three 'Management Competence Factors' required as one of their 'Success Factors' for BPR implementation, and, although not surprisingly, they identified 'Problems related to commitment, support, and leadership' as one of two 'Management Support Factors', under 'Failure Factors' (Fig. 1, p. 106).

However, rational though this might be, the 'agony of the process' (ibid: 107) might also be a contributor to the mixed responses received. Once more, examples from the larger of the two co-operating LGOs will be cited first.

6.7.1 CountyC

The respondents' perceptions of who was 'leading' their various SRD initiatives varied across a range of:

1. immediate line manager/Head of Service (7);
2. Head of Change Management (3), and;
3. the Chief Executive (2).

Similarly, their views on the nature of this 'leadership' were equally varied, as the responses will show. For example, this first respondent (BH) was referring to both 1 and 2, above, when she said:

- 'I think some of it is about my – the management support I have. I think I have got very good management support... ...from my line manager and from [the Head of] Change Management.' (BH/LM1-2)

Contextually, until three years previously this (contact centre) manager's career had been in the 'private sector', where what she had been 'used to' was:

- '...if you had an idea where I worked previously you ran with it. You put it into effect, but if it all went pear-shaped, you were the one that was hung out to dry and, so, you did sort of eventually – you had to have a lot of risk management, [adding that] generally speaking you were left to your own devices sort of in middle management. The difference when I came here is that, yes, it's not as simple to make a change because there's a whole hierarchy of people to go through, and, that can be quite frustrating to start with.' (BH/LM1-2)

She reinforced, however, her view that there was this positive and supportive approach from the CMT, and her own line manager, with:

- 'They constantly give me advice on new technology, and they are there very much in a supporting role. I don't report to them directly... but I share huge amounts of information with them as well as with my own line manager.' (BH/LM1-2)

A colleague from a different department also made comment on this 'freshness' of her immediate line manager's 'inspirational' leadership, as another who had come from the 'private sector':

- 'My immediate line manager, the divisional admin manager that I mentioned there, he is new to the council and he is quite a breath of fresh air. He's quite inspirational.'
He's not scared of tackling anything, which is rare (laughing). He's quite an inspiration to me." (PJ/LM1-2)

Whilst there is undoubted cross-over here with issues of leadership and culture – dealt with later – her specific comment on her line manager's 'attitudes' to change were again quite revealing, in the context of the lightness she apparently displayed whilst sharing her views:

- 'His attitudes are, "Well, let's have a go at it and see how far we get." He's not scared to have a go, whereas a lot of people who've worked in local government for a long, long time know that the best thing to do is, "Do your bit. Do as well as you can, but don't keep popping your head above the parapet" (laughing)." (PJ/LM1-2)

Another respondent was not so clear who held the actual role in relation to his own specific project:

- 'I personally don't know who's officially the project sponsor.' (DC/LM1-2)

This lack of clarity was evident in a different team where, once again, the rhetoric did not appear to be matched by the reality:

- 'We do get very confused messages because we're told at – from the most senior level to be, quite fundamental about the change. Start with a blank sheet, et cetera. So we start with a blank sheet... Start with a blank sheet, but then as soon as it starts to affect people and jobs and – people start – senior management are, backing off, so it – and it stops us from being, as – as radical as we need to be.' (M-E/LMs1-2)

This apparent vacillation amongst senior management was emphasised later in the interview when the respondent was talking of leaders at the 'strategic director' level:

- 'I think they struggle with where they want to go, with where they want to be. And they – because they struggle with that themselves, they find that difficult to communicate down, to get things moving in the right direction, and that's our biggest problem, clear leadership.' (M-E/LMs1-2)
When they were asked what was 'missing', they responded (jointly):

- 'Leadership. Leadership and strategic thought... Decision-making as well.' (M-E/LMs1-2)

The issue of SMT commitment was being approached – with echoes of Boddy and Buchanan's (1992) 'Managing Up' – starting with 'Heads of Support Services', in order to accelerate progress:

- 'So, if we could get their, heads of support services on board, with what we were doing, it, you know, we stood a pretty good chance of actually moving forward.' (HD/HoS/CMT)

And the pair (M-E) above was quite clear (again jointly) that this lack of 'decision-making' was an actual obstacle to success, a 'failure factor':

- 'No, this is [line manager's name], and everybody's waiting for him to go. Because we feel, that he's holding a lot of things back. Everything has to be fed back up to [name], absolutely, everything, which slows everything down, and doesn't empower people. And if he doesn't like it, it doesn't happen, ...simple as that. And it – you may never find out why he doesn't like it, because he doesn't always feed back either.' (M-E/LMs1-2)

Another, when asked to clarify if he'd had to 'sanitize' his project report, with regard to 'people's understanding of what radical change is all about?', said:

- 'And they don't want – they absolutely do not want you saying, "It will release one hundred jobs," because everyone here will start going, "Whose jobs?" and causing panic. I think they may embrace the ideology of it, but the actual reality of it...'
  (LD/LM1-2)

Yet another, who was one of the same group who had been through the UoD-delivered SRD training, voiced similar concerns about her line manager's inflexible approach to the redesign process itself:
'So, his — his attitude to the whole thing was, "I run projects my way and this is how we're running it." So, that's how, far from Service Redesign it was. It was, "I don't like this. This is how we're doing it." And I'm on another project now which is part of the Service Redesign and it's going the same way, "This is how I do it".' (RT/Non-Mgr)

This was a surprising comment, since that same line manager had been on CountyC's previous (the initial) SRD training programme (in 2004), but the respondent (above) was very clear on the matter and did not feel 'empowered to do anything with the training that [she] was given.' This lack of perceived empowerment was corroborated by another pair of interviewees who stated that it was:

'...down to individual service heads. If they've got that drive and passion, and they've got the autonomy and the authority to do it, they can, take on some fairly big changes within their part of the organisation and, the authority needs that because the best way to show that that's worth doing is to follow somebody else's lead, so we do need people that are prepared to, perhaps shake things up, but I don't — I think it's very hard in this organisation.' (F-W/CMT)

6.7.2 Summary

Overall within CountyC the primary perception was that if CMT were leading the change project then the 'leadership' would be positive and committed. However, when it was left to (e.g.) 'individual service heads' and line managers, other issues came into play and there was no guarantee at all of that same level of commitment. Some of the reasons will become more apparent when we examine later the issues around change management itself and the effects of context and culture. Essentially, whilst there was some supportive leadership' (CMT plus individual line managers), there were 'confused messages', a 'hierarchy [to] go through', and lack of 'decision-making'. There was no evidence of an across-the-board commitment from senior management, nor of any consistent 'change-through-BPR' type of communication, continuously reinforcing the message.
6.7.3 CityC

In CityC’s case the respondents' perceptions of who was 'leading' their various SRD initiatives varied across the range of:

1. immediate line manager/Head of Service (Highways) (4);
2. Head of Change Management/Change Managers (2);
3. Director of Resources (Finance) (3), and;
4. the Chief Executive (2);

...indicating the hierarchical relativity of this 'Leadership' role, from the perspective of the person(s) being led.

The responses within CityC are of necessity different from CountyC in the respect that most of the CountyC respondents had, to a varied extent, been involved in some aspect of SRD, whereas few of CityC's 'Pilot Group' have been. Those who have, were either directly or indirectly involved in the 'Highways' to 'City Direct' project.

One of those (BS, Admin' Manager) was full of praise for her own manager (HJ, HoS) who had also been one of the 'Pilot Group', and was the operational 'leader' of the 'Highways' unit during its BPR intervention:

- 'I just think [name; 'is'] a really nice decent bloke and I just feel like I want to do my most - my utmost to, help him. ... He's a very good manager. He's very supportive. He's very approachable. He sees things the way they are. He doesn't talk, jargon. He's just a very straightforward bloke and -- and that's what I like.' (BS/LM1-2)

She was also very positive about the visible commitment of the newly-recruited change managers, who 'came in' at the end of the Pilot Group's training event.

At the other end of the hierarchical scale, the most senior (Director of Resources) person interviewed at this stage of the process also demonstrated
his leadership commitment to overcoming some of the higher-level internal 'resistance':

- '...ultimately what had to happen is myself, and two of the chief officers who were involved in it, we had to sit down in a closed room and agree a deal basically, because the fundamental component of it is, calculating how many staff should transfer from one place to another, and we just sat down and did a deal, and we all shook hands on it. ...we basically just sat down as three directors and agreed a deal and then communicated that back and, made the decision on that basis and, everybody's been fine since.' (DP/SMT)

It might be relevant to note that whilst completing the 'Self-Diagnostic' (Hammer and Stanton, 1995: 85-99), he saw himself – in combination with CityC's Chief Executive – as the 'Leader' of their BPR initiatives. He was quite frank also on the question of how well the Chief Officer Group (COG), as five individuals, were committed to the concept of BPR, or understood what 'BPR or reengineering really is':

- 'I think all of them understand it. But not all of them support it.' (DP/SMT)

However, a more sceptical view of this issue of senior level 'commitment' was emphasised by another HoS, who saw it as primarily 'lip service' being paid to the whole 'change process':

- '...it is, lip service. They're too busy doing their job, frankly, they've done enough haven't they? They've employed some people to do it. It's, sort of working.' (EM/HoS)

His personal view was that BPR was actually being quietly 'abandoned' as one of CityC's 'mechanisms' for change:

- 'I suspect we're, coming close to the point where we're actually, without making a big song and dance about it, abandoning BPR as the mechanism, that we will use both for reviewing and improving services, and for determining, which customer-facing elements can be best provided from, from a contact centre. I think, that's the way it happens a lot [around here] – I think we're slowly in the process of abandoning BPR
as an approach, but we’re not about to tell anyone and we probably never will. We’ll just stop talking about it." (EM/HoS)

This possibly cynical view was not shared by the HoS in charge of the 'Highways' unit (HJ; and praised, above, by his Admin Manager) who spoke very positively of the senior manager he saw (DP; Director of Resources – see also above) as the BPR 'Leader':

- 'I think he is a director who you can recognise has a bit of a crusading approach to improvement, and seems to rise above what must be a massively big job, anyways, he’s going off to [a different local authority], you know a four-times-bigger job. He seems to be able to have that knack of rising above the job and communicating his enthusiasm and his intention to change things. But I think that's very rare... and, in my experience in local government, that's very rare.' (HJ/HoS)

However, he saw this quality as very scarce:

- '...there are very few managers of that, calibre and ability that they have the ability to sort of, ride above the dross of the day job and be visionary on the things which they think are important.' (HJ/HoS)

Yet he did acknowledge again that not all 'Directors' might be equally on board with what he saw as the 'crusading zeal' of others:

- 'I'd strongly suspect, we’re talking confidentially... that [Director's name] might have a view on BPR which is, "ain't got time for that." Know what I mean?' (HJ/HoS);

...and emphasised this point later when asked – regarding the 'Leadership' section of the 'Self-Diagnostic' questionnaire – '[what] would those scores have been if you'd have been thinking of the remainder of [the Directors and the Chief Officer]?'

- 'Much lower.' (HJ/HoS)
He also acknowledged that no-one from senior level had attended the training course, however briefly, to 'front the event' or show their commitment to and backing for BPR within CityC:

- '[Name] didn't come and, bang the drum, [name] didn’t come and bang the drum'; (HJ/HoS)

...and he thought this should have happened, not least because of their own need to understand BPR, at least at an 'awareness' level:

- '...what you really wanted was, more senior people to be at that course, or some other awareness course.' (HJ/HoS)

This same HoS came in for further praise from another 'Pilot Group' participant (an 'Area Co-ordination Officer' within the 'Highways' unit) who had not been directly 'involved' in this main BPR initiative, but who was 'aware' of it because of her involvement 'with the business planning for the division':

- 'I think he – that he led it very well and that, I think some people could maybe have, tried to put obstacles in the way, but I think he realised that this had got to be done. This is what is required, what the City Council wanted to happen, and he was going to make sure that that is what happened. And also, work with the change managers to come out with the best outcome.' (SM/LM1-2)

Whilst in her own questionnaire she had named the 'Highways' HoS (HJ) as the 'Leader' in mind, she had a view on who these 'Leaders' were and where 'key leadership' for this BPR initiative would be 'coming from':

- 'I saw that the key leadership would be the Chief Executive, [named], but that the actual people tasked with it would be [Head of Change Management, and] the change managers.' (SM/LM1-2)

This issue of senior level 'Leadership' was also raised by the recently recruited change managers, where they clearly saw themselves as being part of that 'Leadership' structure:
- CM2: I don't think we've got an individual leader of change in the council. There are a number of senior managers who exhibit some of the qualities and behaviours you'd expect as a leader of change, but they're not embodied in one person.

- CM1: There is no charismatic leader of change, for me. I think there are charismatic leaders of change, I think you have two in the room, but I don't think you've any in a recognised leadership position. This is not actually a model of change being led by personality. This is not personality-led change.

- CM2: And the leader of the council and Chief Exec' both say the right words when they're on a platform, about change and what needs to happen and that it's a big thing and that it's a long-term thing, but that's — it's not a continuous, message coming from the top.

Whilst they similarly recognised the 'resistance' noted by others, they also acknowledged the 'Leadership' efforts displayed by some in the lower management echelons:

- CM1: '...there's actually a degree of scepticism in middle managers and below in the services that we've had the opportunity to work in.'

- CM2: 'And there are also examples of leadership at that level as well, of people who recognise that something could be done and have taken an active role in making it happen.'

However, they did similarly acknowledge the views of some others in that the Director of Resources (DP) was, more than his peers, a 'leader of change', but even that acknowledgement came with a qualification:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JC: So are any of those people actually, leading it in that, very clear way that was indicated in that questionnaire?</th>
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<tr>
<td>CM1: No, none.</td>
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<td>JC: None of the directorate?</td>
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<tr>
<td>CM1: No. [Name] is the only one that I've actually seen do any visible leading, of change.</td>
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CM2: Yes.

JC: But not of BPR?

CM1: He's doing some BPR in his own area. He's doing some process reengineering in his own area. I don't know whether it's transformational or fundamental.

JC: Well, given the definition in your strategy document which says its fundamental rethinking and radical redesign...

CM1: Well, then the answer is no. I don't think he's doing BPR.

JC: So the answer is no?

CM1: I think he's doing continuous improvement.

CM2: Incremental change, I guess.

An SMT member interviewed commented that she was 'quite surprised how operational those [Improvement Project] meetings were', and how in her view they lacked 'vision':

- 'I thought there'd be a little bit more visioning of what change meant, what the issues arising from it might be, where it might position us, where it might position the organisation, and that wasn't there. That was lacking. Now whether that's because they didn't understand that, I don't know, but certainly I would have expected to see a little bit more, blue-sky thinking perhaps, about where is this taking us to?' (YH/SMT)

The Head of Change Management was interviewed three times and, during the first, he too commented on the lack of 'drive from the top' for doing BPR, but in this instance largely because CityC was already an 'Excellent, 4-Star' Council:

- '...there is less of a drive from the top for doing it, because of that.' (SG/HoS/CMT)
At the same time he confirmed his view that it was from this 'top' level that this 'Leadership' should come:

- 'It should be the Assistant Directors,... it should be coming from that level.' (SG/HoS/CMT)

In the second interview he elaborated on this when questioned on whom people would look to for their leadership, with:

- 'They would look to a board, and they would look to the [Highways] board, or [Improvement Project] board for their leadership. They wouldn't look to an individual person. Now, I'm sure you may have had a discussion with [the new change managers] to feel that one of the problems that we have at the council here is that nobody is prepared to take responsibility for decisions. Everything's done through boards, and to an extent, that's the same with the leadership issue...' (SG/HoS/CMT)

His only deviation from this when asked who, if anyone, was really 'committed to BPR?' following their visit(s) to other local authorities (LA):

- 'One, probably. [Director of Resources] I would say.' (SG/HoS/CMT)

However, he still believed that even this positive and apparent 'leader of change' would not have 'understood the implications of [BPR] and what it really meant.'

During this interviewing period (May 2006-Jan. 2007) this particular director announced his move to another LA, and the HoS Change Management admitted he did not know who:

- '...would be the new champion, of the radical approaches to change.' (SG/HoS/CMT)

He reinforced this concern over the possible de-prioritisation of BPR, later, with:
'Losing our champion at the top of chief officer group is not going to help matters this year, because, despite what I'm saying, our focus will be on CPA, not so much the rest of the organisations. People like directors and that will be, so, this will not be the year [2007] for trying to do anything radical, certainly not this first half of the year. ...but with our champion going from our department on BPR, he would also have been our champion for CPA, and so the chief executive will be left with no choice but to be the champion for CPA and if the, push comes to shove, my priority has got to get the chief executive on board and engaged and championing CPA not BPR, because that's the immediate, priority.' (SG/HoS/CMT)

This contrasted sharply with the Chief Executive's (CE) own much earlier comments, during an 'interview' with [BBC presenter] in 2005, during the Council's '[Improvement Project] Week 2005', when his responses included his apparent commitment to 'reengineering':

- 'Now we're looking at this moment at [Highways] because that's one of the areas... what we are going to have a look at is, reengineering what we do in [Highways] to make sure that we can answer people and not pass them on... what we're doing is we're building on what we've got and adding the services as they come up... Before we go on to a system, as being live, we look at it, take it apart and put it back together.' (CE)

Finally, whilst discussing the one BPR training cohort (Pilot Group) that had gone ahead, when asked if 'any line manager or senior manager, leader of the council even, elected or unelected, went to any of those [training] sessions,' he responded:

- 'Well, they wouldn't have.' (SG/HoS/CMT)

6.7.4 City Homes

'Leadership' was also an issue at this CityC ALMO, when in an interview with two of the participants, following a UoD-delivered Service Redesign training day, they suggested to me that the 'people' themselves 'have wanted to change things' but the leadership to do so had not been evident:
• '...they've realised it does need change but they've had no support before to actually change it.' (S-P)

However, what really became the issue was that the raised expectations from that day had not been matched with subsequent leadership commitment:

• 'I think, unfortunately, the day set off, it was a great day, everybody came back really enthusiastic, and then from my particular point of view, nothing's happened since. ... on this particular day we're talking about, this systems thinking, it just seems a shame because you've got—you're sort of in—a way, whipped the staff up into quite a positive frame of mind thinking, "We've got power for changing this, and changing these roles," and then it's gone stale again.' (S-P)

This was probed a little deeper later:

JC: So what's lacking now?

PB: Commitment isn't it? Pulling it through...

JC: From whom?

PB: I think it's senior management level.

SH: I think it's senior management and I think other priorities have come along since.

The respondent was quite clear in her view on what 'should' have happened:

• 'I think we should have come back from the systems thinking day and had time blocked out in calendars, that nothing else took priority over, a day, a week for the next three weeks or something like that, and we should have then sat down and bottomed it, but it was the commitment to do it or the justification for doing it, and this is when I go back saying you need your whole of your senior management team on board, to make it happen.' (PB/LM1-2)

And she expressed her view (supported by her colleague) that the staff had been let down by this apparent lack of 'senior management' commitment:
'I think a lot of staff aren't given the credit but they actually do realise what they're doing. They do think of different ways to change the job and I think they saw this as an opportunity to say, "I don't think we need to be doing this," and change what they were doing. And I think they thought, "Something's going to happen now," and it didn't. It came to a standstill.' (PB/LM1-2)

When they were asked who, specifically, had the decision-making 'power' and who, therefore, was not 'up for it', they were in agreement that it was the unit's Head of Service:

- 'That would be [HoS name].' (S-P)

6.7.5 Summary

Although to a lesser extent in terms of overall activity, the (two) CityC change managers were also viewed positively, indicating an understanding and acceptance of their role-necessity within the organisation, and a broad acknowledgement of their value-add to the change process. However, and as with CountyC, true commitment to 'reengineering'/change-through-BPR' was rarely found, with only sporadic evidence of the sort of, 'strong, aggressive, committed, and knowledgeable leadership' insisted upon by Hammer and Champy (1993: 107), without which there would be no-one, 'to persuade the barons running functional silos within the company to subordinate the interests of their functional areas to those of the processes that cross their boundaries' (ibid). In their later revision, citing a management interviewee from 'Duke Power,' they make the point that, 'it isn't easy to change the culture of a corporation. Unless it is pushed from the top, it won't get done':

'During the transitional period, I spent two days a week — it probably should have been four — out in the field, providing leadership, and working on finding a proper balance between process owners and frontline workers. I was as visible as I felt I could be at the time, but if I had to do it over again, I would increase my presence' (Hammer & Champy, 2001: 181).
Hammer and Champy (2001: 199) stated, 'You have to vigorously attack the business issues and then actively demonstrate leadership from the top down.'

In the views of those interviewed this did not happen, BPR was not 'actively', 'vigorously', nor continuously communicated throughout the organisation, and that 'proper balance' was not evident. As Emery (1991: iv) said:

'Needless to say, if our goal is truly to re-engineer the organization, we will also need vigorous and continual support from top management. Gaining such support may be the hardest part of all.'

The balanced perception was that, at the most senior level in CityC – the Chief Officer level – there was perhaps 1 out of 5 who fully supported a more radical, BPR-type approach to change, and that therefore there was no 'continuous message from the top' in support of this approach, as a result. There was more a form of 'leadership by board', not dissimilar to the 'hierarchical' and 'lack of decision-making' evident within CountyC.

At this juncture, between 'Leadership' and 'Change Management', it is worth reflecting on a Capita/I&DeA report to CityC, dated 20th June 2001, in which the Council were criticised under 'Leadership – Strategic Vision', as follows:

'...a considerable degree of additional activity is required if the corporate plan is to be a driver for effective corporate action' (p. 5, item 14).

On the following page, item 15 stated:

'Key to the success of this work will be engaging staff and members throughout the authority in the vision and ensuring they "buy in" to the corporate plan to deliver this. In so doing, it will be essential that Chief Officers and Executive members are able to project enthusiasm about the direction in which the authority is heading.'

As we see elsewhere, there was no real evidence later that the 'corporate' Change Management Strategy had been briefed out to Heads of Service and thence on 'down the line', thereby 'engaging staff', nor that Chief Officers or
Executive members had 'projected enthusiasm' regarding their 'vision' of Business Process Reengineering contained within.

As one CityC HoS (EM) has already said, perhaps BPR was just, 'too hard'?

6.8 **Analysis 4: Change & Change Management;**

**Analysis 5: Context & Culture**

(Note: because of the considerable overlap between context, 'organisational culture' and 'organisational change', these themes have been treated as one.)

'...strong new change managers or "transformational leaders" are likely to be needed to unfreeze the organization and launch the change programs.'

(Schein, 2004: 314)

Issues surrounding change and change management – Attitudes, Behaviours, Culture; Resistance and Fear; inc. the 'DREC' model, 'Denial', 'Resistance', 'Exploration', and 'Commitment' (Scott & Jaffe, 1994), often also 'Acceptance'; 'Deep' Change – featured strongly amongst those interviewed, and each organisation (i.e. all three, including City Homes) had some form of change management team.

The 'culture' of these organisations – shown by Schein (2004) as operating on 'several different levels' (see Methodology, Fig. 5.3, p. 21), exemplify Hammer and Champy's (2001: 228) warning that organizations must not allow, 'existing corporate cultures and management attitudes to prevent reengineering from getting started.'

These 'underlying assumptions', embedded more deeply and forming the organisations' 'ultimate source of values and action' are likely also to manifest themselves in those attitudes (fear?), behaviours (resistance?); requiring what Hammer (2004a) called 'Deep Change', examples of which are presented in these subsequent extracts.
6.8.1 Resistance to Change – Attitudes & Behaviours & Culture

6.8.1.1 CountyC

The first example of this 'resistance' was given by the contact centre manager, who said:

- 'I think there's still a lot of, pockets of people that are afraid of it and don't want to let go of what they've done for twenty years and think that if you're challenging that, it's actually, a criticism of them as an individual rather than the fact that you're trying to just get a better process to give you lots of improvement.' (BH/LM1-2)

And 'culture', tinged with 'fear':

- 'I think that, there was a lot of negative feeling in departments and I don't think that was particularly about service redesign. I think it was about the whole change culture. I think it was more about departments saying, "Oh that there call centre, you know they, they're all going to take our jobs." It was a threat, a personal threat.' (BH/LM1-2)

On the issue of attitudinal change she concurred with Seddon's (2007a) view that it's a 'thinking thing':

- 'I think the hard bit is, to try and get across to people that, you're trying to get them past that point of thinking. You're trying to get them to actually, stand back and take stock of what they do and ask themselves why. And that, just to get to that point with some people is really hard, because straight away, they will be defensive.' (BH/LM1-2)

This same 'thinking' issue was echoed by the Head of CMT with:

- 'Where we really drive the long-term 5-10-year gain out of all this, is getting people to change, how they think.' (HD/HoS/CMT)
And where earlier (under 'Readiness') he had commented on the 'big cultural shift' required, he also understood that it would take time for those 'deep' changes to happen:

- '...one of the things I've also learned is that some of these projects have a longer lead-in period than others and what [name]'s been doing the last 2 years is basically gaining, or, increasing the awareness of why we need this project, what it's going to do for us, so when we do actually de..., come to deploy it, it'll have a lot smoother transition than it would have other... otherwise have had.' (HD/HoS/CMT)

And the contact centre manager demonstrated her understanding of this emotional journey involved by alluding to the change 'curve' (Kübler-Ross, 1969; Scott & Jaffe, 1994) often cited as part of change management processes:

- 'I think there's always that bit of human – this is where I think the curve is absolutely right because I think, despite – I feel I am a very positive person and I don't, think I have a particular problem with change, but there is always that first, element of doubt, of self-doubt where I think, "Ooh." And, "will they unearth something where they'll be sat there thinking, 'Oh, we thought she [was] quite a good manager and look what we've found.' No, I don't think you'll ever get away from that. I think you'll always have that sort of split-second doubt.' (BH/LM1-2)

This 'journey' point was echoed by one CMT respondent who said that 'taking people along' was a matter of effective 'communication' and 'involvement':

- 'Communication, and making sure you take people along, on the journey and engage them at the start, in terms of their ideas about the service – and feed back on that on a regular basis.' (CS/CMT)

- 'If you involve them early on – ask them for their thoughts and ideas around this process and give them feedback, at appropriate intervals – when you, in your decision-making, so that they can see, your thinking, what the reasoning is behind it.' (CS/CMT)

He gave a tangible example of one employee's movement along this 'DREC' journey who, after having had CountyC's need for change explained, and then
considered her 'options', recounted later how it had been the 'best thing' that had 'ever happened' to her:

- 'I did meet up with her a couple of years after, and she said, it's the best thing that's ever happened to me, in terms of how she felt about the job, the work, contribution she made; she's happy and she'd have said, I'd have never have made that change if I haven't have been forced, into having to, think about, what I was going to do.' (CS/CMT)

And finally, on this point of 'involvement', he added that many of the 'good ideas' came from the people themselves:

- '...a lot of the good ideas that we did, I have to say, came from people that are currently providing the service and the customers. They inform, very much, a lot of the proposals that we developed, in that, and things that we took into account, came from the, from that group.' (CS/CMT)

Having only come to the council a few years previously from the private sector, the contact centre manager's (HB) expectations of its 'unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings' had at least partly been realised:

- 'I expected a local authority to be... full of sort of doddery old men and dusty corridors, in [named person's] area, there's still a lot more of that. It's still very insular, and probably a little bit sexist as well.' (BH/LM1-2)

She contrasted this, however, with the more 'positive' and forward-thinking' approach of the change management team (CMT):

- 'The change-management team are very, generally speaking very young people, very positive, very forward thinking, want to drive out a lot of the slow sort of, old man chattering that stops some of the projects from going ahead.' (BH/LM1-2)

This was underpinned by the HoS Change Management Team (CMT) who saw SRD as a means by which to help challenge this 'culture';
• '...one thing we really need to do is to embed, a culture of challenge and, try and empower people to say, 'Can I do this better? Can I improve this?', and that's the real benefit out of this whole service redesign.' (HD/HoS/CMT)

Finally, having commented that one of her 'predecessors [had] ruffled quite a few feathers in her time', the contact centre manager then acknowledged how her own leadership approach to the changes had elicited better results:

• 'I think I approached it in a slightly different way to perhaps she was able to do at the time she started it, and I think I've managed to win quite a few people over. ... I think we've actually stimulated ideas that perhaps wouldn't have been there before.' (BH/LM1-2)

The resistance issue was echoed by another interviewee who said that:

• '...others that have to be dragged along kicking and screaming and we've still got that, and we've put in a lot of work into trying to manage that situation.' (CA/LM1-2)

The 'denial' stage of the emotional journey was exemplified in the views of another, who commented on the inhibiting aspect of the Council having reached 'Excellent' status:

• '...well we've had "Excellent" status for a few years and, it gets trumpeted in the council and I have heard people say, "Well, we're excellent, so why bother? We don't actually need to change".' (DC/LM1-2)

This point was noted also by another (CMT) respondent:

• '...things that might get in the way. The fact that we're an excellent organisation — in terms of assessment — that's often — we're excellent, why do we need to change?' (CS/CMT)

He (DC) also noted the caution within 'senior management' when there were higher than acceptable degrees of risk and uncertainty prevalent in many BPR-type initiatives:
'I think people are fearful, senior managers are fearful that, going ahead with something unless it's really tied up.' (DC/LM1-2)

Another pair of interviewees (M-E) concurred:

'...a lot of the work-force knows what they would like to do – to try and change things and how they could, but they’re being stymied by somebody who’s got a different idea.' (MS/LM1-2) ... 'But we are moving towards that [staff involvement] now. We are actually starting to invite people to sessions where they can come along and give suggestions, et cetera, so it is changing slowly.' (ET/LM1-2)

But this move towards 'involvement', whilst useful in terms of change management principles (communicate to and empower others), was not always supported at a more senior level:

'...we’ve used those, 'as-is' models as a starting point to speak to staff, to ask them about the difficulties with that current process. What can they do to make it [better] – how can we make it better? [but] my deputy director does not want you to involve the staff and it's a fighting battle for me all the time to get him to involve the staff.' (ET/LM1-2)

And the succeeding dialogue provided further illumination on this point:

JC: 'Why doesn’t that person want to, you to involve the staff?'

ET: 'Because he doesn’t want to alarm them. He thinks he's going to alarm them; and I've explained to him that if he doesn’t involve them, a) he'll never get buy-in and b) they'll all think it's [a] fait accompli and, you know, and just think...'

JC: 'So you're pro-involvement, he’s anti-involvement?'

ET: 'Yes.'

JC: 'Isn’t – is there some conflict then between this, alarm and, 'clearly articulate the need for change’?'

ET: 'Yes, definitely. And this doesn’t just come from him. This comes from above. I’ve had this same discussion with the strategic director and he’ll say to me, “Well, sometimes you
The other of the pair then reverted to the issue of inhibition, or resistance, coming from senior management, in that whilst they both understood, 'from the course,' where they needed 'to try and take things,' they were being prevented from doing so once back in the workplace:

- 'But I think we're now back in an environment where you're not allowed to do that. And so no matter what you know and what you think you should be doing, you're being frustrated from doing.' (MS/LM1-2)

A more tangible reason for resistance to change was when vested interests came into play, such as when it affected (e.g.) 'job evaluation' calculations, and the example given was people being reluctant to give up calls to the call centre:

- '...what you actually ended up with was, these people actually wanted, these calls, because, they could then put on their, job evaluation, questionnaire, dealing with single status that their job had a lot of contact with the public.' (HD/HoS/CMT)

Again he recognised, in general terms, the organisation was probably not yet 'ready' for that 'big cultural shift'.

**Culture vs Change**

Some more specific observations were made regarding where the organisation's 'culture' – those deeper, underlying assumptions – affected the pace of change, or the ability to achieve it at all. This was more prevalent amongst those who had more recently arrived into the LA from the private sector, as one comment exemplified:

- '...you don't just come along and, just go with the flow and just change things. You have to accept the way the culture is and try and, not butt your head against it too hard, you have to, gently move it because just people have been here for 25 years, a
lot of the people, ... a lot of people here will say, "Well, that's the way I've always done it." I think that's something that needs challenging and, changing here.'

(LD/LM1-2)

He gave his own example of how long some things took to be navigated through the 'political minefield':

- 'I work mainly with [name] who's the IT service redesign guy, who's excellent. He's really, really good, really wants to change things, but he's also quite useful at, directing through the political minefield. So I feel like there's this change management group, but they're often the senior, senior managers, the chief officers, whether they really believe - they signed up to it, but whether they really believe in it, I'm not sure. I'm not convinced at this stage. There are a few, but, whether that's true, it's - an example, the reason I believe that is it's taken a year for us just to get projects from business case which has been in circulation for a long time, to just being allowed to present it to cabinet, so the real idea of, this is something we want to do. A whole year, the document's just been going around the houses, you know it's just incredible ... It goes around again, and round again, and I think some of that's not because they've got genuine comments, it's political stalling.' (LD/LM1-2)

And one of the reasons he gives for this is that CountyC is still 'very much a silo mentality.' When probed further on this he said (verbatim retained to indicate the caution being expressed whilst revealing the issue):

- 'Because of their empire? This is the land of the empire. It's - I have - I - I know and I'm not naming names, but I know a - a pers... - manager at my level who manages a team who, who had team members who are depressed, frustrated. They have nothing to do all day. They have like menial - these are really skilled people, really exp... - I'd love to have these people working for me, and, they - he gives them nothing to - and now he's looking for more people because he sees more people as power. And that's, um, that's a fact. And he, you know, these people are incredibly good resource yet,... and they're underutilised.' (LD/LM1-2)

This person's particular project was organisation-wide with potential for huge benefits;

- 'I see this project as changing, the corporate picture, not just a small part of it, and it's going to impact more than just this project. It's going to impact the way people work,
and if we can get people to change, on this project, it will certainly alter their thinking to future change' (LD/LM1-2);

...yet the context within which it was being progressed and the culture of the organisation were proving significant inhibitors to that progress and frustration to the interviewee – who was positive about individuals, but not about the organisation as a whole – as the following sequential extracts continue to reveal (again, verbatim largely retained):

- The majority of people, I’d say, have been working here for at least fifteen, fifteen years that I’ve come across, and the further up you go, of course, that becomes more true. And they have this thing called ‘[County] Way’ (quote/unquote) and I spoke to – and that was a very, very, very senior person who said this to me – and he said, you know, "Someone, we had someone else, like you come in from the private sector, who tried to rock the boat too vigorously and he's no longer here. He’..." And I said, "Why was that?" And he said, "Well, he got frustrated." Very good like that, they can frustrate you out. That's the way they'll do it. ... Just by making things go through the bureaucratic will. Um, so culture, for me is, you get all these people in a lot of the departments who are quite downtrodden and, you know, there are some really brilliant resources here that are just, 'Well, that's the way we do things', because upstairs, it's – they have their agenda there and it gets, "No, we can't do this. We can't do that. We're just doing this". ... here people – we've got such a good resource but they're not always allowed to, um, perform the roles that they could perform. ... It's so empire-driven here, and it's highly political and that's the culture here. And the workers know it and then – so they – a project like this comes along and they go, "Yeah, yeah. It – It'll never happen".' (LD/LM1-2)

An interesting term; 'frustrate you out'. How 'senior', one might ask, does one have to go in order to become a 'very, very, very senior person'? And later he commented (verbatim again retained):

- '[My office colleague is] the first person, off the back of this project, to put together a comprehensive document, because as part of his tender we're going to have to show, suppliers, what the environment is. No, no, it's always been swept under the carpet. We're the first people to, um, document what the current state of play is, and we've, you know, [colleague's name]'s received universal praise for the accuracy... to the point where some people said, "That's dangerous, that document because it's so accurate, that if suppliers get it, it makes them open to an outsource type move." Um,
you know, and internally, I know – again, naming no names, some senior, senior people have swept, consultants' reports under the carpet to protect empires.'

(LD/LM1-2)

This cultural resistance to change was manifest also in the resultant lack of (and overlap with) leadership felt by the interviewee – supported by his office colleague (OC) – and whilst he was extremely positive about what, in his view, was the potential for that leadership from within CountyC's CMT, he appeared almost reconciled to the need for patience for a 'few years', and its consequent frustration:

- LD: 'There are these things in the periphery that I'm having to push, rather than, people going, "Right, that's what we need to do".'

OC: '...we do need input from other people. It's not just – we can't do this project by ourselves.'

LD: 'I do think change management, they've got some – they are – well, they have excellent people and they're – in fact I think [the Head of CMT is] future Chief Exec' material. I think he's brilliant. I think he's really, really good. However, I wonder how much, at the moment, his hands are tied by, the old guard. And there is a kind of, a lot of the old guard are due to be retiring the next few years, maybe then, real change will happen. There's definitely that, let's-wait-and-see kind of thing, going on, which I find, immensely frustrating.'

Another interviewee (female, ICT) commented that whilst 'service redesign' might be happening elsewhere, it was not perceived positively within her own department:

- '...in the small part of the council that I'm involved in, it's – it seems to be perceived as a negative thing, with, volcanic kind of, consequences.' (RT/Non-Mgr)

(NB Her use of the word 'volcanic' had clear synergies with the word 'seismic' that CityC had removed from its July 2006 'Change Management Strategy' document, to be replaced with the supposed more euphemistic 'radical', indicating the potential sensitivity on both LAs regarding the 'selling' of BPR-
type change. In fact, CityC's HoS (CMT) had admitted (Nov. '06) that his original choice of change descriptors — 'incremental,' 'extrinsic,' 'intrinsic' and 'seismic' — had been 'straight out of a, text book obviously,' and these descriptors were subsequently replaced with: 'gradual,' 'step,' 'evolutionary' and 'radical' for the final draft — 'Final: Version 2'; see Appendix 19.)

Again there was an overlap between the perceived lack of 'leadership' and apparent resistance — or at least reluctance — to change:

- 'I think personally someone needs to be a bit more, have a bit more leadership about, the whole, service redesign. I think it does need to change, but, people seem to be very tentative and not ambassadors of any ideas. It's kind of, "Let's, tiptoe around it and see — see what the reaction is like. If — if it's negative — I hear a lot of people saying, when they're trying to find out because there's service redesign still going on all the time. [Her manager's] team has grown. He's got two people, working full-time on it now, but they often say that people lie to them, about how things work because they don't want their status quo to change. They don't want to lose their departments. They don't want to have to justify the way that they do things.' (RT/Non-Mgr)

Other (a pair of) interviewees commented on the 'conservative nature' of CountyC as an organisation and, culturally, its lack of propensity towards 'radical' change:

- 'I think the reality is that the County Council, they're not going to be up for radical, fundamental, dramatic change. It's going to be incremental change, or pilots, or a phased approach because that's the nature, the conservative nature, with a little 'c', of the organisation.' (F-W/CMT)

Some of this 'conservatism' may have been partially the result of CountyC's caution in a highly unionised environment, hence their 're-badging' exercise:

- 'BPR had got incredibly negative connotations with the unions, so the first time we went to a meeting and started talking about BPR, it was around the time that organisations were announcing thousands of, redundancies, cut-backs, all on, having done an efficient BPR exercise, so basically we re-badged it as service redesign. ...a lot of the banks and insurance companies were shedding thousands of staff and
blaming or crediting BPR with achieving that, and it wasn't a comfortable thing to be talking about. So we just changed the thing, and called it something else.'

(HD/HoS/CMT)

This point was similarly made by the CMT No. 2, who also commented:

- '...we've used the expression service redesign because it's more palatable. In terms of how it's perceived by elected members, and, possibly, strategic directors as well.'

(CS/CMT)

And he commented on BPR's lack of 'fit' with CountyC's 'culture':

- '...does it fit with the culture? Well it tells you something doesn't it - that we've re-badged it, to service redesign.'

(CS/CMT)

The political dimension of 'Labour-controlled' CountyC's 'little 'c' conservatism' and reluctance to be 'shedding' staff was emphasised by this same person:

- 'There is, there would be, scepticism, about it, and fear, in some areas and, in terms of what it means and our ability to deliver -- we're a Labour-controlled authority, committed to, maintaining services -- nobody will tell you this but, in-house, and, not having too great a disruption, on the workforce.'

(CS/CMT)

6.8.1.2 CityC

Resistance to Change – Attitudes & Behaviours & Culture

In an apparent reflection of CountyC's 'County Way', one CityC Pilot Group, respondent – following their BPR training – had a similar comment about the 'way' CityC 'do things':

- 'So that was a concern that I have then and it to me came across as being typical of the way [CityC] do things, in so much that, they like to just play around at the edges and have a go at and, to use the term that I use "dip into", these ideas, BPR being -- being one of them. And it came across very much to me that we -- we've got these set of rules. These are the bits we think are going to be most useful, so these are the
bits that we think perhaps you ought to concentrate on and don't worry too much about the rest of them because we don't think they're that useful anyway, and I was left with this feeling whilst, I could go away and explore if I wanted, the council didn't perceive any merit in pursuing those. And it was put across in that way. And I left the training sessions — there were three or four sessions in all — feeling a little bit deflated and I'd picked up some skills and is usually the case after, that type of, training course you come, back to the workplace, full of enthusiasm thinking, "Right, I'm going to use this, and I need an opportunity now." And that opportunity hasn't materialised.' (AP/HoS)

Similarly, the perception of 'empires' was an issue for managers within CityC also as part of this cultural resistance to change:

- '...people were very concerned about their empires or potential empires reducing by, staff and resources shifting, away, and I think, and this is a concern that I think many people have in the council, that — you cling on to your resources, you cling on to your, to your staff and, to the bits of the service that you deliver, because you want to maintain your status.' (AP/HoS)

He commented that the lack of 'openness', which he saw as prerequisite for successful reengineering, would become another 'barrier' to change because:

- '...the fear would be that they might lose resources as a result and that could affect them personally. The end result could be that a service was being delivered better and the customer was happier, but I don't think that was foremost in their minds.' (AP/HoS)

Later in the interview he returned to the issue of the 'way' CityC 'do' things, implying almost a fad status to this BPR initiative:

- 'The only thing that I would say is that, the way this has panned out — so I was trained, you're given an opportunity to go on, a course, and the interest of people generally, volunteer and you go and see what it's all about. You get the knowledge. You come away. You feel inspired, and it fizzes out, nothing happens. And you personally have got, the knowledge, but you don't feel as though it's being used, and I know that's how I feel, and I know that colleagues that have been on this particular course feel, but I've been on other types, of, training, and it's the same kind of approach, and it's almost — it's a bit like it's the [City] way, that, there's a topical issue.'
They throw some resources at it. They write a strategy document. They get some experts in. They run a course. They get a bit of knowledge on board. They move a few steps down the process, down the line, and then it all seems to stop and — or certainly, really slows down and you lose the momentum, and you're on to the next thing. And I don't know whether it's the same, everywhere in local government and that's just the way it is, or whether it's a particular, thing in [CityC].' (AP/HoS)

Change Management issues

The most senior manager (Chief Officer Group) interviewed on CityC doubted even that their main 'BPR initiative' — that of moving the [Highways] into their contact centre, 'City Direct' — constituted 'reengineering' at all, saying that it was primarily a 'change management' issue:

- 'Well, it is change managed — it's not, nothing about Business Process Reengineering itself. It is about how you get change brought in and it's a real difficult, thing.' (DP/SMT)

But he was clearer that an earlier exercise, on a 'fairly small service area', had been reengineered, and that it 'was BPRed to death' with successful outcomes:

- '...that one itself was good because it was really professionally run. It was a small area, and it proved that you could reengineer both the back office and front office and achieve significant benefits, that was both cost savings and improved customer outcomes.' (DP/SMT)

Perhaps that might be the issue; BPR will be 'alive and well' only when it is 'professionally run', in terms of Lewin, Hammer and Champy, Kotter, etc?

However, this was the person seen by many as the most senior 'leader' in the context of CityC's change management and reengineering initiatives, so perhaps was the one taking a more strategic view than those more closely involved, and the issue of 'involvement' came out in a later comment, highlighting again perhaps Kotter's (1995) emphases on 'communication' and 'empowerment':

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• "We've tried to do it through, persuasion and volunteers but also prioritisation of services that most could benefit from it." (DP/SMT)

This does not appear dissimilar from the comments of the Chief Executive (CE) during a 'conference' interview with himself, the Council Leader and a BBC interviewer, during the Council's '[Improvement Project] Week 2005':

• "We've got to change the people that we have. Most of the people that I've ever come across are up for change, they want to do it." (CE: 2005)

(NB It must be noted, contextually, that the CE was actually 'on stage' when this comment was made – lated transferred to a DVD – and was therefore giving CityC's [Improvement Project] initiatives his positive support. That doesn't mean he didn't mean what he said, but he was unlikely to say the opposite.)

What it was dissimilar from, however, was that same senior leader's comment regarding strong resistance at his own, 'director' level, which was counter to the CE's assertion above:

• 'I'd say; they're all committed to the concepts, but the actuality is somewhat different... Two of the directors were heavily, against that... but it was surprising that they – it surprised me the level of resistance to, going down that route. I think they're resisting their losing control.' (DP/SMT)

Another (Head of Service) had a different take on the 'culture' of CityC; that of doing things 'on the cheap':

• '... that's always been the problem, we've been trying to do it on the cheap. We try and do everything on the cheap, that's part of our – that's one of the real, defining, cultural icons if you like of, cultural symbols of [this] City Council.' (EM/HoS)

He also referred back to the issue of 'organisational readiness', in terms of CityC's cultural 'fit':

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• 'Well I think he probably is on to something, because – poor fit between the realities of our culture, and what you might achieve with BPR, if you were culturally ready for it, lie at the heart of a lot of our problems and – problems as an organisation and problems in terms of, realising [Name's] strategy. [Name's] strategy was, not congruent with our organisational readiness, for what he was proposing...' (EM/HoS)

When asked why they might not be 'ready' he said there was no 'willingness to be radical,' no 'willingness to accept challenge and change.' And when asked who? he replied: 'The senior management group.' He then gave a rather longer view of that same group's approach — or his perception of it — to 'delivering change':

• 'The Chief Officer Group, focus on their, day job, their perception of what that is hasn't changed for a number of years. Then they recognise a load of pressures on them coming, principally externally, to respond to this or respond to this or be seen to deliver this change or that change. Principally, in one form or another, central government or an agency of, that works for central government. They employ people like [Name 1] to, do that for them, so they can get on with their day job. So he goes away and writes something, that's, you know, got lots of words in it that they're seeing in their magazines at the moment, and appears to have, pressed lots of buttons and they say, "Bang on, [Name 1]. Well done. We'll have some of that." And then [Name 1] is supposed to make it happen for them, which means none of this is central; to their — to their real perception — to their perception of what their job really is. So you actually get COG agreeing to this, and then, [the two change managers] for instance, going over to, [Head of Service's] department, encountering resistance, finding people who have no idea they were coming, encountering a resistance problem, and not finding [Head of Service], for instance, of any help; because he doesn't understand what he agreed to and it's peripheral to — not central to — his job. [Name 2], is the council's chief legal officer. That is a solicitor. That's his job but all of this is, "Oh. Oh, you know, well we've got to do it. It's a good job we've got a couple of people like [Name 1] to keep us on the straight and narrow here".' (EM/HoS)

He continued, admitting his overt cynicism, with:

• 'We have adopted, a veneer of enough trendy stuff to make it look like we're pushing the right buttons because that's a necessary tactic in order to keep being employed
and do what we really do. And that's a deeply cynical viewpoint, but... I almost feel obliged to put it because other people will be bullshitting you.' (EM/HoS)

And he repeated that view later – whilst commenting that, 'that's the way it happens a lot' [around here] – that there was, 'No senior management commitment.'

The (then) newly-recruited change managers had a less cynical and possibly more considered approach to these 'cultural' issues:

- 'One of the strands that [Name] and I have been working on for a couple of months now is to position the difference between structure and culture. So, for example, BPR looks at process improvements, that's the structure, methodologies, tool kits, whereas continuous improvement and our belief in that, might well be cultural. ...if you were to look at what the council is good at, it's good at putting structures in place, but not necessarily as adept at helping develop a culture that maximises those structures. ...the way [change manager colleague] and I have been working is to try to move the conversation away from BPR as a toolkit, to continuous improvements as a sense of who we are and what we are.' (FB/CMT)

In the second interview his colleague commented that they had seen no actual 'BPR' going on from the recently trained 'Pilot Group':

- 'We've got no evidence of anybody who's been on the BPR course, having, started, commissioned, run a BPR project.' (KC/CMT)

When asked about the current situation on the 'Highways' project, they sought to separate out BPR from the issue of organisational culture, at least, in the way it was 'done' in CityC:

- **JC:** Where is it now? Where is the [Highways] BPR project now, has it been concluded?
  - **FB:** This is where I get on my hobby horse, so I probably should apologise in advance. There's no such thing as a BPR project. It's a change project with a BPR stage in it. The BPR stage happened between January and April and that was signed off. We're
now in the process of making that change happen.

JC: Can you explain to me what the difference is?

FB: The BPR process, as described in the work that [the BPR training consultants] were commissioned to do, is to design a future model of operating new processes with some perceived or — with a set of benefits that can be delivered once you implement these processes. That is a stage in a much bigger project.

KC: Yeah.

FB: The remainder of the project that we're in now is actually about implementing those changes to deliver those benefits, which is all about people and culture.

JC: Are you saying that BPR isn't about people and culture?

FB: Not the way the model was done here.

And continuing, on BPR within the context of the Council's risk-aversion:

- '...there's a context in which the processes are redesigned and that is the culture of the organisation. So a lot of what we've picked up in the last 12 months is that this organisation is hierarchical: that managers are, perform in a survival mode, if you will. They're not risk-takers. So to be transformational, you've got to take risks. By definition, you're doing something you've never done before.' (FB/CMT)

When questioned further on the Council's appetite for change, the second change manager said:

- 'Not a lot. Not for radical change.' (KC/CMT)

The subsequent dialogue then revealed a possible link to the potential 'risk' of CityC losing its then 4-Star CPA rating, which could then possibly increase that 'appetite' for a more radical, BPR-type of approach, but that it did not exist at the moment:
FB: I think there might be an opportunity and I think the appetite might get more – I think we might develop more – more appetite for more, more radical change if and when we lose our 4-star CPA rating.

JC: So only if you fall in the ratings from where you are now?

FB: I think – that's a personal perception. I think that will generate more appetite, and I think you might get a link between, "Here is where we're not performing very well. We need to do some process reengineering on that." Because there's no link at the minute.

KC: No, there isn't.

They also commented on CityC's 'culture' of 'training', without any evidence of progression to 'learning' and application:

- 'In terms of culture, I think we're stuck at the training block and haven't moved on to learning.' (FB/CMT)

In their second interview they cited project-management training as an example of this cultural 'block':

- 'I think it's also symptomatic of the approach in the council to put people on training courses, without necessarily seeing any learning having come out of there at the end. We've got a long list of people who've done project management training and very little evidence of the project management methodology being implemented anywhere.' (KC/CMT)

This view is not dissimilar from that expressed by a CityC HoS much earlier (under 'BPR - Understanding (Definitions), and its Implementation') that the 'training' was not followed by 'action':

- 'Then we'd have had lots of people coming on the training, because managers would have been told, to learn a methodology, to use it, to report upon it and then take some action. And that's never – that's never happened.' (EM/HoS)

And this lack of training consolidation was echoed by SMT member 'YH':
...we cannot just pay for people to go on training and not help them consolidate that and get some practice.' (YH/SMT)

That same HoS thought that the reason for the subsequent lack of demand for further training in BPR, was because there was no perceived demand actually to 'do the work':

'I think people aren't coming forward for the training because they aren't being asked to do, or don't feel like they need to do, the work.' (EM/HoS)

And when the two change managers were asked to confirm that view – that there was no 'requirement to deliver from that' (BPR training) – they both responded unanimously:

'That's correct.' (K-F)

The interview concluded by returning to 'risk' as one of the 'barriers' to change:

'I was trying to explain earlier, John, that one of – an example of which is in a hierarchical environment, this – it does not encourage – it's not conducive for managers to take risks, to be their own, person, if you will, to manage in their own style. And that is one barrier we need to overcome.' (FB/CMT)

Another interviewee – one who had been indirectly involved in the 'Highways' project – commented on the positive effect of the change managers' involvement:

'I became involved in something that enabled me to not apply the techniques and what have you that I'd been shown on the course, but to see them being adopted, so I say the involvement of the change managers, was, crucial in that. I do wonder how different things would have been had they not been involved. ... it's just if you took the change managers out, what would happen? And I think the danger there would have been that we would have been reverted to type. And so I think the change managers, in terms of just making us think a little bit more radically, was a key component.' (GJ/LM1-2)
He continued with an oblique reference again to a 'Council-wise' culture:

- 'That's what they brought, along obviously with their expertise of the process engineering, but in terms of, basically guiding us to help us think a little bit more – non-council-wise.' (GJ/LM1-2)

As Seddon repeatedly says, 'It's a thinking thing.'

And as has been seen previously, the propensity for 'cynicism', that has also been expressed earlier, might too have been more 'Council-wide':

- 'And there is a degree of cynicism across the council I would say.' (HJ/HoS)

In this case, in this HoS's view, it was about:

- '...the mismatch, between, being a 4-star council, an Excellent council, and the reality of how people feel stretched in trying and deliver its services.' (HJ/HoS)

As we have previously seen, this '4-Star'/Excellent' status can itself be an inhibitor of 'radical' change. But on the issue of BPR and the change managers' effect on that 'cynicism', he was again quite positive:

- '...when the BPR managers came into my section, they were fighting against a fairly, cynical staff view as to, "It's just another fad," and you know, "We just want to get on with the day job which we haven't really got quite enough resources to do anyway." We did turn that perception around. ... We did turn that perception round and credit to the change managers, who were excellent. I would like to think that there has been a mood shift and that the initial cynicism and it's-just-another-fad-isn't-it, have been, I hope, dispelled.' (HJ/HoS)

Nonetheless, and 'talking confidentially,' he still referred to one of CityC's only five 'Directors' as possibly quite 'hostile' to the BPR concept:

- '...the culture in that department, I would imagine, is probably going to be very hostile, to, the concept of using something that I think they'd see as a bit faddy, to be honest.' (HJ/HoS)
The HoS in Change Management also saw 'culture' as one of the issues:

- '...the other culture I think we need is a culture of change and improvement' (SG/HoS/CMT);

and commented on how he saw it at that time (May 2006):

- '[CityC's] culture is one of paying less than the norm, and getting away with less resources than other [Councils].' (SG/HoS/CMT)

Doing things 'on the cheap' (EM), perhaps, or just another result of CityC's Council policy of maintaining a low level of Council Tax, but he too was another who regarded their current '4-Star' status as a constraint against change:

- 'I think that what you need to remember is that another argument that will always come up in [CityC] is, we are an excellent 4-star Council.' (SG/HoS/CMT)

Later, in the second interview (November 2006), he commented again on CityC's 'culture', following his visit to Liverpool, identifying this as yet another constraint:

- 'Now I came back here and tried to use that concept here and we couldn't – the culture here would not allow, that kind of radical, approach... because of the trade unions.' (SG/HoS/CMT)

Referring to a board level 'debate on the wording of CityC's own Change Management Strategy, he said that it was the 'Directors' who were not 'up for' it:

- 'there was a big debate in the Council [was] about... I had still said incremental change because, I knew that we wouldn't – the council wasn't up for the, radical change.' (SG/HoS/CMT)
The political aspect was also an influence, because the 'board' was chaired by the 'Labour' Leader of the Council at that time, who, the interviewee said:

- '...obviously, won't want to upset the trade unions.' (SG/HoS/CMT)

(NB In 2006 the political landscape in CityC changed from a slim Labour majority to a loss of overall Labour control – see table 6.3, below – but the 'Leader' remained the same.)

Table 6.3: CityC's 2006 Council election results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State of the Parties in CityC</th>
<th>Seats on the Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party: 4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; May 2006</td>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; May 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib. Dem.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two years later, in 2008, this had changed even further to that shown in Fig. 6.1, below, since when the Council Leader has been a Liberal Democrat member:

Fig. 6.1: CityC's 2008 Council election results

Source: CityC's Council website (accessed 20/08/08)
There is considerable overlap here between issues of 'culture' – and the [City] 'Way' – and those of effective change management, but they are retained here because of the comment, below, of this same HoS interviewee regarding what he perceived as the 'mentality' of the organisation. In our third interview (January 2007) he exhibited his frustration at the lack of senior management's acknowledgement of the efficacy of the change managers, and their 'positive' contribution:

- 'What they fail to realise is that without the two change managers' virtually full-time input for the last eighteen months, nothing would have happened in [City Direct], and that's the, slightly annoying thing... The feedback that I get from people who [the change managers] work with in terms of change stuff, both for [City Direct] and others, is all positive.' (SG/HoS/CMT)

Another frustration emerged later over the way these (two, at that time) change managers had – or had not – been utilised:

- '...my big regret about what we did with the change-management team, I should never have, committed the change managers, to supporting the [Highways project] like we did, because I think that's where it's all gone wrong because, we've invested, nearly £200,000 in the change managers over the two years, with the support costs and the rest of it, and, people have only seen – people haven't seen any, major, change.' (SG/HoS/CMT)

A further frustration appeared after reflecting on the fact that, '[we] can't even get, people to write business plans here,' so what 'hope' would 'BPR' have:

- 'But across the organisation people just don't see the benefit of that [writing business plans]. Well, if that's the mentality we've got in this organisation – if that's the mentality of managers we've got about just managing their business on a day-to-day basis than planning ahead, what hope have we got of getting them to, think, about, "Oh well, one of my team are going on a BPR session. What am I going to use it for when they come back?"' (SG/HoS/CMT)
6.8.2 Summary of Findings

In summary we might refer back to the literature: Champy suggested that 'change comes with a disruptive relentlessness that used to take decades to play itself out, and now takes only years or months' (1996: 160). In the decade-plus since that was written, that pace of change has not lessened, nor has its 'disruptive relentlessness', but it has more probably accelerated and possibly contributed to the increase in change-management teams (CMT) within organisations generally. CityC and CountyC both have such teams, and in each case the CMT – their leaders and members – came in for praise from the interviewees, for their forward-thinking and hands-on, 1:1 approaches. Criticisms, again generally, were aimed at others within both organisations; but primarily line and senior managers.

Organisational culture – and its almost symbiotically inevitable resistance to (and fear of) change, and thence maintaining the cultural status quo – was perceived by many to be at the root of any lack of meaningful progress with BPR, SRD, or more 'radical' initiatives for change. 'Culture', again according to Champy, is 'probably the most dramatic of these issues':

'Time was, not long ago, when people believed that a culture, even a business culture, was a given. Like the weather, it was something you couldn't do anything about. Now when managers speak of their business's culture, as often as not it's to talk about changing it, using it, manipulating it in some way – to better serve the business.
Culture has become a tool' (ibid: 160/161).

'Tool' or not (and Seddon continually rails against them), 'manipulating' culture in order to 'better serve the business' has inherently to be part of the change management process. Seddon (2008a; Seminar 1) says that 'culture change is free', because it's 'in your system', which is somewhat at odds with his denial of Crosby's (1980) 'Quality is Free' philosophy (Seddon, 2007c). Nonetheless, systemic or not, the culture, the 'Way' – those 'espoused justifications' (Schein, 2004) – within both CityC and CountyC, would appear
to underpin the oft-exhibited resistance to change by line and senior management, alluded to (and complained of) by many interviewees.

'Free' culture change or not, its widespread existence is costly to both organisations in the non-realisation of potential BPR/SRD benefits, but more so perhaps within CountyC, if only because, and ironically, their further progress along that road of change has given rise to more, potentially waste-reduction/service-improvement projects, only to see them slowed, or totally foundered, by that same resistance. Some of this, from the material gained and opinions expressed in that larger organisation — the maintenance of 'headcount', purely to maintain management status and position, and people not gainfully employed up to their full potential for similar reasons — was in their views certainly counter to the 'espoused' values of the organisation and its ethos to 'serve' their citizens.

Within CityC, the resistance, or the potential for resistance, was equally evident but, apart from the 'Highways'/City Direct' project, there was far less evidence of any actual BPR going on, so far less 'radical' change to 'resist'.

The Chief Executive's comment (albeit part of a CityC PR 'broadcast') that, 'Most of the people that I've ever come across are up for change, they want to do it' (CE: 2005), might well be true amongst the 'people' — in the first interview with the HoS of Change Management, he commented on the customer service training they had recently given to (e.g.) the 'bin-men', and that 'the best feedback we got, was from them' — but the wider evidence suggests quite strongly that in the higher echelons of CityC's line management, and up to and including director level, they are not so 'up for [radical] change', nor, apparently, did they 'want to do it'.

Lack of consistent and continuous 'communication' and the active 'involvement' of staff — key success factors in most change programmes ('radical' or not) — were seen by many as reasons why some change projects were not proceeding successfully. 'Doddery old men in dusty corridors', the 'old guard', and 'fearful' senior managers 'protecting empires', appeared to be
in 'denial' of the need for radical change, inhibited even more by their Councils' 'Excellent' and '4-Star' ratings.

The apparent lack of any 'appetite' for 'radical change' was suggested to be a result of managers working in 'survival mode', where the aims were to 'cling to your resources', 'maintain your status', avoid loss of 'control', and maintain a 'veneer of enough trendy stuff', despite the acknowledged 'mismatch' between being a '4-Star'/Excellent' council and the 'reality' of actual service delivery. Evidence suggests that both councils had accepted that 'incremental' ('step') change was the most they could reasonably expect. 'Volcanic' (CountyC) and 'seismic' (CityC) change were not on the agenda.

The following section – Stage 3, Impact Analysis – considers the outcomes and possible impacts of each organisation's reengineering/redesign initiatives.
Chapter 7: Stage 3 – Impact Analysis

7.1 Introduction

This consisted of gathering responses from the two LGos – approximately one-year on from the original in-depth interviews – regarding the outcomes and impacts of their various BPR SRD initiatives, and seeking evidential corroborations.

The process was slightly different for each LGO, as Stages 1 and 2 had already revealed differing degrees of commitment to the basic principle of Business Process Reengineering (BPR) or Service Redesign (SRD).

In CityC's case, no subsequent BPR training (post-Pilot Group) had taken place since 2005, and the only 'project' that had been implemented had been that which had 'reengineered' the 'Highways Dep't' into the new LGO Contact Centre – 'City Direct'. Consequently, the 'impact' data-gathering was focused on the evidence for tangible benefits from the move of 'Highways' into 'City Direct', and obtained through 1:1 interviews with the Contact Centre Manager and the Assistant Director of Customer Services.

Also in CityC, one participant was asked to complete the 'Project Radicalness Planning Worksheet' (Kettinger, et al. 1997) in order to reflect upon the 'radicalness' or otherwise of the one main project they had undertaken. This was limited to one person who had been involved directly with their 'Highways Dep't' project; he was initially one of the change managers, recruited in 2005, but had since been made substantive, and then promoted again to HoS Customer Service, with specific responsibility for the contact centre, 'City Direct'.

In CountyC's case the original participants were also asked to complete the 'Project Radicalness Planning Worksheet' (Kettinger, et al. 1997) in order to reflect upon the 'radicalness' or otherwise of the projects they had undertaken. A later opportunity also arose in 2008 to capture a further cohort of CountyC's
SRD trainees' views as they embarked upon a fresh tranche of Service Redesign projects. This served the combined purpose of gathering their structured views as to the possible 'radicalness' of the projects they were proposing to undertake, and it gave the participants themselves a further assessment process by which they could possibly consider the implications of their project choice.

The main data was gathered via a focus group held on 17th March 2008, for which all five attendees had also completed a short (3 key questions) preparatory questionnaire (see Appendix 20), as extracted below:

1. Project Objectives:
   - What were its key aims?
   - What were its specific (i.e. 'SMART'*) goals?
   - What were you really trying to achieve?

2. What were the actual outcomes of the project(s)?

3. What were the tangible(**) benefits? Where would evidence to support this be seen?

   * S – Specific; M – Measurable; A – Attainable; R – Relevant; T – Trackable (Blanchard, 1989)

   ** e.g. Cashable savings; Improvements in Customer Satisfaction measures; anything else?

The outputs from these questionnaires were charted verbatim – see Appendix 21) – and along with the focus group discussions provided the data required for evaluating the evidence for any tangible impacts from the projects concerned. The larger of the two LGOs will be discussed first, then the smaller.

The primary criterion for the study was Hammer and Champy's (H&C) original definition of Reengineering, given as:
'The fundamental re-thinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of performance, such as cost, quality, service, and speed'.

(Hammer & Champy, 1993: 32)

Three key questions, therefore, emanated from this definition:

1. Were the change management interventions 'process'-centred?

2. Has there been 'fundamental rethinking and radical redesign' of the processes concerned?

3. Is there evidence of 'dramatic improvements'?

7.2 CountyC

The projects considered under this stage of the review were as follows:

1. Advisory Booking Service (CA)

2. Tablet PC Project for Trading Standards (BH)

3. Early Years & Childcare Children's Information Service Redesign (HS)

4. Electronic Document & Records Management (EDRM) (LD)

5. Local Authority Land Searches (F-W)

6. Desktop PCs – Delivery, Maintenance & Support (RT)

Taking these in turn, a further reductive chart (Fig. 7.1, overleaf) was created to distil the outputs from both the questionnaires (pre-focus group, and Kettinger, et al., 1997) into the key elements of:
• nature of 'process' involved;

• degree of 'radicalness' (i.e. 'fundamental rethinking and radical redesign'?);

• potential or predicted 'savings';

• projected benefits;

• was the project completed?

• 'dramatic' nature of results or outcomes.

Note: In addition to the four 'projects' represented by the five focus group attendees, two further sets of both questionnaires were completed by two delegates who were unable to attend on the day, representing two further projects (no's 3 & 6).

Fig. 7.1: Impact Analysis Distillation Chart (CountyC):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project No. &amp; Title:</th>
<th>1 Advisory Booking Service (BH)</th>
<th>2 Tablet PC Project – Trading Standards (CA)</th>
<th>3 Early Years &amp; Childcare Information Service Redesign Project (HS)</th>
<th>4 Electronic Document &amp; Records Management (EDRM) (LD)</th>
<th>5 Local Authority Land Searches (F-W)</th>
<th>6 Remote Management, Desktop PCs (RT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of 'process' involved/ purpose of project</td>
<td>Internal (schools) customer, booking (online enrolment) of courses.</td>
<td>New ways of working for Trading Standards field people, using 'tablet' PCs.</td>
<td>Redirect 100% of all telephone interactions through CountyC's Call Centre.</td>
<td>Corporate-wide enabling project for CountyC's entire document &amp; records management.</td>
<td>Investigation of Land Searches within and between LGOs – consequent improvement.</td>
<td>Council-wide processes for delivery, maintenance &amp; support of desktop PCs – software &amp; hardware.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective(s):</td>
<td>£15,000 (on completion*)</td>
<td>Cost savings in staff time, accommodation &amp; travelling – no estimates. 75% of staff working on the new system.</td>
<td>Redirection of '100%' of calls through CountyC's contact centre. '25%' of</td>
<td>None stated in bus. case, but estimates given of '7-figure' potential over 5-10-year implementation period (see</td>
<td>1.5 FTE (Poss. rising to an 6 x FTE (est'd £161,880) if 'shared service' adopted,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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| Objective(s): | Intangible | To introduce a mediated on-line course enrolment on behalf of the Education Advisory service, through Call [County], and to maximise its efficiency and effectiveness. | 'Try new technologies and see if we could get some efficiencies.' | Increase awareness of County C contact centre amongst users. | To implement a 'Corporate EDRM system; implemented by stages aligned to modern electronic records policy, procedures and corporate file plane which is a logical hierarchical structure for the storage of documents and records.' | To introduce improvements at County & District in moving from paper based processes to electronic processes. To improve service performance and reduce costs. To respond effectively to the growth of Personal Search Companies |

| Due Date: | Mid-Feb., '08 | March, 2008 | 31<sup>st</sup> August 2006 | Not stated | Not stated | Not stated |

| Degree of 'radicalness' (Ave' score) | 3.45 | 2.27 | 3.18 | 3.36 | 2.82 | 1.73 |

| Propensity for Risk *** | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1.5 | 1 |

| 'Radicalness' score overall | 3.22 | 2.13 | 2.59 | 2.18 | 2.16 | 1.36 |

| Potential or predicted 'savings' | £15,000 (see also below *) | None stated | None financial. Largely qualitative | £100,000s to £1,000,000s (Potential) | None stated | None stated |

| Projected benefits | Cost savings & customer improvements | 75% of Trading Standards Officers on remote system | 25%+ of telephone interactions solved at first point of contact (Call Centre) | Non-specific, as benefits would be achieved through phased implementation. Also, major, council-wide 'culture change' | To stem the loss of revenue to Personal Search Companies (PSC) Improve speed of service to customers | Improved consistency of approach. Reduction in wasted resources |

| Was the | Not yet | No – due to | Yes | Not yet | Not yet | No |
From the above it can be seen that three of the six projects (4, 5 & 6) had council- or corporate-wide remits, but only one of these had the potential for very large-scale savings – project 4 (EDRM).

Only one of the six projects (3) has reached completion, and whilst it will have delivered ‘qualitative’ benefits, it has not claimed any ‘cashable savings’.

There was broad agreement within the focus group attendees that project 4 (EDRM) had ‘huge’ potential for cultural change and financial (e.g. ‘7-figure’) savings across CountyC – albeit over a timescale of years (5-10) – but at the
time of that meeting (17th March 2008) the project had still not received its corporate 'go-ahead'.

7.2.1 Degree of 'Radicalness'

The Kettinger et al. (1997: 72) 'Project Radicalness Planning Worksheet' questionnaire in its original form has a separate 'Propensity for Risk' scale of marks at its bottom, to which the average of the main 11 questions are added, and then 'averaged' again in order to arrive at the final 'score', or 'Process Change Strategy', but in order that contributors themselves did not (intentionally or otherwise) allow the potential for this calculation to influence their responses for questions 1-11, this final 'Factor' was homogenised into the main set of questions, and only separated afterwards for calculation.

In the chart above, only that 'average' (from scores 1-11), the 'Risk' score, and the overall calculation – or 'Process Change Strategy' – are shown.

Kettinger et al., at the head of their questionnaire, break their 'strategy' options into three types, each increasing in its degree of 'radicalness'. From left to right these are: 'Process Improvement' (scores of '1'-2'); through 'Process Redesign' (scores of '3', but effectively, say, '2.3'-3.7*?); and to 'Radical Reengineering' (scores of '4'-5'). In the case of these CountyC delegates' projects, no single project scored above the threshold that would have taken it into 'Radical Reengineering'. As above (with 'Risk Propensity'), those three table headings were similarly removed from the questionnaire as presented, in this case so as to not 'guide' the participants' 'scoring' away from the numerical ratings and into a descriptive choice.

(* In their article, Kettinger et al. give the example of a score of '3.68' as being 'Substantial Process Redesign '+'.)

Three of the six projects were ultimately rated within the range '2.13' to '2.18' by their owners, implying a borderline 'radicalness' between 'Process Improvement' and 'Process Redesign'. One project – no. 6, 'Remote
Management' (of Desktop PCs – Delivery, Maintenance & Support) – scored very low at '1.36' overall, and whilst its owner was not part of the focus group, this low rating is consistent with her views expressed at the earlier interview.

The highest rated project – 1; 'Internal (schools) customer, booking (on-line enrolment) of courses' – scored an overall '3.22', still placing it firmly in the 'Process Redesign' category, and unaffected by its mid-range 'Risk' score of '3'. This project had projected 'savings' of £15,000, 'after completion of all phases' – which would not qualify for 'dramatic' results – and it was not yet complete after approximately 18 months' work.

The potentially most 'radical' project – both in terms of the individual project owner's view, the group's view, the 'average' score (Q's 1-11), and its claimed potential to realise 6-7-figure sums, albeit over a period of up to ten years – was no. 4 (EDRM) which rated a mid-range '3.36', placing it still firmly within the 'Process Redesign' bandwidth. However, when the 'Propensity for Risk' was applied by the manager responsible for the project, this reduced further to 'Process Improvement' in overall terms. This was surprising in view of the project's deemed potential for impacting the organisation as a whole, culturally and tangibly, albeit over that very long period, but whilst the 'Feasibility of IT to change [the] process' scored a maximum '5' (as its key enabler), the low scores (2) on 'Performance measurement criteria' and 'Project resource availability', combined then with the lowest score, '1' – indicating a 'Very Risk-averse' organisation – to result in '2.18' for its overall 'Process Change Strategy' rating.

### 7.2.2 Later Planned Projects

Subsequently (May 2008) a request was granted by CountyC to gain further data on this basis from two later cohorts of Service Redesign Training (SRT) – 8th & 28th May – where 14 more questionnaires were completed. These are shown as two separate groups, below, and in both cases their 'Degree of Radicalness' average score are firmly midway in the 'Process Redesign' area. The 'Propensity for Risk' scores are similarly placed, slightly below midway,
giving overall 'Process Change Strategy' ratings of '2.78' and '2.55' for their overall scores:

Table 7.1: Later 'Project Radicalness' ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Group 1 8th May</th>
<th>Group 2 28th May</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree of 'radicalness' (Ave' score)*</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propensity for Risk</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Radicalness' score overall</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>2.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(* Note: Also called the 'basic advisability index')

The relevance of these two groups was that they had yet to embark upon their projects, so were completing this 'Planning Worksheet' as an additional part of their own project planning activities. The highest rated 'Average Factors' (or 'basic advisability index') was '3.64', with the lowest at '2.36' – again suggesting (prior to the 'Risk' factors being added) that they all fell within the 'Process Redesign' range. With two exceptions, the 'Propensity for Risk' ratings were all either '2' or '3'; the exceptions being one each at '1' and '4'. The respondents all felt that the device was a useful addition to their Service Redesign project planning processes.

The full scorings for all three groups can be seen at Appendix 22.

7.2.3 Individual Projects (Main Group)

Project 1 – Advisory Booking Service (BH)

This project was essentially dealing with the approximately 10,000 calls p.a. for course bookings for LEAs, and was supported by a weighty
Project/Business Case (23rd October 2007) detailing where it aimed to contribute to nine 'Corporate Objectives' over the areas of 'Improving Access', 'Seamless Services', and 'Improving Services'.

Its owner, however, confessed that one of the reasons it was not yet completed was because they had been 'sidetracked' on to other 'really interesting' and 'more exciting' projects – the 'accommodation' aspects, for example, and 'reviewing the places we use'. The potential gains from this 'sidetracking' were higher than the initially projected '£15,000' for the original project, and more likely to be in the order of '£100,000s' than '£10,000s', or 'a decent wedge' (CA). However, whilst this did appear to be a further and 'more exciting' reengineering opportunity, one problem was that it required a more 'concentrated effort and concentrated resources which [the group] weren't able to give at that time'; so, 'interesting' or 'exciting' as it might have been, the group was required to refocus on its original project and the 'BPR' did not happen.

The other snag, as project 2's manager (CA) pointed out, was that as soon as any such 'cashable savings' had been identified by any planned project, they would be 'taken straight out of your budget, so you don't have a choice about how you might re-use this, it's gone'; and that was why certain managers were 'very nervous' about stating potential savings up-front and 'quoting a figure.' (The delegate's point about 're-use' was made in the context of Gershon's requirement to 'release people to the front-line'.) This 'nervousness', a point agreed by all there, had led to 'efficiency savings being scaled back' because the 'last thing you want is an over-estimate.'

Project 2 – Tablet PC Project – Trading Standards

The primary aim of this project was to bring about more 'flexible ways of working' with field-based Trading Standards people, using 'tablet' PCs rather than the existing 'form-based' methods. A key aim had been to get '75%' of the field people using the new methods by 'mid-2007' (later revised to 'March
A secondary objective had been to 'try new technologies and see if we could get some efficiencies.'

More specifically, it had aimed to:

- save costs – staff time, accommodation & travelling;
- improve data quality, and;
- pilot new ways of working – flexible working/location-independent working.

However, whilst a survey 'showed that our customers liked the new system and thought it was a good idea,' the project had not progressed because 'resource originally allocated' had been taken elsewhere, and because senior 'management have not 'bought in' to full consequences of change needed.' In terms of tangible 'financial' benefits, there had been 'none gained.'

Project 3 – Early Years & Childcare Children's Information Service Redesign Project (HS)

The primary aim of this project – the only one in the sample that had been completed – was to redirect all calls for this service into the new 'Call County' contact centre, with '25%' of those interactions being dealt with at 'first contact'. This had been completed, with largely qualitative and 'non-cashable' (e.g. Gershon) benefits, but also with more than the planned '25%' of calls being handled at 'first' contact' by CountyC's call centre.

Project 4 – Corporate EDRMS (Electronic Document & Records Management System)

During the focus group itself the owner of this project confirmed this was a major 'corporate' project with initial cost estimates in the order of £400,000, and a potential initial 'saving' of (circa) £500,000, or £100,000 net. This apparently low initial 'gain' was due to the up-front investment required (by the 'lead department'), from which the Council would then continue to benefit as a
whole as more 'departments' embraced, and were embraced by, the new IT system. Its primary aims were to:

- improve efficiency by increasing use of electronic workflow methods;
- reduce office accommodation tied up with paper storage;
- modernise services for our customers by widening the range of methods they can use to communicate with us;
- expand access and inclusion by supporting 24/7 service delivery in 'Call [County]' and our Web site;
- increase the number of types and volume of electronic transactions, thus improving our responsiveness, and lowering our data-capture costs;
- improve support for remote and home-working, with consequent reductions in property costs and unproductive travel time; and,
- provide a robust and standards-compliant corporate information management solution, ensuring we can easily and effectively satisfy Data Protection and Freedom of Information obligations.

However, there were 'big issues' involved according to the project manager; for example the major cultural change required by the Council in the way it managed information, and the fact that (at present) it did not have an information management strategy. He was keen to stress that whilst it was an IT-based project – 'because it's IT that does it' – the major issue was the requirement for 'cultural change', 'a shift in the way (they) manage information,' and, as another member present emphasised, departments will 'need to use it' in order for the council to make the savings!

As the project owner stated in his pre-meeting questionnaire responses, 'aside from realising efficiency gains,' what they were 'really trying to achieve' was:

- 'to change the culture of the organisation in the way in which departments and individuals work together.' (LD/LM1-2)

Additionally, in his original 'Detailed Business Case' (April 2004, p.7) he had been clear that it was 'important to note that the efficiency gains realised by the project will lead to employee role changes and present many opportunities
to release or re-deploy human resources', i.e. people. This was entirely in line with CountyC's needs in terms of Gershon's (2004) agenda, and Hammer and Champy's view that:

Fundamental changes in business processes have implications for many other parts and aspects of an organization – every part of it, in fact' (1993: 65).

However, in terms of the 'actual outcomes of the project', he had responded simply, 'Ongoing', although during the group discussion he (LD) stated he expected to hear 'within the next 24 hours' whether a decision to go ahead had been taken. (NB E-mail dated 25th Sept., 2008, stated that CountyC's 'EDRM procurement [bid had] failed and [they] had to identify other options for moving forward. Cabinet agreed to merging the EDRM project with another larger project to replace all existing financial and HR systems.‘)

Project 5 – Local Authority Land Searches (F-W)

This project was interesting in that during the focus group its 'key aims' were stated as being to:

- improve the speed of service;
- claw back business (i.e. loss of revenue) from Personal Search Companies (PSC); and,
- develop 'shared services' with other Councils in the county.

However, on the individually-submitted questionnaire responses the two 'joint' project managers (PM) had slightly differing interpretations, as shown in the table below:

**Table 7.2: Project 5 'Objectives'**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Manager FB/CMT</th>
<th>Project Manager WM/CMT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What were its (or their) key aims?</td>
<td>What were its (or their) key aims?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To investigate whether the Land Searches processes of managing and using information, within and between</td>
<td>To ensure that the Districts respond effectively to changing customer expectations and the growth of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What were the specific (i.e. "SMART") goals?

**Stage 1 (6 weeks)**
- To agree a mechanism for the electronic exchange of information between the County Council and District Councils in Derbyshire relating to the Land Searches service.
- To baseline information relating to existing processes.
- To identify potential process improvements and level of benefits arising.
- To develop an outline specification for a potential prototype solution.
- To produce and end of Stage 1 Report – (before any agreement to Stage 2).

**Stage 2 (12 weeks)**
- To develop a prototype system to assist with responses for datasets which are currently maintained electronically.
- To assess each dataset that is currently held in non-electronic format as to whether it should be electronically captured.
- To undertake appropriate data capture and solution population.
- To produce an end of project report.
- To make recommendations for further action and the potential wider roll-out beyond the pilot area.

What were you really trying to achieve?
- To introduce improvements at County & District in moving from paper based processes to electronic processes.
- To improve service performance and reduce costs.
- To respond effectively to the growth of Personal Search Companies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific</th>
<th>Measurable</th>
<th>Achievable</th>
<th>Realistic</th>
<th>Timely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To stem the erosion of revenue that is being lost to Personal Search Companies.</td>
<td>An increase in the amount of income collected</td>
<td>To improve the efficiency of the service and explore the potential for joint working</td>
<td>Partners keen to address the service problems</td>
<td>Income currently lowest it has ever been, service heading for trouble</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To improve the efficiency of the service and explore the potential for joint working</td>
<td>A reduction in the number of days for a search to be undertaken</td>
<td>To improve the speed of the service to the customer</td>
<td>Sponsorship from Chief Executive</td>
<td>Opportunity due to new shared service agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To improve the speed of the service to the customer</td>
<td>A reduction in the number of days to exchange information with partner</td>
<td>Improvements in performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Whilst both sets of 'objectives' might cover the project's overall remit, what is surprising is that only one set – that in the right-hand column – had been lifted from the Service Redesign Project document (February 2007), and even then the 'SMART' goals in that column – taken from the pre-meeting questionnaire – had not appeared in that same project document. Also, at the time of the proposal's submission (October 2007; part of those two delegates' 'Learning Through Work' module assignment), these 'objectives' had been commented on by the then course tutor as seeming to be 'reactive', and he had posed the question, 'Are you perhaps missing an opportunity to be radical and dramatic in terms of improvement?' The fact that these objectives had not changed in the intervening six months suggests that that 'opportunity' was still being 'missed'.

In similar vein the responses to questions 2 and 3 in the questionnaire are shown in tabular form, below, to highlight the two delegates' differing perceptions of progress to date:

Table 7.3: Q2; What were the actual outcomes of the project?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Manager FB/CMT</th>
<th>Project Manager WM/CMT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identified and trialled options for improvements in the Land Searches Service;</td>
<td>The project is still ongoing. Some progress has been made; for example, there has been improvement in the exchange of information between districts and the County.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantified benefits of moving to mainly electronic processes, from mainly paper based processes;</td>
<td>A draft business case for the project has been produced and approved by the Council's Chief Executives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified, captured and maintained appropriate electronic data – covering 1/3 of [district council cited];</td>
<td>Some business process workshops have taken place, which have identified inefficiencies in the process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed, populated and trialled a prototype system;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established an electronic transfer mechanism with [district council cited];</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced staff skill levels in Mapinfo and project delivery;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured and ongoing maintenance of County-wide details of Section 38/278 Agreements – published on (CountyC's Intranet);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlighted overlap with other service areas – Highway Systems (NSG) and Asset Management – with potential for resource sharing;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified potential income opportunities (e.g. Prescribed line revocation);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An End Stage 1 Report and an End of Project Report.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.4: Q3; What were the tangible benefits? (&) Where would evidence to support this be seen?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Manager FB/CMT</th>
<th>Project Manager WM/CMT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electronic records use at County;</td>
<td>Not too many at present apart from performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of a suitable GIS based system;</td>
<td>between exchange of information between County and the districts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced staff skill levels;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced staff willingness to embrace new working methods;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce turn round time between CountyC and [district council cited] from 4 days to 1 day.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In one sense both these PMs were in agreement, as they had been working together on this project for some 18 months at least, yet in another the five 'tangible benefits' in the left-hand column, above, do not equate to the right-hand column's, 'Not too many at present', reflecting their different perceptions of progress to date.

Project 6 – Remote Management (of Desktop PCs – Delivery, Maintenance & Support) (RT)

This project was represented in the interviews by the only non-management grade within the cohort taking part. The employee concerned came over as equally intelligent, committed, and professionally aware as the management grades interviewed (as expected). She also commented on her relatively recent tenure with the County Council (approximately 20 months at February 2007).

Her rating (Kettinger, et al., 1997) of 'Project Radicalness' scored '1.73', prior to its 'weighting', but this interviewee was another who scored CountyC as '1', or 'Very Risk-averse', which then reduced the project's 'Radicalness' score overall to '1.36', the lowest of all the projects.
Its 'key aims' were stated as:

To address the duplication of effort and resources in the delivery, support and maintenance of desktop computers; specifically:

- Software deployment;
- Patch management;
- Software and hardware inventory;
- Software metering.

She commented that 'SMART goals were not observed,' and in answer to the question – 'What were you really trying to achieve?' – stated:

- 'A more consistent approach to the way computers are delivered and managed to bring all machines in line with basic standard requirements. This was intended to reduce the amount of resources used manually and [in] reactively managing computers, and also wasted resources in users waiting for help.' (RT/Non-Mgr)

However, in response to – 'What were the actual outcomes of the project?' – she said, simply:

- 'Nothing changed.'

Similarly, in reply to the final joint question(s) – What were the tangible benefits? (and) Where would evidence to support this be seen? – she again confirmed:

- 'As no changes were implemented, there were no tangible benefits.'

This is yet again consistent with her views at interview some 13 months earlier when she had commented that:

- '...at the moment it's being shelved.'
Back at that time, I had asked, and being very clear that I was only seeking to check for understanding, '...what you're saying is that, within the ICT division at least, whilst one or two people appear to be trying to champion Service Redesign, other people are tiptoeing around it, not telling the truth, afraid of, having to divulge how they work now in case that has to change. Am I misunderstanding you?', and she had responded quite clearly:

- 'No, you're not.' (RT/Non-Mgr)

Savings per se were being made across CountyC, but not necessarily, through the use of BPR. For example, savings of 'something like £30,000' had been made through taking '244' mobile phones 'off contract', but there was no evidence at all that this was anything other than a normal management 'review' of the variety of contracts existing across the council and bringing them together into one, thence negotiating a better council-wide deal.

As with CityC, CountyC also had gone through a stage of input from an external consulting organisation to build their in-house change management expertise, from which, in late 2001, the change management team (CMT) had emerged. A larger organisation in FTE terms (by an approximate factor of 3), CountyC embarked upon a broader change management agenda of '24 projects', with, commencing in 2004, some specific staff training in service redesign (SRD). Many findings were similar to CityC's.

1. Was it 'process'-centred?

There was an aim, clearly, to bring about a more process-centred approach to change, evinced by the training of some 90 people from 2004 to 2008. However, the evidence from those interviewed – drawn primarily from the 2006 tranche – has shown a mixture of approaches, successes and results. Some projects – vehicle maintenance (PJ/LM1-2), mobile phones (HD) – and
their claimed results, were really little more than the robust application of sound, but normal, management practices.

2. Has there been 'fundamental rethinking and radical redesign'?

There was little evidence of this depth of approach to those projects embarked upon and/or completed. That is not to say 'change' has not been happening, but the degree of 'challenge' to existing processes has – as in the other case study – been restricted by the cultural resistance to, and fear of, anything approaching 'radical' change, especially (according to the interviewees) at the higher levels of management.

In the context of the original template for BPR, 'fundamental rethinking and radical redesign' have a very clear implication of a 'no holds barred' approach. This means, equally clearly, that processes themselves are 'at risk', as well as the 'roles' and personnel who operate them. In this respect, and also it seems because of its current political affiliations, CountyC was definitely risk-averse. This view was supported by outputs from the Kettinger et al. (1997) 'Project Radicalness Planning Worksheet'.

3. Have there been, or is there evidence of, 'dramatic improvements'?

Again this is contextual, as 'dramatic' for some is 'modest' for others. As above, this became more evident when the 2008 cohort were asked to 'rate' their planned projects using Kettinger, et al's (1997) 'Planning Worksheet', where their results fell distinctly within the mid-range 'Process Redesign', rather than 'Radical Reengineering'. Lest it be assumed the respondents were avoiding extreme 'rankings', the comment above is drawn from the overall calculations and averaged from the groups, but within individual questionnaires there was ample evidence of the full range of options being used.

The one project that showed the most potential for more dramatic gains – or savings (albeit over the longer-term) – across the whole council, after more
than two years' work to date, was still to gain formal approval. Another, that had 'delivered', showed possible savings of approximately £15,000, but in the context of an LGO charged with achieving cuts of £7.3M over the current financial year, that's relatively insignificant.

7.2.4 Summary

Overall, from the sample projects supplied within CountyC, there was no real evidence of any 'dramatic' outcomes, improvements or savings having been achieved, and from those few projects detailed above there is no real evidence of successful 'reengineering'. That is not to say that no improvements were being made. Their CMT have 'delivered' on '23 out of 24' planned projects over the period 2001-2008 (presentation by Head of CMT, May 2008), in addition to those sampled above. Total 'investment' on those projects is unclear, but there has been £10M on IT 'infrastructure' alone, with (e.g.) a 47% increase in public e-mail transactions (1,700/month) by 2006.

The Council has invested to date a notional £15-20,000 with UoD in terms of Service Redesign Training (SRT), and they have for some while had a comprehensive range of 'tools and techniques' (T&T) available to all staff on their in-house intranet, yet on the basis of this research evidence that investment has yet to yield any meaningful tangible savings.

Some of the 'projects', above (at least in terms of their documentation), have shown indications of use of that SRT, plus possibly those T&T, yet there has been no evidence of 'reengineering' as defined hereto; 'fundamental rethinking and radical redesign', and delivering 'dramatic results', and this is despite the fact that the Head of the CMT intimated that they were 'badging' much of their general 'change' initiatives under the banner of BPR:

- '...we're badging an awful lot of our, change generally stuff as reengineering, service redesign projects.' (HD/HoS/CMT)
This lack of evidence would reinforce the point made by the owner of Project 4 (EDRM), above – but in this case referring to the use of that SRD training – that, 'departments will need to use it' in order for the council to make the savings!, otherwise the training investment, and the potential for real service improvements and tangible savings – at least from this (or these) initiative(s) – is wasted. Also, it is perhaps equally reasonable to suggest, though, that the low-hanging-fruit has now been picked, and all the windfalls collected.

On this evidence at least, BPR, quintessentially, is not 'alive and well' within CountyC.

7.3 CityC

CityC has claimed one, major 'reengineering' initiative through the period 2006-2007, the bulk of the period studied. This was the reengineering (their term) of their 'Highways' dep't into a front- and back-office arrangement, with a number of the internal 'front-line' staff being transferred into the council's new contact centre, 'City Direct'. CityC engaged the services of an external consulting group from late 2005 until later in 2006, primarily to carry out the first tranche of 'BPR' training, but then additionally to directly lead the council's BPR intervention within its initial redesign of the 'Highways' service.

1. Was it 'process'-centred?

Although in essence this was a 'process-centred' change, one of the (then) newly recruited change managers stated that the:

- '[Highways] implementation into [City] Direct is more of a change programme than a BPR project' (e-mail, 30th October, 2006).

He added at the time, however, that:

- '[City Direct] in many ways runs counter-culture in that it is focusing the Council into processes across departments as opposed to current silo thinking' (ibid).
This comment on 'silo thinking' was in line with one of the stated aims of CityC's 'Corporate Restructure', issued one year earlier. One extract of this stated that:

'The intention of the new structure is to give us a slimmer more strategic Chief Officer team, which can respond more quickly to the fast changing agenda and one where every director can be responsible for a range of functions and not be locked into specialist silos.'

On the Highways initiative alone, it would be reasonable to conclude that elements of the change were process-centred, but what has not been clear is the extent to which those remaining 'back-office' processes have been subject to the same reengineering, subsequent to the 'front-office's movement into City Direct. However, in a later interview with the now HoS Customer Service – the manager of 'City Direct' – the interviewee claimed that 'reengineering' of this 'back office' is now, 'exactly what we are doing'.

What has been clear is that – apart from those units directly affected by the Highways initiative; e.g. Pest Control, Parking Services, Parks and Trees – no other BPR-type interventions (in CityC’s terms) or projects have taken place within CityC. No other BPR training has taken place, and, as one HoS interviewee commented, CityC appeared to be quietly 'abandoning' BPR:

- 'I think we're slowly in the process of abandoning BPR as an approach.' (EM/HoS)

However, this may still not be the case, as the HoS Change & Performance Management, in a presentation to management on 13th Feb., 2008, stated as one of his eight bullet points on his 'Transforming [CityC]' agenda, that (we) must:

- '...review all our processes diverting resources from back-office support to front-line service delivery' (SG/HoS/CMT)
In that same presentation he also declared that, by itself, 'incremental change' would not 'be enough'. This is contrary to the statement in his own 'Change Management Strategy' document (Version: Final 2.0, July 2006, p. 4), where it stated:

'The Council will in most cases adopt an incremental approach to change.'

This too, however, was inconsistent with a later paragraph, under section 3. The Way Forward – Delivering the Strategy, which under 3.21 (p. 11) stated:

'A key area of work across the Council is the fundamental review and redesign of processes. This is known as Business Process Re-engineering – BPR. ... The corporate Change Management Team as well as managers of the services being reviewed will undergo comprehensive training in the Council's methodology prior to any review work starting.'

Inconsistencies such as these in messages from 'the top' are likely more to confuse than unite the management and workforce, especially in terms of any 'vision' for the future.

We have seen that this 'comprehensive training' (albeit only 2-3 days) took place once only, in 2006, and primarily involved those directly affected by the Highways initiative. Since completion of the training, the attendees have had no involvement with any 'BPR-type' of improvement work, nor were they required to initiate any themselves. Therefore, whilst CityC has made major changes to one key area of its organisation, it has demonstrably not embraced BPR, and certainly not in any robust and 'corporate' way.

2. Has there been 'fundamental rethinking and radical redesign'?

In some respects, yes, because the 'Highways' service has been 'rethought' from a large, apparently 'failing', administrative unit, and 'redesigned' into a new front- and back-office service, with the customer-contact element being taken over by 'City Direct'. In other respects no, or not really, because the degree to which this had been 'fundamentally' rethought or 'radically'
redesigned has to be seen in the context of an organisation mostly comfortable with slower rates of change. It might seem 'fundamental' and 'radical' to CityC, but front- and back-office thinking (contact centres and 'specialists') have been around for decades.

However, and importantly, it was not a universally held view that this particular service was actually 'failing', and closer attention to its resourcing might have delivered acceptable improvements in situ.

No, also, because the redesign itself was not the result of any local 'fundamental rethinking', but as much (if not more) the result of corporate visits to other councils (e.g. Liverpool) – what Seddon (2008a) calls 'Industrial Tourism' – and the perceived need to 'reengineer services into the contact centre' (SG), as part of, and driven by, central Government's 'e-Government' agenda run by their 'e-Government Unit' (EGU), whose mission states:

- "'ensuring that IT supports the business transformation of Government itself so that we can provide better, more efficient, public services.' The Prime Minister, Tony Blair.' (See: [http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/e-government/](http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/e-government/) – last updated 04/05/07; accessed 17/07/08.)

That this had been a CityC intention is confirmed by a June 2005 report to the 'Chief Officer Group', where item 3, under 'Context', stated:

'A key element of the Customer Services Strategy is the development of an integrated Contact Centre in the city centre.'

Also – and this was relevant from the outset – at the 'Review of Draft BPR Toolkit' meeting between CityC and its BPR consultants, held on 8th November 2005, one of CityC's newly recruited change managers specifically asked the contractor if he could:

'...confirm that the BPR Toolkit has not been designed for 'Radical Change' (FB/CMT)'

(Meeting minutes).
The contractor responded (i.e. 'confirmed that...'):

'the BPR Toolkit has been designed for 'Incremental Change' (ibid).

Those minutes also show that the change manager:

'...commented that the 'Implementation' section of the Toolkit is not strictly BPR' (ibid).

This was somewhat incongruous, given that 're-engineering' and/or 'BPR' were mentioned specifically a dozen times in the main 17 pages of CityC's (2005) 'Change Management Strategy', and warranted its own 4-part section within the Strategy's 'Action Plan' (pp. 18/20).

Elements of 'BPR' were, though, evident in the 'rethinking' of processes as, under the initial guidance of the external contractor, the relevant departments went through a 'BPR Blueprint Workshop' (26th Sept., 2005), process-mapping exercises to establish (e.g.) the 'As-Is' process, followed by a number of 'To-Be' and 'Straw Man' review meetings (their contractors' terminology), most of this taking place in the early part of 2006.

In effect, however, the apparent 'solution' had been decided before the 'problem' was properly identified and examined, if it was at all. The processes were simply 'redesigned' to fit that solution. That is not BPR.

3. Have there been, or is there evidence of, 'dramatic improvements'?

One of the issues here was that there were no 'measures' taken of relevant end-to-end service delivery prior to the reengineering exercise. The primary source, therefore, of evidence of improvement, post-reengineering, has been the data made available by the Head of Service (HoS) of City Direct, CityC's contact centre (one of the change managers recruited in late 2005, now promoted), in a lengthy discussion on 2nd June 2008. This was two years after publication of the 'Final' version of CityC's 'Change Management
Strategy' (July, 2006), and four years after its 'Service Access Review' (March, 2004).

The three key themes, or questions, of this discussion were:

1. What were the perceived or actual improvements?
2. Has there been any demonstrable, measurable benefit in customer service?
3. Has there been any cashable saving in terms of Gershon; jobs, £££?

One claimed 'improvement' was that, prior to 'reengineering', the previous Highways staff of 5-6 people were able to deal with approximately 250 calls per day. Since the move, with now 3½-4 people, they (City Direct) were able to take up to 350-400 calls per day. This was CityC's perceived 'headline' improvement; that they could now take more customer calls per day with fewer staff. However, the manager/interviewee concerned (FB) accepted the principle that 'activity' should not be confused with 'work' (Seddon, 2008b), and that the increased call numbers may have simply reflected those that previously were not 'getting through'. He accepted also that there was no actual measure in place to ask customers if their 'problem had been resolved.'

They had been unable to track any savings from this project, and the manager could give no 'cashable benefits from the [Highways] exercise':

- 'What's turned out to be the benefits have not been cashable benefits.' (FB/CMT)

He estimated that the current level of 'failure demand' into City Direct was in the order of '40%', presenting considerable opportunities for waste reduction. He also accepted that new IT systems were being brought in without any prior 'reengineering' of relevant processes, although some may then be done 'as a result', and he agreed that this 'wasn't BPR'.

He said that, when they were initially recruited, the two change managers were not 'pointed at any back-office reengineering, which is where the
cashable benefits really were,' and that the 'focus' had been on the 'front-office' (City Direct), reaffirming that the changes were contact centre-driven.

On 'dramatic changes', he accepted that there was no evidence of these:

- 'I don't think there are any dramatic changes.' (FB/CMT)

He also agreed that there had been no 'release of resources to the front-line' (Gershon), and that there were 'no cashable benefits that we've reported.'

7.3.1 Project Radicalness

For reasons that will now be clear, there was no broad swathe of people engaged in process redesign or reengineering-type projects to whom the PRPW could be offered. It was therefore offered to one person, to complete retrospectively, but from the perspective of when he had recently (winter 2005/2006) join the Council and was about to become involved in the 'Highways' reengineering project.

This one response is probably worth some consideration and explanation. Starting at the extremes, there were only two ratings at '1' (the lowest score), and just one at '5' (the highest); lowest two first:

- Rating 'Process breadth' at '1' positions this 'Highways' process clearly at the 'intra-functional' end of the spectrum, whereas rating 'Performance measurement criteria' at '1' ('efficiency-based') suggests possible alignment with the 'cost savings' imperative that was one of the key drivers for CityC's choice of BPR as a process of change within its overall Change Management Strategy.

- Alternatively, rating 'Value chain target' at '5' maintains that this was a 'core' process. This has to be seen in the context of CityC as a collection of services – as opposed to being a single-focus organisation.
- of which 'Highways' was the largest service and, some suggested, one that was deemed to be 'failing'.

Fig. 7.2: PRPW example for CityC

'Project Radicalness Planning Worksheet'

Name: HoS Customer Service
Project Title: CityC's 'Highways' project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic centrality</td>
<td>Is the targeted process merely tangential (1) or integral (5) to the firm's strategic goals and objectives?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does IT enable only incidental change (1) or fundamental process change (5)?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility of IT to change</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>process</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process breadth</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior management commitment</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance measurement criteria</td>
<td>Are the preferred performance measurement criteria efficiency-based (1) or effectiveness-based (5)?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process functionality</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project resource availability</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural flexibility</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural capacity for change</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management's willingness to</td>
<td>Does any modest impact on people (1) or a management willing to deal with the consequences of disruptive impacts (5)?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>impact people</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value chain target</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior management's propensity</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for risk</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen above, apart from the 'risk-aversion' rating, all other responses were either '2' or '4'. The lower, '2', ratings will be dealt with first:
'Project resource availability' – not rated as 'scarce', but certainly perceived as relatively low, and consistent with an organisation that considered itself to be 'lean'.

'Structural flexibility' – whilst not rated as 'rigid' (because they were reorganising into a front- and back-office structure – the organisation was firmly maintaining its hierarchical structure.

'Cultural capacity for change' – again, whilst willing to move from the status quo ante and 'split' the service, CityC was still retaining its top-down, command-and-control culture.

'Management's willingness to impact people' – the 'disruption' to people was largely limited to a small quota of personnel being moved into the new contact centre, with the resultant cessation of a small number of 'temps'.

* Note: this is not 'lean' in terms of Krafjik (1988), or 'systems thinking'.

These were again balanced off by four ratings at '4':

'Strategic centrality' – this was relatively 'central' to CityC's strategic goals, as can be seen from their Service Access Review and Change Management Strategy (Appendix 19) documents.

'Feasibility of IT to change process' – this was largely an IT-driven project. The new contact centre, 'City Direct', was a 'given' solution. 'Highways' was simply the first major service to be moved into it.

'Senior management commitment' – this has to be seen in the context of someone who (at the time being retrospectively considered) had been recently recruited to become directly involved in this change project, and it was 'led' by the one Chief Officer who was rated by most respondents as the 'leader' of reengineering at that level. This is an entirely reasonable response from that time, and that person is no longer with the organisation.

'Process functionality' – this was deemed to be fairly 'low', but as we have seen elsewhere, this was not a universal view, especially amongst those closest to it; where one person's (AD) view was that, had it been more adequately resourced in situ, 'reengineering' might not have been necessary.
The only rating not yet dealt with is 'Senior management's propensity for risk', which was rated at '3'. He qualified this by commenting that, back at that time, he saw the HoS 'Highways' as 'very risk-averse on people', and that now, thirty months later, he perceived the whole 'organisation' as 'very risk averse when it comes to people'. As has also been explained previously, what he hadn't been told was that this final statement was used differently in the overall calculation, i.e. used to 'weight' the average of the sum of those above; see below, Table 7.5:

Table 7.5: CityC's 'Radicalness' Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HoS (FB)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree of 'radicalness' (Ave' score)*</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propensity for Risk</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Radicalness' score overall</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the event his risk-aversion rating made little difference to the overall score of '2.8', placing (again) this relatively major change exercise still firmly within the bounds of 'Process Redesign'; not 'Radical Reengineering'.

This is relevant because this person was positive about the potential for use of this PRPW question set in the context of the Council's overall approach to change:

- 'I think it was extremely useful. I think, uh – I do think you could use it to assess the type of change program or project you're getting into. It might lead you to look at the type and quality of resources used to fund the project. ... And we would benefit from having something like that in our change management methodology' (FB/CMT);
...and he was in a position (having since been promoted twice) of being able to influence that.

7.3.2 Summary

CityC have taken a major process and, over a period of 1-2 years, redesigned that process into a restructured, front-/back-office arrangement, that was largely driven by an IT-based imposed 'solution'. It was in line with one of their strategic aims – improving 'access' to services – but there have been no recorded cashable savings. None of the BPR-trained people, not involved in this specific change, have been encouraged or required to embark upon any other BPR-type change projects, and all subsequent planned BPR training was cancelled (through 'lack of demand'). No other BPR or reengineering projects are planned.

On this evidence again, BPR, in the terms of radical reengineering, is not 'alive and well' within CityC.
Chapter 8: Stage 4 – 'Member Check'

8.1 Testing

As mentioned previously, a 'member check' (Lincoln & Guba, 1985: 236) was conducted where:

>'the provisional report (case) is taken back to the site and subjected to the scrutiny of the persons who provided the information (or counterpart persons). The task is to obtain confirmation that the report has captured the data as constructed by the informants, or to correct, amend, or extend it, that is, to establish the credibility of the case' (ibid).

In each 'case', the 'counterpart persons' – whilst themselves people who had been interviewed on more than one occasion – were the Heads of Change Management in each of the two Councils. These 'member checks' were based on extracts from the key findings – 10 points in CityC's case, and 13 points for CountyC – and presented to the respective 'persons' on Thursday and Friday, 16th and 17th October, 2008.

Their responses were quite pragmatic, and almost entirely in agreement with the findings, as précised on these visits. 'Almost', because in isolated examples they queried items in order to check for understanding, but mostly they actually added supporting and constructive comments to the feedback as delivered; examples overleaf.
8.1.1 'Understanding' of BPR?

On the point of senior managers' 'understanding' of BPR, their respective feedback (with extracts from responses) was:

1. *CityC:*

   Senior managers (leaders) are regarded as lacking understanding of the true nature and portents of BPR – considerable variation within and across CityC.

   The interviewee's response was pragmatic acceptance; with comments such as: it was 'a fair point'; 'I don't disagree'; it's 'possibly due to personalities' and/or 'the way we operate.'

2. *CountyC:*

   The perception was that senior managers (leaders) lack understanding of the true nature and portents of BPR – considerable variation within and across CountyC. This was more apparent when 'job losses' might result, although there was evidence of 'post-freezing' when vacancies occurred and whilst redeployment opportunities were considered.

   The interviewee's response included such comments as: 'Fair comment. We did not have a focus on definition and understanding. The focus was structural, changing the structure could produce cost savings [and] we could hit targets by moving things around, cutting out areas of duplication.'

   [It was] 'difficult to engage managers with programme.'

8.1.2 'Organisational Readiness'?

As a second example, on the subject of 'readiness' the feedback was the same for both organisations (again with extracts from responses):
'A predominant view was that [the Council] was not 'ready' for such radical change as 'reengineering'.

Responses:

1. CityC

This was considered a 'fair point' – CityC is a '4-Star' organisation and 'external assessments [had] been consistently good... difficult to push radical change ... no need ...'

This was seen as a 'timing' issue, because of 'personalities' and 'where [some senior managers were] in their careers... retiring soon'; [We're] 'not complacent ... but selling radical change [is] more difficult' now than perhaps it will be in a couple of years' time.

2. CountyC

'Yes agreed, but we need to move on. We need to push on, push [that] emphasis, [that] Project Management emphasis.'

8.1.3 'Case for Action/Drivers'?

As a further example – that of contact centres as the drivers for change – the feedback was again similar, with respective response extracts shown also:

1. CityC

'The key drivers appeared to be the need to cut costs and the 'fashion' for contact centres.'

The interviewee nodded; adding that 'growth of ['City Direct' was] continuing ; [we] 'thought we were using BPR to serve a purpose.' He added that there
was 'some tension with two initial change managers; they didn't like the approach of the external consultants, and that 'caused some tensions'.

2. CountyC

'The key drivers appeared to be utilisation of IT, the need to cut costs, and the 'fashion' for contact centres.'

The interviewee said he 'agreed', as this had been 'the focus.'

He added that, "Call County' had produced some benefits in service, but also increased volumes of work, and with it issues of caller dissatisfaction, terminated calls, queuing.'

He acknowledged that CountyC had no 'measure' of failure demand, and that could possibly constitute a large proportion of those 'increased volumes'.

Full copies of those 'member check' feedback points for each Council are shown at Appendices 24 and 25, and these also include the 'notes' taken during the feedback interviews.
Part Five: Conclusions & Recommendations

Chapter 9: Conclusions & Recommendations

9.1 Introduction

To conclude, we must return again to what this research aimed to consider. The original title of the investigation was:

Reengineering Corporation Street
An Empirical Study of Business Process Reengineering (BPR) in Two Local Authorities

The overall aim was to investigate the experiences and perceptions of two Local Government Organisation (LGO) practitioners, 'CityC' and 'CountyC' – whilst they introduced Business Process Reengineering (BPR; as part of the declared change management strategies within those LGOs) – in order to derive recommendations for LGO policy-makers and practitioners.

In support of this aim, the primary research objectives were:

- To identify and critically evaluate empirical research evidence on BPR, with particular emphasis on practice in the public sector;
- To investigate the adoption of BPR within the range of change management practices in two selected local authorities;
- To make recommendations for policy makers and practitioners regarding the adoption of BPR as a change management technique within the public sector;
- To contribute to knowledge and understanding of BPR implementation within the public sector.

The initial impetus for the study was to test Hammer & Champy's (2001: 2) assertion that, 'Re-engineering is, in fact, one of the success stories of
business history,' but in the context here of its employment within UK local government change programmes. Underpinning the original primary questions, the research has sought to establish:

1. Is BPR 'alive and well' (Hammer & Champy, 2001: 2) within local government?

2. Has BPR been the 'enormous success' (ibid: 5) that these local authorities intended it would be, in their drive for radical improvements?

3. What are the reasons underpinning the success, or otherwise, of BPR's contribution to those LGOs' change initiatives?

The research has therefore focused on BPR as an example of a Best Practice (Gershon, 2004: 7[27]) in the delivery of change programmes in local government organisations, as these two LGOs strove to achieve and/or maintain 'Excellence' within the context of such assessments as; BVR (Best Value Review), BVPI (Best Value Performance Indicators), CPA (Comprehensive Performance Assessment), and now, in 2008, CAA (Comprehensive Area Assessment).

It is worth noting that since commencement, 'CityC' did achieve 'Excellent' status through its 2005 CPA – retained in 2008 – and, following its 2007 CPA, 'CountyC' also was judged to be, 'a four-star authority with an 'Improving Well' Direction of Travel' (CountyC website).

This research is more relevant now, in late 2008, than it was when it was first proposed four years ago, and this mirrors MacIntosh's (2003) conclusion that:

'...while academic interest in BPR is fading, the public sector's interest may persist for some time to come.'

This was also clearly evinced by comments from Sir Peter Gershon on the Radio 4 programme, 'Today', when, reflecting on the progress to date of his
reforms, he said, 'this is just the beginning' (Davis, 19th March, 2008; see Literature Review for full extract).

That this is, 'just the beginning', may have been quite prescient because the Leader of the Opposition, David Cameron, in a speech entitled 'Living within our means' (see Appendix 26), also said:

- "The third component of our strategy is to cut out waste and make government more efficient. ... We are using the best private sector expertise to find ways to save taxpayers' money and improve service delivery ... If we can show people exactly how their money is being spent, that will leave no hiding place for waste and inefficiency" (19th May, 2008).

Research Objectives 1 and 2 were:

- 'to identify and critically evaluate empirical research evidence on BPR, with particular emphasis on practice in the public sector,' and;

- 'to investigate the adoption of BPR within the range of change management practices in two selected local authorities.'

These have been achieved through engagement with the two facilitating LGOs — 'CityC' and 'CountyC'* — over the period 2005 to 2008, whilst they sought to apply the principles of BPR/SRD* as part of their respective approaches to the implementation of more radical change, aimed at service improvements and cost savings. Additionally, in 2005, this was augmented by visiting a London Borough Council that had also claimed 'success' from its application of BPR. (* For reasons discussed earlier, CountyC chose to use the 'softer' term, 'Service Redesign', or SRD, for their implementation of BPR.)

Similarly, Research Objectives 3 and 4 are also addressed in this section:

- To make recommendations for policy makers and practitioners regarding the adoption of BPR as a change management technique within the public sector;

- To contribute to knowledge and understanding of BPR implementation within the public sector.
9.2 Status of BPR – the Evidence

The evidence on BPR from this research shows it to have been of low status, and largely ineffective in its application. It may be unfortunate that 'rhetoric vs reality' has become a cliché, but the terms are unavoidable. The strength of rhetoric around BPR in both organisations has been evident. However, whilst there is evidence of process improvements (or cost savings) using change management techniques, and some process improvement (as opposed to 'radical reengineering'\(^*\)), the reality is that there was no evidence of quintessential Reengineering; any senior management-led commitment to 'fundamental rethinking' of business (organisational) processes, followed by their 'radical redesign', which then resulted in 'dramatic' improvements.

(* Note: Again, for purposes of clarity, the terms used by Kettinger, et al., 1997, are adopted to differentiate between the lower and upper ends of a process improvement spectrum: 'Process Improvement', 'Process Redesign', and 'Radical Reengineering'. This has been discussed previously, and will be returned to.)

The research discovered no real evidence that anyone, at any level, amongst those espousing the virtues and intended application of BPR, in either organisation, had made any real attempt to understand – i.e. fully understand – what this might mean. It is contended that any organisation – but more especially any large organisation so mired in cultural drag as has been acknowledged in these two LGOs – that was beginning to consider embarking upon an approach to change that by its own definition was to be 'radical', should in the first instance seek to fully understand what that might mean.

Whilst the right language was used in documentation, presentations, etc., the 'understanding' itself was at the very least inconsistent, and in reality was quite inadequate.

This was a senior management leadership responsibility, yet degrees of understanding and commitment at this level also were at best inconsistent.
As a further consequence of this the application of BPR was at least muted, if not in fact ineffective. For example, whilst in one LGO there had been a lengthy exercise of consultant-aided 'reengineering' of processes to bring the customer-facing (or 'front-office') aspects of their 'Highways' service into the LGO's new contact centre, the 'solution' had been decided beforehand. There was also reasonable evidence that this might not have been the best (or even the only) solution, and little evidence that alternatives had been considered.

In many large organisations - and LGOs have no monopoly on this - there is considerable evidence of ineffective processes resulting in unproductive activities and large (if not massive) amounts of hidden waste. 'Hidden', because it is not usual to find a ready acceptance of this, and even less likely that it will be measured in any meaningful way. As Seddon (2007a) says, 'Don't confuse activity with work.' Being busy is not the same as being effectively employed.

Again this distils down to one focal area, that of leadership. Without knowledgeable, effective and committed leadership, no change effort in large organisations such as these, aimed at exposing such ineffectiveness and waste, and 'fundamentally rethinking' their processes, is likely to succeed.

In one respect the results of all of this are not surprising. Much of the earlier research and available knowledge on such relevant topics as people, culture, leadership, and change management remains largely intact and confirmed. Similarly, the progenitors' concept of 'reengineering', or BPR, is in the main reinforced, with the already acknowledged caveat that (up to) '70%' of BPR efforts might fail. As previously stated, for 'radical', high-risk and high-uncertainty change initiatives, a '30%+' success rate might be considered very acceptable indeed, and MacIntosh (2003), temptingly, did also conclude that:

'...it would appear that BPR projects can succeed in the public sector.'
However, risk-averse LGOs, in their current environment, are unlikely to embark upon high-risk strategies with such a low potential for success. Al-Mashari and Zairi (1999) delineated very clearly the major 'success factors' - 5 categories; 32 'Factors' in all - if a 'BPR implementation process' is to stand a real chance of success; shown here again as a reminder:

1. Change of Management Systems and Culture;
2. Management Competence Factors;
3. Organisational Structure Factors;
4. BPR Project Management Factors; and,
5. IT Infrastructure Factors.

A tall order, perhaps, though not impossible.

Yet it is this same 'current environment' that will require UK LGOs to continue to strive, and strive much harder, for major improvements in the efficiencies of service delivery, with commensurate savings on costs. As Gershon (2008) said, this is 'just the beginning', and as CityC's HoS Change and Performance Management said, earlier in 2008, 'incremental change' will no longer 'be enough'.

The concepts of strong and determined leadership, a full understanding of reengineering and all its implications, and issues around cultural change are clearly key, yet the first two of these - items 1 and 2, above - were not in evidence in these two LGOs, at least not where it mattered. What De Cieri, et al. (1991: 63/64) said of TQM applies equally to BPR:

'...for any level in the organisation, if the immediate superior does not understand TQM or does not appear to apply the principles of TQM in his/her work, then adoption will be difficult for any individual employee.'

You can 'understand' something you don't have to 'lead', but you can't 'lead' something you don't 'understand'.

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The change management teams (CMT) in both LGOs were, feedback suggested, comprised of competent and committed people. Yet there is a cost to this. One of those CMT comprises 8 FTE (Full-Time Equivalent posts) at an estimated annual cost of £300K. This excludes 5 additional FTE funded through their 'County Partnership'. The other LGO's CMT equates to a smaller, but still costly unit of 3 x FTE, at an estimated £200K (inc. HoS). These were primarily salary costs only; the actual costs being much higher.

An important factor, therefore, is that as a minimum, for these CMT to be 'effective' their costs should be recouped through their improvement – cost-saving and/or revenue-earning – activities, otherwise they are simply an additional cost to the organisation.

In one LGO there was some evidence of this saving. For example, in what the HoS CMT described as a 'very very simple little project,' they apparently saved £30,000' – or approximately 10% of their CMT's primary salary costs. However laudable, though, that may be, the 'solution' was more imposed than 'fundamentally rethought'.

The other, smaller LGO has admitted to having 'no cashable savings' as a result of this 'reengineering' activity. Similarly, there is no real measure of any improvement in customer service, from the customers' perspective. What there has been, is a measured increase in 'activity' as a result of the contact centre's implementation.

Feedback on the 'style' of the change managers in both LGOs has been positive. However, if they do not as a minimum recoup their own costs or bring about commensurable and measurable improvements in end-to-end customer processes, then they remain, as stated, simply an added cost. Yet the CMTs themselves can only do what the 'Leadership' is committed to, and the first requirement under Al-Mashari and Zairi's (1999) 2nd 'Success Factor' is 'Committed and Strong Leadership'.

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There is evidence that this 'leadership' exists elsewhere, if not within LGOs then closely associated with them; in 2002, Austin Mitchell, MP for Great Grimsby, opened a debate in the House of Commons on 'council housing', and gave this example:

'Last month, I attended a housing conference with the north-east branch of the Chartered Institute of Housing. I heard an exciting presentation by Tom Mannion, the chief executive of the Irwell Valley housing association in Manchester. His association has few problems with arrears, which can usually be quite a problem for councils. It has few problems involving crime, drug-addiction and expulsions, and is able to provide a more effective service, good behaviour contracts with tenants and gold service guarantees so that, when repairs become necessary, tenants can choose which repairs are to be done and the bill is not paid until they are satisfied with the work. Repairs are to be done as soon as a tenant with a gold service contract requests them.'

Source: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/westminster_hall/2002/dec/10/council-housing

That Dr Mannion's 'exciting' qualities were recognised by CityC (or at least, their ALMO, City Homes) was evinced by his inclusion in their 'Staff Conference' in 2005 – the year of publication of CityC's Change Management Strategy:

'The afternoon session began with the guest speaker Tom Mannion – Chief Executive of Irwell Valley – who presented a humorous motivational speech with great gusto and thoroughly deserved the ovation from the audience.'


Subsequently, in 2007, CityC themselves also engaged Dr Mannion to speak at their 1-day 'Leadership Conference' (8th September), at which I was present. He was without doubt 'exciting', 'humorous', and 'motivational', yet there is no evidence that CityC's own senior leadership has been 'motivated' to adopt any of Dr Mannion's more 'radical' suggestions.

A further example, albeit much earlier, was provided by Keen and Scase (1998: 66-86) in their case study of Barset County Council, where the election of an 'outsider', 'Councillor Harvey', in 1984 was reported by one commentator as replicating:
...Mrs Thatcher's victory nationally in 1975. Each was an outsider bent on radical change..." (ibid: 69/70).

Further, and in line with Hammer and Stanton's advice that:

'If no one naturally fills the role of leader, a leader must be recruited';

...Harvey himself subsequently:

'sought a Chief Executive \textit{with the clout to tell chief officers what to do}, and who would play \textit{a vital role} in taking change forward \textit{... focusing not just on changing structures but also on changing processes} (ibid: 70).

Al-Mashari and Zairi also indicated that 'Empowerment' and 'People Involvement' were equally 'critical' to BPR's chances of success, yet there was evidence in both LGOs of management's (some senior) reluctance to let go of their control and release the creative talents of their people, in order, as Al-Mashari and Zairi suggested, to 'Create an Effective Culture for Organisational Change'. In Hammer and Stanton's (1995) terms, they simply are not 'ready'.

The driving forces (Lewin, 1947) remain on the increase, and within the two collaborating LGOs there was evidence of people seeking to buck the traces of the old ways – 'City Way' and 'County Way' – in order to bring about some of the more 'radical' changes required. But isn't it difficult for the lower ranks to feel 'empowered', if the 'resisting forces' are seen as senior management? So, how could they do it?

9.3 Strategic Linking of Project Choice

Strategically, choice of project is of fundamental importance. 'Will this project take us further towards our strategic objectives?' 'Yes'? Or 'no'? There is a case for 'no', and that is – as CountyC appear to have been doing – engaging people in reengineering training, followed by project activity, that begins the
process of moving the culture towards becoming a process-thinking organisation. But taking four years to train 95 people in a 38,000-person (23,000 FTE) organisation is not 'dramatic' progress on that front.

Equally, laudable though these intentions were, there was no real evidence (apart from the 'EDRM' project) that the projects in this selection were strongly linked to strategic objectives.

Much more importantly, selecting processes for reengineering that are in line with the organisation's strategic goals is far more likely to deliver the service improvements and waste reduction that is required. This importance cannot be over emphasised. A major branding company was recently commissioned (albeit hypothetically) to 'make Gordon Brown, and new Labour, attractive once again' (Liddle, 2008). One of the employees said:

"What we would do for Labour, if they came to us, is force them to reconnect with their principles. They have to try to remember what they are for."

The owner of the company, Wally Olins, then chipped in with agreement:

"They've become distracted by other things, by the process of governing, and lost the point of why they are there. They have become exhausted; the ideas have dried up. That sort of thing happens with a lot of companies."

Ideas are the life blood of innovation and change. Remembering what (you) are 'for', or 'there' for, is to 'reconnect' with your purpose, your reason for being. Effective reengineering, or process redesign, begins with 'reconnecting' with 'purpose'. The fundamental question is, 'Why does this process exist and for who?'

Evidence from this research indicates that managers within these LGOs have, in some cases, become 'distracted ... by the process of governing'; or, in their cases, the maintenance of their position (e.g. salary, staff numbers, budgets, turf, status) within that 'process of local government'. Is this acceptable?
Strong strategic leadership is required to 'reconnect' these organisations to their reason for existence, to 'un-distract' them.

In this context, this strength of leadership has not been apparent in either organisation. There has been no evidence of any 'reengineering leader who is:

'a senior executive who is strongly committed to reengineering and who possesses the title and authority necessary to institute fundamental change' (Hammer & Stanton, 1995: 86).

This was also borne out by the 'Reengineering Leadership' results for both organisations, within the self-diagnostic on 'Organizational Readiness'.

The need for greater strategic linking of project choice was further evident in the responses from the 'member check' interviews, October 16th & 17th, 2008, where the HoS Change Management for CityC commented with lack of 'surprise' that middle and senior managers were not familiar with their (i.e. his) 'Change Management Strategy' document, because they (CityC) had a 'high number of strategies' and (e.g.) BPR was not 'high on the agenda'.

The (now) Director of Transformation for CountyC, similarly commented that CountyC would need a 'shift in its strategic thinking to fewer big projects to hit targets.' He said that previously the focus had been 'structural', where, by 'changing the structure [they] could produce cost savings,' and they could 'hit targets by moving things around and cutting out areas of duplication,' but he accepted that this focus was 'likely to change in the near future to two or three big projects.' He accepted that there has been a 'problem with maintaining [management] motivation, [and that] SMT have other priorities.'
9.4 Diagnostic Models and Measures – 'Radicalness' & 'Readiness'

Two concepts that emerged during this research, and for which no evidence of their use elsewhere has been found, were the Hammer and Stanton (1995) 'Organisational Readiness Self-Diagnostic' exercise, and the Kettinger, et al., (1997) 'Project Radicalness Planning Worksheet' (see Appendices 11 and 27, respectively).

Each of these instruments were offered to most interviewees in both LGOs at different junctures, and with just a few minor, qualifying comments, both were considered to be positive additions to the overall BPR planning process. In each case they were offered individually and on separate occasions; i.e. each without reference to the other questionnaire. This was largely an emergent decision, as they had been 'discovered' on different occasions during the research process.

In both LGOs there was a clear if pragmatic acceptance that, organisationally and culturally, they were not 'ready' for change of such a fundamentally radical nature as BPR. This acceptance was despite both LGOs' initial declarations that BPR was to form a key part of their strategies for change.

Across both LGOs, the evidence suggests that, with one potential exception, no single project would fit the key criteria proffered by the original definition of 'reengineering' (Hammer & Champy, 1993) — they never called it 'BPR' — i.e:

- 'fundamental rethinking';
- 'radical redesign'; and
- 'dramatic results'.

That one possible (CountyC) exception, despite its potential for larger-scale savings, would still not 'fit', because it fell well short of the additional requirement (or strong suggestion from Hammer & Stanton) that:
You must reengineer quickly. If you can't show some tangible results within a year*, you will lose the support and momentum necessary to make the effort successful’ (1995: 30).

(* NB Davenport (1995b) suggests this is more likely to be 18 months.)

If we therefore discard the term 'rhetoric' – lest the more pejorative meaning is inferred – then whilst in both LGO cases the ambition might have been BPR (or 'Radical Reengineering'), the reality has been no more than 'Process Redesign', though more probably 'Process Improvement', suggesting again that, at least within the context of local government organisations, there is reason for and validity in the concept of 'degrees of BPR'.

This brings us to a number of options that will be of fundamental assistance to such organisations when considering embarking on change strategies for which they might not be culturally or organisationally 'ready', or projects that might be at an inappropriate degree of 'radicalness'.

9.4.1 Organisational Readiness

'Self-Assessment Diagnostic' (Hammer & Stanton, 1995: 85-99)

The combined results of this 'diagnostic' exercise for the two councils are shown again below, along with Hammer and Stanton's 'minimum recommended' and maximum possible scores:
In all categories, and the 'diagnostic' as a whole, the results are below those suggested by the authors. This presents the opportunity for any organisation embarking upon a potentially more 'radical' change strategy to increase their awareness of their own state of 'readiness' to do so. Under 'Improving Your Scores' (ibid: 90-99), Hammer and Stanton (H&S) 'explain the significance of each of the twenty statements that make up the diagnostic and offer recommendations for improving low scores' (p. 90). These can be seen in full in Appendix 28, but just two examples — both relevant to the LGOs covered — give an indication of how this could make a significant difference:

Statement 1:

"The leader of reengineering is a senior executive who is strongly committed to reengineering and who possesses the title and authority necessary to institute fundamental change."

Improvement Recommendation:

"The reengineering leader must be a senior executive who is passionate about reengineering and has a strong commitment to it. Passion and commitment are not enough, though. He or she must have the authority to implement the changes needed to support major process redesign.

If the nominal reengineering leader is not demonstrating passion and commitment, he or she must be made to understand the complexities of reengineering and why dynamic leadership is so important. Reviewing case histories (successful and unsuccessful) and meeting with counterparts at other firms can help provide a model of what is required — and an appreciation for why it is so vital.

If no one naturally fills the role of leader, a leader must be recruited. Potential leaders within the company should be targeted and educated about reengineering, its mechanisms and its potential.

To demonstrate the need for reengineering, you should document the costs and consequences of existing processes. Customer testimony about process inadequacies can be particularly persuasive in convincing potential leaders that they need to act. So are financial data that demonstrate the costs of your processes and benchmarking information that documents competitor superiority' (p. 91).
Statement 2:

'The reengineering leader truly understands the nature of reengineering and the magnitude of the change – organizational change in particular – that it entails.'

Improvement Recommendation:

'Unfortunately, many senior managers try to reengineer without really understanding what it means. They use the term because it is fashionable, without appreciating its consequences. Overlaying a new process on an old organization is a recipe for disaster. Unless the leader really understands and pushes radical change, reengineering will not succeed.

The leader must understand where reengineering is headed, or the effort will be abandoned in midstream. To assist a prospective leader in developing this understanding, you should dramatize as vividly as possible the changes that reengineering will likely bring to the company's structure, personnel, compensation system, and other areas' (pp. 91/92).

As previously stated, but to reinforce the points made again by these first two of H&S's 20 statements; you can't 'lead' something you don't 'understand'.

Both of the above examples show clear resonance with the findings of this study and other relevant literature; e.g. Seddon's (2007a) point that 'structure is subordinate to process.' The evidence suggests that, had either of these two LGOs considered, beforehand, the implications of their stated 'BPR' strategies in the light of a 'diagnostic' exercise such as this, then at the very least they could have gained a much clearer perspective as to the adequacy of their 'Reengineering Leadership', their level of 'Organizational Readiness', and the appropriateness of their planned 'Style of Implementation'. Neither did.

Some of the messages from this diagnostic exercise may be hard to take, but despite how difficult that might be, they are actually real opportunities to begin a process of improvement that might, just, deliver by orders of magnitude previously considered impossible.
For example, it might be very hard for a senior executive to accept that, from the diagnostic exercise, that 'no one naturally fills the role of leader,' and therefore that, 'a leader must be recruited.' Also, it might be equally hard to admit that 'many senior managers try to reengineer without really understanding what it means,' especially if you are that 'senior manager'.

This is not an indictment of the current leader's competence, but a real opportunity for that person's true leadership to emerge. For example, we need look no further than recent commentary on the UK's current Prime Minister, seemingly facing a similar predicament. Under the heading, 'Dropping Brown is bad. Keeping him is worse', Lance Price* (27th July) expounded:

'The risks inherent in a change of leadership are enormous, but I believe they are less than the risks of carrying on as we are. Improbable though it is, if Brown were to stand aside voluntarily, he would be greatly admired and thanked for doing so. ... If Brown goes with dignity he will retain the respect of his party as a man who gave it his best shot but was big enough to recognise that modern political leadership requires qualities he just doesn't have' (The Sunday Times, p. 21).

This does not mean the chief executive must be 'dropped', but it does mean that he or she has to be 'big enough', as Hammer and Stanton recommend, to either target, or recruit, someone who is:

'...a senior executive who is strongly committed to reengineering and who possesses the title and authority necessary to institute fundamental change.'

Taking this first, bold, step is likely then to enable H&S's second point, that:

'The reengineering leader truly understands the nature of reengineering and the magnitude of the change – organizational change in particular – that it entails.'

These points offer sound advice, which it is folly to ignore. The proof, if any more were required, is that in neither of the studied organisations was there any evidence of a senior leader passionately committed to fundamental and
radical change. Nor was there anyone who 'truly understood the nature of reengineering' — using the definition they had accepted — or the magnitude of disruption that it might involve. As the Cranfield report (Holland & Kumar, 1995) said, 'many executives launch reengineering efforts without completing critical homework.'

There is no fundamental requirement for LGOs to 'reengineer', but there is continuing and increasing pressure on LGOs to improve their service delivery, whilst at the same time 'dramatically' reducing their costs. Reengineering, or BPR, offers the same opportunity to assist in that process as it did when these two LGOs declared their intentions to adopt it some years ago. The issue is, they have to mean it!

This Hammer and Stanton diagnostic model — the first of the two being proffered — enables organisations such as these to 'measure', in a meaningful way, their 'readiness' to embark upon change of a more radical nature. In the main, both of the studied LGOs fell short of the 'minimum recommended' scores, but not massively so. By taking stock in this way, and a little more time to make the organisation more 'ready' by following some of the suggestions given, the rhetoric of BPR might far more easily have been converted into some degree of reality. The key, of course, is that 'passionate' and 'strongly committed' leadership, the person who Hammer and Champy (1993: 102) described as:

'a senior executive who authorizes and motivates the overall reengineering effort.'

The other, perhaps equally key, of the five roles identified by Hammer and Champy as essential to the successful implementation of reengineering, was the 'reengineering czar':

'an individual responsible for developing reengineering techniques and tools within the company and for achieving synergy across the company's separate reengineering projects' (ibid: 103).
The irony is, perhaps, that both of these LGOs had developed their 'reengineering techniques and tools' within their organisations, but no-one was committed to using them; at least, not to 'reengineer'. Raising their organisational readiness in this way would seriously improve their chances for successful reengineering implementation, and the benefits that would bring.

Personal Development Plans (PDP) are commonplace, so is not the concept of an 'Organisational Readiness Plan' (ORP) equally valid? It is suggested that this is what the Hammer and Stanton 'diagnostic' exercise offers. On the one hand, the fact that since its publication in 1995 there appears to be no evidence of its widespread use is unfortunate. On the other hand it offers now a clear opportunity to research its application within UK LGOs as their largely traditional cultures wrestle with the continuing need to deliver radical change.

9.4.2 Project Radicalness

'Project Radicalness Planning Worksheet' (Kettinger, et al., 1997)

This 'Project Radicalness Planning Worksheet' (PRPW; see Appendix 27) provides an alternative diagnostic dimension, in terms of 'project planning', to that of the organisation itself; that of the degree of 'radicalness' of the planned project, or change initiative. As before, no participants from either organisation had come across any such instrument with which to provide some sort of prior litmus test on the wisdom of embarking upon a particular project, whereas all those who used it when invited — including both 2008 cohorts of CountyC's BPR trainees — suggested it would be of value. In this latter case all participants used it as intended, as part of their own project planning processes. (NB On an ongoing basis, those 20-30 projects themselves could provide further opportunities to research this instrument.)

With this diagnostic tool there were eleven key 'Factors', each with its own 'Question' to be rated from '1' to '5', in reference to what the authors describe as the 'descriptive anchors at the two poles'. The full PRPW can be found in
Appendix 27, but as with the previous exercise, two sample 'Factors' and their associated 'Questions' will provide examples of its potential.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor:</th>
<th>Question:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Strategic centrality</td>
<td>Is the targeted process merely tangential (1) or integral (5) to the firm's strategic goals and objectives?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Project resource availability</td>
<td>Are only minimal resources (1) available to support the process change or are resources abundant (5)?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once the 11 'questions' have been rated, the total of their scores is then averaged into what the authors call the 'basic advisability index' for 'radical process change', before a further, final 'Factor' is assessed; that of the:

'Senior management's propensity for risk'.

This rating is then added to the previous total's average (the 'basic advisability index'), and then the new 'total' is averaged again. From this final score the proposed project (or change initiative) is categorised as being within one of three bandwidths, each of increasing degrees of 'radicalness':

- Process Improvement;
- Process Redesign;
- Radical Reengineering.

In the example given by Kettinger et al. (1997: 72, Fig. 4) the overall score (including the 'Propensity for Risk' factor) was '3.68', which the authors categorised as 'Substantial Process Redesign '+' '. Following this lead (and given that there is no '0' in their scale), the model to follow (Table 9.1, overleaf) uses '2.3' and '3.7' as the notional upper and lower limits of 'Process Redesign'. Below that we have Process Improvement (which could range from 'minor' to 'substantial'), and above that we have 'Radical Reengineering' (which could range from 'Radical Process Reengineering' to 'Radical Organisational Reengineering', or something similar). The lower end of 'Process Redesign' could, equally, be 'Minor Process Redesign', and 'Minor
incremental changes', for example, easily equates to kaizen, or 'continuous improvement' (CI).

The words are important, but not excessively so. The key issue is to give a graded scale to the 'numbers' that emerge from the organisation's attempt to use the device to assess the 'radicalness' of any proposed project, so as to increase their ability to classify it in these terms. For example, a simple scale, if required, could be as follows:

Table 9.1: Suggested 'Radicalness' descriptors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratings: (Bandwidth)</th>
<th>Minor</th>
<th>Modest</th>
<th>Substantial</th>
<th>Radicalness of Project:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 2.29</td>
<td>Minor incremental changes</td>
<td>Modest incremental changes</td>
<td>Major incremental changes</td>
<td>Process Improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 to 3.7</td>
<td>Minor process redesign</td>
<td>Modest process redesign</td>
<td>Substantial process redesign</td>
<td>Process Redesign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.71 to 5</td>
<td>Radical single-process reengineering</td>
<td>Radical multi-process reengineering</td>
<td>Substantial radical organisational reengineering</td>
<td>Radical Reengineering</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the case of larger of the two LGOs studied, the mean of the two CountyC groups (May 2008) was '2.67', categorising 'the project' as 'Modest process redesign' (* remembering, of course, that in this case it was an average of a number of recently proposed projects).

Kettinger et al's (1997) article's primary thrust is a 'Study of Methodologies, Techniques, and Tools' relevant to 'Business Process Change', and as part of their study they develop a further 'methodology' – a 'BPR Project Stage-Activity Framework' – yet it could be argued that the last thing BPR requires is
more 'methodologies', and more 'tools and techniques'. Once more, as Blanchard (1989) asked, "How many diets does it take to get slim?"

Answer: "The one you stick to!"

The point being made here is that considerable research has already been completed over the decade and a half since BPR first emerged. Yet, for example, there is little (possibly no) evidence of these two devices — both of which offer considerable potential for improving the success rates of organisational reengineering (or constraining ambition) — being used in real situations.

9.5 Policy & Practice

9.5.1 National Level

It is accepted that a study of just two LGOs — however 'in-depth' — plus an additional 'visit' to one other, will not provide robustly generalisable conclusions. However, if central Government is to continue with its top-down imposition of policy, supported (or enforced?) by a robust inspection regime, then it would need to acknowledge the effect that this has at local government (LGO) level. In such an environment of 'organizational retrenchment', Keen and Scase (1998: 38) suggested that:

'The manager's degree of freedom to manage within the framework of performance outcome targets and criteria can become constrained by increased levels of action planning and control over work processes as well as over outputs.'

In discussing the 'new managerialist model' of the 1980s and 1990s, they stated that:

'differences between local government and the private sector are disappearing in the sense that managing, say, a social services department is basically the same as running a company' (ibid: 42).
Yet the evidence of this research is that those 'differences' still abound, the managers' (Chief Executives down...) 'freedom to manage' is still highly restricted and 'constrained', and the 'targets' regime is still dominant. On the basis of this study at least, if Gershon's recommendations to bring more private sector practices into the public sector is to stand a greater chance of success – at least within LGOs – then central Government would be advised to acknowledge the restricting effect that these regimes have, and reconsider their approach. 'Evidence-based Policy' has been a mantra, yet 'Policy-based Evidence' has, in many cases, been the norm, with spurious examples of 'evidence' being sought and used to support the imposition of idealistic (but not systems-based) policies in attempts to 'prove' they are working.

The achievement of 'Excellent'/4-Star' status was supposed to result in a reduced regime of inspection for the Council so awarded, yet in CityC, they say, this has certainly not been the case. Keen and Scase again:

'...many local authorities are reluctant to reduce their reliance on detailed and centralized control systems for reasons associated with senior managers' fears of losing power as well as because of public accountability requirements' (ibid: 50).

These are serious cultural and managerial issues if radical change and the commensurate freedom to innovate are to progress and thrive at LGO level. Such 'fears' need to be removed and recruitment and reward systems reviewed if senior LGO leaders are to be encouraged to, and comfortable with, more radical approaches to change; otherwise:

'the scope of local authority middle managers' innovative activities is likely to be restricted to incremental, as opposed to radical, innovations within a framework of clear corporate policies and rigorous control systems' (ibid: 52).

9.5.2 Local Level

Arguments over approaches to corporate strategy – 'Planning' vs 'Emergent' – have raged for at least two decades, but LGOs have little choice; they are required to 'plan'. CityC, for example, were criticised in 2001 for their lack of
strategic planning (see 6.1.1 for overview of CityC). Recent training on how to create Business Plans, and 'Prince2' project management methodology, provide two recent examples of where they have tried to correct this. Both of the two LGOs studied already – and therefore, one might assume, possibly others too – have a surfeit of un- or under-used 'tools and techniques' at their disposal. All they need to do is use them.

The point here is redolent of Papert and Harel's (1991) 'Constructionism', or 'learning by making' – in this case, ultimately, piloting new processes. The very nature of BPR's high-risk and high-uncertainty means that the depth of planning should be limited to the minimum necessary to get started, and thereafter enter into an iterative process of learning by doing; what Papert (1980) likened to being 'as natural as learning French while living in France.' Hammer and Champy's original (1993; or updated 2001) text already provides sufficient guidance to any CEO/Chief Executive wishing to do this, and so do many others.

To 'unready' or 'risk-averse' organisations (LGOs, in this case), whilst Hammer and Champy state that business reengineering means 'starting over' (1993: 31) and the alternative view (Stoddart & Jarvenpaa; 1995) was that a 'Hammer-like "clean slate" BPR was not typically practised,' there is no Tayloristic 'one best way'.

What LGOs such as CityC and CountyC are therefore advised to do is begin to utilise more meaningfully what already exists; and in this case, the two diagnostic exercises to do with their own 'organisational readiness', and the 'radicalness' of their planned projects. Designed independently, and for use separately, they appear to offer far more if used synergistically.

9.6 'Readiness and Radicalness'

This research indicates, therefore, that these two instruments need to be used in conjunction, as a more versatile, combined and synergistic pre-
reengineering or pre-process redesign assessment tool. As Kettinger et al. (1997: 62) stated:

'Most methodologies ... generally recognize resistance to change and attempt to minimize this through an assessment of cultural readiness and through activities to establish project buy-in.'

Tying together an assessment of organisational or cultural 'readiness' with the alternative assessment of a proposed project's 'radicalness', provides dual approaches to the consideration and planning process, with very clear alternatives for action as a result.

For example, if a project team within a LGO was satisfied, after analysis, with the 'radicalness' of their planned project, but less satisfied, after diagnosis, with their own organisational 'readiness', then this indicates a course of action tending towards the H&S suggestions for 'improving your scores', depending upon which area was deemed to be least 'ready'; i.e. the various individual components within the three areas of 'Reengineering Leadership', 'Organizational Readiness', or 'Style of Implementation'.

Alternatively, if the organisation's senior management (or reengineering leader) had self-diagnosed themselves to be largely 'ready' for a seriously radical change initiative, it may then wish to use the PRPW to readjust, upwards, its level of ambition on the proposed initiative. Or, should they deem themselves to be at a lower level of organisational 'readiness', then a project's ambition might need to be curtailed. These points hint back at Heygate's (1993: 79) 'Levels of Process Redesign' model (Lit. Rev., Fig. 4.4, p. 97), with its two dimensions of; 'Level of ambition for change' and 'Type of program needed,' and Venkatraman's (1994) alternative approaches to BPR with the 'Degree of Business Transformation' set against 'Range of Potential benefits.'

Tying these instruments together provides increased options when public sector organisations such as LGOs have to take into account their contextual,
as well as their cultural constraints, prior to consideration of major ('radical') change initiatives. Using both of these two instruments would assist in surfacing those deeper 'underlying assumptions', alongside 'espoused values and beliefs' (Schein, 2004), in order to make the more 'visible' the antecedent issues that need attention before embarking upon organisational change.

9.6.1 Initial Models

A proposed initial model to illustrate these considerations is shown below, Fig. 9.1.

Fig. 9.1: 'Readiness plus Radicalness'

Earlier in the research, County C's 2006 cohort's overall average for the 'Organizational Readiness' score had been '62.1'. And, albeit more recently, the mean of two more CountyC groups (May 2008) for 'Project Radicalness' was '2.67', categorising 'the project' as 'Process Redesign' (* note: in this case 'the project' was an average of a number of proposed projects).

If these two results were plotted on to the above model, as an example only, it would appear as shown below:
Looking at this the results indicate that the organisation as a whole has some work to do on its overall level of 'Organizational Readiness' if it were to undertake 'Reengineering' as defined, whereas the balance of projects being considered or undertaken appear to fall into the modest 'Process Redesign' area, or well within their scope of ambition. This suggests that the organisation could, if it so chose, increase its level of ambition, in relation to its current 'Readiness' level, whilst still remaining within the bounds of 'Process Redesign'; or, if desired, it could carry out some of the suggested 'improvements' (depending on the area[s] of shortfall) to increase its level of 'Readiness', if it were to embark upon projects within the more ambitious area of 'Radical Reengineering'.

It is also important to note that the '62.1' is shown on the overall scale, whereas any action the organisation wished to consider, to improve its scores, would need to refer back to the specific area(s) of shortfall: 'Reengineering Leadership', 'Organizational Readiness', and/or 'Style of Implementation'. This 'stacking' of the individual components of the overall 'diagnostic' is therefore a limitation of this representation.
Contextually, however, these are very important issues, for since 'Leadership' is a key enabler, and 'Culture' potentially a primary inhibitor, then a structured approach to influencing either or both of these will improve (e.g.) such public sector organisations' chances of delivering more substantial improvements to service and savings on costs.

Combining these Readiness and Radicalness concepts therefore illustrates their contextual relationship, whilst offering further and deeper diagnostic opportunities for these organisations (LGOs) to assess their capability for attempting various 'degrees' of BPR; from simple, incremental 'Process Improvement', through 'Process Redesign', to 'Radical Reengineering'.

9.6.2 Basic Models

A further basic model is shown below, which might begin this process of combination:

Fig. 9.3: Basic Model

This version attempts to link the concepts to show that increasing organizational readiness, along with project 'ambition', would enable the organisation to work towards the 'radical reengineering' scale of planned...
project. However, the model is still limited by its two-dimensional arrangement, so a three-dimensional representation might assist this Kolb-like 'abstract conceptualisation'; see Fig. 9.4, below:

Fig. 9.4: Readiness & Radicalness, a 'cubist' approach

This attempts a simple alpha-numeric grading of each dimension of diagnosis, as shown below, but is still inadequate in offering any real guidance to policymakers or practitioners.

In simple terms, if the organisation were in A3 and B3 (i.e. if the leaders were A3, presumably the culture/readiness would be B3?), but only at level C1 regarding 'style of implementation', then if they still wished to carry out 'Radical Reengineering' (C3), should they consider engaging 'experts' (consultants) to help with their BPR introduction/implementation?

As an illustration, we could take the broad example of CountyC's overall 'Radicalness' result of '2.67', which positioned its project ambition level firmly within 'Process Redesign', or 'Level 2'.

On their 'Readiness' diagnosis, their actual 'Organizational Readiness' assessment was only marginally short of Hammer and Stanton's 'recommended minimum' score, whereas both 'Reengineering Leadership' and 'Style of Implementation' scores fell further short.
This might suggest therefore that the organisation would be successful at its present level of 'ambition', but that if it chose to attempt a project whose 'radicalness' positioned it as 'Radical Reengineering', they would need to take stock of both their 'leadership' and 'implementation style' competences.

Options on leadership, for example – as already mentioned – would include Hammer and Stanton's advice that:

> 'If no one naturally fills the role of leader, a leader must be recruited. Potential leaders within the company should be targeted and educated about reengineering, its mechanisms and its potential.'

Any such initiative would, of course, depend specifically upon which actual 'scores' fell most short of the level recommended, and these areas would then be the first to be acted upon.

Additionally, for example, under 'Style of Implementation', options for improvement might include:

- the 'leader' pushing projects forward rapidly to demonstrate the required new 'style';
- applauding rule-breakers;
- cross-functional process-mapping, focusing on the end-to-end process;
- designating a process owner who is given authority to make sure things happen;
- establishing current process performance measures and baselines, and 'transformational' goals.

(Source: Hammer & Stanton, 1995: 98/99)

Clearly, there can be no 'one-size-fits-all' solution, as any 'diagnosis' will be context- and organisation-specific, but by at least doing such a twin-pronged diagnosis, the organisation (or its change leaders) would be taking stock of their overall (and detailed) 'readiness', and comparing that with the scale of their project ambition ('Improve'; 'Redesign'; or 'Reengineer'?). Another 'health warning on the packet' might also be the acknowledged propensity for organisations to exaggerate the positive in their self-diagnoses.
9.6.3 A Combined Self-Diagnostic Instrument

Further 'developmental' options* were next considered based on Hayes' (2007: 334-336) 'three dimensional' models to 'aid choice[s] of interventions', and a more useful representation, therefore, might be the three-dimensional, or 'stepped' model, offered below, which combines the three components of Hammer and Stanton's diagnostic on 'Organizational Readiness', with Kettinger et al's 'Project Radicalness Planning Worksheet' (PRPW). Suggested new descriptors for each 'readiness' level are also offered at each 'step' of that combined self-diagnostic instrument:

Fig. 9.5: Combined Self-diagnostic Instrument

(* Note: Additional developmental stages are shown more fully at Appendix 29.)

The immediate visual implication in this representation is that there are 'steps', upwards, showing an organisation's potential to progress through the three 'levels' of overall 'Organisational Readiness' – and within each separate component of that independently – towards being better prepared to attempt
change projects of increasing 'degrees of radicalness', through to full-scale, organisation-wide, 'Radical Reengineering'.

From a LGO policy-maker's perspective, the willingness to consider the Hammer and Stanton self-diagnosis exercise would suggest at least some realistic intention to reflect upon the appropriateness of its current leadership, the 'readiness' of the organisation as a whole, and its expertise in the area of reengineering implementation, prior to making any sort of commitment to change of a more 'radical' nature.

Equally, but perhaps from a practitioner's (local manager's) perspective, when potentially 'radical' change projects are being initiated – i.e. at project identification stage – use of the Kettinger et al. 'Worksheet' to assess a proposed project's level of ambition would enable operations managers (process owners) to engage in more rational and structured discussions with their local policy-makers, in order to consider any possible mismatch that might have been exposed. It is important to note that external facilitation could be required at this stage.

9.6.4 'Expert' Perceptions & Model Usage

In the two examples below, the first shows a constructivist (expert group) perception of CityC's preparedness in terms of organisational readiness, where the LGO is perceived very clearly to be at a 'Low' level of 'readiness' in all three areas of the overall 'Organizational Readiness' dimension:
Remembering that the Hammer and Stanton self-diagnostic tool is with relation to embarking upon 'reengineering', it was considered that:

a) CityC's senior leadership do not demonstrate the will or desire to consider direct engagement with change of such a radical nature;

b) that whilst there are pockets of innovation, their organisation as a whole is still largely complacent, staid, and traditional in its readiness for such change, and;

c) that even with a recent influx of additional change management expertise, they were still not exhibiting real readiness to challenge established orders.

On this basis, it placed them firmly in the arena of 'Process Improvement' in ambition terms.

However, in the case of CountyC (and for similar reasons of a long-term, in-depth professional relationship), whilst their 'organizational readiness' level was perceived to be similar to that of CityC, both 'Reengineering Leadership' and 'Style of Implementation' were considered to be one 'step' up from that.
The evidence for this was the extent of Service Redesign training that had been carried out, which whilst not extensive in terms of the organisation's size it showed a willingness of the leadership to expose their people (managers) to new ways of thinking about change. Also their change management team was better resourced, had been operating much longer, and was perceived to be more 'go-ahead' in its style and commitment. This is represented in the further model below:

Fig. 9.7: CountyC's current state of 'readiness'

Using this combination of diagnostic activities, one option, always, would be to scale back the organisation's 'ambition' if areas of 'readiness' fell short, but if an organisation felt its ambition was both rational and worthy, then the real challenge would be to 'grow' its appropriate attribute, skill, and style areas that might enable it to achieve those ambitions by improving its service-delivery more systemically (or processually); or, more literally, by 'stepping up' to the mark, or to the next 'level'.

However, and as often, there is another possibility. In Hammer and Stanton's case, their 'scores' are currently summed, in order to build towards what they term as the 'Minimum score for diagnostic as a whole' (1995: 90), whereas the
Kettinger et al. model, whilst using the same '1-through-5' rating scale, uses averages. If, therefore, users were also to 'average' the Hammer and Stanton scores, in a similar columnal manner, then each of the three components, and the diagnostic as a whole, could then be vertically 'banded' as 'Low', 'Medium' and 'High', in a similar way to the Kettinger PRPW. This would allow a more objective assessment of the 'Low', 'Medium' and 'High' 'steps' (or 'levels') suggested above, for 'Organizational Readiness', both for the individual components and for the diagnostic as a whole. 'Low', for example would be from '1' to '2.29'; 'Medium' would again be scores around '3', but effectively, say, '2.3'-'3.7'; and 'High' would be for score higher than that, up to the maximum of '5', as shown below, Table 9.2:

Table 9.2: 'Banding' the Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scores:</th>
<th>Organizational Readiness</th>
<th>Project Radicalness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'3.71' to '5'</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Radical Reengineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'2.3' to '3.7'</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Process Redesign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'1' to '2.29'</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Process Improvement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The aim is not to be prescriptive, in a Vroom andYetton (1973) 'decision tree'-style, but more to appeal to the decision-makers' cognitive powers as they consider the organisation's strategic options along with change-project choices. Primarily (though not exclusively) these are aimed at the senior people, within the upper echelons of these LGOs, in order that more cognitive, rational discussion might take place prior to such strategic choices.

Additionally, and to illustrate the findings, there are strategic links also between this combined self-assessment and the process of setting
performance measures through, for example, use of a Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 1992) approach:

Fig. 9.8: Example of a Balanced Scorecard

![Balanced Scorecard Diagram](http://www.jiscinfonet.ac.uk/infokits/analytical-tools/scorecard)

This is not to recommend the concept per se, but if it were already in use by the LGOs then the following questions might be relevant:

- **Customer (Voice of the):**
  - What are the current measures?
  - How well does this process meet the customers' purpose?

- **Internal Business Processes:**
  - What is the purpose of this process?
  - What is the nature of current demand (volume & variety)?

- **Learning and Growth:**
  - How committed is the organisation to continuous improvement?
  - How 'ready' is the organisation for 'radical' change?

- **Financial:**
  - What are the end-to-end costs of the process?
  - What are the costs of 'waste' ('failure demand')?
Similarly, as a self-assessment tool there are resonances also with other approaches to organisational self-assessment and improvement, for example ISO 9000, McKinsey's '7S' framework, or the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) Model; see below:

Fig. 9.9: The European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) Model

As an additional self-assessment tool, but one that focuses specifically on organisational 'readiness' for more 'radical' strategic change, this 'Readiness & Radicalness' diagnostic would provide further input towards (at least) sections 1, 2 and 5 of the 'Enablers' in the above EFQM model.

9.7 Further Research

What this also provides, very clearly, is the opportunity to engage in further research in parallel with these, or any other such organisation, willing to cooperate as it then acted upon the outcomes of such considerations.

The assumption is that within such organisations as these LGOs there already exists (or is ready access to) managerial expertise capable of the type of strategic diagnostic thinking required, prior to making strategic choices. There are many BPR 'methodologies' available for such organisations to consider (see again Appendix 4), and the aim here is not to recommend any one
against any other. Hammer and Champy did not do this either, in fact the
danger in doing so is the didactic enforcement of a rigid 'tools' approach to the
whole (or holistic) process. Better, as Hammer and Champy demonstrated, to
expose this phenomenon of more radical, organisation-wide process change
which they labelled 'Rethinking Business Processes' and 'Business
Reengineering,' and then show very clearly the essential requirements
required of those leaders and organisations considering its application: the
Why, the What, the Who, and the When. Then, having cited examples of the
successful experiences of representative organisations, they left it to others to
apply their understanding and intelligence in the way best suited to their own
particular organisations and circumstances.

It is for these reasons also that no attempt has been made to alter in any way
the original concepts offered by; a) Hammer and Stanton (1995), and b)
Kettinger, Teng and Guha (1997). It would be tempting to do this, but that
would be without the foundation of any further empirical research on which to
base such changes. That would be like playing with the shape of a wheel
prior to first finding out how useful it might be as it was, and in a variety of
applications. The clear suggestion here is that this 'application' should
happen, and that it should happen repeatedly in this form, despite any
potential 'discomfort' that users might feel because of the 'American' (in one
case) or private sector origins, the unfamiliar phraseology, or any other
issues. If modifications were then required, they would be on the basis of that
same iterative, perhaps action-learning-based process of learning and
improvement.

Notwithstanding all the good things that are happening in the organisations
studied, where these two LGOs fell down (if that is not too harsh a term) was
to embark upon something they did not understand well enough, were not
'ready' to undertake, and did not have the strength of leadership required to
make it happen. So it didn't.

At the subsequent 'member check' stage of the research, the Heads of
Change Management for both organisations were offered the opportunity to
'position' themselves on a blank version of the above models, and in both cases placed themselves at \( \frac{3}{4} \) the same levels as those shown. Both of those senior managers considered that the two diagnostic question sets were of potential value – especially as they needed to strive for more strategically-linked, and now possibly more 'radical' change – and accepted the possibility that it might be relevant to continue to co-operate with further research, were they to adopt such a 'self-diagnostic' approach.

It is not in dispute that, UK-wide, incremental (if not radical) change is still required within LGOs at large. Were these two particular organisations to embark again upon a similar journey towards 'radical reengineering', then intelligent use of such diagnostic concepts (and used in combination) would seriously assist that process.

Again, as Burke (2004) said:

'These insights are not new; as conventional wisdom they have been part of your organizational change mantra for decades. Unfortunately, all too often they are only given lip service. Until serious attention is paid to them, the implementation of process reengineering, along with other organizational transformation, will continue to have mixed success.'

As previously indicated (see Methodology, p. 191) the implications are clear that further research is required if the 'deductive' component of Kolb's (1984) 'Learning Cycle' is to be continued, through 'Active experimentation', to 'test' the theory.

The suggestion is that both assessment tools should be offered for use, separately and independently, but that then the results should be considered in combination, using the 'Steps' model to form a balanced view of organisational readiness in conjunction with project radicalness ambition levels.
In March 2007 Phil Woolas, MP – then Minister for Local Government and Community Cohesion – launched his new 'Business Improvement Package' for 'Improving local services for citizens and businesses.' In its 'Ministerial Foreword' he stated:

'Expectations of citizens are rising fast. They want more choice in the way that they receive services. They want higher service standards. At the same time, there is increasing pressure on local authorities to cut costs, including the cross public sector requirement to deliver cashable efficiency gains of at least 3% per annum. The unique selling point of our Business Improvement Package (BIP) is that it is designed to help your local authority and its partners improve services whilst reducing costs at the same time' (p. 5).

Whether it is called 'Business Improvement', Business Process Reengineering or Process Redesign, as this pressure on LGOs to show more radical improvements continues to increase, this research can substantially aid their efforts; and as suggested above, both organisations studied in this research have expressed interest in the possibility of continuing with research into such a self-diagnostic approach towards achieving more 'radical' change.
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An Empirical Study of Business Process Reengineering (BPR) in Two Local Authorities

APPENDICES
Researcher Background

I was born in January 1946 and came to academia rather late in life. From school I became a 2-year apprentice on what was then GPO Telephones – much later to become BT – and stayed with that organisation until taking early retirement in September 1996.

Throughout those 34 years I saw the organisation change names from those early 'GPO' days to become 'Post Office Telecommunications' on 1st October 1969 and stay as that public corporation through the 1970s, change again to 'British Telecommunications' in the 1980s, and eventually be re-branded as 'BT', in the 1990s.

It was formally changed from being a 'public sector' organisation (a section of the Civil Service) to the 'private sector', when it was 'privatised' in 1984, but throughout that same decade a longer-term process of organisational change had commenced as a result of the parallel 'driving forces' (Lewin, 1951) of technology and competition, and triggered by the 'British Telecommunications Act' in July 1981. In 1982 the first private 'switches' (PABXs & PMBXs) were 'liberalised', allowing private suppliers to sell, install and maintain switches in private customers' premises, mainly businesses. Later in the decade the organisation's monopoly status was further eroded when the wiring beyond the 'customer termination' was also liberalised with the advent of the plug-in telephone socket, or Line-Jack Unit (LJU), requiring the organisation to 'give away' the internal wiring of all their residential customers.

The word 'customer' itself only properly entered the organisation's lexicon with its change of status from public to private on 'Vesting Day', 6th August 1984, when the transfer of its business, its property, rights and liabilities to British Telecommunications plc took place. For further information on BT's privatisation see Appendix ?? (source: http://www.btplc.com/Thegroup/BTsHistory/Privatisationinfosheetissue2.pdf)
The primary impact of this public/private transformation was the formality of the organisation's contractual status with its customers; for the first time, really, the company (as it had become) could be held to account. It was no surprise, therefore, that at the same time – through 1985-1986 – all managers and staff within the company went through formal training on 'Total Quality Management' (TQM), in order to encourage the ethos of 'continuous improvement' (CI).

In the mid-1970s I had progressed to become a First Line Manager, and then in the 1980s to Second Line Manager, and to Personal Contractor status as a result of BT's 'Project Sovereign' down-sizing exercise in 1991:

- **BT – a new name and identity for British Telecom**

  On 2 April 1991, the company unveiled a new trading name, BT, a new corporate identity and a new organisational structure. This structure focused on specific market sectors, reflecting the needs of different customers – the individual, the small business or the multinational corporation. The reorganisation was named Project Sovereign to reflect the company's commitment to meetings customers' needs – 'the customer is King.'

  (Source: [http://www.btplc.com/Thegroup/BTsHistory/History.htm](http://www.btplc.com/Thegroup/BTsHistory/History.htm))

  Throughout the next five years BT reorganised and down-sized further with a series of annual 'early release' schemes, aimed at shedding the 'fat' as part of the drive to increase efficiency in its customer services. During this period BT went from a quarter of a million employees to 'less than half the people we had when we were privatised' (Thomas, 1999):

  - 'In just over a year – a remarkably short timescale – we halved our layers of management (from 12!)' (ibid).


  It was during this period that 'Business Process Reengineering (BPR) first emerged, as at the same time BT strove to transform itself into a process-based organisation:

    - 'We also then started to move on process change. The biggest single initiative (from many) has been what we have called Breakout. This was an attempt to break out from our old ways of doing things, and centred on four elements. Firstly, we wanted
to re-engineer our processes – we felt that we were not managing things as efficiently as we should' (ibid).

As a senior manager I had a key implementation responsibility in the latter stages of that 'Project Breakout', in what was then known as the 'Genesis Integrated Pilot', where BT brought together the surviving BPR initiatives that had previously been trialled separately, across the organisation, into one 'test-bed' area, comprised of Nottingham, Derby and Stoke, to see if they could work together. It is primarily from my experiences, gained over these, my latter years on BT, that my 'pre-understanding' (Gummesson, 2000) comes.

Within one year of leaving BT, in September 1997, that I embarked upon a full-time MBA (Master of Business Administration Degree) at the University of Derby. Of the 80+ MBAs awarded that year, mine was one of the only two Distinctions, and I was also the recipient of the 'Masters' Level Prize for Outstanding Performance'.

I was immediately taken on as a 'Sessional' lecturer, initially in the areas of Operations Management and Marketing, but after a number of years – during which I had taught in Switzerland and Israel – I became directly involved in working with the two Local Government Organisations (LGOs) who would eventually participate in this study. This involvement focused primarily on Leadership, the Management of Change, and Business Process Reengineering (which one of those LGOs preferred to call Service Redesign, or SRD).

It was these subsequent 'pracademic' experiences that substantially underpinned that 'pre-understanding', engaged my interest and further nurtured my curiosity, such that when in 2004 the opportunity arose to apply for a full-time, funded PhD Graduate Teaching Assistant (GTA) position, I was encouraged to do so and submitted my proposal. In 2005 the position was confirmed, and the study commenced on 7th March.
Appendix 2

Al-Mashari & Zairi's (2000) 'Table 1'

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<td>1. Discover: identification of problems, setting of targets, determining processes for redesign, and forming BPR team</td>
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<td>3. Vision: selecting processes for re-engineering, and setting redesign options</td>
<td>3. Innovate and build: rethinking new processes</td>
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<td>4. Solution: defining technical and social requirements for new processes, and developing detailed implementation plans</td>
<td>4. Reorganise, retrain, and retool: implementing new processes structure, training on new technologies</td>
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<td>5. Transformation: implementing re-engineering</td>
<td>4. Reorganise, retrain, and retool: implementing new processes structure, training on new technologies</td>
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<td>1. Discover: identification of problems, setting of targets, determining processes for redesign, and forming BPR team</td>
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<td>2. Measuring and mapping existing processes</td>
<td>2. Hunt and gather: process analysis, documentation, benchmarking, and IT levers identification</td>
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<td>3. Analysing existing processes</td>
<td>3. Innovate and build: rethinking new processes</td>
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<td>6. Implementing redesigned processes</td>
<td>4. Reorganise, retrain, and retool: implementing new processes structure, training on new technologies</td>
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<td>1. Discover: identification of problems, setting of targets, determining processes for redesign, and forming BPR team</td>
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<td>2. Initiation: organising re-engineering team and setting performance targets</td>
<td>2. Hunt and gather: process analysis, documentation, benchmarking, and IT levers identification</td>
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<td>3. Diagnostic documenting existing processes and identifying performance gaps</td>
<td>3. Innovate and build: rethinking new processes</td>
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<td>4. Redesign alternatives identification, prototyping, and IT platforms selection</td>
<td>4. Reorganise, retrain, and retool: implementing new processes structure, training on new technologies</td>
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<td>5. Reconstruct: BPR implementation in terms of installing IT components and reorganising other business components</td>
<td>5. Prototyping new processes design</td>
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<td>6. Monitor: identifying performance measures and linking to incremental improvements</td>
<td>5. Prototyping new processes design</td>
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<td>1. Discover: setting strategies and vision for business</td>
<td>1. Incubation: team members selection, best practices determination, and IT application identification</td>
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<td>2. Redesign: including all activities and skills contributing to redesign process</td>
<td>2. Targeted brainstorming: identifying improvement opportunities, and future processes redesign alternatives</td>
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<td>3. Realise: change management techniques, BPR team establishment, communication, measuring performance, and management of resistance</td>
<td>3. Eureka: taking choice for implementation, motivating team, and ensuring commitment</td>
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<td>4. Learning laboratory: starting experiments to test small-scale prototype for proposed processes</td>
<td>4. Learning laboratory: starting experiments to test small-scale prototype for proposed processes</td>
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### Matrix of Tools and Techniques and Uses

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<th>Identity Problem</th>
<th>Gather Data</th>
<th>Analyse Data</th>
<th>Generate Solutions</th>
<th>Select the Solution</th>
<th>Plan for Implementation</th>
<th>Implement and Test</th>
<th>Continue to Improve</th>
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**Handbook Section 6**

**Issue 1**

Jan 1988

**Appendix 5**
Appendix 5

Problem Solving Process

CONTINUOUS PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS

I. IDENTIFY PROBLEM
II. WHAT DO WE KNOW?
III. WHAT ARE THE ROOT CAUSES?
IV. WHAT COULD WE DO?
V. WHAT'S THE BEST THING TO DO?
VI. SELECT THE SOLUTION
VII. PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION
VIII. CAN WE IMPROVE ON WHAT WE'VE DONE?

CONTINUE TO IMPROVE

GATHER DATA

ANALYSE DATA

IMPLEMENT AND TEST
Appendix 6

John Seddon & BPR

John Chamberlin

As the primary purpose of this research is to 'investigate the use of Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) within Local Government Organisations (LGO)', then the focus of this literature search must be towards BPR, the public sector, and the UK. In moving towards that focus from the more general history and track record of BPR, it is relevant to consider the work of John Seddon, as one of the UK's current 'voices' in the area of systems thinking, and more specifically on promoting the 'Toyota System for Service Organisations' and his increasing focus on the UK's public sector.

John Seddon's Vanguard Consultancy has, over the last decade, been working with some major service organisations from (e.g.) BT, Zurich Financial Services and Friends Provident, through a number of local authorities, to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), so no review of BPR-related literature in the UK could reasonably exclude his work. However, Seddon himself would reject the suggestion that his work is in any way 'BPR-related', because, as will be seen, he calls 'BPR' a 'Fad'.

Seddon probably first came to wider prominence following the publication in 2003 of his second book - 'Freedom From Command & Control: A better way to make the work work' - although prior to that, in 1992, he had published the precursor to 'Freedom', called 'I Want You to Cheat!', re-issued in 2002*. At that time 'Cheat' had sold '20,000' copies, and to date the approximate sales on both books, respectively, are:

'Cheat' – 25,000
'Freedom' – 10,000

(* This review retains and uses the '1992' reference since the 2002 re-issued text was not rewritten, and this helps to maintain its original contemporaneousness alongside discussion on other BPR-related works of the early 1990s.)

Seddon has published prominently in the national press and many of those articles are available via his consultancy website: www.lean-service.com/6.asp. He also publishes a monthly newsletter called Vanguard News – available to anyone who wishes to sign up – the purpose of which is, he states, to 'be emphasising perspective, a sideways look at the folly of command and control' (Vanguard News, Jan. 2006).

His relationship with BPR, specifically, in the case of this research, is at least confusing. In 'Freedom' he opens Chapter 8 – entitled, 'Do these bake bread' – with, 'CRM is just one of the many management 'fads', and, two sentences on,
lumps these 'solutions' together as 'being sold under [the] labels - CRM, TQM, BPR, EFQM and so on' (Seddon, 2003: 159). He then confirms the 'fad' status of BPR with, 'Each new fad is followed by spectacular reports of failure ('80% of BPR efforts fail', '80% of CRM efforts fail - it always seems to be around 80%) and a litany of reasons' (ibid).

Seddon takes particular exception to ISO 9000 (letting the other 'fads' off the hook slightly?) with, 'There is little doubt each fad - perhaps with the exception of ISO 9000 - did something for someone somewhere' (ibid), reinforcing this over the page with, 'Despite all of the evidence pointing to the fact that ISO 9000 has a negligible or negative impact on economic performance, organisations continue to be coerced to use it...' (ibid: 161). One criticism of his writing at this stage might be his lack of any 'referencing' in the academic sense, but that could most probably be because these two books were aimed at a different, more 'practitioner' market, so his comments like 'spectacular reports' and 'all the evidence' have therefore to remain unchallenged, at least directly, for the moment. This exception was reinforced in Seddon's 'open letter' (http://www.lean-service.com/EmailDownloads/StevanBreeze.pdf) to Stevan Breeze, chief executive of the British Standards Institute (BSI), following Breeze's reply to his article, 'These checks don't prove anything', about ISO 9000, in the Daily Telegraph (May 13th, 2004; http://www.lean-service.com/6-22.asp), where Seddon had stated unequivocally, 'In short, ISO 9000 is based on bad theory, not quality theory'.

(Note: John Seddon has no monopoly of this relegation of other improvement initiatives to 'fad' status, as Hammer and Champy (1993: 25) state that 'none of the management fads of the last twenty** years ... has reversed the deterioration of America's corporate competitive performance'.)

[** NB 'twenty' becomes 'thirty' in Hammer and Champy, 2001: 28.]

However, Seddon's own earlier writing does not always support the strength of these later, or current, opinions. For example, whilst railing vociferously against TQM, ISO 9000, 'and so on' in 'Freedom', in his previous book ('Cheat') – in the summary at the end of chapter 5, 'Fundamentals of quality' – he cites, arguably more positively, that 'Total Quality Management means mobilising everybody' (Seddon, 1992: 70), implying that by doing that (whilst also applying his other eight 'fundamentals'), TQM could well succeed?

Also, on page 44, he states that, 'There is undoubted merit in the philosophy underlying BS5750/ISO9000', and, 'The problems do not lie in the philosophy but in practice, and practice of course, is governed by attitude' (ibid: 44), which implies that it is simply implementation that is the issue (although implementation is rarely simple). So a further but apparently similar contradiction occurs in his article, 'The 'quality' you can't feel', when he states, 'ISO 9000 is not improving organisations because it is based on bad theory' (Seddon, 2000; http://www.lean-
service.com/6-quality.asp). 'Undoubted merit in the philosophy', and 'bad theory', do not make comfortable bed-fellows.

Whilst passionate in his presentational work, strident in his evidence-based arguments, and with a growing following (evinced by his monthly newsletter contributions at least), Seddon's thinking as an occupational psychologist was primarily influenced by the key quality gurus - 'From Deming I learned about the work of Taiichi Ohno' [and we might infer therefore that Juran was also in there somewhere] (Seddon, 2003: 13) – and he has clearly nailed his colours to the 'systems' mast, citing Ohno as 'the first person to realise the profound benefits of managing the organisation as a system' (ibid).

What Seddon calls a 'system' is clearly akin to what Davenport and Short (1990) meant by 'process'; as in, 'Process thinking has become widespread in recent years, due largely to the quality movement' (Davenport & Short, 1990: 13). In fact, he freely accepts that, in discussions of 'systems thinking', that a 'system' is the same thing as a 'process' (conversationalexchange; Vanguard 'Lean Fundamentals' seminar, 23/05/06).

Seddon's apparent opposition to (e.g.) BPR becomes therefore more interesting when one considers this synonymy between 'systems' and 'processes' (see Appendix 1) in the context of such opening statements in 'Cheat' as, '... to achieve real quality often requires a fundamental reappraisal of the way the organisation works. Roles must be redesigned, procedures reviewed, new systems built and so on', followed by, 'They [people - in organisations] need to question the assumptions that govern today's practice and redesign the way they work in the light of what the organisation is setting out to achieve' (Seddon, 1992: 8/9). He says (ibid), 'People need to be unreasonable', which is not very far from Hammer's (1990: 107) 'At the heart of reengineering is the notion of discontinuous thinking - of recognizing and breaking away from the outdated rules and fundamental assumptions that underlie operations.' Both writers are clearly emphasising the need to challenge 'assumptions', and both in a 'fundamental' context.

Seddon's assertion that 'Roles must be redesigned' is clearly akin to Hammer and Champy's: 'Managers in a reengineered company need strong interpersonal skills and have to take pride in the accomplishment of others. Such a manager is a mentor, who is there to provide resources, to answer questions, and to look out for the long-term career development of the individual. This is a different role from the one most managers have traditionally played' (Hammer & Champy, 2001: 82). Seddon's 'role redesign'?

Seddon's (unreferenced, 2003: 159) statement that '80% of BPR efforts fail' compares unfavourably with Hammer and Champy's admission that, 'Our unscientific estimate is that as many as 50 to 70 percent of the organizations that undertake a reengineering effort do not achieve the dramatic results they
intended' (Hammer & Champy, 1993: 200; Hammer & Champy, 2001: 221), but the corollary of this, and in the context of 'fundamental' and 'radical' changes, is that 30 to 50 percent of such efforts have succeeded in delivering those 'dramatic results', which hardly constitutes failure. Even if Seddon's '80%' was correct, a '20% achievement of 'dramatic' gains could be considered by some organisations an acceptable success rate, and perhaps an entirely reasonable one in the context of Hammer's (1990: 105) clear health warning that 'It's an all-or-nothing proposition with an uncertain result'. (For more evidence see also, Champy, 1996: 2/3, where he cites the 1994 study by CSC, 'The State of Reengineering Report'.)

Another issue, perhaps, is that the statement that '80% of BPR efforts fail' is un-evidenced, and neither is it the same as saying that 'as many as 50 to 70 percent of the organizations ... do not achieve the dramatic results'. Not achieving 'dramatic results' does not necessarily equate to 'failure'. Where does the '80%' come from?

In Seddon's (2003: 26) chapter 2 - The customer service centre as a system - he uses the term 'Value demand', that which 'the service centre exists to serve', and then 'Failure demand' as that 'created by the organization not working properly'. He defines value demand as representing 'the demands customers make for things they want, things that are of value to them', which in Boehling and Joksch's 1990 article on examining TQM's role, equates to 'Quality is meeting the customers' requirements' (Boehling & Joksch, 1990: 21). As Tom Peters would say (and has), 'Pure and simple!'

This failure demand is also known as 'rework' and 'waste': anything that is done again because it was not done correctly the first time (in the customer's terms), or had to be thrown away for the same reasons. This is what Crosby (1986) refers to as the 'Cost of Poor Quality'.

Seddon's primary thesis is predicated on a number of basic tenets: 'the relationship with the customer is everything', that 'service is the creation of value', and that 'it's about the customer's emotional experience of the organisation, the customer's perception' (1992: 15). These are underpinned by one foundational belief: 'Service is delivered by the system - not just the people in the front line' ... 'It's more a matter of how the whole system in which he or she works supports or hinders their dealings with you' (ibid). In his article 'Systems Thinking and Management', he calls this 'doing the right thing', and, citing that 'Deming and Juran demonstrated that people's behaviour is governed by the system they work in', claims therefore that 'Change in performance requires a change to the system' (www.lean-service.com/systems.asp).

This view is supported by Aquayo (1991: 202) with, 'Quality is made in the boardroom. A worker can deliver lower quality, but she cannot deliver better quality than the system allows', and Peppard and Rowland's (1995: 46) view that,
'People can only perform as well as the processes let them and similarly the processes can only perform to the level of the skill, knowledge and motivation of the people who operate them'.

However, this second quotation hints also at the responsibility of the worker to deliver the best that the current 'system' enables them to do, which some might suggest is an entirely reasonable expectation – a fair day's work for a fair day's pay. In that same article on Systems Thinking Seddon states, 'Training everybody in [e.g.] customer care assumes that if people do 'as they should' with customers, customer service would improve', whereas, he asserts, 'their behaviour in front of the customer is governed by their system' - but one could equally validly suggest that if the 'system' was fit for purpose, then it would – as Peppard and Rowland appear to suggest also – be an entirely reasonable proposition for people to perform 'up to' the process. As Seddon states (ibid), 'There is a critical difference between doing things right and doing the right things' – which Drucker (1967: 4/5) defined as the difference between 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness', respectively. The corollary of this could be, therefore, that if the 'system' (or process) is fit for purpose and enabling people to do the 'right things' – be effective – and the people 'do as they should' by 'doing things right' – being efficient – then 'customer service would improve', would it not?

As Seddon says in his article 'Better Thinking About Managing People' (www.lean-service.com/6-13.asp), 'These are not bad people, they work in a bad system'. That might well be true, in most cases, but that does not mean there will never be 'bad people' in an organisation, and when they do turn up they need dealing with appropriately, to everyone else's benefit. Joynson (1995) claims, 'the average British factory operates at only 30 percent effectiveness because of the inefficiency built into the system' (Joynson & Forrester, 1995: 12), highlighting these systemic issues.

His view that to 'be in a position to improve things it is necessary to know the extent to which customer requirements are being met' is essentially not very different from Crosby's (1986: 64) definition that quality is 'conformance to [the customer's] requirements', and it could follow therefore that some component of that 'conformance' would be people doing 'as they should'.

There is no intention here to take anything away from Seddon's basic premise that the starting point is to see 'the organisation as a system', but merely to provide the check that, however, small, there is also bound to be a 'people' effect on even the best of systems. Isn't that why 'management' is required?

However, Seddon does not totally deny this because whilst stating clearly that management's focus should be to act 'on the work not the workers' (because) 'the major causes of variation in performance are in the system' – what he calls, 'the work and the way the work works' – he also acknowledges that 'Managers (and service agents [in the example given]) need to know whether variation in
performance is attributable to agents or the system', ... 'before any action can be contemplated'. Otherwise, he says, 'managers will make the situation worse' (Seddon, 2003: 32, 33, 35/36, respectively). This simply brings the 'effective' v 'efficient' argument back into management's ball park; decide, first, the 'right thing to do', then do that thing right.

Seddon commences his Systems Thinking article with the sweeping statement that 'What we have witnessed over the last 20 years is a series of programmes of change failing to achieve their intended outcomes...', citing 'Customer Care, ISO 9000, TQM, ABC, BPR' as examples, and claiming that 'All the research and experience show that the latest panacea does no better than its predecessors'. Yet in citing also that '80%' of [e.g.] BPR and CRM efforts have 'failed' (2003: 159), he appears to accept by default that some 20% of each may well therefore have succeeded, and it will be evident elsewhere in this literature review that 'all the research' does not, in fact, show 'failure' as the only result of BPR attempts.

Interestingly, and perhaps therefore exacerbating the confusion mentioned earlier, it becomes apparent from a closer reading of Seddon's two books that there are many parallels between the basic -- 'fundamental', even? -- principles of BPR (despite its claimed 'fad' status) and his own allegiance to 'systems' thinking. For example in 'Freedom' (2003: 164) he states, 'The right place to start change (if you want to improve) is to understand the 'what and why' of your current performance as a system*', which is remarkably similar to Hammer and Champy's (2001: 133) 'Once a process has been selected for reengineering, a process owner designated, and a team convened, the next step is not redesign -- not yet. The next step is to "understand" the current process', and to Davenport and Short's (1990: 14, Fig. 2) 'Understand and Measure Existing Processes'.

[* This is reiterated almost verbatim in his article, 'The Business Excellence Model: Will It Deliver?' (www.lean-service.com/6-3.asp); 'the best starting-place is a thorough understanding of the 'what and why' of current performance -- to understand their current organisation as a system, warts and all.]

Seddon's (1992: 86) comment - under the para' heading, 'Using measures for improvement starts with thinking differently' - 'Any consideration of measurement as a means of process improvement requires a radical shift in thinking and attitude', is not particularly different from Hammer's (1990: 108), 'In reengineering, managers break loose from outmoded business processes and the design principles underlying them to create new ones'; or Hammer and Champy's (2001: 79) 'Reengineering entails as great a shift in the culture of an organization as in its structural configuration'; or even Davenport and Short's (1990: 21) quotation from Rank Xerox UK, that when undergoing process redesign in 1988 (they) 'faced all the issues of attitudinal change and retraining that any such change implies'.

The mention, above, of the phrase 'causes of variation in performance' bring us back to Seddon's other key principles; those of demand, variation, work flow, and
capability. In his article, 'Design Against Demand' (first published in 'CONTACT', www.lean-service.com/6-17.asp), he states that the 'starting-place for changing management thinking is [that] managers must understand demand from the customers' point of view', reinforced in 'Freedom' (2003: 30) with, 'Being blind to the nature of demand also means the loss of opportunities to design against demand'. He emphasises the nature of two types of demand by pointing out the 'urgency' required in dealing with failure demand — 'solving the customers' problems'... whilst you 'invest in eradicating the causes'; and of value demand, by delivering 'what the customer wants efficiently. To do this means working on the work flow, from the customer demand through to its completion'.

In 'Freedom' (2003: 35) he talks about understanding a worker's 'capability' by taking measurements of 'time-series data' in order to establish the statistical variation in that person's 'daily measures — what can be expected as 'just as likely' results' — and what could 'be expected in this system'; its 'upper and lower limits' (UCL and LCL). And as he says in 'Design Against Demand', 'managers need [those] measures of capability and flow', reflecting an almost Semco-like (Semler, 1999) distribution of relevant information throughout the organisation by adding, 'Such measures can be used by managers and workers alike'. This reinforces what he said in 'Cheat' (1992: 85) that these measures 'should be valued and used by the people who do the work'. Unlike Ricardo Semler, Seddon is not advocating any democratisation of the company or organisation, but this acknowledgement, above, that the 'service agents' (not the managers) 'are best placed to address the question: what are the causes of variation?' — because those 'identified as within the team's control can and should be acted on by the team' (Seddon, 2003: 37) — is similar to one of the realisations Semler (1999: 128) had as part of Semco's moves towards a more 'sharing' ethos; 'we knew we would have to share something even more valuable: information'. This was emphasised in Semler's second book (2003: 127) in a way that brings it closer to Seddon's point that information should be 'used by the people who do the work':

'At Semco, we practice truth with a simple formula: Free sharing of information. We are so committed to it that we don't just tell people they have a right to information. We actively present it to them in e-mails and at democratic meetings. We also encourage people to learn how to use the information at their fingertips.'

This appears totally in line with Seddon's (2003: 36) advice that the 'better way to think about managing people is to lead them in understanding and acting on the system. It harnesses [service agents'] ingenuity towards contributing, learning and improving, rather than engaging their ingenuity against the system'. This in turn is in line with Semler's discovery that 'More often than not, the groups would break up to work together on solutions...'; and that they [Semco's management] should, 'never forget that we are dealing with adults who are responsible and informed, at that', and that [the 'groups'] 'quickly offered solutions that were more clever and realistic than those first suggested by management' (Semler, 2003: 128). In 'Cheat' (1992: 91) Seddon confirms this with, 'Performance information
should be used by the people who do the work.... They are in the best position to decide what is necessary to improve performance'. This is akin to what consultant Sid Joynson (1995: ???) calls the 'intelligent use of intelligent people'?

The remaining aspect, work flow, is key to this understanding (by the 'service agents' or the 'people who do the work'), and in his article on the Business Excellence Model (BEM) Seddon emphasises that they will need 'help' in 'how to develop more useful measures (of capability and variation)' (www.lean-service.com/6-3.asp). And despite his frequent use of the term 'fads', he ventures, perhaps unintentionally, towards supporting another possible 'fad' – that of 'Managing By Wandering Around' (MBWA) – when he then adds, 'managers who see themselves as hands-on leaders achieve far more in terms of staff morale and performance improvement' (ibid). And later (ibid: 103) he gives the example, 'By being on the spot the managers gained valuable knowledge of all the problems their customers experienced and were able to look at their organisation from the customer's point of view'. MBWA. Pure and simple.

Semler (1999: 66) also advocates this with; 'Today I am a big believer in MBWA, or Managing By Wandering Around. Popularized at Hewlett-Packard, it simply means taking time each week to walk around with, as Bob Dylan said, no destination known':

![Cartoon](https://example.com/cartoon.png)

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That 'destination' might be, as Seddon himself said in 'Design Against Demand', to 'walk the flow'?

Another area of possible conflict in Seddon's writing is his argument against the idea of management 'coaching' in his article, 'Do You Have a People Problem? (http://www.lean-service.com/6-5.asp), where he suggests you are more likely to 'have a management problem', a comment with which Mr Deming may well have agreed. Seddon's claim that 'the idea that the manager is a 'coach' is promulgated by trainers on courses on 'people management' is supported by his recommendation that 'you don't be fooled'. Without widening this debate further at this juncture – because it will be widened elsewhere in this literature review – his comments above do not make 'coaching', per se, a bad thing. In fact, his own words in 'Cheat' (1992: 103) – 'As more problems were solved staff became
more confident and competent' – provide all the evidence required to support its legitimacy.

'Competence' and 'Confidence' are what the horizontal and vertical axes, respectively, of Hersey & Blanchard's model of Situational Leadership Theory (SLT), also dealt with elsewhere, are designed to increase, and 'Coaching' – the second of their four leadership 'styles' – is by definition within a specific range of combinations of 'directing' and 'supporting' behaviours, in order to supply the competence/confidence (respectively) required by the 'follower', in any specific 'situation' (Blanchard, 1989; Blanchard, et al., 1994; Hersey et al., 2001).

Seddon (ibid: http://www.lean-service.com/6-5.asp) says that '(the) 'coaching' model of management assumes two variables: having the 'right' people in place, and exhibiting the right management behaviour when managing those people', and that this 'effective management behaviour to improve performance is rarely to do with aping the kind of behaviour exhibited by sports coaches', yet where is this argument to be found that the 'right management behaviour' is synonymous with 'aping ... sports coaches'? Nowhere. Coaching – as stated above – is not some 'aping' behaviour, it is defined by Blanchard (et al., 1987: 34) as combining 'both direction and support'. None of Seddon's points in that article – sound though they may be – is invalid because 'coaching' as a legitimate leadership 'style', on the road to enabling the 'people' to become fully competent in, and confident at, what they are being 'required' to do.

In fact, in Seddon's own website article, 'Better Service, lower costs and happier people: too good to be true?' (http://www.lean-service.com/6-24.asp), Friends Provident manager Sandra Davison says, 'We continue to train, coach and support our experienced team members' (this author's italics), demonstrating styles two and three of Hersey and Blanchard's (and Hersey, et al., 2001) SLT model.

On Seddon's (Feb. 2006) visit to the University of Derby's Business School he said there was 'no research evidence' to support 'Situational Leadership'. Messrs Hersey, Blanchard and Johnson might disagree with that.

This, perhaps, provides an example of where Seddon's apparent all-or-nothing approach to his methods might falter, as when he comments (2003: 134) that we should 'get rid of 'people management' and replace it with 'leadership', an alternative and presumably equally valid view is that leadership is the 'people part of management' (Lawson, 1999).

Based on his reminder (2003: 35) that, 'As Deming and others taught: 95% or more of variation in performance is in the system', he reasonably argues that it is a waste of 'Command and Control' managers' time to be focusing on '5%' (or less) of 'the problem', and, were it true, few could argue with the sense in that. Where one might argue, however, is with this 'systems-or-nothing' stridency of approach. In calling Six Sigma 'TQM on steroids' (2006) he potentially takes
Taylorism to new heights, where F W Taylor's 'One Best Way' becomes John Seddon's 'Only Way', which appears to deny any value at all in other approaches and is unlikely, on a simple balance of probabilities, to be the case.

For example, it could reasonably be argued also that many of the points he makes – quite validly perhaps – as he poses questions through his 'Performance Management Model', could be equally well made, although taking a slightly different approach, by considering the 'A.C.H.I.E.V.E.' model (Hersey, et al., 2001: 350-353) combined with the 'S.M.A.R.T. Goals' model (Blanchard, et al., 1994: 89/90). Neither approach could be said to be right nor wrong, they are just different.

Similarly, Seddon's opposition to (e.g.) BPR could be equally challenged, when many of the points he makes were equally well made by some of BPR's key early protagonists; examples from Seddon, 2003:

p. 130 – 'The majority of performance problems are in the system and that is management's responsibility'.

Davenport and Short (1990: 23) agreed with this, when they made it clear that for 'process management to succeed' management would have to 'develop new skills'. And Hammer and Champy (2001: 30) say, 'Yet, in company after company we have seen, management works at fixing the pieces instead of redesigning the processes by which the company's work gets done' – very similar to Seddon's own thesis, 'the way the work works'.

Harrington (1991: 24) puts it slightly differently, but in essence agrees also with his; 'Management must focus its attention on, and invest resources to revamp, the critical business processes that make companies efficient, effective, and adaptable to the needs of individuals, customers, and the customers'.

Hammer again, but later (2004: ???), re-emphasises this in his article on 'Deep Change', and how this 'affects the very essence of a company: how its work is done.'

p. 151 – 'If process redesign is conducted by experts who then 'cascade' their solution to the workers, resistance will be in-built'... 'When you change the way work is designed and managed, and make those who do the work a central part of the intervention, the culture changes dramatically'.

This principle of 'involvement' or 'self-management'/direction' is reflected in Davenport and Short's (1990: 19) 'Interpersonal processes involve tasks within and across small work groups, typically within a function or department... This type of process is becoming more important as companies shift to self-managing teams...'; and Hammer and Champy's (2001: 204) 'and put the work in the hands of self-directed teams'. And, as Watson (1994: 205) says also, 'we observed that cross-functional teams are a fundamental enabler for making successful organization-wide transformation happen'.

This need for involvement was confirmed by Spencer (1992: 40) who said, 'From this point of view alone it makes good sense to use the people who are part of the
Appendix 6

process and this is the approach advocated by BPR', and, 'BPR strongly advocates that the people involved in the process should be at the forefront of re-engineering'.

p. 181 – 'Understand' (the system); 'Improve' (the system); 'consider' (use of/changes to) 'IT'.

This ordering of 'redesign' and relegation of 'enabling' IT to third place, is not unlike Watson (1994: 126) whose chapter 7 is entitled, 'Information Technology Provides Enablers'; nor Davenport and Short (1990: 22) who talk of 'IT-enabled redesign' (NB their usage of 'BPR' is Business Process Redesign); and Hammer and Champy (2001: 47) who claim, 'We say in reengineering, information technology acts as an essential enabler.'

And this enabling aspect of IT was again reinforced by Spencer (1992: 40) with, 'Imaginative use of technology is another key factor, enabling the elimination of outdated organizational boundaries and infrastructures.'

As Seddon himself says in his article 'Is IT Bugging You?' (http://www.lean-service.com/6-6.asp), 'Improve first, then 'pull' IT. Few real differences there, then.

This final point was reinforced again, more recently, in Seddon's monthly newsletter, Vanguard News (October 2006), with, 'IT should never be the driver of change; it should follow good re-design and be 'pulled' not 'pushed'.'.

This brings me to one final example where Seddon's work can be reasonably challenged, if not in principle then certainly in some of its accuracy and the representation of detail. In 'Freedom' (2003: 90-96) he uses the case study of a 'Utility organisation' where they (Vanguard consultants) spent some time with a number of 'testers' and, 'In all, (we) saw about 100 utilities being tested'. Later (pp. 92/93) he makes the following comments (necessarily here taken as extracts, but not, I emphasise, out of context):

1. 'The job, as currently designed, is pointless';

2. 'Worse, every utility had to be 'dug' – the hardest part of the job. But the knowledge gained from digging added no value to the testers' decision.'

3. 'Imagine the impact on motivation: testing a utility to a specification, which includes quite a substantial amount of physical work only to learn nothing more than you already know and do nothing constructive to maintain the life of the equipment'; followed by, 'Can you imagine digging out holes around utilities every day, finding that as few as one hundred showed they needed replacement, but worse than that being able to tell those that would show this result without having to dig?'

I will deal with these points approximately in turn, but with some overlaps:

1. the 'pointlessness' of the job?
Appendix 6

Seddon states previously (ibid: 91) that these 'testers' were 'people whose job it was to inspect utilities to ensure they were fit for purpose'. These 'utilities' were telephone poles, and their 'purpose' was to support the overhead wires and cables that provided the customer-end (primarily, but not always) stage of that 'Utility's' nationwide telecommunications infrastructure. The poles were, almost uniquely, made of wood; wood rots, and these poles have an age range from new, to extremely old (50 to 100 years' old is not uncommon). Faulty poles (e.g. 'Decayed', or 'Damaged', above or below ground level) were classified 'D' – 'Dangerous'.

The testers' job was to help maintain the physical integrity of that overhead infrastructure, but the aspect of these poles being 'fit for purpose' that Seddon fails to mention (intentionally or otherwise) is that these poles are frequently climbed by that Utility's service engineers. Rotten poles can fall over, often precipitated by some form of extraneous disturbance, which can in turn easily be caused by the weight of an engineer. That causes deaths, and industrial deaths are unacceptable.

Without labouring this point too much, I will cite the example of one of my own 'testers', from around the same time at which Vanguard might have conducted their research. This guy – an extremely conscientious engineer – said to me one day, "John, my job's a waste of time." I asked him why that was, and he responded, "Because 98% of the poles I test are OK, so you could get rid of my job and save (the company) money." In reply I said, "98%, really? So, let's see, we've got approx' fifty engineers on this site alone (a relatively small Derbyshire location), and each of them will probably climb, say, three poles a day?" He nodded, so I continued, 'At 98% being OK, that means 2% will be faulty; 1 in 50. So that means, on average, that either three engineers a day get one chance of climbing a 'D-pole', or one engineer gets three chances?" The guy looked at me and said, "I've never looked at it like that before John, I think I'd better carry on." I, of course, said, "Yes, I think you should." A faulty 'utility' (pole) means a 'dangerous one' – a 'D-pole' in the jargon – and the bulk, but not invariably, of that genuine 'dangerousness' (excluding other more notional 'hazards' – proximity to spiked railings, etc.) is found below ground level.

Earlier in 2004 I contacted John Seddon by e-mail to ask the question about his case study - was this 'Utility' a 'Telecom's' utility, or an 'Electricity' utility? His e-mailed response was, 'Telecom's, but it doesn't matter.' But I argue that it does. On an 'Electricity Utility' the service engineers have to physically climb their wooden poles only very infrequently, whereas on a 'Telecom's Utility' the engineers' (installation, maintenance and repair) requirement to climb individual poles is very frequent, averaging possibly 2-to-3 times per day, per engineer. This puts an entirely different perspective on the job of the 'testers', the equivalent of which – to the same degree – does not exist on the 'Electricity Utility'.

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On the 'Telecom's Utility', pole testers actually save lives, but, fortunately, the Utility can't count how many.

2. 'every utility had to be dug'

This is factually incorrect. On that 'Telecom's Utility', only 'utilities' (poles) that are aged 'twelve years' or older, have to be 'dug' (this can be found in the testers' job spec.), and the 'tester' can identify any pole's 'age' just by looking at its branded markings (by which, also, for information, he can deduce its depth in the ground – another part of the safety aspect of the inspection). Seddon/Vanguard should have been told that, but there is no mention of it in his text. Perhaps they weren't told. However, no pole, less than twelve years of age, has to be 'dug' as part of the routine test – only if a 'special test' is requested – and the 'Utility' in question has millions of those, which demonstrates, unequivocally, that, on average, any tester's 'day' could comprise a mixture of poles that might, or might not, have to be 'dug'. I believe it was misleading (to the uninformed reader) of Seddon (2001: 92) to make that claim.

His claim that 'digging added no value to the testers' decision' is effectively dealt with in response 1, above, and 3, below.

3. learning 'nothing more than you already know (and doing) nothing constructive to maintain the life of the equipment', followed by, 'Worse, every utility had to be 'dug' – the hardest part of the job'.

Seddon is correct, digging is not only the 'hardest part of the job', but pole-testing, per se, is probably one of the hardest and most lonely jobs on the whole of that 'Utility'. I know, I used to work there, and pole testers across the whole of the east midlands were a part of my remit.

However, he is incorrect to say that these 'testers' do 'nothing constructive to maintain the life of the equipment', because the full range of their duties – whether, again, he was told this or not – contains a number of preventative measures by which to extend the life of those poles, once 'dug', depending on circumstances. That range of duties also includes many opportunities for the 'testers' to improve the standard of each 'pole', whilst there, based on their own initiative. He may well be right to suggest it was 'demoralising work', but the counter is that there were also (and possibly still are) considerable opportunities for the testers themselves to bring self-directed variety into their work.

It is also justifiable, contrary to Seddon's claim, that 'digging' added definite 'value to the testers' decision'. Unless matters have changed – although I suspect they hadn't at the time of Seddon's 'survey' – there was
no known method of accurately, one hundred percent of the time, ascertaining a pole's below-ground integrity, without fully exposing it to at least a depth of approx. 300mm below ground level. Only then, on poles aged twelve years or over (remember), did the tester make his (or her) final 'decision'.

At that time, I was aware of no method, nor any 'tester', that could 'tell those that would show this result without having to dig'.

(NB For further information on this subject, you are referred to 'Ethics On The Line, or Up The Pole? A report on ethics within [company name], with particular reference to safety in the overhead network', this author's MBA (DMS) assignment on 'Business Ethics', which carries an appendix on a visit – between 28 Feb. and 1 March, 1994 – of a team of 'Utility' managers and their 'testers', to a similar group elsewhere in the UK, where 85 'utilities' were observed being 'tested' and relevant evidence gathered. The irony, perhaps, is that this visit was undertaken for the same reason, in essence, as Vanguard Consulting's – in order to find ways to 'improve the productivity' (Seddon, 2003: 91) – except that in our case we were being 'pressed' to emulate the 'productivity' being claimed by the group visited. That visit, however, resulted in far different findings, hence the author's choice of the case study for his DMS 'Business Ethics' assignment.)

The challenge above is not intended to undermine Seddon's work per se, but to suggest, perhaps, that he does his own arguments no service at all unless he presents a clear, full and accurate picture of the cases he chooses to cite. In this particular example, above (Seddon, 2003: 90-96), I believe that is demonstrably not the case. Moreover, perhaps, this weakens any potential for generalisation from the case, whilst also raising possible doubts over any other examples he uses, thus devaluing his work at a time when he might well be seeking greater commercial, industrial and academic credibility?

However, and in conclusion, John Seddon would perhaps be hard-pressed to agree that he has made a significant contribution to BPR in the UK. After all, he says, it's a 'fad'. But I submit, nonetheless, that he has. I suggest that, in essence, the following points are parallels between the basic BPR concepts as propounded since the early 1990s, and Seddon's views now:

Principles

- The primary focus should be on the 'system', or 'process'.
- People's behaviour is governed primarily by the system, or process.
- The potential gains from redesigning systems/processes are substantial.
- BPR and TQM are different, but can be complementary, and mostly are.
- Information Technology (IT) is the enabler, but not the driver.
Appendix 6

- *Nothing,* is 'off limits'.

**Process/Change**

- View the system/process from the customers' standpoint***.
- Understand the current system/process*** (the 'as is') before doing anything else.
- Ask the people who use the system/process.
- Don't forget, but do involve, the 'people'.

**Management/Leadership**

- It is management's responsibility to understand this.
- The task requires committed leadership, at all levels, but especially, and visibly, from the 'top'.

If there is any difference at all, I suspect it is in the emphasis that Seddon/Vanguard place on 'understanding variation' of demand***, but in essence that is very little different from understanding the 'inputs' to the 'ITO' or 'SIPOC' models - 'Inputs-Transformation-Outputs', or 'Suppliers-Inputs-Process(es)-Outputs-Customers', respectively - which is the starting point for most people engaged in process redesign, or BPR.  

*** This was confirmed in conversation with John Seddon on May 23rd, 2006 [Vanguard 'Lean Fundamentals' seminar, 23/05/06] when he said that, within BPR, the 'understand the current system/process*** (the 'as is') ignored the need to fully understand the 'variety in demand', thereby enabling the system's (re)design against demand'.

# Or is it? Is that 'difference' sufficient? Seddon would argue for yes, because it is this 'variety' that is the essence of understanding the 'way the work works'. Without this understanding, of capability and variation, how can we (re)design the 'system', or process - and in this context, as previously, I argue that they are not sufficiently dissimilar - such that we are actually improving the 'way the work works' by (re)designing against demand'? This sufficiency, therefore, appears to rest on the degree to which this 'understanding' is only implied by Hammer and Champy's (2001: 133) 'The next step is to "understand" the current process', or Davenport and Short's (1990: 14, Fig. 2) 'Understand and Measure Existing Processes', and Seddon's (2003: 164) explicitly stated, 'The right place to start change (if you want to improve) is to understand the 'what and why' of your current performance as a system' (then we should act 'on the work not the workers', Seddon, 2003: 32), or, 'The place to start is 'Check':

XXIII
I suggest not, and therefore that John Seddon's 'One Best Way' of 'ITTS' — 'It's the System, Stupid!' (@JC) — and 'systems thinking' has made a significant, if possibly somewhat 'born again', contribution to (business) process redesign - BPR by any other name — within the UK.

Seddon, however, still argues differently and poses the question 'How do people 'get it'?'. In order to reinforce the point that until people actually do go and 'check' what is their full 'type' and 'frequency' of the 'variety of demand' at their own frontline — their customer interface — they will not see what it is that their system is primarily set up to deal with; they will not 'get it':

'This cannot be learned from management reports; it needs to be learned by being in the places of transaction. When you spend your time in those places you find out how well the service works for customers. You will also start to appreciate the waste: re-work, doing too much work, duplicating work and so on' (Seddon, 2003: 104/105).

It could be argued, so I will, that Hammer had this 'learning' as a foundation of his primary case for reengineering, as the following passage might attest (1990: 107/108):

It should come as no surprise that our business processes and structures are outmoded and obsolete; our work structures and processes have not kept pace with the changes in technology, demographics, and business objectives. For the most part, we have organized work as a sequence of separate tasks and employed complex mechanisms to track its progress. This arrangement can be traced to the Industrial Revolution, when specialization of labor and economies of scale promised to overcome the inefficiencies of cottage industries. Businesses disaggregated work into narrowly defined tasks, reaggregated the people performing those tasks into departments, and installed managers to administer them.
Our elaborate systems for imposing control and discipline on those who actually do the work stem from the postwar period. In that halcyon period of expansion, the main concern was growing fast without going broke, so businesses focused on cost, growth, and control. And since literate, entry-level people were abundant but well-educated professionals hard to come by, the control systems funneled information up the hierarchy to the few who presumably knew what to do with it.

These patterns of organizing work have become so ingrained that, despite their serious drawbacks, it's hard to conceive of work being accomplished any other way. Conventional process structures are fragmented and piecemeal, and they lack the integration necessary to maintain quality and service. They are breeding grounds for tunnel vision, as people tend to substitute the narrow goals of their particular department for the larger goals of the process as a whole. When work is handed off from person to person and unit to unit, delays and errors are inevitable. Accountability blurs, and critical issues fall between the cracks. Moreover, no one sees enough of the big picture to be able to respond quickly to new situations. Managers desperately try, like all the king's horses and all the king's men, to piece together the fragmented pieces of business processes.

Managers have tried to adapt their processes to new circumstances, but usually in ways that just create more problems. If, say, customer service is poor, they create a mechanism to deliver service but overlay it on the existing organization. Bureaucracy thickens, costs rise, and enterprising competitors gain market share.

In reengineering, managers break loose from outmoded business processes and the design principles underlying them and create new ones. Ford had operated under the old rule that "We pay when we receive the invoice." While no one had ever articulated or recorded it, that rule determined how the accounts payable process was organized. Ford's reengineering effort challenged and ultimately replaced the rule with a new one: "We pay when we receive the goods."

Reengineering requires looking at the fundamental processes of the business from a cross-functional perspective. Ford discovered that reengineering only the accounts payable department was futile. The appropriate focus of the effort was what might be called the goods acquisition process, which included purchasing and receiving as well as accounts payable.

This makes it fairly clear that the old 'command and control' (Seddon, 2003) approach had passed its sell-by date, but also that it was both possible and quite relevant to consider non-business-wide processes with regard to reengineering, or redesigning them: it was the whole 'process' that needed to be considered, not the whole business, or in other words, the process, not the 'department'. This changes the polar representation of BPR from a functional, top-down approach, to one that is longitudinal and process-based.

However, what this could therefore pose is the question of whether the differences are not in whether something 'is BPR' or is 'not BPR', but whether there are 'degrees' of BPR – whether there is a 'range' of BPR approaches, from, perhaps, 'gentle' (as opposed to kaizen's 'incremental'), to the full-blown 'radical', as proposed by Hammer and Champy? Can an organisation 'try' BPR – tentatively, while it 'learns' – or must it only commit to a radical, all-or-nothing approach?
Appendix 7

CountyC – Service Redesign Training (SRT) Benchmarking Questionnaire

I am a PhD Research Student at the University of Derby (UoD: Faculty of Business, Computing & Law), and I am researching:

'Reengineering Corporation Street: An Empirical Study of Business Process Reengineering (BPR) in Two Local Authorities'.

As part of that study CountyC has granted me access to conduct research into your organisation's past and current Service Redesign Training, and other similar and related change initiatives. My request for you to complete this questionnaire is the first part of that field research, and I expect it should take you no more than 15 minutes. Please do not be concerned if you perceive that any of your own responses (e.g. knowledge levels, etc.) are limited at this stage, as this could be expected. The questionnaire is simply a bench-marking exercise at this early stage of the Service Redesign process, but will provide a foundation for the rest of the research.

It would be most helpful, please, if the questionnaire could be printed, completed, and returned by post to me by Thursday, 11th May. Alternatively, if you prefer, it could be returned in person (enveloped, please, for confidentiality) on Friday 12th May – at the start of Service Redesign Training – where a box will be available.

The further research will be carried out over the coming 12-18 months, during which my aim is to follow the progress of service redesign projects resulting from this (and possibly other) SRT programmes. All research data will be confidential, and protocols regarding ethics and anonymity have been agreed between both organisations. No findings will be published without the appropriate consultation. Your name on this page of the questionnaire is requested solely for the purpose of any follow-up questions or clarifications, and I look forward to contacting you again as your individual project(s) progress over the coming months.

Some questions simply require a tick-box response, others ask more open questions and some are a mixture of both. Please answer as frankly as possible, and use the reverse of the sheets if necessary, as required.

Thank you – John Chamberlin

Contact details: Derby (01332) 591840 / (FAX) 597741
E-mail: J.E.Chamberlin@Derby.ac.uk
Address: Faculty of Business, Computing & Law, University of Derby, Kedleston Road, DERBY, DE22 1GB

Respondent's Name: ___________________________
Appendix 7

Service Redesign Questionnaire:

1. What does 'Service Redesign' mean to you?

2. How did you come to be a delegate on this programme of Service Redesign Training (SRT) – how was this decided (please tick all that apply):
   - Did you volunteer? □
   - Were you nominated? □
   - Was this part of a 'personal development plan'? □
   - Are you involved in a 'change' project/initiative? □
   - Other reason? (Please specify below) □

3. What were you told, prior to becoming a delegate?

4. Who communicated this to you?

5. Have you heard of the term 'Business Process Reengineering' (BPR), or something similar?
   - Yes □
   - No □

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Appendix 7

6. Are you aware of any other Improvement Concepts, e.g.:

- Benchmarking ☐ ☐
- TQM* ☐ ☐
- Change Management ☐ ☐
- BEM** ☐ ☐
- Other (please specify below)? ☐ ☐

* Total Quality Management
** British Excellence Model; sometimes called the European Foundation Quality Model (EFQM)

7. How would you rate your knowledge level on the following:

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<th>Basic</th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>Knowledgeable</th>
<th>Very Knowledgeable</th>
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Any other comments:

8. How would you rate your skills on the following:

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<th>Competent</th>
<th>Highly Skilled</th>
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Appendix 7

Any other comments:

9. What training have you received on any of these?
   - [ ] 0 – None
   - [ ] 1 – Internal Course
   - [ ] 2 – External Course
   - [ ] 3 – Internal and External courses
   - [ ] 4 – Other (please specify below)

If so, please give further detail:

10. How would you evaluate the training you received?
    - [ ] Very Poor
    - [ ] Poor
    - [ ] Adequate
    - [ ] Good
    - [ ] Excellent

Any other comments:

11. How would you rate your current level of experience on Business Process Reengineering (BPR), or Service Redesign (SRD):
    - [ ] None
    - [ ] Very Limited
    - [ ] Limited
    - [ ] Competent
    - [ ] Highly Experienced

Any other comments:
Appendix 7

12. How would you rate your level of understanding on the following:

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<th>Basic</th>
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<th>Competent</th>
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Any other comments:

13. Why does the CountyC think it needs to redesign its service processes?

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<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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<td>Are its processes inefficient?</td>
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<td>Are its processes ineffective?</td>
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<td>Is it Government-driven?</td>
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<td>Other reasons (please specify)?</td>
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14. Why do you think the CountyC needs to redesign its service processes?

XXX
15. How would you rate CountyC's current processes (please tick one box):

- Poor
- In need of some improvement
- Average
- Better than most
- Excellent

Any other comments:

16. What are your reasons for being involved in this Service Redesign (SRD) process?

17. What, in your view, are the critical success factors (CSF) for any SRD projects that you, personally, might undertake - those things that are essential, if your change/redesign projects, resulting from this training, are to be successful? Please describe up to five 'critical factors'.

18. Do you have any other views or comments you wish to add regarding SRT, BPR, or Change Management within CountyC? (Please feel free to continue overleaf.)
Appendix 8

CityC – Business Process Re-engineering (BPR)
JC's Visit – 13th March, 2007
Visit to Interview [Interviewee's name] – CityC's ...

Reminder/Intro' – JC's PhD

BPR/SRD Definition?

How would you define 'BPR' (please write this down)?

What do you think are the key words in your definition?

Organisational 'Readiness'?

'Readiness' Questionnaire - GS

Follow-up on 'Readiness' Q's:

SRD Project Review:

Review of Interviewee's/team's project assignment, and further progress to date?

Go through feedback already received.

Personal feedback?

What was the 'definition' of the project?

What was the 'problem statement'? – what were the 'objective'(s)?

Why was that 'problem' (opportunity?) chosen?

Where did the need come from: Customer(s)? Government?

Were there any 'strategic' links?

How was the problem prioritised?

Were 'the staff' involved? In what way?

What 'process' did you follow? (e.g. 'PSP'? 'DMAIC'?)

Could you talk me through that?

Do you have any further documentation relevant to this project, please?
Appendix 8

BPR General:

Do you think there are 'degrees' of BPR?  
What are your 'minimum criteria' for a change process to qualify as BPR?  
Why do you think that?  
How would you describe that? or those?  
Why did DCC choose BPR?  
Where did it (BPR/the 'choice') come from?  
Whose idea was it?  
Where did the 'commitment' come from?  
Who, specifically, was 'committed' to it?  
How much of this is decided, or affected, by the 'top team'?  
Reflect on the DCC 'plan' to 'train' people to implement BPR/SRD...  
To your knowledge, has anyone else who's completed BPR/SRD training, actually started doing it?  
What is the evidence for that?  
Are there any results yet?
Appendix 9

CountyC – Business Process Re-engineering (BPR)
JC’s Visit – (e.g.) 20th December, 2006

Visit to Interview (Name here) – CountyC’s ...

Reminder/Intro’ – JC’s PhD

BPR/SRD Definition?

How would you define 'BPR' (please write this down)?

What do you think are the key words in your definition?

Organisational 'Readiness'?

'Readiness' Questionnaire – GS

Follow-up on 'Readiness' Q’s:

SRD Project Review:

Review of Interviewee's/team's project assignment, and further progress to date?

Go through feedback already received.

Personal feedback?

What was the 'definition' of the project?

What was the 'problem statement'? – what were the 'objective'(s)?

Why was that 'problem' (opportunity?) chosen?

Where did the need come from: Customer(s)? Government?

Were there any 'strategic' links?

How was the problem prioritised?

Were 'the staff' involved? In what way?

What 'process' did you follow? (e.g. 'PSP'? 'DMAIC'?)

Could you talk me through that?

Do you have any further documentation relevant to this project, please?

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Appendix 9

BPR General:

Do you think there are 'degrees' of BPR’?

What are your 'minimum criteria' for a change process to qualify as BPR?

Why do you think that?

How would you describe that? or those?

Why did CountyC choose BPR?

Where did it (BPR/the 'choice') come from?

Whose idea was it?

Where did the 'commitment' come from?

Who, specifically, was 'committed' to it?

How much of this is decided, or affected, by the 'top team'?

Reflect on the CountyC 'plan' to 'train' people to implement BPR/SRD...

To your knowledge, has anyone else who's completed BPR/SRD training, actually started doing it?

What is the evidence for that?

Are there any results yet?

1 The method is explicated in detail so the reader can judge whether it was adequate and makes sense. An articulate rationale for the use of qualitative research is given so that sceptics will accept the approach. The methods for attaining entry and managing role, data collection, recording, analysis, ethics and exit are discussed. There is an auditability trail – a running record of procedures – and there is description of how the site and sample were selected. Data collection and analysis procedures are public, not magical.

The method is explained in Research Methods section – Chapter 5 – and the rationale for the use of qualitative research approach was based on Patton's (2002) 'Reality-Oriented Inquiry', with semi-structured, in-depth interviews held with 29 participants from the two co-operating LGOs. 'Purposive sampling' (Saunders, et al., 2000) was employed with participants selected from those organisations' BPR training cohorts and those involved more directly at junior, middle and senior management levels.

Entry and Role

Entry to both case study organisations was provisionally agreed prior to the outset and confirmed once the PhD proposal had been accepted. All participants offered further opportunities to contact and/or visit them.

Managing the role of researcher became challenging, primarily in terms of workload and time management. Although the 'GTA' post was full-time, during the first 18 months residual teaching commitments took their toll on available time. During year three, by when most of those commitments been released, I was then offered the opportunity to drop one remaining module (from two) which enabled a renewed focus
through the Autumn and Winter of 2007/08. Family and personal commitments were also an issue, as I needed to maintain a reasonable work-life balance throughout such a lengthy commitment. This was tempered also, however, by my own enthusiasms for the topic and the challenges of the 'learning journey'.

Data Collection and Recording

This is fully auditable, comprising of:

- Audio-recording – all interviews were audio recorded using a digital recorder.
- All interviews were first professionally transcribed by and independent typist.
- Additional brief manuscript notes were made during interviews.
- All transcriptions were then read through whilst listening again to the audio recording, with corrections/additions being made to gain extremely accurate verbatim transcripts.
- Group interview video- and audio-recorded, plus comprehensive notes taken by independent note-taker.
- Notes made from attendance at various (e.g. consultants' visits and training sessions) meetings.
- Organisational documentation gained on request – nothing requested was refused.

Data Analysis, Notes:

- Data analysis and reduction began with manuscript notes on amended transcripts, based on template analysis (King & Cassell, 2007), focusing on thematic and emergent issues; words, phrases, longer sentences, or full dialogue extracts.
- Peer group validation then carried out on sample analyses.
Appendix 10

- Draft analyses focused on themes distilled from peer group review.
- Transcript extracts then transferred to cards.

Ethics

A professional and ethical approach has been maintained throughout. Both organisations were assured I would comply with the University’s ethics policies, and that both client and individual anonymity would be maintained. Names of individuals, and both organisations, have been changed and 'coded' to keep participants anonymous.

Exit

Exit was not a key issue, as both myself and the University were continuing our engaged with both organisations on the delivery of other programmes. Senior managers were aware of this and other participants were made aware of the 'limited' nature of their involvement at the outset, as part of my assurance no to 'abuse' the access agreements. All participants were offered verbatim transcripts of the corrected interviews, which some accepted. Findings were later checked with key participants in each CC.

Audit trail

This statement forms part of the trail itself as a record of checking procedures and data use. Other components are the primary data set and associated working documents, with diaries and journals as supplementary evidence.

Sites & sample

Site and sample are both covered in Methodology, Chapter 5.
Assumptions are stated. Biases are expressed, and the researcher does a kind of self-analysis for personal biases and a framework analysis for theoretical biases.

My 'personal bias' took the form primarily of that 'pre-understanding' (Gummesson, 2000: 57; Coghlan, 2001: 51) of BPR, initially from my industrial exposure, but later added to from my more recent academic experiences. I acknowledged an enthusiasm for BPR, but my earlier 'rational linear' (Boddy & Buchanan, 1992) approach to the concept was mollified towards a more 'participative' (ibid) view as I learned the contextual differences between private and public sector organisations.

The Conclusions table was redrafted in order to remove and concerns regarding my 'bias', and to clarify my 'Interpretive' approach – as opposed to it being simply my views – as the data was presented as my interpretation of the respondents' views.

Any potential for bias against 'public sector organisations' was removed very early, during the in-depth interviews, when I formed the view that all participants were skilled, knowledgeable, and conscientious employees, who were mostly all eager for change.

Later 'pre-understanding' of these organisations had been formed from my on-going relationships with both CCs through other UoD programmes, dating from 2002, to the present. This was supplemented also by my involvement with publications based on research into these taught programmes (Dexter, et al., 2005; Chamberlin, et al., 2006).

'Framing' the analysis round themes from the literature and those emerging from the research assisted in the thematic analysis and further removed any bias.
3 The research guards against value judgements in data collection and in analysis.

Value judgements can never be entirely absent. How would I know? However, my aim in capturing via digital recordings, and then very detailed verbatim transcripts, was to preserve the respondent's true meanings, not to impose my own. Listening again (and again) when necessary enabled those meanings to be clarified through pauses, intonations, etc., whenever I was unsure. My own 'voice' was in the writing style, but my aim was to be dispassionate, despite my 'passion'.

4 There is abundant evidence from raw data to demonstrate the connection between the presented findings and the real world, and the data are presented in readable, accessible form, perhaps aided by graphics, models, charts, and figures.

The connection between the real worlds (Patton, 2002) of the participants was maintained through the use of verbatim extracts (Brown, 2007) from interviews, preserving also in the process their readability. These were their stories, and their accounts of their 'world' of work. My own 'pracademic' familiarity with their context(s) added to this reality. The bulk of the findings are in this narrative form, but later analysis is supported by other tables and models.

Evidence from supporting quantitative and qualitative (Hammer & Stanton, 1995; Kettinger et al., 1997; BPR 'Definitions' tables) is also presented in tabular form.

5 The research questions are stated, and the study answers those questions and generates further questions.

The original aims for the research have remained unchanged, but the specific objectives were refined part-way through the study as part of
the formal registration and review process. These objectives were repeated throughout the thesis in order to reinforce the focus.

The research questions are implicit within those objectives, and they have been answered within the limitations of the contexts of and samples from the two cases concerned. Further questions have emerged as a result of this study.

6 The relationship between this study and previous studies is explicit. Definitions of phenomena are provided, with reference to previously identified phenomena, but it is clear that the research goes beyond previously established frameworks – challenging old ways of thinking.

The relationship between this and previous studies is made clear throughout the main body of the report, especially the Literature Review, and in particular Hammer and Stanton (1995), Kettinger, et al. (1997), and Al-Mashari and Zairi (1999).

Existing models are fully acknowledged – although no tangible evidence has been found of their reported use – and new ones posited based on these, through the Analysis and Conclusions.

7 The study is reported in a manner that is accessible to other researchers, practitioners and policymakers. It makes adequate translation of findings so that others will be able to use the findings in a timely way.

Accessibility of the will be restricted because of client confidentiality. The thesis will be available through normal facilities, but within the restriction of this confidentiality. The findings will be translated into conference presentations and for academic papers, and will also be used to inform current teaching within the University of Derby. The aim
Appendix 10

of this also will be to guide the thinking and behaviour of — in the first instance most probably — those participating LGOs.

Summary finding have been fed back to the appropriate senior figures in those organisations.

8 Evidence is presented showing that the researcher was tolerant of ambiguity, searched for alternative explanations, checked out negative instances, and used a variety of methods to check the findings (i.e. triangulation).

It was not possible, neither was it necessary, to question everybody in these organisations. Data collection continued until sufficient data was deemed to have been gathered, the indication of this being that 'no new information is forthcoming' (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) from the projects/interviews. 'Alternative explanations' were obtained by interviewing managers from various levels, and therefore with various perspectives, within each organisation. Additional 'triangulation' was attained via access to relevant company documentation.

9 The report acknowledges the limitations of generalisability while assisting the readers in seeing the transferability of findings.

These issues are covered in 'Conclusions', but the limitations of the study's 'generalisability' are recognised as primarily applicable to the two 'cases' concerned, secondarily to other contextually similar LGOs, and thirdly but more tenuously to other UK public sector organisations.

Similarly, caution must be exercised over the 'transferability' of the findings, but consideration of the new model's potential would be a first step for other readers.

10 It is clear that there was a phase of ‘first days in the field’ in which a problem focus was generated from observation, not from library

XLII
research. In other words, it is a study that is an exploration, not merely a study to find contextual data to verify old theories.

The problem arose from established contacts with and within both participating organisations. The opportunity for the study arose at the same time as the observation of the intentions of both organisations to embark upon similar strategies for 'radical' change.

This researcher's prior exposure to similar attempts and examples of radical change in a large organisation reinforced the desire and need to carry out the study.

11 Observations are made (or sampled) of a full range of activities over a full cycle of activities.

Observations were made over a range of Council projects, commencing with very early data collection as both Councils began to implement their 'cycles of activities'. Inevitably some of this took place prior to a full literature search (normally not the case), as both organisations had already begun training personnel and engaging consultants.

This range was greater in one Council than the other, but even then there was an attrition rate over the period of study as some participants either did not respond, or discontinued or did not complete their projects.

In both Councils, but in differing ways, it could be argued that, overall, these activities are continuing.

12 Data are preserved and are available for re-analysis.

The data are preserved in dated folders (literature, interview transcripts), in electronic format (interviews, plus other occasional [e.g.
radio) recordings), on cards (approx. 700), and in the form of manuscript notes.

13 Methods are devised for checking data quality (e.g. informants' knowledgeability, ulterior motives, and truthfulness) and for guarding against ethnocentric explanations.

The interview data were recorded and transcribed verbatim and then reported as the participants' own perspectives. Subsequent analysis and reduction of the transcripts involved my interpretation of those perspectives. 'Knowledgeability' in terms of 'BPR' was an integral part of the study and to some degree was being 'tested'. This, and the fact that it was their perceptions that were being sought, was made clear from the outset.

Based on already established (albeit varied) relationships, I believe that the honest presentation of my 'motives' removed any 'ulterior' issues and any lack of 'truthfulness'. My own perspective is that I saw no evidence of those ulterior motives, nor any lack of truthfulness.

Any 'ethnocentricity' was obviated by a balanced gender split that appeared representative of the two (mostly white male) organisations. It is accepted, however, that any potential for generalisability would be affected by the differing mixes that would be found in (e.g.) public sector education or health environments.

14 In-field work analysis is documented.

Formal analysis was only undertaken once the verbatim transcripts had been corrected, and then primarily against pre-determined (gaps in the literature) and emergent themes. However, the basis of the semi-structured interviews was to allow for further 'emergent leads' to be followed as necessary. It could also be argued that 'intuitive analysis'
was taking place during these interviews as those 'leads' emerged, and as part of the necessary 'drilling down' process.

15 Meaning is elicited from cross-cultural perspectives.

There were primarily only two organisations, and their 'cultural perspectives' could be viewed as contextually similar. However, other 'cross-cultural perspectives' emerged (intuitively, see 14, above) when some interviewees revealed their recent 'arrival' from the 'private sector', and the conflicts and tensions that resulted. Once more the 'verbatim' recording and interpretive analysis reflects those alternative 'real worlds'.

16 The researcher is careful about sensitivity of those being researched – ethical standards are maintained.

Ethical standards were explicitly reinforced and the commencement of each interview (mostly off-record to reduce transcription costs) and all interviewees expressed their understanding, acceptance and willingness to co-operate. All were assured of individual and organisational confidentiality. What could not be avoided were any interviewees who may, as part of normal business with the other co-operating LGO, have engaged in chance conversations regarding my research, although it was expected that this would be minimal, at most.

In most (but not all) cases interviews took place 1:1 in a separate room where we were left undisturbed. In the cases where this was not so, that was mainly because some interviewees jointly involved in the same project were purposively interviewed in pairs, and in one case the 'close colleague' of the interviewee who stayed did so at the request of the interviewee.

In all cases interviewees were asked to comment on the nature, style and 'challenge' of the interview at its close. Most responses were by
far affirmative; one was given 'off-record' after the interview, but still as part of positive feedback.

17 People in the research benefit in some way (ranging from getting a free meal to an hour of sympathetic listening to being empowered to throw off their chains).

There were no 'free meals'; on the contrary, it was me who received many 'free coffees'. Consistently apparent, however, were the 'benefits' claimed by many interviewees; saying that it was useful to 'talk' in a way they never normally had time (nor were invited) to do, that the 'questions' (and questionnaires) had been interesting and useful, and verbatim examples of these are shown in the main text.

18 Data collection strategies are the most adequate and efficient available. There is evidence that the researcher is a finely tuned research instrument, whose personal talents, experiential biases, and insights are used consciously. The researcher is careful to be self-analytical and recognise when he or she is getting subjective or going native.

Choice of research strategies is dealt with in Methodology, Chapter 5. However, I sought early feedback on interviewing technique from both the supervision team and all those interviewed. I became more 'finely tuned' as this process progressed, particularly with regard to the balance on 'me' vs 'them' in the narrative, as I had noted (personally and after feedback) that early on I needed to listen more, and speak less. I believe I am both self-reflective and self-critical, and, for example, later interviews showed greater listening.

'Pre-understanding' has previously been acknowledged, but awareness of this allowed me to guard against subjectivity, though I believe my personal 'talents', previous 'insights', and considerable previous interviewing 'experiences' (recruitment, promotion, appraisal, discipline,
research, etc.) in a large organisation, were enablers rather than inhibitors.

19 The study is tied into 'the big picture'. The researcher looks holistically at the setting to try to understand linkages among systems.

The 'big picture' linkage is brought out through the review of literature, in terms of varied approaches change and quality management, plus more recent strengthening of the penumbral centre-ground between BPR and systems thinking, especially in relation to service provision in the public sector (Seddon, 2008). Whilst this research is not targeted at 'the public sector per se' but at 'BPR' in the context of two LGOs within the UK public sector – this is also covered appropriately in the literature review.

20 The researcher traces the historical context to understand how institutions and roles have evolved.

As stated in Q. 19, the recent history of the public sector is covered in the literature, where of necessity much greater focus was placed on the 'historical context' of BPR, its emergence, early history and its survival in the 21st century.

One benefit of being a 'mature' PhD student is that I was able to call upon relevant experiences as part of a core team when in a large private (previously public) sector organisation (BT), as it went through various attempts and approaches of large-scale cultural, quality and organisational change programmes, and from the varied perspectives of affected, affecter, trainer, junior manager and senior manager.

Specifically mentioned in the literature is Harvey, whose 1995 report – 'Re-engineering: The Critical Success Factors. The second updated and expanded edition of a major report on British companies'
experience of re-engineering' – covers on pages 29-45 that same organisation and relates to the period and events of which I was a part. I was part of the organisation when it was the 'GPO Telephones' in the early 1960s, and saw its transition through 'Post Office Telecommunications' in the 1970s, to privatisation as 'British Telecommunications' ('British Telecom') in the 1980s, and then to 'BT' in the 1990s. It was the first half of the 1990s that saw its first and most dramatic 'downsizing' and at the same time its attempts at nationwide 'reengineering'. During that period my own Midlands group was one of only three (Nottingham, Derby and Stoke) involved as part of what was known at the time as the 'Genesis Integrated Pilot', as BT 'tested' its newly reengineered processes in live environments to see which would 'work together' and which would not. Again, at the time, this was aimed at the 'BT of the Future'.

All this was part of my 'pre-understanding' about how 'institutions and roles have changed'.
Appendix 11

CityC/CountyC – BPR Research Questionnaire

'Organisational Readiness'?

Name: ___________________________ Date: ________

The aim of this questionnaire is to establish an organisation's 'state of readiness' for embarking upon such a 'radical' process of change as BPR. It uses a recommended tool, called the 'The Self-Assessment Diagnostic', which looks at the three areas of 'Reengineering Leadership', 'Organisational Readiness' and 'Style of Implementation', and with the following series of questions covers those three diagnostic areas.

You should ask yourself how true you think each statement is of City/County Council. The scoring system is an answer scale that runs from 1 to 5, with 1 representing strong disagreement (i.e., the statement is not at all true of City/County Council) and 5 representing strong agreement (i.e., the statement is totally true of City/County Council):

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Reengineering Leadership*

(* Note: Please indicate who – i.e. which 'leader' – you have in mind when answering questions 1 to 6: ___________________________. Thank you.)

1. The leader of reengineering is a senior executive who is strongly committed to reengineering and who possesses the title and authority necessary to institute fundamental change.

   Score: Strong Disagreement □ □ □ □ □ Strong Agreement
   1  2  3  4  5

2. The reengineering leader truly understands the nature of reengineering and the magnitude of the change – organisational change in particular – that it entails.

   Score: Strong Disagreement □ □ □ □ □ Strong Agreement
   1  2  3  4  5
3. The reengineering leader has a vision he or she wishes to create and is able to express that vision clearly and simply in operational terms.

Score: Strong Disagreement 1 2 3 Strong Agreement 4 5

4. The reengineering leader is ready and able to exercise leadership – through communications, personal behaviour, and systems of measurement and reward – in order to make reengineering succeed.

Score: Strong Disagreement 1 2 3 Strong Agreement 4 5

5. The reengineering leader is prepared to commit both the organisational resources and personal attention that reengineering requires.

Score: Strong Disagreement 1 2 3 Strong Agreement 4 5

6. The entire senior management team shares the leader's enthusiasm for reengineering.

Score: Strong Disagreement 1 2 3 Strong Agreement 4 5
Organisational Readiness

7. The organisation as a whole recognises the need for reengineering and fundamental change.

Score: Strong Disagreement Strong Agreement

8. The organisation understands the nature of reengineering, including the fact that it results in multidimensional change that impacts processes, jobs, organisational structure, management responsibilities, etc.

Score: Strong Disagreement Strong Agreement

9. The organisation believes that the reengineering leader and the senior management team are truly committed to reengineering, and that this commitment will be long-lasting.

Score: Strong Disagreement Strong Agreement

10. The organisation has none of the complacency and arrogance that often follow a sustained period of success.

Score: Strong Disagreement Strong Agreement

11. The organisation is free of the scepticism, mistrust, and ambivalence that often follow a program of downsizing or restructuring.

Score: Strong Disagreement Strong Agreement
12. The organisation has the financial and human resources needed to implement reengineering.

Score: Strong Disagreement Strong Agreement

13. Key staff organisations – human resources, finance, and information systems – are positive about the prospect of reengineering and capable of innovative response to its demands.

Score: Strong Disagreement Strong Agreement

14. The organisation's experience with total quality management (TQM) has created an environment that is receptive to reengineering.

Score: Strong Disagreement Strong Agreement

15. The organisation places a high value on serving customers and has a solid understanding of customer needs.

Score: Strong Disagreement Strong Agreement

Style of Implementation

16. The organisation is comfortable with the way in which reengineering proceeds, through risk taking, learning, and ambiguity.

Score: Strong Disagreement Strong Agreement
17. The members of reengineering teams will feel empowered to 'break the rules' and to challenge long-standing assumptions.

**Score:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strong Disagreement</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Strong Agreement</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>

18. The reengineering effort is directed at key business processes rather than organisational units.

**Score:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strong Disagreement</th>
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<th></th>
<th>Strong Agreement</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

19. Managers have been given end-to-end responsibility for the processes to be reengineered and are motivated to assure that the processes are successfully reengineered.

**Score:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strong Disagreement</th>
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<th></th>
<th>Strong Agreement</th>
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<td>1</td>
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</table>

20. Measurement systems and performance goals have been established to chart the progress of reengineering.

**Score:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strong Disagreement</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Strong Agreement</th>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name: ___________________________</td>
<td>Date: _____</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reengineering Leadership**

|----------------|---|----------------|---|----------------|---|----------------|---|----------------|---|----------------|---|

Minimum score for section: 24

**Organisational Readiness**

|----------------|---|----------------|---|----------------|---|----------------|---|----------------|---|----------------|---|----------------|---|----------------|---|----------------|---|

Minimum score for section: 28
Style of Implementation

Statement 16: 3
Statement 17: 4
Statement 18: 4
Statement 19: 3
Statement 20: 3

Minimum score for section: 18

Minimum score for diagnostic as a whole: 75
Evaluating Your Scores

Hammer & Stanton (ibid: 89/90) give 'minimum scores' for each statement, each section, and the diagnostic as a whole, but emphasise also that the 'minimum recommended section score is larger than the sum of the statement scores', and that this is because 'mere adequacy in each category is not enough to guarantee success; overall strength is what is needed' - with minimum 'section scores' as follows:

'Reengineering Leadership' – 24 out of a possible 30;
'Organisational Readiness' – 28 out of a possible 45;
'Style of Implementation' – 18 out of a possible 25.

They offer a list, below, that 'indicates the minimum numbers [they] believe an organisation should score before tackling reengineering – that is, prior to launching the effort. Some issues are more vital than others, and hence have a higher minimum score':

Reengineering Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Minimum score for section: 24

Organisational Readiness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Minimum score for section: 28

Style of Implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Minimum score for section: 18

Minimum score for diagnostic as a whole: 75
Appendix 12

Examples of Theme Cards

--

DP1 / 10/24/23

Change Management

DP1 / 10/1-2

"In it is change managed – it is not something about Business Process Reengineering."

--

EM1 / 4/21-23

"That was quite illuminating though. It told me a lot of things that I vaguely knew but in a more coherent manner about it why it is not working."

--

ME1 / 8/27-29

"Forget the constraints and the resources and the disposition of resources you have now and map it as if you had started from the beginning."

--

ME1 / 8/24-29

"Why would you bother mapping it out to you – you then don't want it to be conditioned by the existing map, don't know for you'll find out I don't actually know a lot about BPR."

--

ME1 / 6/7-10

"Change will be different."

--

BH1 / 6/29-31

"I think there's still a lot of picture of people that are – are against it and don't want to let go of what they've done for twenty years and think that if you're challenging that, um, it's actually you, a criticism of them as an individual rather than the fact that you're trying to just get a better process to give you better improvement."

--

BH1 / 6/22/29

"What is resistance to change?"

--

BD1 / 2/21-29

"You don't have a long enough history with the staff and just change things. You have to accept the way they're working now, and try and you know, not put your head against it too hard, you have to go with it."

--

LD1 / 5/25-27

"It's taking a year for us just to get projects from business case which has been in circulation for a long time, to just being allowed to proceed it's already by the real idea, this is something we want to do. It will be a year, the document just been going round the house."

--

LD1 / 1/19-19

"They absolutely do not want you changing. It will reflect on hundred jobs. Because everything here will start going, 'Whose job? And causing panic."

--

LD1 / 1/19-18

"Leadership/Politics"
Appendix 13

Photographs of Theme Groupings from Analysis Process Review Meeting, December 2007:

1. **BPR/SDR**
2. **Benefits/Outcomes/Results/Savings**
3. **Case for Action/Drivers**
4. **Change**
5. **Communications**
6. **Culture/Context**

---

**People**

**Processes**

**Resources**

**Structure/Organization**
Appendix 13

SEDDON/SYSTEMS
LEAN

LEADERSHIP

MEASURES/METRICS

FISH!

IT/ICT

Examples
'Pulling' expertise
Variety demand
Purpose
'Clean' data

Examples - ve
Communications
SMT commitment

Evidence

Enabler
Driver
CRM
02CityC

Business Process Re-engineering (BPR)

How would you (personally) 'define' BPR?

Could you please, in your own words, give your definition of BPR by completing this sentence: BPR (Business Process Re-engineering) is defined as...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee:</th>
<th>Definition:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hammer &amp; Champy (1993: 32)</td>
<td>&quot;the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of performance, such as cost, quality, service, and speed.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FB</td>
<td>redesigning how people and resources are organised to achieve better or improved results that align with the organisation’s strategic intent or mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KC</td>
<td>a process or methodology to help define ways of improving a business process, and to develop a plan to implement the changes required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>a structured review of processes with a view to delivering service improvement &amp; efficiency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>mapping out existing business processes and then remapping them, starting with the customer end-point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>a structured examination and modernisation of systems and processes to achieve better value for money and improved customer service.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pilot Group:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee:</th>
<th>Definition:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GJ</td>
<td>a structured methodology to assist in 'mapping' where the business/service is now, to help assist in 'mapping' where ideally we want to be i.e. more effective/efficient service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>(BPR is) a set of structured skills that can assist an organisation to effectively change a process that it undertakes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HJ</td>
<td>breaking down and analysing the existing business(es) processes, in a defined area of work, with a view to establishing new more efficient processes with an action plan to implement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SM</strong></td>
<td>...unravelling existing processes within an organisation and developing new more efficient ways to undertake the tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BS</strong></td>
<td>... examining and redefining the business processes within an organisation in order to streamline, improve and standardise processes which may lead to more efficient and well-run organisation improving service, deliver, et cetera.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>YH</strong></td>
<td>... changing processes, structures and (possibly) personnel to ensure we meet customer needs in an efficient and flexible way.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**City Homes***:  
**PB**  
... rethinking what & why we do what we do, & the way we carry out our day jobs.  
**SH**  
... a process of looking at working procedures & questioning whether they are effective to complete the designed outcome & where not putting in changes.

* 'City Homes' is a CityC 'ALMO'.

LXII
## CountyC

### Business Process Re-engineering (BPR)

How would you (personally) 'define' BPR?

Could you please, in your own words, give your definition of BPR by completing this sentence: BPR (Business Process Re-engineering) is defined as...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Definition:</th>
<th>*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>…identifying a process for improvement; discussing with users a way of improving and building a case for change, be it securing funding, or just changing people's ways of working.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LD</td>
<td>…radical redesign of methods and ways of working to continually improve process and practice.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>…stripping down a business process and rebuilding it from scratch to achieve the results that are required.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WM</td>
<td>…the process of moving an organisation from its current state or position to another desired state, ensuring the change aligned to the vision, aims and mission of the organisation.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>…[the] breaking down of services into underlying constituents elements (product deliverables); assessing whether all elements add real value, rationalise where possible and the seeking to re-assemble constituent elements (that add value) in a more efficient manner.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>…taking an as-is process, breaking down all the functions with 'operational' staff and then looking at potential efficiency gain, to produce a re-defined process ensuring full support &amp; buy-in from senior managers &amp; operational staff.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>…analysing an existing process and outcome, considering the impact on the customer and the cost efficiencies, and setting about changing and improving the results for both the customer, staff and the cost.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET</td>
<td>…looking at existing Business Processes and seeing if they are the most effective and efficient way of carrying out the process.</td>
<td>8a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>…taking an area of the business, appraising its significance and effectiveness and identifying areas of concern, to improve it by stripping it out, analysing its purpose and rebuilding it to be more efficient and effective.</td>
<td>8b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT</td>
<td>...looking at existing practices and trying to see if there are more efficient or effective ways of working.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>...the systematic analysis of services with the aim of re-designing, or at least evaluating, these so they best serve the objective of the service.</td>
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<td>...looking at the current situation and then deciding how to improve and make changes to improve the service area in question.</td>
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<td>...an opportunity to review and improve a defined business process with the objective of improving it, in terms of speed, level of response and reduced cost of operation.</td>
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<td>...a way of helping us to look at what we do, identify ways of doing it more effectively and efficiently and improve the service(s) we provide.</td>
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CityC

Business Process Re-engineering (BPR)

Key Words Table (13 Interviewees)

Could you please, in your own words, give your definition of BPR by completing this sentence: BPR (Business Process Re-engineering) is defined as...

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* 'Service' (improvement) – (SG)
** Similar to 'organised'? – (FB)
*** Assumed! – (DP)
**** 'Better Value-for-Money' – (DP)
$ 'Structured' (skills) – (AP)
$$ Improvements in... – (HJ)
CountyC

Business Process Re-engineering (BPR)

Key Words Table (12 Interviewees)

Could you please, in your own words, give your definition of BPR by completing this sentence: BPR (Business Process Re-engineering) is defined as...

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**Key Words:**

- Interviewee: Hammer & Champy

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* 'Assess what adds value' - FR

** Similar to 'adding value'?
Example of one CountyC interviewee's perception of their Call Centre's 'Value-add':

| JC: | Is the call centre adding value or is it merely a veneer between the customer and back office departments? |
| HD: | It's an adding value, definitely. |
| JC: | What value does it add? |
| HD: | Well, the easy way is to give you an example... We have a foster care service in the authority, and, we have a dedicated foster care team; based in social services, and these are people, highly professional, social workers mainly, in the main that deal with, with the enquiries; and every so often you'll probably see adverts going out that say, if you're 'interested in becoming a foster carer? Please give us a call'. |
| JC: | Yeh. |
| HD: | And what happened in the past was that they would call a dedicated number which would actually terminate in the foster care team, of professionals, and there would probably be a social worker on the end of the phone – and the first thing you want is a pack on information... |
| JC: | Mmm. |
| HD: | ...so they'd send out a pack of information. Um, then they'd get a response form back and the first thing you have to do is go out and visit and do a, you know, talk to the people who want to become a foster carer, or look at the house, all that sort of stuff. And that's quite, you know you're talking there about a matter of weeks of, of... |
| JC: | Mm |
HD: We've had a look at that process and eventually they were keen to have a look at it with us as well, 'cos they were(n't) hitting their targets ...

JC: The call centre were keen to look at it or the foster people?

HD: No, the foster people...

JC: Right.

HD: ...the foster, um, care team. So what we did is we brought that service into the call centre, and we developed probably the longest script we've got, in the call centre. So if somebody calls now, well, they see an advert; the first number they see is the 08456 number, because it's actually manned 8 till 8...

JC: Mmm.

HD: ...and Saturdays as well, so it's a better service from that point of view straight away.

JC: Mmm.

HD: When they actually call, 'Call [County]', they say what they're calling about; interested in becoming a foster carer. They actually, the call centre say well, if you've got 20 minutes, now, it's quite a long time, I realise, on the phone, but, we can actually start the process now. And what they've developed is a script, with the foster care team, the professionals, to take the people through a whole series of steps, which are essentially filtering steps, so if, one of the questions they ask – getting a load of basic information – one of the first questions they ask is around, 'do you want to foster a child under 6 months?' Yes. Do you smoke? And if you do, the two things are incompatible, you can't, you can't...

JC: Mmm.
HD: Um, 'Do you want to foster an under, under 4-year-old?' Well how, 'will he have his own bedroom?' No, well, he won't. I'm sorry that, according to our... So what happens is that, by the end of that phone call, people have actually self-selected them out, themselves out of this process, and what the, foster care team actually receive is an incredibly rich, group of, um, people who have been forwarded on from the call centre. So rather than sort of like to trying to, you know, respond to every request, and see like go and see 100 people, they might go and see 20, who stand a very very good chance of actually becoming a foster carer.

JC: Hmm.

HD: So, I think in that, in that sense, it's added an incredible amount of value to the process.
CITY COUNCIL

Change Management Strategy

Version: Final 2.0
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<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>2. The Strategy</td>
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<td>3. The Way Forward – Delivering the Strategy</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>4. Conclusions</td>
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<td>5. Action Plan</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 In 2003, the Council introduced the Building for Excellence strategic change programme. In 2006, the programme was reviewed and now addresses five key themes...

- Improving organisational and service performance.
- Delivering efficiency and value for money.
- Improving communication and community engagement.
- Developing a culture of excellence and learning.
- Providing excellent customer services.

1.2 In December 2004, a review by the Audit Commission rated as being an ‘Excellent’ Council. In order to maintain our progress the renamed Building on Excellence programme leads strategic change across the Council. The focus remains on implementing the five themes and the delivery of the related projects along with a performance-orientated culture that embraces new ways of working. We will need to continue to improve to retain our ‘excellent four star’ status confirmed in 2005 by the Audit Commission under the new rules known as ‘CPA The Harder Test’.

1.3 This document outlines the Council’s overall approach to strategic change management. It is based on practical experience, principles of good project and programme management derived from Prince2 and recognised models of delivering change.

1.4 A Change Management Toolkit is being developed to give managers and employees practical advice and examples when embarking on, managing or working through a change activity. This will be available on ‘net in late 2006.
2 THE STRATEGY

Our Vision...

2.1 Building on Excellence is the Council's Change Management Programme. Our vision is to create and sustain an organisation that 'delivers excellent services, performance and value for money.'

2.2 To achieve this Vision, the Council needs to...

- Provide easy access to high quality Council services for everyone in
- Use modern approaches to work, new technology and business change to achieve high quality services.
- Continue to modernise the Council's services to ensure excellent service quality, performance and accountability.

2.3 The aims of the change programme reflect the Council's value of 'adopting new ways of working wherever these will help us to do things better and provide value for money, customer focussed services.' They also contribute towards the Council's priority delivering excellent service, performance and value for money.

2.4 City Council’s approach to managing change reflects its 'excellent four star' CPA status. The Council will in most cases adopt an incremental approach to change but recognises that there are four main types of change, all of which are relevant and being experienced by individuals, Business Units and Departments across the organisation. These four types of change are...

- **Gradual change** – policies or strategies are amplified and employees need to adhere to them even more strictly. An example of this might be the need for even tighter budgeting.

- **Step change** – changes to the working environment of the organisation require employees to adapt quickly and maintain high performance levels. An example of this might be an office relocation or introduction of new technology.

- **Evolutionary change** – strategies evolve and employees need to adjust to new cultures, targets or Council visions. Uniting the organisation behind the Customer Service Strategy is a good example of this type of change.

- **Radical Change** – where a major change has a significant impact on the Council, and successful management of this change is vital to the future of the organisation. A major restructure is a good example of this type of change.
2. **THE STRATEGY**

2.5 To help deliver the Council's vision for change, a number of objectives have been identified. These are...

- A compelling vision for action.
- Committed leadership.
- Re-engineering processes to deliver efficient and effective services.
- Securing stakeholder support through effective communication.
- Rigorous project management.
- Infrastructure alignment.
- Creating capacity.
- Evaluating success and the lessons learned.
- Promoting equality of opportunity.

2.5.1 **A compelling vision for action.**

The Council will have a clearly documented case for implementing change which sets out why action is needed and how the proposed action will add value.

2.5.2 **Committed leadership.**

The change programme will receive strong and visible support from senior management. The change programme will be sponsored and led by high calibre and credible managers.

2.5.3 **Re-engineering processes to deliver efficient and effective services.**

Business Process Re-engineering – BPR – will be introduced across the Council to review services and processes making them more efficient and effective.

2.5.4 **Securing stakeholder support through effective communication.**

Key stakeholders will be identified and engaged in the change programme. Communication with stakeholders will be clear, consistent and persuasive in order to share the Council's vision, to keep them updated on progress and to make sure that they are aware of their role in the process.

2.5.5 **Rigorous project management.**

The Council will use the project management methodologies it has developed across the whole change programme, tailoring its use to meet the requirements of each individual change project. Project Management training will be available to anybody leading a change initiative.
2 THE STRATEGY

2.5.6 Infrastructure alignment.

Change projects will be backed-up with the appropriate resources including budgets, performance measures, Human Resource policies and IT resources. Employees with the relevant skills will be deployed on these projects.

2.5.7 Creating capacity.

Employees working on change projects will be released for sufficient time and will have their work priorities re-assessed to allow them to make an effective contribution.

2.5.8 Evaluating success and the lessons learned.

All change projects as well as the overall programme will be regularly evaluated to see whether or not goals have been achieved and if they have been a success for all stakeholders. The lessons learned during the change process will also be regularly reviewed and assessed.

2.5.9 Promoting equality of opportunity.

City Council is committed to providing equality of opportunity to all both in terms of those who work for the organisation as well as in the services it delivers. A key element of the change programme will be to make sure that when services and processes are changed and improved, equality of access and opportunity is not compromised.
3. THE WAY FORWARD – DELIVERING THE STRATEGY

Delivering change...

3.1 In April 2005, the Building on Excellence Board and the Council’s Cabinet approved the establishment of a Change Management Team to provide support to strategic change across the Council. Some of the current initiatives include:

- supporting improvements in Council service delivery
- establishing a Council Customer Contact Centre
- support for improving new ways of working in particularly the use of information technology
- supporting the far reaching changes required by the Integrated Children’s Services agenda
- implementation of the Council’s Accommodation Strategy
- support to the Gershon efficiency review agenda.

3.2 The importance of managing change goes well beyond the services provided directly by the Council. Councils are being increasingly challenged to lead and contribute to change across the public sector and through the new Integrated Children’s Services agenda, closer working with the health sector, Local Area Agreements and providing community leadership. Effectively changing and modernising our own services, enhancing the Council’s reputation, will mean we are well placed to meet these challenges.

3.3 Creating lasting change can be complex and difficult. Successful implementation of any new strategic direction should be based on a clear strategy or plan, with strong senior management commitment to creating change. It is also important to make sure that the organisation has the capacity to deliver the desired outcome. Change will only be successful if the entire workforce is able and prepared to play their part in implementing it. Unless these issues are explicitly addressed, most change programmes will fail to deliver their full benefits.

3.4 In , we have developed the Building on Excellence programme and its five themes to provide a clear vision for what we want to achieve. The Council has demonstrated its commitment to the success of the programme through the resources it is making available for the Change Management Team and funding of projects within the programme.
3. THE WAY FORWARD – DELIVERING THE STRATEGY

Cultural Change

3.5 Change management requires the Council to be proactive and manage employees effectively. It is important that employees are involved and consulted during a period of change. This way they will contribute rather than being reactive and possibly resistant. The way the organisation operates, its ethos and principles for working is its culture. Ensuring an appropriate culture is not only part of making a change effective but is often the very aspect that needs to be changed.

3.6 The Council has already embarked on a journey to align the culture of the organisation to meet the Council's vision of delivering excellent services to our customers.

3.7 The Corporate Plan, published in April each year, says what the Council's vision, objectives and key outcomes are, how it aims to deliver them and how much funding is being invested in order to achieve its aims.

3.8 Employees need to understand the organisational objectives and feel well informed and consulted. They need to have a clear understanding about how their jobs contribute towards the corporate vision, but they also need to have and feel they have a role in the decision-making process.

3.9 In future, the processes leading to decision-making and internal communication itself need to be two-way. Effective two-way communication develops an understanding of both vision and values throughout an organisation and enables all employees to feedback on what works and what doesn’t in front line service delivery. This feedback, along with responses from customer surveys and the input of Members, is vital before any significant changes to service delivery are introduced.

3.10 A good standard of internal communication between employees and Members is important. Members, like many employees, are also local residents who obtain Council services. They play a vital role in the formulation of policy, in giving residents' feedback to staff, in acting as ambassadors for the Council and in shaping the public perception of the authority. They need to contribute to and have a clear understanding of the Council’s corporate strategy, its key policies and all ongoing changes – both internally and in service delivery.

3.11 The Council's Communication Strategy needs to foster an environment, which promotes constructive feedback. This should be based on equality of access to relevant information irrespective of position within the organisation. This, in turn, provides employees with the opportunity and motivation to share knowledge and the tools to deliver a quality service, improving the service to customers.
3. THE WAY FORWARD – DELIVERING THE STRATEGY

Cultural Change continued

3.12 The Council’s long-term aim is to have a culture and processes in place, which encourage and facilitate good communication between all levels, in which all employees feel their views and ideas are important. It is particularly important that front line employees - along with members of the public - have the opportunity to influence policy, as they know from first hand experience what the customer wants and needs.

3.13 Key aims should include an understanding of the Council’s vision, values and objectives by all managers, to make sure they can pass on the message to employees, so they in turn understand how they can contribute to those aims, values and objectives. Together, these will help make sure employees have the information to do their jobs, have a clear sense of direction and are motivated and positive about the Council as an employer and provider of services to the city.

3.14 Empowering employees at all levels within the organisation to act on the Council’s vision will be a key element of the change programme. Employees must be free to develop new ideas and approaches without being hindered by the old ways. Organisational processes will need to be changed to help remove obstacles that may hinder change. These obstacles may not be physical but may exist in the minds of employees. Everybody must be given every opportunity to adopt the changes being proposed and to embrace the vision.

Key successes to date...

- Annual Corporate Plan clearly articulates the Council’s Vision, Values, Objectives and Key outcomes and demonstrates how these are cascaded down through the organisation.
- Council priorities are determined through in-depth consultation with the public and elected members.
- Information being more widely shared through net including CMIS and Performance Eye.
- Progress in establishing a performance culture recognised through CPA and external audit.
3. THE WAY FORWARD – DELIVERING THE STRATEGY

Compelling vision for action.

3.15 The most important starting point for any change programme is to have a clearly documented case for change based on rigorous analysis. This should set out why action is needed, and how the proposed action will add value. It should also set out a new and compelling vision, articulated in such a way as to engage stakeholders. The Council has recognised the need to change to meet the increasing expectations of service users, the wider needs of our communities, the national drive to improve public services and the opportunities presented by new technology and ways of working.

3.16 The Building on Excellence programme establishes the vision for action in

![Diagram of Building on Excellence]

3.17 The case for change has been established through external inspection as well as self-assessment and internal review. The programme is a dynamic entity with projects and initiatives being completed as well as new ones being established. All activities are designed to contribute to our vision of ‘delivering excellent services to our customers.’

Key successes to date...

- The Council has a clear vision for change set out in the Building on Excellence programme.
- Five Themes provide a clear vision and for change and improvement.
- Areas for change and improvement are clearly identified.
3. THE WAY FORWARD – DELIVERING THE STRATEGY

Committed leadership

3.18 Committed leadership is needed at all levels of the organisation, with strong and visible support from senior management. The change programme should be sponsored and led by high calibre and credible managers.

3.19 The Change Management Programme is led by the Chief Executive. The Building on Excellence Board is responsible to the Cabinet for the overall direction and management of the programme. It has responsibility and authority for the strategies within the remit agreed by the Cabinet. The programme is endorsed and supported by all three main political groups on the Council.

3.20 The Change Management Team is responsible for working with Departments and individual service areas to deliver the change agenda at a practical level, making sure that the overall aims and objectives of the programme are being addressed and achieved at every stage of the programme. Team members have been selected for the skills and attributes they bring to the Council and in particular to the change programme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key successes to date...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Building on Excellence programme established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Programme sponsored by Chief Executive and led by the Director of Resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Change Management Team established to provide capacity and support into the change programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Support for change from all three political groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Re-engineering processes to deliver efficient and effective services.

3.21 A key area of work across the whole Council is the fundamental review and redesign of processes. This is known as Business Process Re-engineering - BPR. The Council has appointed to work in partnership to develop a BPR methodology and framework, to deliver training and to provide mentoring support as required. The corporate Change Management Team as well as managers of the services being reviewed will undergo comprehensive training in the Council’s methodology prior to any review work starting.
3. THE WAY FORWARD – DELIVERING THE STRATEGY

Securing Stakeholder support through effective communication

3.22 It is critical to identify key stakeholders and engage them with the change programme. Stakeholders should include:

- all Council employees
- Trade Unions
- elected members
- residents including young people
- other relevant voluntary and statutory agencies.

3.24 Clear, consistent and persuasive communication is needed to share the new vision with stakeholders, to keep them updated on progress, and to make sure that they are aware of their own role in the process. Communication needs to be a two-way process. Feedback to communication is important, particularly if the changes to be introduced are difficult to understand, threatening or if it is critically important to get the changes right.

3.25 A Communication Plan was established at the start of the programme and continues to develop and evolve to meet the changing requirements as the Strategy Areas and individual projects enter different phases.

3.26 The Building on Excellence Newsletter and the annual employee conferences have been key communication tools. Building on Excellence week celebrates the achievements made on the programme and showcases and highlights the many areas of change already happening within the Council.

3.27 A new Employee Magazine ‘Council Life’ was launched in September 2005 replacing the Building on Excellence Newsletter. The magazine provides all employees with regular updates and information on progress and developments within the Change Programme.

3.28 As Building on Excellence brings about real changes in what people do and how we do things, we will focus more on detailed, two-way communication with the people affected in order to understand and deal with their concerns.

3.29 Communication with the public is a key element of the change programme as services change and improve. A Strategic Review of Communication in 2005 provides a focus for improved communication both within and outside the organisation. This new Communication Strategy resulting from the review will be a key element of the change programme.
3. THE WAY FORWARD – DELIVERING THE STRATEGY

Key successes to date...

- Annual Employee Conferences focusing on change and improvement.
- Building on Excellence Newsletter.
- Appointment of Head of Consultation and Communication May 2005.
- New Council Website launched in June 2005.
- Building on Excellence Week held in September 2005.

Rigorous project management

3.30 The Council needs to commit the right resources to make sure the change programme is delivered on time. Project team members should have clear accountabilities for delivery of project outcomes, using disciplined and well-managed project processes. They should use rigorous project plans, including milestones, timeframes and monitoring mechanisms to track progress.

3.31 One of the early success stories of the Building on Excellence programme has been the introduction of project management principles across the Council. These have been documented in the Council's own Project Management Manual which has been based on the Prince2 project management methodology.

3.32 A training programme has been established on the methodology as well as more formal courses on the Prince2 methodology both at Foundation and Practitioner levels.

3.33 Clear project structures have been established both at a programme level as well as for individual strategy areas and projects. Reporting and monitoring mechanisms check that projects are being delivered within the timeframes and budgets that have been set.

Key successes to date...

- Project Management principles well established across the Council.
- Project Management Training programme developed and being delivered on a regular basis.
- Formal Prince2 Training Courses regularly delivered at Foundation and Practitioner levels.
- Robust project structures with effective reporting and monitoring mechanisms established.
3. THE WAY FORWARD – DELIVERING THE STRATEGY

Infrastructure alignment

3.34 Change has to be backed up with appropriate resources to support the new arrangements - particularly budgets, performance measures, Human Resource policies and IT resources. It will also be important to make sure that there are sufficient employees with the relevant skills in place.

3.35 A key element of the change programme will be the re-engineering of services. Business Process Re-engineering or BPR as it is known is the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to bring about dramatic improvements in the performance of services.

3.36 The Council has engaged an external provider to work in partnership to help develop the BPR framework. They will also provide training and mentoring support to managers and employees involved in re-engineering their services and processes. By fundamentally reviewing services and processes, we will have an opportunity to re-align the Council's infrastructure in a way that makes sure we deliver excellent services to our customers.

3.37 Technology will be a key element in supporting the delivery of the change management process. We will develop a range of tools for use by the Change Management Team and Service Managers to enable them to take full advantage of the new opportunities that technology can bring.

3.38 BPR and the use of technology will be key elements of helping the Council achieve the savings required as part of the Gershon efficiency agenda as well.

**Key successes to date...**

- Building on Excellence budget established to help support individual change and improvement projects and initiatives.
- Business Process Re-engineering partner engaged to help support the Council in developing a framework and to deliver bespoke training in the Council's methodology.

Creating capacity

3.39 For a change management project to be delivered on time, it needs sufficient resources. Project Team members must be released for sufficient time and have their work priorities re-assessed to allow them to make an effective contribution. Leading a change programme is difficult. It is likely that those people leading it will feel uncertain. Therefore, they need to feel properly mandated and supported to challenge existing practices and carry out the work necessary to make sure that the project is a success.
3. THE WAY FORWARD – DELIVERING THE STRATEGY

3.40 The Change Management Team will provide a valuable resource to Project Teams providing project management, change management, HR and BPR skills and expertise. However, it is important that we provide those involved with change projects the capacity to focus on the challenges of the projects without being continually diverted back to dealing with the day job.

Key successes to date...

- The recognition by the Building on Excellence Board that additional capacity is required through the establishment of the Change Management Team to act as a central resource for all change projects.
- Funding from the Building on Excellence programme to support change and improvement initiatives across the Council.

Evaluating success and the lessons learned.

3.41 At the end of the change process we need to be able to see whether or not the change has achieved its goals and been a success for all stakeholders. We also need to take time to review the lessons learned during the change process.

3.42 There are a number of pitfalls that could jeopardise successful change...

- Lack of clarity around the vision.
- Lack of senior management commitment to change.
- Overestimating the ability of the organisation to deliver the new vision.
- Underestimating the time required to create the change, particularly if change in culture is required.
- Failure to design processes, structures and incentives that reward change.
- Lack of attention to stakeholders to make sure they are fully committed to the new vision.
- Poor communication of the vision for change and of the details of the Change Project Action Plan.
- Insufficient involvement of stakeholders in both inputting to the change at design stage and implementation of the change.
- "Change fatigue" – the organisation and its staff have been subjected to so many change programmes that they disengage.

These are all issues that we constantly need to monitor and address.

3.43 This Strategy and the resources and structures that have been established to run the change programme through Building on Excellence are designed to help make sure that we do achieve our aims and deliver our vision.
3. THE WAY FORWARD – DELIVERING THE STRATEGY

3.44 Change does take time and resources. The Building on Excellence Board has recognised this through the establishment of the Change Management Team as well as the provision of financial resources to support and encourage innovation, change and improvement.

Key successes to date...

- A clear commitment to change from Cabinet, Chief Officer Group and the Building on Excellence Board.
- A realisation that even as an 'Excellent' Council we constantly need to change and improve.
- Provision of additional resources both financial and human to help drive the change agenda forward.

Promoting equality of opportunity.

3.45 City Council is committed to providing equality of opportunity to all both in terms of those who work for the organisation as well as in the services it delivers. A key element of the change programme will be to make sure that when services and processes are changed and improved, equality of access and opportunity is not compromised.
4. **CONCLUSIONS**

4.1 City Council is committed to delivering excellent services to its customers. To achieve this, the Council needs to continuously seek ways to change and improve. The Change Management Strategy sets-out the framework for how change will be approached.

4.2 The Council is embarking on a journey of change which will have an impact on Departments, Business Units as well as individual employees. The change programme therefore needs to be delivered with sensitivity.

4.3 Through the change programme and the use of Business Process Re-engineering, the Council will radically change the way services are delivered and will transform customers experience and expectations of the Council.

4.4 Employees are a key stakeholder as they will be at the heart of the change programme. Working with all stakeholder groups will be a major element of the programme, making sure that we communicate regularly and effectively so that everybody knows and understands what is happening at every stage of the process.

4.5 We must also acknowledge that things change. We will need to review this strategy regularly to make sure that we keep pace with new developments both within the organisation and from outside.
## 5. ACTION PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Lead</th>
<th>Timescales</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Change Management Team</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete recruitment of Change Managers</td>
<td>Business Improvement and Change Manager</td>
<td>September 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Management Team Induction and Training</td>
<td>Corporate Training and Development Adviser</td>
<td>October / November 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Change Management Strategy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalise and consult on draft Change Management Strategy</td>
<td>Change Management Team</td>
<td>September / December 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publish / launch final version of Change Management Strategy</td>
<td>Change Management Team</td>
<td>February 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop and launch the Change Management Toolkit</td>
<td>Change Management Team</td>
<td>By April 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communication and Consultation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare scope for review of Communication and Engagement</td>
<td>Head of Communication and Consultation</td>
<td>By September 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete review of Communication and Engagement</td>
<td>Head of Communication and Consultation</td>
<td>By 31 January 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare and launch new Communication Strategy</td>
<td>Head of Communication and Consultation</td>
<td>By March 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revise and launch Consultation Strategy</td>
<td>Head of Communication and Consultation</td>
<td>By March 2006</td>
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## 5. ACTION PLAN

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<tr>
<th>Action</th>
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<th>Timescales</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Management</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide Project Management Training in the Council’s approved methodology.</td>
<td>Corporate Training and Development Adviser</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Business Process Re-engineering - BPR**

<table>
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<th>Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop a framework and methodology on BPR for the Council</td>
<td></td>
<td>By December 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a training programme on BPR to reflect the Council’s methodology</td>
<td></td>
<td>By December 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide BPR training on the Council’s approved methodology.</td>
<td></td>
<td>From March 2006</td>
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</table>

**Change Management Projects**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Programme</td>
<td>Direct Programme Team</td>
<td>From May 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project Manager: Head of Customer Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation Project</td>
<td>Accommodation Project Team</td>
<td>From May 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project Manager: PFI Programme Manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gershon Efficiency Reviews</td>
<td>Gershon Co-ordinating Group</td>
<td>From April 2005</td>
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5. ACTION PLAN

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Lead</th>
<th>Timescales</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategy Reviews</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of Customer Service Strategy</td>
<td>Customer Service Project Team</td>
<td>August 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of Direct Strategy</td>
<td>Direct Programme Team</td>
<td>September 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of Change Management Strategy</td>
<td>Change Management Team</td>
<td>October 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. **Key Reference Documents...**

City Council Corporate Plan 2005 / 2008

City Council Best Value Performance Plan 2005/2006

City Council Customer Service Strategy 2004 and 2005

City Council Customer Service Standards 2005

City Council Contact Centre Strategy 2005

City Council Building on Excellence Manual version 4

City Council Project Management Manual 2005

City Council e-Roadmap – A Vision for 2005

Most of these documents are available on net or by contacting the Strategic Planning and Performance Unit.
Impact Analysis – Focus Group Preparatory Questions
(CountyC)

Focus Group SRD Project 'Prompts'

Name:

Project Title:

1. Project Objectives:
   - What were its key aims?
   - What were its specific (i.e. 'SMART'?) goals?
   - What were you really trying to achieve?

2. What were the actual outcomes of the project(s)?

3. What were the tangible(*) benefits? Where would the evidence to support this be seen?

(*) e.g. Cashable savings; Improvements in Customer Satisfaction measures; anything else?)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name: Project Questions</th>
<th>BH</th>
<th>CA</th>
<th>HS</th>
<th>LD</th>
<th>FB</th>
<th>WM</th>
<th>RT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Title:</strong></td>
<td>Advisory Booking Service</td>
<td>Tablet PC Project – Trading Standards</td>
<td>Early Years &amp; Childcare Children’s Information Service Redesign Project</td>
<td>EDRM*</td>
<td>Local Authority Land Searches**</td>
<td>Local Authority Land Searches**</td>
<td>Desktop PCs – Delivery, Maintenance &amp; Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Project Objectives</strong></td>
<td>To introduce a mediated online course enrolment on behalf of the Education Advisory Service, through ‘Call County’ (County C’s Call Centre) and to maximise its efficiency and effectiveness.</td>
<td>1. To save costs – staff time, accommodation &amp; travelling</td>
<td>2. To improve data quality</td>
<td>3. To pilot new ways of working – flexible working / location-independent working</td>
<td>Here are the key aims of the project, they were all SMART goals: 1. To re-direct 100% of all telephone interactions through Call County by 31st August 2006. 2. CallCounty to solve approximately 25% of all telephone interactions for parents/carers looking for childcare during their first contact. 3. To evaluate three IT systems and agree a solution by 31st May 2006. 4. To increase awareness of Call County to our customers and childcare providers in the county by 31st August 2006 using marketing and publicity.</td>
<td>Roll-out a Corporate EDRMS* 1. What were its (or their) key aims? The introduction of an EDRMS into the Council is an enabling project which aims to assist with or directly allow us to support the objectives of the Council’s Information Management Strategy, the Council Plan, e-Government targets and our Gershon objectives. Together these initiatives aim to: 2. Improve efficiency by increasing use of electronic workflow methods 3. Reduce office accommodation tied up with paper storage 4. Modernise services for our customers by widening the range of methods they can use to communicate with us 5. Expand access and inclusion by supporting 24/7 service delivery in Call County and our Web site. 6. Increase the number of types and volume of electronic transactions, thus improving our responsiveness, and lowering our data capture costs 7. Improve support for remote and home</td>
<td>To investigate whether the Land Searches processes of managing and using information, within and between local government tiers could be improved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
working, with consequent reductions in property costs and unproductive travel time.
- Provide a robust and standards compliant corporate information management solution ensuring we can easily and effectively satisfy Data Protection and Freedom of Information obligations.

1. What were the specific (i.e. "SMART") goals?
2. Reduce Council office space currently used for paper filing, and reduce the annual amount of paper generated and stored by the Council going forward.
3. Reduce the amount of paper stored off-site and costs associated with this.
4. Realise efficiency savings from utilising workflow and BPR through the introduction of electronic working, reducing staff time spent on managing paper files, freeing re-useable office space, and reducing a range of sundry costs associated with paper processes.

- What were you really trying to achieve?
- Aside from realising efficiency gains, we are really trying to change the culture of the organisation in the way in which departments and individuals work together.
| What were the specific (i.e. 'SMART') goals? | To have 75% of Trading Standards Officers and other enforcement staff working with the system by mid-2007 (revised March 2008). | Reduce Council office space currently used for paper filing, and reduce the annual amount of paper generated and stored by the Council going forward. | Reduce the amount of paper stored off-site and costs associated with this. | Realise efficiency savings from utilising workflow and BPR through the introduction of electronic working, reducing staff time spent on managing paper files, freeing reusable office space, and reducing a range of sundry costs associated with paper processes. | Stage 1 (6 weeks) | To agree a mechanism for the electronic exchange of information between the County Council and District Councils in [the county] relating to the Land Searches service. | To baseline information relating to existing processes. | To identify potential process improvements and level of benefits arising. | To develop an outline specification for a potential prototype solution. | To produce and end of Stage 1 Report – (before any agreement to Stage 2) | Stage 2 (12 weeks) | To develop a prototype system to assist with responses for datasets which are currently maintained electronically. | To assess each dataset that is currently held in non-electronic format as to whether it should be electronically captured. | To undertake appropriate data capture and solution population. | To produce an end of project report. | To make recommendations for further action and the potential wider roll-out beyond the pilot area. | Specific | To stem the erosion of revenue that is being lost to Personal Search Companies. | To improve the efficiency of the service and explore the potential for joint working. | To improve the speed of the service to the customer. | Measurable | An increase in the amount of income collected. | A reduction in the number of days for a search to be undertaken. | A reduction in the number of days to exchange information with partner. | Achievable | To improve the efficiency of the service and explore the potential for joint working. | To improve the speed of the service to the customer. | Increase income for the service. | Improvements in performance | Realistic | Partners keen to address the service problems. Sponsorship from Chief Executive. | Timely | Income currently lowest it has ever been, service heading for trouble. | Opportunity due to new shared service agenda. | The SMART goals were not observed. |
| What were you really trying to achieve? | Ideally cost savings, but above all we were keen to identify improvements and benefits to meet both the department's objectives, whilst enhancing the customer experience. | To try new technologies and see if we could get some efficiencies. | Aside from realising efficiency gains, we are really trying to change the culture of the organisation in the way in which departments and individuals work together. | To introduce improvements at County & District in moving from paper based processes to electronic processes. | To improve service performance and reduce costs. | To respond effectively to the growth of Personal Search Companies. | Trying to improve the service and exploit the opportunity offered to develop a shared service. | A more consistent approach to the way computers are delivered and managed to bring all machines in line with basic standard requirements. This was intended to reduce the amount of resources used manually and re-actively managing computers, and also |
2. What were the actual outcomes of the project(s)?

| We are only in the early stages of service delivery and need to review the success of the first stage. We did identify a number of other projects for service improvement as well – all of which had a knock-on effect to the work we were involved with for the Advisory Service.
| The process has actually changed several times as we tweak the way we work, and as yet we haven't agreed the final budget transfer – once we have analysed the costs from the first phase we will submit the business case to ensure the financial arrangement can be approved.
| We were able to make a good start and get one section up and running. We have struggled to get this further because:
1. Goal posts have changed – number of visits, samples, etc., has dramatically reduced due to change in policy. Less activity means less scope for financial efficiencies.
2. Other projects have taken resource originally allocated.
3. Management have not 'bought in' to full consequences of change needed.
| All of the above were achieved, except Call County solved more than 25% at first contact which was an excellent achievement.
| Identified and trialled options for improvements in the Land Searches Service
Quantiﬁed beneﬁts of moving to mainly electronic processes, from mainly paper based processes
Identify, captured and maintained appropriate electronic data - covering 1/3 of district council
Developed, populated and trialled a prototype system
Established an electronic transfer mechanism with district council
Enhanced staff skill levels in Mapinfo and project delivery
Captured and ongoing maintenance of Countywide details of Section 38/278 Agreements - published on DMaps (Intranet)
Highlighted overlap with other service areas - Highway Systems (NSG) and Asset Management - with potential for resource sharing
Identified potential income opportunities (e.g. Prescribed line revocation)
An End Stage 1 Report and an End of Project Report
| The project is still ongoing. Some progress has been made, for example: there has been an improvement in the exchange of information between districts and the County.
A draft business case for the project has been produced and approved by the [CountyC] Chief Executive’s.
Some business process workshops have taken place, which have identified inefficiencies in the process.
| wasted resources in users waiting for help.
Nothing changed.

3. What were the tangible benefits? Where would the evidence to support this be seen?

| We identified potential cost savings of £15,000 after completion of all phases.
We will conduct a customer satisfaction survey at the end of phase 1. We have seen an increase in the number of electronic bookings (which has a cheaper transactional cost), and
| 1. Financial – none gained because of above.
2. Survey carried out showed that our customers liked the new system and thought it was a good idea.
3. Staff response mixed, some very good, some poor – internal
| Italics indicate the evidence...
- Rapidly increases the opening hours to the public Monday – Friday 8:00am – 8:00pm and Saturday 9:00am – 4:30pm Opening hours have been extended.
- All CountyC services
| Electronic records use at County
Development of a suitable GIS-based system
Enhanced staff skill levels
Enhanced staff willingness to embrace new working methods
| Not too many at present apart from performance between exchange of information between County and the districts.
As no changes were implemented, there were no tangible benefits.
| XCIX
| 'Call County' offers extended hours of access. | Interviews | will be made more accessible to the public by using a single point of contact to access many other council services using one 'Big Number'. All callers are now being directed through the 0845 ? ? ? ? number.  
- The response to the public will be more consistent due to the Rapid Development Tool being utilised in Front Office to generate a script for the Call Centre Advisor to read from for all simple enquiries. Scripts have been written by the Early Years & Childcare Team to assist the Call Agents in dealing with generic enquiries.  
- The history of the customer contacts with the Council will be holistic and stored in a centrally managed location. All Customer contacts are now being captured by MASE a sophisticated client hub.  
- Utilising the Call County Admin Team for dispatching generic information packs will streamline the admin process and free up CIS Officer resource to concentrate on outreach visits and Integrated Children's System (ICS) Service Directory work. All EY&CC information is now being captured by the Call Agents and then electronically forwarded to the Admin Team for a centralised dispatch service. | • Reduced turn-round time between CountyC and [cited District Council] from 4 days to 1 day |
- ICMS will be reviewed to enable easier interoperability with other IT solutions in a controlled, secure, and seamless manner. Full integration has been successfully implemented; information is captured once within Front Office and then seamlessly transferred to the ICMS solution.

- More contact will be made with providers to ensure that information about them is updated more frequently, providing a more accurate picture to customers seeking childcare. A childcare audit is carried out as often as possible by Call County where providers are contacted to update childcare information. This is undertaken during Call County quiet periods after 6pm.

- There will be reinvestment of time savings which will qualify as non-cashable Gershon service improvement savings. The Early Years & Childcare staff are now able to concentrate on delivering a dedicated professional service, instead of the more mundane tasks.

- We can proactively contact customers to offer other services that may be of interest to them. We can now predict services to offer our customers using the knowledge base that we have built up in MASE; customers are
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** This was the same project.
### Kettinger, et al's (1997: 72) 'Project Radicalness Planning Worksheet' for County C

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Average individual 'Factors' score: 3.09, 3.09, 2.73, 3.36, 2.73, 2.73, 3.36, 2.64, 2.97

Average for Group: 3.09, 3.09, 2.73, 3.36, 2.73, 2.73, 3.36, 2.64, 2.97

Sum of Av'e individual Factors & Risk: 5.09, 7.09, 4.73, 5.36, 4.73, 4.73, 5.36, 3.64, 5.09

Final Average: 2.55, 3.55, 2.36, 2.68, 2.36, 2.36, 2.68, 1.82, 2.55
SECTION 7 OPTIONS APPRAISAL

7.13 The Review Team propose the following step change solutions...

- Rationalise existing hotlines by October 2004

- Develop mini-call centres or 'hubs' from April 2005

- Create an integrated customer contact centre for telecommunication and face-to-face contact from September 2007.

The procedures, information and infrastructure that are needed to support all methods of access

7.14 The Review Team acknowledge that a considerable amount of work is being done as part of the Building for Excellence Programme under the E-Derby Strategy area which will impact on and provide solutions to customer service / access issues.

7.15 Working as part of the Derbyshire Partnership, the Council is developing an A-Z for the website and an E-Forms solution.

7.16 In January 2004, the Council decided not to participate at the present time in the development of a Customer Relationship Management - CRM solution as part of the Derbyshire Partnership. This was the correct decision for the Council as the solution did not fit with the established strategic direction for the supporting infrastructure. There were also issues regarding the availability of resources to implement the solution within the required timescales set by the partnership.

7.17 The Review Team acknowledges that a CRM solution will be required prior to the introduction of the integrated customer contact centre and recommends that a solution be implemented from April 2005.

7.18 Placing technology over existing systems and processes is not the solution however and a significant amount of Business Process Re-engineering – BPR will be required as part of the rationalisation of the hotlines, development of the mini-call centres and introduction of the integrated customer contact centre. This exercise will be completed as part of the Building for Excellence Programme in close liaison with a newly appointed Corporate Customer Services Manager who will initially report to the Assistant Director – Revenues and Benefit see paragraph 7.19.

7.19 Lack of management information has been identified as a key issue for the Council and as part of the implementation of the strategy, a system of collecting information will need to be introduced across all departments. This will also be the responsibility of the Corporate Customer Services Manager. It is recommended that the new Performance Management Information System - PMIS – is used to assist this process.
SECTION 8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.30 The customer services strategy should be linked-in to the Council's Performance Management Strategy and local performance indicators should be developed to enable customer service to be monitored and reported. Business Units should be encouraged to develop and include customer service related performance indicators within their annual Business Plans.

8.31 Mechanisms for regular and consistent consultation with customers including hard to reach groups should be introduced in all Departments to enable the Council to monitor public satisfaction and to ensure that customer service is continually improving across the organisation.

Business Process Re-engineering

8.32 The customer services strategy will require Departments, Business Units and employees to work in different ways. The rationalisation of hotlines, the introduction of the virtual call centre and ultimately the development of the integrated customer contact centre means that the Council needs to urgently review all the back office processes that will feed into these new ways of working.

8.33 Business Process Re-engineering is an area being addressed under the Building for Excellence programme and the outcomes of this review and the improvements being proposed emphasise the importance that corporate capacity should be developed as soon as possible to enable this work to start.

Information and Technology

8.34 Technology is key to the implementation of the improvement plan and strategy. Technology cannot just be bolted on however and the process re-engineering outlined in the previous paragraphs must take place before technological solutions are implemented.

8.35 The Council cannot expect employees to deliver excellent customer service if they have not been provided with excellent information. The work being undertaken as part of the E-Derby initiative such as the A-Z, Property Gazetteer and E-Forms will all help to ensure that employees have the information they need.

8.36 CRM is still a developing area and while the Review Team has proposed a cautious watch and see approach to the implementation of a CRM solution based on the experiences of other authorities. However in the long-term, it does see the benefits both to customers and employees of introducing a CRM solution for Derby. The introduction of a technological solution such as this can only follow once organisational, culture and process re-engineering issues have been addressed.
SECTION 8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Face-to-Face Contact

R17 Reception areas should be standardised to ensure a consistency in the information available, opening times and level of service delivered – see page 90 paragraphs 8.23 – 8.24.

R18 The plans to address Disability Discrimination Act - DDA issues in reception areas should be progressed as soon as possible – see page 78 paragraph 7.12 and page 90 paragraph 8.25.

Management Information

R19 All Departments must drive up standards and start monitoring the levels of customer contact by voice, face-to-face, electronically and by letter – see page 80 paragraph 7.19 and page 90 paragraph 8.28.

R20 Departments must put systems in place to start monitoring the amount of resources being committed to customer service – see page 80 paragraph 7.19 and page 90 paragraph 8.28.

R21 A system of recording formal and informal feedback from customers whether good or bad should be introduced across the Council – see page 90 paragraph 8.29.

R22 Local performance indicators for customer service should be introduced at a Corporate, Departmental and Business Unit level to enable customer service activity to be monitored and reported. Departments and Business Units must include these performance indicators within their annual Business Plans – see page 90 paragraph 8.30.

R23 All Departments must introduce regular and consistent consultation with customers so that the Council can monitor public satisfaction to ensure that customer service is continually improving across the organisation – see page 91 paragraph 8.31.

R24 The Corporate Customer Services Group should develop mechanisms for regular and consistent consultation with hard to reach groups to make sure that any future service development meets their needs – see page 91 paragraph 8.31.

Business Process Re-engineering

R25 There is an urgent need for Business Process Re-engineering specialists within the Council and the work proposed under the Building for Excellence Programme should proceed as soon as possible. This needs to be closely linked to the government's modernisation and e-government targets and will be an integral part of delivering the Council's vision for improved service access to customers – see page 80 paragraph 7.18 and page 91 paragraphs 8.31 – 8.32.
CityC – Feedback on Findings
Thursday, 16\textsuperscript{th} October, 10.30 – 11.30
Head of Change Management, Performance and Research

The title of the investigation was:

\textbf{Reengineering Corporation Street}

\textit{An Empirical Study of Business Process Reengineering (BPR) in Two Local Authorities}

The overall aim was to investigate the experiences and perceptions of two Local Government Organisation (LGO) practitioners, 'CityC' and 'CountyC' – whilst they introduced Business Process Reengineering (BPR; as part of the declared change management strategies within those LGOs) – in order to derive recommendations for LGO policy-makers and practitioners.

In support of this aim, the primary research objectives were:

- To identify and critically evaluate empirical research evidence on BPR, with particular emphasis on practice in the public sector;
- To investigate the adoption of BPR within the range of change management practices in two selected local authorities;
- To make recommendations for policy makers and practitioners regarding the adoption of BPR as a change management technique within the public sector;
- To contribute to knowledge and understanding of BPR implementation within the public sector.

The initial impetus for the study was to test Hammer & Champy's (2001: 2) assertion that, 'Re-engineering is, in fact, one of the success stories of business history,' but in the context here of its employment within UK local government change programmes. Underpinning the original primary questions, the research has sought to establish:

1. Is BPR 'alive and well' (Hammer & Champy, 2001: 2) within local government?
2. Has BPR been the 'enormous success' (ibid: 5) that these local authorities intended it would be, in their drive for radical improvements?
3. What are the reasons underpinning the success, or otherwise, of BPR's contribution to those LGOs' change initiatives?

The research has therefore focused on BPR as an example of a Best Practice (Gershon, 2004: 7\textsuperscript{[27]}) in the delivery of change programmes in local government organisations, as these two LGOs strove to achieve and/or maintain 'Excellence' within the context of such assessments as; BVR, BVPI, CPA, and now, in 2008, CAA (Comprehensive Area Assessment).
First, thank you for the 'access' and co-operation over the period 2005 to 2008, inclusive.

Whilst the key findings are not particularly positive for 'reengineering' within CityC, they are an interpretive synthesis of various employees' perceptions. However, those same findings suggest at least two clear opportunities to improve the organisation's approach to such potentially 'radical' organisational change in the future.

Key Research Finding Themes:

- BPR – Understanding (Definitions), and its Implementation
- BPR – 'Organisational Readiness', and 'Degrees' of...
- 'Degrees' of BPR?
- Case for Action/Drivers
- Leadership
- Change & Change Management; Context & Culture
- 'Project Radicalness' (Emergent)

Key Points:

1. Senior managers (leaders) are regarded as lacking understanding of the true nature and portents of BPR – considerable variation within and across CityC.
   'A fair point'; 'don't disagree'; poss. due to personalities/ 'way we operate'.

2. A predominant view was that the CityC was not 'ready' for such radical change as 'reengineering'.
   'A fair point as well' 4-Star organisation .... 'external assessments have been consistently good ... difficult to push radical change ... no need ... personalities and where they're at in their careers ... retiring soon'; 'not complacent ... but selling radical change more difficult'.

3. Reengineering meant differing things to different people, with the concept of 'degrees' of BPR finding some acceptance.
   No comment.

4. One major 'reengineering' project was claimed – 'Highways' – where there was some evidence of 'before' and 'after' process mapping. However, there was little evidence of 'fundamental rethinking', and more of 'redesign' in order to make the 'front end' fit to the 'City Direct' contact centre, rather than to reflect design against purpose.
   'I don't think I'd disagree ... our first re-engineering project ... need to fit in with 'City Direct' (CD) ... use of word 'claim' correct'.

5. The key drivers appeared to be the need to cut costs and the 'fashion' for contact centres.
   Nodded; growth of CD continuing; 'thought we were using BPR to serve a purpose'; 'some tension with two initial change mgrs/ they didn't like BPR consultants' approach/ caused some tensions'.

CIX
6. Senior managers were not coming across to employees/research project participants as committed to BPR, and so offered little in the way of committed leadership through any form of continuous communication.

'Yes ... a lot of mgrs not engaged unless selected ... and we were using BPR with them ... kept heads below the parapet.' 'Budget 'tinkering' doesn't lead to radicalness; poss. different if we had imposed 20% cuts'.

7. There was little evidence of anyone having read or been otherwise familiar with the core Change Management Strategy document, which mentioned 'BPR'/reengineering a number of times.

'Doesn't surprise me'; high number of strategies; 'not high on agenda'.

8. There was considerable praise for the original two Change Managers from many interviewees.

'Yes; not critical of them, but issues re. BPR consultants'.

9. The 'culture' of the organisation was mentioned by most, with some participants, suggesting that the Council was more comfortable with 'incremental' rather than 'radical' change.

No real comment here.

10. Project participants could offer no evidence of recorded cashable savings (Gershon, 2004), nor measures of tangible improvements in customer service as a result of the reengineering initiative.

'Interesting ... had continually asked the change managers to get a grip on benefits realisation ... still an issue'.
A Way Forward?

Two issues have emerged as of possible help to organisations such as CityC:

- 'Organisational Readiness', and;
- 'Project Radicalness'.

Both of these concepts offer the opportunity for the organisation to self-assess its capability in terms of its 'readiness' for such radical change that BPR, or reengineering, implies, and in terms of the organisation's level of ambition towards the nature (or 'degree') of project 'radicalness' it undertakes.

The example shows a constructivist (expert group) perception of CityC's preparedness in terms of organisational readiness, where the LGO is perceived very clearly to be at a 'Low' level of 'readiness' in all three areas of the overall 'Organizational Readiness' dimension (see sep. sheet).

Remembering that the Hammer and Stanton self-diagnostic tool is with relation to embarking upon 'reengineering', it was considered that:

a) CityC's senior leadership have not demonstrated the will or desire to consider direct engagement with change of such a radical nature;

b) whilst there are pockets of innovation, their organisation as a whole is still largely complacent, staid, and traditional in its readiness for such change, and;

c) that even with a recent influx of additional change management expertise, CityC were still not exhibiting real readiness to challenge established orders.

Using this combination of diagnostic activities, one option, always, would be to scale back the organisation's 'ambition' if areas of 'readiness' fell short, but if an organisation felt its ambition was both rational and worthy, then the real challenge would be to 'grow' its appropriate attribute, skill, and style areas that might enable it to achieve those ambitions by improving its service-delivery more systemically (or processually); or, more literally, by 'stepping up' to the mark, or to the next 'level'.

Re. placing on model;

1 – 'resistant to change'
2 – 'complacent' but poss. middle box 'if generous'
3 – 'surprised if top-down'; saw it as middle box; 'unfair re. command and control'; possibly difference due to GS taking perspective from his position near 'top of hierarchy'.

But overall, 'doesn't surprise me'.
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- 'Project Radicalness' (Emergent)

**Key Points:**

1. The perception was that senior managers (leaders) lack understanding of the true nature and portents of BPR – considerable variation within and across CountyC. This was more apparent when 'job losses' might result, although there was evidence of 'post-freezing' when vacancies occurred and whilst redeployment opportunities were considered.

   Fair comment. We did not have a focus on definition and understanding. The focus was structural, changing the structure could produce cost savings. We could hit targets by moving things around, cutting out areas of duplication.

   Difficult to engage managers with programme.

   Focus has been on small projects but this was likely to change in the near future to 2 or 3 big projects.

   Suggested example of Hertfordshire, under programme 'new ways of working' had achieved dramatic reduction in administration centres.

   Shift in strategic thinking to few big projects necessary to hit targets.

   IT has been seen as a driver and enabler for cost savings.

2. A predominant view was that CountyC was not 'ready' for such radical change as 'reengineering'.

   Yes agreed. But we need to move on. We need to push on. Push emphasis. Project management emphasis.
3. Reengineering meant differing things to different people, with the concept of 'degrees' of BPR finding some acceptance.

Yes agreed. Achievements have been by working with small groups and projects, not worrying about organisation spread.

4. The major thrust appeared to have been investment (£10M?) in CountyC's IT Infrastructure in order to enable the Council to 'exploit' the website.

A major project has been 'Call County' call centre. Focus on directing traffic through call centre.

Call centre has produced some savings through rationalisation of other offices, but also may have increased traffic volumes.

No real assessment of why do we need this service. Measures of failure demand and value demand are weak.

5. However, there was little evidence of 'fundamental rethinking' of processes, and more of 'redesign' in order to make the 'front end' fit to the 'Call County' contact centre, rather than to reflect design against process purpose.

See 4, above.

6. The key drivers appeared to be utilisation of IT, the need to cut costs, and the 'fashion' for contact centres.

Agreed, this was the focus.

'Call County' had produced some benefits in service but also increased volumes of work, and with it issues of caller dissatisfaction, terminated calls, queuing.

7. The perception was that, apart from yourselves in CMT, senior managers were not committed to BPR (SRD in your case), and so offered little in the way of committed leadership through any form of continuous communication.

Yes agreed. SMT not really bought in, but managed around by focusing on projects.

8. There was evidence amongst respondents of a generic familiarity with the core concepts of 'Business Process Reengineering' (BPR), in the context of 'Service Redesign' (SRD).

Yes, not surprised by these findings. Worked around it. The situation might not be helped by culture and some internal procedures, example job evaluation scheme which might encourage a protective attitude.
9. There was evidence of considerable (and sometimes covert) resistance to change, especially if that might impact upon an individual manager's status, role, pay, or other 'resources' within the organisation.

See 8, above.

10. There was praise for the Change Management Team from some interviewees.

Good, nice to hear.

11. There was little in the way of recorded cashable savings (Gershon, 2004), directly related to any specific reengineering or 'SRD' project, nor were there any measures of tangible improvements in customer service as a result of any reengineering initiative.

This was disappointing. Gershon measures not well published internally and provided a lot of scope for playing internal games, shifting things around to hit targets without being real savings. The scope for this was running out.

Personal and departmental targets also an issue. Seen as threatening, for jobs and sanctions.

Early soft targets (for savings) running out, need to focus on harder choices to keep hitting targets. His Strategy (still to be approved) is to recommend focus on 2 or 3 major / big projects.

12. There was evidence of savings following what could be more appropriately attributable to normal 'management' activity.

Yes agreed. There was a problem with maintaining motivation, SMT have other priorities.

13. There was evidence of considerable desire to change amongst a number of those involved in the SRD training, but they feared, and experienced, resistance to proposed change when back at work.

Some key issues for the future:
- Shift in strategy to fewer big projects.
- Feeling that soft options running out, increasing pressure.
- Outsourcing might need to be considered.
- External expertise might need to be considered.
- Increase in radicalness would bring exposure to increased risk.
A Way Forward?

Two issues have emerged as of possible help to organisations such as Derbyshire CC:

- 'Organisational Readiness', and;
- 'Project Radicalness'.

Both of these concepts offer the opportunity for the organisation to self-assess its capability in terms of its 'readiness' for such radical change as BPR, or reengineering, implies, and in terms of the organisation's level of ambition towards the nature (or 'degree') of project 'radicalness' it undertakes.

CountyC's preparedness in terms of organisational readiness was that the LGO is perceived very clearly to be at a 'Low' level of 'readiness' in that dimension, whilst both 'Reengineering Leadership' and 'Style of Implementation' were considered to be one 'step' up from that.

The evidence for this was the extent of Service Redesign training that had been carried out, which whilst not extensive in terms of the organisation's size it showed a willingness of the leadership to expose their people (managers) to new ways of thinking about change. Also, the change management team (CMT) was reasonably well resourced, has been operating for some years, and was perceived to be quite 'go-ahead' in its style and commitment.

Using this combination of diagnostic activities, one option, always, would be to scale back the organisation's 'ambition' if areas of 'readiness' fell short, but if an organisation felt its ambition was both rational and worthy, then the real challenge would be to 'grow' its appropriate attribute, skill, and style areas that might enable it to achieve those ambitions by improving its service-delivery more systemically (or processually); or, more literally, by 'stepping up' to the mark, or to the next 'level'.
Cameron, David – Living Within Our Means

A speech made on May 19th 2008.

"For the past two and a half years, the changes I have led in this Party have been aimed in one direction: giving people a positive alternative to a failing government. I don't want us to be elected on the back of a disintegrating Labour Party. I want us to be elected with a clear mandate to make the changes Britain needs.

"So we've changed the way we select candidates. After the next election our Party will be more like the country we hope to lead. We've changed our policies and our politics: becoming once again the true champions for progressive ideals like tackling poverty, protecting the environment and kick-starting social mobility. We have taken clear positions and stuck to them:

"Putting economic stability before tax cuts.

Improving public services for everyone, not helping a few to opt out.

Recognising that the progress people want to see is a better quality of life, not just higher GDP.

"All this supports the overriding mission we have set for ourselves: to revive our society just as Margaret Thatcher revived our economy; to reverse Britain's social breakdown, just as she reversed our economic breakdown. And we have set out how we will achieve that mission - by ending the era of top-down state control and big government. We want to respond to what should be a new post-bureaucratic age, by decentralising power, by giving people more opportunity and control over their lives, by making families stronger and society more responsible.

ANGER WITH LABOUR

"That is our positive alternative, the alternative to a Labour government that people are increasingly regarding with contempt. Whether it's on the streets of Crewe and Nantwich, around the country in the run-up to the local elections, or in the emails and letters I get, I've noticed a new feeling of anger.

"It's not just because the Prime Minister can't seem to stop treating people like fools - whether it's on the true reason for last year's cancelled election, or the true reason for last week's 10p tax trick. It's not just because in Britain today there are more people in severe poverty and nearly five million people on out-of-work benefits, because mortgage rates have gone up and the cost of living is going up and because all this shows that Labour have failed to deliver either the social justice or the economic efficiency they promised.

"The anger today is about more than Labour's economic incompetence. It's about more than Labour's failure to advance progressive ideals. The reason people are more
and more angry with the government today is that while they see their taxes going up and up, there's no corresponding improvement in the quality of their lives.

"Of course our quality of life is not just about what government does - far from it. But there's a real sense of unfairness that people are feeling today. They feel that Labour have broken the basic bargain between government and the people, the bargain that says: "We'll take money off you in taxes, and you'll get decent quality services in return." That's what I want to focus on today.

WE NEED TO START LIVING WITHIN OUR MEANS

"After a decade of reckless spending under Labour, Britain needs good housekeeping from the Conservatives. We need to start living within our means. Why? Because in the decades ahead there will be pressure to spend more on the essentials - whether that's care for the older generation, equipment for our armed forces, or more prisons and police to keep us safe. At the same time, we have reached the limits of acceptable taxation and borrowing.

"With the rising cost of living, taxpayers can't take any more pain indeed they want a government that can give them the prospect of relief. And our economy can't take any more pain without losing jobs to lower tax competitors.

"So how are we going to square the circle? How are we going to spend more on the essentials without putting taxes up - and over time, creating the space for cutting tax, as we have promised to do? Our overall method and aim are clear: we will share the proceeds of economic growth. Sharing the proceeds of economic growth is what living with our means, actually means. Not spending everything we have. Not borrowing to spend beyond our means. But ensuring that, over time, the economy grows faster than the state, so spending falls as a share of national income and we can reduce taxes and borrowing.

"Those who criticise sharing the proceeds of growth have sometimes not appreciated that if a government actually did this, either taxes, or borrowing, or both would have to fall over an economic cycle. I stress: have to fall.

"Today we are setting out our strategy for delivering this commitment. We'll do it by attacking the problem at its source: by attacking the three causes of a bigger state and rising public spending.

"First, the cost of social failure. Family breakdown, unemployment, drug and alcohol addiction - these social problems rack up the biggest bills for government, so we've got to get them down.

"Second, the cost of unreformed public services. Massive top-down state monopolies cost more and deliver less, so we need to improve the running of public services through more choice, competition and non-state collective provision.

"And third, the cost of bureaucracy itself. All bureaucracies have an inbuilt tendency to grow, so we need to call a halt to the wasteful spending and inefficiency we've seen under Labour."
"But that's not about some one-off efficiency drive, it's about a whole new method of government that's careful, not casual, with public money.

"That is our strategy. It learns the lessons from Labour's failure to control public spending. It's based on simple Conservative principles of good housekeeping. And it avoids easy answers in favour of commitments that we know we can deliver.

LABOUR AND WASTE

"The first and most obvious mistake Labour have made it when it comes to public spending and taxpayer value is their acceptance of government waste. It's clear that we now have in power in this country a bunch of Labour politicians who are just shockingly casual about public money and how it's spent.

"£20 billion wasted on an NHS computer that still isn't working properly.

£2.3 billion spent refurbishing the offices of MOD civil servants.

And in one year alone nearly £2 billion of tax credits lost due to fraud and error.

"These are outrageous examples of a spendaholic culture in government a culture that is the public sector equivalent of the reckless, debt-fuelled spending spree that Gordon Brown's policies have encouraged in the private sector. The level of government waste in our country today is evidence of an out-of-touch political elite who have forgotten whose money it is they're spending. Ministers who get in their offices and think 'great, now how can I spend lots of money.' People who have become so accepting of government waste that they assume it's just part of the job and that anyone who objects must be calling for "cuts." But Labour's mistakes on public spending go far deeper than their casual tolerance of government waste.

LABOUR AND REFORM

"I believe that a much more important factor than the waste is the superficiality of Gordon Brown's political thinking.

"Let me explain how I see it. Contrary to the fashionable view today, I think the Prime Minister has always been rather good at political communication. He was the one who wrote New Labour's soundbites - "tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime"; "social justice combined with economic efficiency." He even used to talk about "cutting the bills of social failure."

"But he has never developed a clear set of political ideas, or a clear political strategy, for achieving the aims expressed by the soundbites. Brown has been good at talking, lousy at delivering. He can tell you what he wants to achieve, but not how he's going to achieve it. That's why people are getting so angry now.

"They were promised national renewal, and ended up with very little of substance being achieved at all.
"And so we see today a government with absolutely no coherent plan for tackling our
country's deep-seated social problems - in particular the devastating rise in family
breakdown and absolutely no coherent plan for reforming public services in order to
make sure they deliver value for taxpayers' money.

"One minute it's local accountability for policing, the next it's a whole new set of top-
down targets. One minute it's a constitution for NHS independence, the next it's a top-
down plan for closing GP surgeries and replacing them with polyclinics. One minute
it's school reform...the next it's putting LEAs back in the driving seat.

"And with Ed Balls using his job to promote his leadership credentials to the Labour
left, it's just a non-stop series of moves to block and reverse school reform, and to
increase state control of education.

"The Prime Minister's draft Queen's Speech last week set out his legislative agenda
more or less right up to the next election. That's it. There's nothing more to come.

"Anyone looking for serious reform, especially in those crucial areas of school
reform, welfare reform and strengthening families the areas that can make the biggest
difference to our society now knows that as far as this Prime Minister is concerned,
the cupboard is bare.

CONSERVATIVE PRINCIPLES

"Our positive alternative is based on three clear principles - principles of good
housekeeping applied to the nation's finances.

"These principles matter because when it comes to these big questions of tax and
spending, in many ways the nitty-gritty questions that are at the heart of politics
people don't just want some technocratic explanation of projected shares of GDP.

"They want to know where you're coming from. What your basic attitude is. Why it
would make a difference to have a new set of ministers sitting in those offices making
those decisions.

"So here's what we're about. This is our attitude, and this is why we would be
different.

"First of all, we understand that you can't get decent quality on the cheap. We will
give public services the proper funding they need so that everyone in the country can
have access to the services they need. As I've said before: no ifs, no buts, no opt-outs.

"Second, we understand that when ministers and officials spend money, it is
taxpayers' money, not government money.

"We will be careful with it, not casual. We will expect to be judged on a clear basis: if
you're taking people's hard-earned money away from them you'd better be able to
show that you're spending it on what people want and that you can get better value for
that money than they could.
"And our third principle is the need for long-term tax reduction. As George and I have said repeatedly, we believe in low taxes - because we believe low taxes are both morally right and economically efficient. But as we have also said, we will never trick people into voting for us with promises of tax cuts that cannot responsibly be delivered, or that cannot be sustained.

"We are the party of low taxes for the long term, not tax cut promises for the short term. That is why we are setting out our long-term strategy today. When it comes to tax and spending, it is tempting for politicians to make simplistic promises and to give easy answers to difficult questions. I know there are people who want us to do just that today, and I'd like to explain why I don't think that would be right.

NO EASY ANSWERS

"We all know that the easiest thing in the world is for an opposition party to stand up at an event like this and blithely talk about all the efficiency savings we will make in government how we will streamline public spending, how we can close tax loopholes, how we can move towards a bright future of less spending and less tax with a few well-chosen cuts that miraculously deliver substantial savings without harming public service delivery at all.

"It is a well-trodden path by opposition parties. I know - I've been there.

"At the last election, we produced something called the James Review. A long list of all the government functions, quangos and bureaucrats a Conservative government would cut.

"Well-intentioned - certainly. A Conservative government should always try to cut out waste and deliver value for money for taxpayers. It's in our political DNA.

"And the James Report was a serious and impressive piece of work. But was the overall approach credible? I'm not so sure. To make a long list of efficiency savings in advance of an election; to add them up to produce a great big total; to turn that total into debt reduction, spending increases elsewhere and a tax cut...?

"People didn't believe it, for the very good reason that controlling public spending is not about a one-off efficiency drive, it's about a whole new culture of government.

"There is a simple fact which political historians amongst you will know very well. The government "efficiency drive" is one of the oldest tricks in the book. The trouble is, it's nearly always just that - a trick.

"In fact it's such a cliché, there was an episode of Yes Minister about it, called "The Economy Drive." Ministers are summoned, officials instructed, the media prepared for sweeping savings in the running costs of government. And then, a few months down the line, the sheepish-looking ministers and officials come back and say "well actually, it wasn't quite as straightforward as we'd hoped, Prime Minister." Gordon Brown announced another one last week.
"Let me make it clear: I believe that driving efficiency though the government machine should be a constant administrative effort. Every business has to improve its efficiency every year, or it won't survive. That should be a constant principle of government too.

"But I do not believe in simplistic lists of cuts. In naïve over-estimations of potential savings. Or in cobbling together a big number in order to get a good headline. Making government more efficient and cutting out waste is absolutely part of our strategy for controlling public spending. But it is only a part.

"To make it the only thing in our plan would simply not be credible. The scale of the public spending crunch that is coming down the line, the scale of people's expectations for public services, and the imperative for competitive taxes all mean that we need to think far more deeply about the role of the state if we are to live within our means in the decades ahead.

"It cannot and must not simply be about "efficiency savings." And it must especially not be about the kind of short-term savings that in the end add to demands on the state because they undermine social value in the name of delivering economic value. Spending cuts that look efficient on a powerpoint chart but end up costing more money are just a false economy. Instead, living within our means is about taking three key steps.

REDUCING DEMANDS ON THE STATE

"The first way in which we will control public spending is to reduce the long-term demands on the state. We need to tackle the causes of the social problems that give rise to public spending in areas like welfare and crime. That means taking forward the work that began with Iain Duncan Smith's magnificent Policy Group report, Breakthrough Britain.

"The key areas for radical reform, and the early focus of our work in government, will be in school, reform, welfare reform, and strengthening families.

"We have already published: Policy Green Papers on school reform and welfare reform, and some of our thinking on making Britain more family-friendly. And the next stage in our work on strengthening families will be published within the next few weeks. If we get these three things right: school reform, welfare reform and strengthening families, then I believe we will make serious progress in tackling these deep social problems that have caused so much pain, and cost so much money, for so long.

"But we will also be developing policy beyond the immediate focus areas of schools, welfare and families to address the complex and interconnected problems Iain and his team identified in his report, From drugs to debt, from children in care to people with disabilities.

PUBLIC SERVICE REFORM
"The second way in which we will control public spending is by carrying out the work that was the great missed opportunity of the Blair and Brown years - proper public service reform. Unlike the Labour Party, there is no internal feud or ideological war preventing us from carrying out the reforms that everyone knows are needed.

"As Nick Herbert set out in a superb speech last week, there is now a distinctive modern Conservative approach to public service reform, based on clear thinking about how we can give power over services to those who use them.

"Where services are individually consumed we will transfer power over those services to individual people, giving them a choice between competing providers.

"And where services are collectively consumed, we will transfer power over those services to the lowest practical tier of government, opening up provision to social enterprises, private companies and community organisations.

"For us, public service reform is about choice and voice - bringing greater accountability to the provision of public services, so the power relationship is not top-down - from Whitehall to public services but side to side - a new relationship between the professionals who deliver public services and the public, who pay for them and use them.

"So in education we will end the state monopoly and allow new schools to be set up by a wide range of expert organisations, giving parents real school choice for the first time. In the NHS we will get rid of the top-down political micromanagement and put the power in the hands of patients, who can choose the GP who they think will get the most out of the NHS on their behalf. And in prisons and probation we will empower the local managers - and pay them by results.

EFFICIENCY AND TRANSPARENCY

"The third component of our strategy is cut out waste and make government more efficient. That is one of the principal responsibilities of Francis Maude and his implementation team. This is a really significant commitment for us.

"Normally, political parties would only devote resources to the things that directly help them win an election. But we don't just want to win - we want to know exactly what we'll do when we've won.

"So Francis and his team will be looking at government efficiency right across the board: procurement, staffing, structures - everything you would expect from a modern, professional and businesslike operation.

"We are using the best private sector expertise to find ways to save taxpayers' money and improve service delivery. But I do not believe that it's enough to just stand here and make promises about efficiency. I believe we need to create additional pressure on ourselves - and that's why I believe transparency in public spending is an absolutely vital part of this.
"If we can show people exactly how their money is being spent, that will leave no hiding place for waste and inefficiency. It will shame ministers and officials into spending public money wisely.

"And in this post-bureaucratic age, the information revolution makes such detailed accountability possible for the first time. That's why last year, we introduced a Bill in Parliament to force the government to list on a public, easily searchable website, every item of public spending over £25,000.

"Unsurprisingly, Labour blocked it - but I can promise you that this will be one of the first innovations of a Conservative Government.

"And I can also announce that we will shortly be launching an online whistleblower service, so that people who work in the public sector can tell our Implementation Team about the waste and inefficiency they would like us to change.

CONCLUSION

"So that is our three-part strategy for controlling public spending: reducing the long-term demands on the state; reforming public services, and making the public sector more efficient and transparent. Britain needs this strategy because under Labour, Britain is on the wrong path.

"They have splashed the cash like there's no tomorrow - but the trouble is, there is a tomorrow, and it's got to be paid for.

"Unless we make big changes, we're heading for a future as a high-tax, uncompetitive backwater with soaring social costs and a falling quality of life. To avoid that future, while fulfilling the essential requirements of modern government, we will need to put into action those good Conservative principles of good housekeeping.

"And then we can look forward to a very different future: a low tax, competitive economy, with a high quality of life and the opportunity for everyone to make something of their life. It used to be said that "good food costs less at Sainsbury's." Well I want good services to cost less with the Conservatives. That's why it's so vital that we have a serious plan for living within our means.

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Source: Enclosure in letter dated 1st July 2008, from Anna Biles, Office of the Leader of the Opposition, House of Commons, LONDON, SW1A 0AA
### 'Project Radicalness Planning Worksheet'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Process Improvement</th>
<th>Process Redesign</th>
<th>Radical Reengineering</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic centrality</td>
<td>Is the targeted process merely tangential (1) or integral (5) to the firm's strategic goals and objectives?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tangential</td>
<td>Integral</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Feasibility of IT to change process</td>
<td>Does IT enable only incidental change (1) or fundamental process change (5)?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Incidental</td>
<td>Fundamental</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process breadth</td>
<td>Is the scope of the process intra-functional (1) or inter-organizational (5)?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Intra-functional</td>
<td>Inter-organizational</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior management commitment</td>
<td>Is the senior management visibility removed (1) or actively involved (5) in the BPR efforts?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Removed</td>
<td>Involved</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Performance measurement criteria</td>
<td>Are the preferred performance measurement criteria efficiency-based (1) or effectiveness-based (5)?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Efficiency Based</td>
<td>Effectiveness Based</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process functionality</td>
<td>Is the process functioning marginally (1) or is the process not functioning well at all (5)?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Higher Functionality</td>
<td>Lower Functionality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project resource availability</td>
<td>Are only minimal resources (1) available to support the process change or are resources abundant (5)?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Scarce</td>
<td>Abundant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural flexibility</td>
<td>Is the organizational structure rigid (1) or is it flexibly conducive (5) to change and learning?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rigid</td>
<td>Flexible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural capacity for change</td>
<td>Does the culture support the status quo (1) or actively seek participatory change (5)?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Status Quo</td>
<td>Adaptable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management's willingness to impact people</td>
<td>Are only modest impacts on people tolerable (1) or is management willing to deal with the consequences of disruptive impacts (5)?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>Disruptive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value chain target</td>
<td>Is the BPR effort targeted at an internal support process (1) or a core process (5)?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Core</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propensity for Risk</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very Risk Averse</td>
<td>High Risk Taking</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

IMPROVING YOUR SCORES

The following comments explain the significance of each of the twenty statements that make up the diagnostic and offer recommendations for improving low scores.

Reengineering Leadership

1: The leader of reengineering must be a senior executive who is passionate about reengineering and has a strong commitment to it. Passion and commitment are not enough, though. He or she must also have the authority to implement the changes needed to support major process redesign.

If the nominal reengineering leader is not demonstrating passion and commitment, he or she must be made to understand the complexities of reengineering and why dynamic leadership is so important. Reviewing case histories (successful and unsuccessful) and meeting with counterparts at other firms can help provide a model of what is required—and an appreciation for why it is so vital.

If no one naturally fills the role of leader, a leader must be recruited. Potential leaders within the company should be targeted and educated about reengineering, its mechanisms and its potential.

To demonstrate the need for reengineering, you should document the costs and consequences of existing processes. Customer testimony about process inadequacies can be particularly persuasive in convincing potential leaders that they need to act. So are financial data that demonstrate the costs of your processes and benchmarking information that documents competitor superiority.

2: Unfortunately, many senior managers try to reengineer without really understanding what it means. They use the term because it is fashionable, without appreciating its consequences. Overlaying a new process on an old organization is a recipe for disaster. Unless the leader really understands and pushes radical change, reengineering will not succeed.

The leader must understand where reengineering is headed, or the effort will be abandoned in midstream. To assist a prospective leader in developing this understanding, you should dramatize as vividly as possible the changes that reengineering will likely bring to the company's structure, personnel, compensation system, and other areas.

3: The leader needs to develop and communicate a vision of the destination of the reengineering journey around which people can rally. Clarity and simplicity are critical. They reduce the terrors of the unknown for employees and allow them to proceed with confidence. For example, at one insurance company, the vision was expressed as "one and done," meaning that any customer request would be handled by one person, and one person alone. By
making the final destination clear, real, and attractive, the leader makes it easier for people to begin the long march.

The vision must not only be communicated but infused with enthusiasm. If the leader is unable to combine passion and logic, resources should be allocated to help him or her do so.

4: Personal commitment is not enough; the leader must actively exercise leadership. A gap between words and deeds causes employees to become cynical and disillusioned. Communications, personal behavior, and measurement and compensation systems are the levers of leadership. The leader must aggressively and consistently use all three levers or face an inevitable crisis of confidence.

5: Reengineering requires energy and hard work. The leader must commit his or her own time to it. The leader cannot afford to delegate responsibility; a lower-level manager will not possess the authority to overcome resistance and to make necessary changes. In addition, some of the company's best people must be drafted onto the reengineering team, as, both a valuable talent pool and a signal of serious intent.

6: Even the most committed leader cannot make reengineering happen alone. The entire executive team must contribute. Noncompliance by a single key executive can derail the entire program, by withholding resources, failing to meet commitments, or malicious rumormongering.

If senior management as a whole does not share the leader's enthusiasm, their support must be enlisted through a combination of persuasion and coercion. Over time, communication and commitment usually overcome initial reluctance. If support is not forthcoming, however, the leader has no choice but to replace those who do not embrace the vision. Do not put off this step. The longer a high-level resister is allowed to remain, the greater the likelihood of trouble. Even companies that have succeeded at reengineering tell us that, in retrospect, they should have removed highly placed resisters earlier.

Organizational Readiness

7: Reengineering inspires fear and resistance. So if people don't see what's at stake, they have no incentive to change. Why should they? Change is painful. Only an organization that recognizes the need for change will be receptive to the reengineering message.

There are many reasons to reengineer. The reason may be defensive – a reaction to financial or competitive pressures or customer concerns. It may be anticipatory – for instance, when impending market changes or new technologies may put your company at a sudden disadvantage. Or it may be proactive, to help your company gain a competitive edge. Bottom line: If employees are to believe in reengineering, they need to know why it's being done.
They must also know that "business as usual" will absolutely not work. The best way to deliver this message is by making what we call a Case for Action, which lays out the business climate in simple, understandable terms and shows why the company must change. Again, this argument must be clearly presented and passionately argued.

8: Employees who do not understand reengineering almost always assume the worst. They assume it is a euphemism for "downsizing," a synonym for total quality management (TQM), or just another management fad. The less they know, the more they dream up scenarios that pit them against the reengineering effort. At best, they will become reluctant participants. At worst, they will be active antagonists. The antidote for this situation is communication: universal, hard-hitting, and repetitive.

The reengineering leader must continually talk up the program, recognizing that the message may not get through completely the first or second or even fifth time. It is always better to risk repetition than to assume a level of understanding (or commitment) that is not there. Reengineering leaders consistently tell us that they underestimated the amount of communication effort that reengineering would demand of them.

9: When it comes to management's own commitment, perception is reality. Even when the reengineering leader and the management team are serious about reengineering, that sincerity is useless unless the employees perceive and believe it. And usually employees would prefer not to. After all, that's easier than accepting the prospect of massive disruptive changes. Unfortunately, such skepticism is often warranted. In many companies, senior management has a history of talking "change" while maintaining the status quo. Employees grow understandably cynical when they hear the word "change" again. Cynicism stifles enthusiasm, and defeat becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

How to combat this cynicism? Thoughtful and nonstop communication; assigning high-profile resources to the reengineering effort; and taking irrevocable actions (e.g., a reorganization or a major realignment of resources) that will only work out if reengineering becomes a reality.

10: Successful organizations are the hardest to reengineer. People point to the signs of success and ask, "If it ain't broke, why fix it?" They brush off recent difficulties or dismiss looming problems because it's more comfortable to believe these are temporary setbacks rather than permanent threats to the organization's health. Such complacency—or worse, the arrogance into which it often evolves—is a serious impediment to reengineering.

The reengineering leader and his or her team must get the organization to look to the future. While past accomplishments need not be diminished, it must be made clear that they are no guarantee of future success. It is also important to discourage, publicly and explicitly, any behavior and attitudes that reflect this sort of complacency. Again, do not assume such attitudes will simply evaporate on their own.
11: After painful layoffs or other realignment measures, employees are naturally even more resistant to change. Stressed and pained, survivors tend to crave a period of stability. Cynicism may predominate if recent changes have failed to produce the promised results.

In such situations, management must recognize the realities of human nature. It is important to respect employees' feelings and address their concerns. Where appropriate, senior managers should admit past mistakes and distinguish them from current efforts. Above all, management must make achieving quick results their top priority. That is the best way to show that reengineering is not just empty talk.

12: Reengineering requires a dedicated team of talented, imaginative people who are unafraid to break rules, who can work together in a multifunctional, multidisciplinary manner, and who put customer needs above organizational turf battles. It is essential that team members devote full time and energy to reengineering. By not tapping the best people or by limiting their involvement, management sends a message, however unwittingly, that reengineering is not of prime importance.

Any organization lacking experienced reengineers faces three choices: develop them through special training programs, import them from other organizations, or make use of consultants. If it appears impossible to place first-rate people on the reengineering effort, management should take stock of all company activities and eliminate or reduce those not vital to day-to-day operations so that valuable resources can be redeployed to reengineering. This will further underscore its high priority.

13: Reengineering usually focuses on value-adding operational processes like product development and order fulfillment. Changes in these areas, however, require the involvement of key staff units such as MIS, HR, and finance. These must help create the infrastructure to support the new processes. In so doing, these units will be forced to violate many of their long-standing norms. New financial measurements will be required, assumptions about personnel will be broken, information systems will need to be developed in nontraditional ways. If the leaders of staff units lack the vision or will to make these changes, reengineering is in trouble. If staff units themselves are unable to rise to the reengineering challenge, they may need new leadership. In extreme situations, it may be necessary to outsource the staff work to a vendor less invested in the ways of the past.

14: Most companies undertaking reengineering today have some experience with total quality management. This can be helpful, or it can be a problem. TQM and reengineering share many characteristics, including a focus on customers, orientation toward processes, and commitment to improved performance. There are, however, important differences between the two. TQM stresses incremental improvement through structured problem solving, whereas reengineering is about radical improvement through total process redesign. TQM assumes the underlying process is sound and looks to
improve it; reengineering assumes it is not and seeks to replace it. Reengineering is best seen as the next step after TQM. Success with TQM can position an organization to take that next step. On the other hand, organizations that have fared poorly with TQM may reject reengineering as just another passing fad. Moreover, some who confuse the accoutrements of TQM with its essence may dismiss reengineering for not fitting the quality mold.

Management must clarify the nature of customer-focused quality and explain how TQM relates to reengineering. It may be wise to reinforce this relationship by integrating the units responsible for the two approaches.

15: To reengineer means, fundamentally, to rebuild the company on the customer's behalf. This requires a deep appreciation of customer needs; without that, reengineering will be mistargeted from the outset. To overhaul the wrong processes or to reinvent the right processes with the wrong objectives is worse than useless.

The reengineering leader must orient the company toward the customer through explicit communications, targeted reward systems, and by getting everyone to talk to customers. Direct customer contact helps people develop a renewed sense of the value of their own work as well as a sharper sense of the customer's overriding importance to the company.

Style of Implementation

16: Reengineering is not a traditional implementation exercise that begins with a highly defined goal and a precise blueprint for achieving it. Rather, it is a collective voyage of discovery, which begins with only a rough outline of the destination and races toward it at breakneck speed. Some cultures are naturally comfortable with this style. Those that are not must learn to adjust. It is the leader's responsibility to help the organization make this adjustment. This can be done by personally exhibiting the implementation style required, rewarding others who exhibit it, and, above all, by pushing projects forward rapidly to completion in order to demonstrate that the new style is indeed the one required.

17: All too often, people who have bold ideas are afraid to act on them. They may remember what happened to the last guy who stuck his neck out with a creative concept. Or they may simply assume that, public pronouncements to the contrary, senior management will automatically reject anything that is truly innovative. To counteract these attitudes, rule breakers must be publicly applauded, and all timid suggestions must be summarily rejected.

18: Many companies claim to be reengineering while actually continuing to work within the confines of the old organizational chart. Inevitably, they accomplish little beyond incremental functional improvements. Real reengineering is always directed at cross-functional processes, not organizational units. Management must begin a reengineering effort by
identifying and mapping the company's processes, and then be certain that reengineering efforts are focused exclusively on these processes.

19: In most companies, process responsibility is fragmented. No one has end-to-end accountability for a process. It is virtually impossible to reengineer in such an environment, since no one has the perspective or the motive to make sweeping changes.

Therefore, a process owner must be designated for each of the processes to be reengineered. The process owner must have the authority and the personal clout to get all departments involved in the process to make necessary changes. To keep the process owner personally motivated, his or her own performance must be keyed to improvement in the performance of the process itself.

20: Without clear process performance measures, an organization cannot establish where it is or where it wants to go. The first step in establishing such measures is to have customers identify the aspects of process performance they care about most (e.g., cycle time, accuracy, cost). The second is to establish baselines: how your processes currently perform in terms of these measures. Next, through competitive benchmarking, customer input, and self-assessment, establish "stretch goals" for each process. These goals should be high enough to rule out doing business as usual without being so high as to be intimidating. Above all, they must be challenging enough to have a major — and transformative — impact on overall company performance.

Do not be discouraged by the rigor of this test or by the high passing grades we demand. This test is not a classroom exercise; it is what reengineering will demand of you as you proceed. We would much rather have you delay your efforts at reengineering than begin them only to see them fail. Most of all, we want you to succeed at reengineering by using this diagnostic to find your weak spots and do something about them before you begin.

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Further 'developmental' options, based on Hayes' (2007: 334-336) 'three dimensional' models to 'aid choice[s] of interventions':

Change Interventions

A three-dimensional model to aid choice of interventions
Hayes (2007)

Change Interventions

Examples of strategic interventions
Hayes (2007)

Change Interventions

Examples of human-resource interventions
Hayes (2007)

Change Interventions

Examples of human-process interventions
Hayes (2007)