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'I'm not X, I just want Y': Formulating 'wants' in interaction.

Abstract

This article provides a conversation analytic description of a two-part structure '*I don't want X, I want/just want Y*'. Drawing on a corpus of recordings of family mealtimes and television documentary data I show how speakers use the structure in two recurrent environments. First, speakers may use the structure to reject a proposal regarding their actions made by an interlocutor. Second, speakers may deliver the structure following a co-interactant's formulation of their actions or motivations. Both uses decrease the likelihood of challenge in third-turn position. When responding to multi-unit turns speakers routinely deal with the last item first. The value of *I want Y* is to formulate an alternative sense of agency which undermines the preceding turn and shifts the trajectory of the ongoing sequence. The article contributes to work in discursive psychology as I show how speakers may *formulate* their 'wants' in the service of sequentially unfolding social interaction.

Keywords

'discursive psychology' 'family interaction' 'conversation analysis'

'directives' 'accounts' 'account solicitations' 'rejections' 'denials' 'want'

Biographical notes

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10 (2b) I just want my clo:thes ba:ck.

11 Sim: what's happened no:w

There is something more than a simple denial here. After denying the accusation that she is 'tryna' start a fi:ght' Jane proceeds to reformulate her actions as directed at 'just' getting her clothes back ('I just want my clo:thes ba:ck.'). This formulation of her wants is *constructed* as the motivating force behind her actions. According to the communication view 'communication is supposed to be intentional, i.e. activated by the speakers' reasoning about its own beliefs, desires and intentions' (Dragoni et al., 2002: 120). That is, Jane experiences a desire to obtain her clothes, believes that Emily has her clothes and thus intends to retrieve them from Emily. However that is not what is happening here. Rather, the formulation of 'wanting' arises as it is used to counter the notion that Jane may be motivated to do some other thing (to 'start a fi:ght'). Rather than a simple 'didn't do it' denial which is susceptible to further challenge (Dersley & Wootton, 2000), Jane formulates an alternative sense of agency and by doing so she is realizing a particular rhetorical effect. To uncover what this effect is it is necessary to turn to those who treat displays of mental states within talk as 'genuine references to psychological states' (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995: 31) and who subscribe to the notion of desires, beliefs and intentions explanatory variables in human actions. In this literature the creation of a contrast between action and intention is understood as a cognitive accomplishment (e.g. Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Shatz et al., 1983). Here it is examined as a piece of interactional business.

1.1 Motivation, Intention and action

The notion that intentional and mental states are a priori cognitive processes which are communicated through language is prevalent in contemporary psychology. Mental states and emotions are understood as discrete, individual entities which other individuals must learn how to 'read' and understand. How individuals learn to bridge the gap between their own and others' minds is formulated as an almost impossible problem. This problem is most commonly studied under the rubric of Theory of Mind, a large body of work which has examined how young children develop the capacity to 'read minds' and to understand the mental lives of others (see Wellman, 2010 for a recent review). This work is grounded in a referential view of language which assumes that mental state terms develop in vocabulary as names referring to inner experiences. How children learn to use mental state terms which 'describe internal, unobservable mental states' and 'therefore pose a referential challenge for the young word-learner' (Slaughter, et al., 2009: 1058) also becomes a problem. Intentions are understood to be instrumental in constructing explanations of others' behaviour as we engage in *theorising* in order to make sense of one another; 'cognizing about the mind is a ubiquitous human activity; we consistently construe each other as agents undertaking intentional action based on our underlying beliefs and desires' (Wellman, 2010: 2).

1.2 Formulating intentions in interaction

In the mid twentieth century philosophers in rhetoric began to discuss the notion of 'motives', or motive-talk (Stokes & Hewitt, 1976). In contrast to psychological research on intentions and *motivations*, which propose inner states as causes of behaviour, motives were defined as reasons for actions which are cited when behaviour is problematic (Mills, 1940). Scott and Lyman (1968) drew on the

pioneering work on motives in their work on 'accounts' which they defined as the provision of a justification or excuse for an undesirable or problematic event.

Accountability as a pervasive feature of people's descriptions was a key feature of early discursive psychology. As Edwards (1997: 7) notes, 'they attend to events in terms of what is normal, expectable, and proper; they attend to their own responsibility in events and in the reporting of events.... and they invoke notions of motive, causation, justification and cognition'. MacMillan and Edwards (1999) examined British newspaper coverage of the death of Princess Diana in the weeks after the event. They show that in reports the press handled their accountability as agents in the events they were reporting as they assembled factual narratives and explanations which assigned and avoided blame. Edwards (2006) examined how the modal verb *would* is used in handling accountability by formulating a general disposition to act one way or another in the context of police interrogation. He shows how suspects invoke intentionality and state what they generally *would* or *wouldn't* do as a basis for denying a specific accusation.

A second pertinent body of work is that in conversation analysis which has examined the sequential design and organisation of accounts (Bolden & Robinson, 2011; Ford, 2002; Robinson & Bolden, 2010; Sterponi, 2003). These studies have examined the practices of soliciting an account as well as types of accounts and their sequential design. Relevant to the current paper, Bolden and Robinson (2011) discuss the practice of calling for an account from a co-interactant using a 'why' formatted interrogative (such as *why did you do that?*). They show how, rather than working as an information seeking question, 'why' formatted interrogatives index the stance that the item to be accounted for is unwarranted or inappropriate. As such, rather than orienting to these turns as seeking information, respondents frequently orient to the

implied challenging stance of the interrogative by either overtly aligning with it or by rejecting the challenge and providing an account to justify the reasonableness of the accountable item.

These studies comprise an approach to the analysis of accounts and intentions as concerns which are displayed by participants in a sequential flow of ongoing actions. This paper extends this work and focuses on formulations of 'wants' in particular kinds of sequential environments, doing particular kinds of actions as a practical feature of accountability.

An examination of *how* speakers formulate notions of 'wanting', where these constructions are deployed and to what end is of relevance to academic psychology and ordinary individuals alike as formulating one's own and others' 'wants' is a common activity in conversation. Consider the following live examples;

Extract 2 Potts 12 06:30

01 Jud: half chewed

02 Jud: ((shows pizza box to Don))

03 (0.4)

04 Don: I don't want half chewed pizza;

Extract 3 AAFE3 26:58

01 Pat: oka:y now Kevin and Gra:nt I want you to be

02 ba:ck here by six.

In extract two Don refuses an offer of ‘half chewed pizza’ by stating that he doesn’t want any. In example 3 Pat tells Kevin and Grant to be ‘ba:ck here by six.’ using an ‘I want’ construction. Extended analysis of the use of ‘I don’t want X’ to build refusals and ‘I want you to X’ to deliver directives is beyond the scope of this paper. However we can note that speakers routinely deploy notions of ‘wanting’ to perform a range of conversational activities. Considering formulations of ‘wants’ as resources in and for interaction takes away from the need to theorise about individual processes which allow individuals to read the minds of others and to consider instead what it means to ‘want’ something as a human action in interaction.

2. Data and method

The dataset comprises approximately twenty hours of ‘fly on the wall’ documentary programmes which each document the lives of a particular family over an extended period of time (the C4 and AAF corpuses) and a corpus of recordings of twelve mealtimes made by the ‘Potts’ family (all names are pseudonyms). The family were given a video camera for one month and were asked to make recordings of ten to fifteen meals. The family were given the option of deleting any recordings before the end of the recording period and all participants gave consent for anonymised extracts to be used in research meetings and papers. The data were transcribed using the Jefferson notation system for conversation analysis. The analytic approach is located within the theoretical framework of discursive psychology, which focuses on psychology as something displayed in talk in interaction (Potter, 2005). The analysis draws on the rigorous analytical techniques of contemporary conversation analysis, which examines matters which are fundamental to the situation of people interacting with each other, such as robust patterns of interaction and rules which

speakers orient to. I examined episodes of talk in which speakers use the verb 'want', the location of this term in ongoing interaction, and the design and action orientation of the turns in which the term appeared.

3.0 Analysis

The analysis focuses on two versions of the practice, which are as follows;

1. In one large group of cases the two-part structure occurs following a turn by speaker A that embodies some proposal by speaker A regarding speaker B's actions. These proposals may be realised through directives and account solicitations. In each instance some proposal is made by speaker A regarding speaker B's actions. The device '*I don't want X, I want Y*' works as a way of rejecting the proposed action by formulating a 'want' which contrasts with the proposed action.

2. In the second group of cases the device is used by speaker B in response to a formulation by speaker A of speaker B's actions or motivations. In this subset the turn is always built using the minimiser 'just'. The device '*I don't want X, I just want Y*' first rejects this formulation and constructs an alternative sense of agency in the second turn construction unit (TCU) . Here the device implies that as the speaker is motivated to do *just* a particular thing, they are not motivated to do anything more.

In all cases we shall see that the *construction* of an intention which motivates and drives behaviour is a members' method which may be deployed in the service of sequentially unfolding interaction.

3.1 Rejecting a proposal regarding future actions

In this section I show how speakers may use the device '*I don't want X, I want Y*' to reject a proposal regarding their future actions made by an interlocutor. Within my

materials these proposals are realised through two main turn types. The first of these are directives, that is, actions which *direct* the recipient in some way, to *do* something or to *desist* in doing something (Craven & Potter, 2010). The second is account solicitations (Bolden & Robinson, 2011) which challenge speaker A's actions and make a proposal regarding their future actions. The '*I don't want X, I want Y*' construction is delivered as a way of rejecting the proposal and decreasing the likelihood of further challenge in third-turn position. In the first TCU speakers first reject the proposal and in the second TCU formulate a 'want' which contrasts with that action. When responding to multi-unit turns, speakers routinely orient to the *final* part of the turn (Schegloff, 2007). The two-part structure then, shifts the trajectory of the ongoing sequence and makes relevant a response to the speaker's formulation of their 'wants'. Consider the following example, taken from towards the end of a family meal. Prior to the start of the extract there has been disagreement between Wayne and the rest of the family regarding the time Wayne will spend 'playing out'. Indeed this is a recurrent theme within the family as Wayne often refuses to finish meals in favour of going out to meet friends. Earlier in the meal Judy and Don, Wayne's parents, stated that Wayne will be staying in that night to do his homework. In response Wayne left the table without permission to do so and reportedly lay on his bedroom floor 'in a strop' before being summoned back to the table.

Extract 4 Potts8 19:27

01 Jud: and then we'll see what tomorrow (.)bri:ngs,
02 when yer come in (0.2) when yer home from
03 school and your upstairs get' cha:nged and
04 you've gone out while I'm putting car awa:y

05 and you've not done your h[ome]work;

06 Don: [[eh]]

07 Don: [*((looks at Jamie))*]

08 (1.4)

09 Jud: >and then you've got us[s-<]

10 Way: [go no:w the::n

11 (0.2)

12 (1) Jud: no: e[at your cho]colate [ca:_[ke]

13 Jam: [(RUSH IT!)] ch[o:c'late c]ake

14 (2a) Way: [don'] wa:n i:t

15 n[o::w]

16 Jam: [tou]gh

17 (2b) Way: °I wanna meet my m[a::tes°]

18 Jud: [well w]here's all your

19 may-you're not going to pa:rk at this ti:me=

20 Way: =the:y're all wa::y'i:n

21 Jud: whe:re they wait*in

22 Way: [*((glances at Judy momentarily))*]

23 Way: [cobden stree::t]

In her turn at line 1, Judy builds a complaint regarding Wayne's previous behaviour as an account to justify why he will not allowed to leave the house and 'play out' with his friends on this occasion. The use of the idiomatic expression 'and then we'll see what tomorrow (.) bri:ngs,' constructs Wayne's future actions as scripted (Edwards, 1994) and predictable. Wayne cuts into Judy's turn with 'go no:w the::n', a request which stands in direct opposition to the line of action proposed by Judy. Judy immediately, emphatically rejects this request ('no:') and tells Wayne to eat his chocolate cake instead. Wayne responds to this directive with the target turn. In the first TCU, 2a, he first defies the directive. Research has shown that in response to defiance, directors typically deliver a second directive which upgrades the director's entitlement and downgrades the contingencies or considerations involved in the recipient compliance (Craven & Potter, 2010) (indeed, Jamie takes a turn in overlap with 'tough' which deletes Wayne's turn and challenges his entitlement to refuse to comply, although this is not oriented to by her co-interactants). In the second TCU, 2b, Wayne formulates an alternative 'want' which contrasts with the projected action '°I wanna meet my m[a::tes°]'. The effect of this is to decrease the likelihood of Judy delivering a further, upgraded directive in third-turn position. When responding to multi-unit turns respondents typically respond to items in reverse order, beginning with the final TCU (Schegloff, 2007). That is, the occurrence of a second TCU ('°I wanna meet my ma::tes°') following defiance ('don' wa:n i:t') shifts the trajectory of the ongoing sequence and makes a response to Wayne's defiance less immediately relevant. Wayne *could* have responded by stating 'don' wa:n i:t' only. However a further, upgraded directive (such as *eat it*) in third-turn position is expectable. Through the deployment of 'I want Y', the topic of conversation is shifted from the matter of the chocolate cake

to that of Wayne meeting his friends, a third party to whom it emerges he has an obligation ('=the:y're all wa::y'i:n'). We can note that this topic shift is successful as the matter the cake is not pursued in Judy's subsequent turn, rather she enquires as to the whereabouts of Wayne's friends (line 21) and Wayne is subsequently allowed to leave the house after agreeing to eat his cake upon his return (data not shown).

In this example then, in contrast to a simple rejecting response Wayne deploys a two-part structure which decreases the likelihood of a further upgraded directive being delivered in third-turn position. He defies the directive in 2a and proceeds to formulate a 'want' which contrasts with the projected action. Here he invokes his friends as a third party to whom he has an obligation to meet. The 'I want' construction then, undermines the projected course of action and successfully shifts the trajectory of the ongoing sequence.

While directives may represent the prototypical action for directing others' actions and making a proposal regarding others' conduct, there are other resources available to speakers for doing so. One of these are why-formatted account solicitations (Bolden & Robinson, 2011) which embody a proposal regarding the recipient's actions. Speakers may respond to account solicitations by first rejecting the notion that they are motivated to carry out the proposed action and proceeding to formulate a 'want' which contrasts with that action. The following extract in which the Potts family are eating a take-away meal from a chip-shop contains a prototypical example.

Extract 5 Potts11 08:00

01 Don: [((walks into camera shot and sits down))]

02 (1) Don: [why don't you get a portion of chips
03 between you instead of throwing-]
04 (2a) Jam:
05 (2b) I want ri:ce chips and gravy he don't
06 like gravy I don't like plain chips.
07 Jam: |((puts food into mouth))|
08 | (0.6) |
09 Way: I don't like ri:ce
10 Don: [|((points towards Jamie's plate))]
11 Don: [well why don't you get a portion of rice,
12 a portion of chips, (.) with the >buh-
13 oh-eh-< gravy,]
14 (0.6)
15 Jud: (can't) () gravy
16 Don: |((points towards Wayne's plate))|
17 | (0.4) |
18 Don: split the ri:ce, n-er-n-uh and the chips and
19 th[en,]
20 Jam: [YE]AH but whose gonna have the other half
21 of the ri:ce

In his turn at lines 2-3 Don challenges Jamie and Wayne's current practice of ordering food separately, rather than one portion of chips to share as this would be less wasteful ('instead of throwing-'). As noted by Bolden and Robinson (2011) account solicitations are frequently co-implicated in actions such as complaining or criticising. As it is Don, Wayne and Jamie's father, who pays for the food, the turn can be heard as complaint implicative. Bolden and Robinson also note that 'why' formatted account solicitations index a stance that the accountable item (in this instance, buying food separately rather than one portion of chips to share) is nonsensical. Similarly, Koshik observes that why-formatted interrogatives may 'accomplish challenging/complaining rather than questioning' (2005: 40) and may convey speakers' stance that 'no adequate account' (51) for the problematic action is available. This turn then, is built to imply that there *is no adequate account* for the purchasing of separate food and thus that in future Jamie and Wayne should order one portion of chips to share. In sum, the turn embodies a proposal regarding Jamie and Wayne's future actions; that they share a portion of chips rather than ordering separately.

At lines 4-6 Jamie responds using the two-part structure '*I don't want X, I want Y*'. The first part of the turn rejects the proposal that Wayne and Jamie share chips in the future; ' '. Bolden and Robinson (2011) note that in third position account solicitors may upgrade their challenging stance in a variety of ways. Note that chips are part of the meal that Jamie is currently eating and so her claim that she doesn't want chips is open to challenge. In the second part of the turn this challenge is headed off as Jamie formulates an alternative 'want'; 'I want chips and gravy,' a specific meal which is typically served in one tray from chip-shops in northern England. While chips form part of this meal, this

is built as *contrastive* with the course of action prescribed by Don. This contrast is further emphasised in the final part of the turn 'he don't like gravy I don't like plain chips.'

We can note that similarly to extract two, the 'I want' format pre-empts and heads off a further challenge. Note that the rejection of Don's proposal is delivered in the first TCU, decreasing the likelihood of further challenge in third-turn position. The 'I want' format displays entitlement to decide what food should be purchased while the subsequent accounts display the reasoning behind this. The 'I want' format then, is built to undermine and reject the proposal that one portion of chips be bought in future.

Let us now consider a final example which shows how account solicitors may upgrade their challenge in third turn position and how the two-part structure works to head off this further challenge. The topic of talk is the date on which the couple, Tim and Marian, will get married. Marian has been at pains to persuade Tim to get married within the next few months, during the filming of the documentary series in which the family are taking part. Immediately preceding the start of the extract Tim has stated that he 'doesn't fancy getting married just yet', citing their current living circumstances (the couple live with Marian's parents) and lack of resources to decorate a flat a reason for waiting.

Extract 6 1974, 16:59

01 Mar: [((looks directly at Tim))]

02 Mar: [s::o, yer gonna make a da:te then]

03 Tim: ((looks at Marian, shakes head while

04 *speaking*))

05 Tim: YEAH BUT IT WONT BE IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS

06 THOUGH- TWO OR THREE MONTHS.=

07 Mar: =*why no::t*

08 Tim: I DON'T A:NNA GET MARRIED IN THE

09 NEXT TWO OR THREE MONTHS.

10 Mar: WHY: NO:T

11 Tim: just don't wa:nt too..

12 Mar: WHY

13 Tim: °well why shoul[d I]°

14 Mar: [(j]ust cause she said-) WHY

15 SHOULDN'T YOU:

16 (0.2)

17 Tim: >>well I just do::n't want to get married in

18 the next two or three mo:nths.<<

19 (1) Mar: wh:y not

20 (2a) Tim: ah don't know, I just don't want to

21 (2b) I just want to wai:t, and get everything done.

22 (.) in this time you ca:nt do anything in

23 [seven weeks ti:me]

24 Mar: [(you- you don't) know] that

25 Tim: I do:: love.

26 Mar: [no you don't.]

27 Mar: [((shakes head))]

In the turn at line 2, Marian proposes that Tim will set a date. Note that 'so' is regularly used by speakers to introduce a formulation of what has been previously said. The turn initial 'so' then, implies that Tim has already agreed to do so. Tim subsequently confirms that a date will be set, but rejects the notion that this will be within the next two or three months, during the timeframe which is preferable to Marian. Marian proceeds to challenge this timeframe using a 'why' formatted account solicitation (Bolden & Robinson, 2011); '=*why no: :t*'. Tim responds with a defensive account at lines 8-9, claiming a desire not to do so. This response is treated as insufficient as Marian deletes the turn with an exact repeat of her turn at line 7, which is produced with raised volume. There is then a series of further account solicitations (lines 10 & 12) and rejections (lines 11, 13, 17-18) as Marian continues to challenge Tim. In his turn at lines 21-23 Tim delivers the two-part structure. In 2a he refutes the notion that he wants to get married in the next few months 'ah don't know, I just don't want to'. Notably, throughout the sequence Tim's claim to not want to get married in the next few months (lines 8-9, 11) have been treated as insufficient. Thus if Tim were to leave it at this it is expectable that a further challenge would be forthcoming. In 2b the likelihood of a further challenge is decreased as Tim formulates a 'want' which contrasts with the course of action proposed by Marian; 'I just want to wai:t, and get everything done.'. He adds an incremental (Schegloff, 2000) instalment to this

account 'you ca:nt do anything in [seven weeks ti:me' which justifies the reasonableness of this. Again we can see that the trajectory of the ongoing sequence is successfully shifted as Marian orients to and deals with the second TCU

'(you- you don't) know that' (clearly, however, Tim is not completely off the hook as the topic of the date of marriage is pursued further!).

In sum, this section has examined speakers uses of 'I don't want X, I just want Y' to reject some proposal regarding their actions. These proposals may be realised through directives or account solicitations. Research has shown that when speakers defy directives, directors typically respond with a second directive which upgrades the director's entitlement (Craven & Potter, 2010). Similarly, account solicitors may upgrade their challenge in third position (Bolden & Robinson, 2011). The use of a two part structure in which speakers first reject the preceding turn and then proceed to formulate an alternative sense of agency shifts the trajectory of the ongoing sequence and decreases the likelihood of a further challenge in third-turn position.

3.2 Refuting a formulation of actions or motivations

This section focuses on the use of the two-part structure by speaker B to refute a formulation of their actions or intentions, as in extract seven 'you're not starting a fi:ght now are you Jane.' When the structure is deployed in this environment speakers first deny the complained-of action and then proceed to formulate an alternative, restricted sense of agency. The inclusion of the minimiser 'just' is a key response feature of these sequences (as in 'I just want my clo:thes ba:ck') as this implies that speakers motivations are restricted, denying that they intend to do anything more.

17 Sim: |((folds up plastic bag))|

18 Sim: °how do you know°

19 (.)

20 Sim: well- whu- d'you don't wanna go there now do

21 you

22 Jan: [*((leans on chair and pushes it further under*

21 the table))]

22 Jan: [whe:n do I go there then]

As the extract begins Jane proclaims emphatically ‘

cause my jumper's gone missing and you::'re seen wearing one that looks exactly like my jumper'. At this Simon, who is in the next room, accuses Jane of 'starting a fi:ght'. There are several design features of Simon's turn at line 7 which evidence the turn's challenging status. First, as a negative interrogative, Jane is heavily held accountable as the turn can be heard as assertive rather than questioning (Heritage, 2002). Second, the choice of lexical description constructs Jane's actions as antagonistic ('fi:ght') as well as intentional, unprovoked and unjustified ('starting'). Finally, as well as specifying Jane, rather than Emily as the recipient, the turn terminal address term works to underscore Jane as the antagonist as well as personal concern for the problem (Lerner, 2003). In sum, the turn can be heard as accusatory as Simon formulates Jane's actions as *intentionally starting* a fight. To deny this accusation Jane deploys an '*I'm not X, I just want Y*' structure (lines 10-11). First she delivers a typical 'didn't do it' denial. Research has shown that when speakers simply deny a complained-of

action, co-interactants respond with a further assertion of the complained-of action (Dersley & Wootton, 2000). Thus leaving it at this would leave the turn susceptible to challenge. The likelihood of this challenge is decreased as Jane formulates an alternative motivation which contrasts with 'starting a *fi:ght*' which is 'I just want my *clo:thes* ba:ck.'. Here the minimiser 'just' is a key component, highlighting that Jane's intentions are restricted to obtaining her clothes and *do not include* 'starting a *fi:ght*'. Note that the choice of noun, '*clo:thes*' deletes the specific relevance of the jumper and in generalising constructs this as a matter of principle rather than an isolated, specific, battle. As someone whose 'clothes' have been taken by another, Jane's requests for them back are hardly compatible with the intentional, unjustified act of 'starting a *fi:ght*'. We can also note that as the denial is delivered in the first TCU, a response to this is less immediately relevant. Jane could conceivably have built the turn as 'I just want my clothes back, I'm not trying to start a fight', which would make a response to her denial immediately relevant. Notably, none of the two-part structures in the data corpus are built in this manner.

Consider another example, which is extract eight. Here the topic of talk is an upcoming party for Jane's fortieth birthday which falls on the same weekend as Mother's Day. Earlier in the day Emily, Jane's daughter, announced that she will be working all weekend and will be unable to spend time with the family. Prior to the beginning of the extract Jane has announced that she is getting 'fed up of the whole weekend'.

Extract 8 2008E1 31:50

01 Jan: [((gestures with hands))]

02 Jan: [what have you a:sked people to bring]

03 (0.4)

04 Sim: they could bringi:ng, (0.2) wh(h)y are you

05 £worried about it£

06 (0.4)

07 Jan: [((gestures with hands))]

08 Jan: [well c'z I'm just wondering what foo:d you're

09 gonna do]

10 (.)

11 (1) Sim: :n't worry abou:t it

12 (2a) Jan: I'm not worried about it

13 (2b) I just* want* to know what it IS.

14 (0.5)

15 Sim: [((shakes head slightly))]

16 Sim: [what are you worried about¿]

17 (0.2)

18 Sim: >>whuh-uh<< I'm not gonna poison anybody don't

19 worry,

In this example Jane uses the two-part structure to undermine and reject Simon's ascription of her as '£worried'. In his turn at lines 4-5 Simon treats Jane's 'wh'

interrogative, regarding the food which will be at the party (line 2), as a challenge (Koshik, 2005). He begins to provide a relevant response ('they could bringi:ng,') and then abandons this in favour of soliciting an account using a 'why' formatted interrogative, challenging the grounds for her enquiry. Jane's subsequent reformulation of her enquiries as a normative action ('I'm just wondering what foo:d you're gonna do'), again minimised with 'just', is rejected as Simon persists with his formulation of Jane as 'worried' as he instructs her to desist in doing so (':n't worry abou:t it'). Jane's deployment of the target turn 'I'm not worried about it I just* want* to know what it IS.' counters and rejects the notion that she is 'worried. As a 'didn't do it' denial (Dersley & Wootton, 2000) the first TCU is itself is open to challenge. This challenge is headed off in 2b as Jane formulates an alternative motivation- that she just wants to know what it (the food) is. Wanting to know what food will be provided at her upcoming milestone birthday party does not equate to 'worrying'. It is notable that this is the third revised question regarding the party food. The 'I want' format embodies high entitlement and strongly projects a relevant response which further decreases the likelihood of a further accusation.

In the previous two excerpts, the two-part structure was built using the verb 'want'. In the next case, taken from the Potts corpus, Judy first rejects Don's formulation of her actions and proceeds to formulate an alternative using the verb 'interested'. This eloquently shows the rhetorical work done by the selection of a particular mental state term.

Extract 9 Potts 6 11:00

01 Jud: David an Tommy,

22 (1.2)

23 Jam: Bob Marley.

24 (1.6)

25 Jud: say nowt then,

26 Don: has he got his wailers the:re

The topic of talk immediately preceding the extract is what Wayne has been doing, and with whom, while he was away from the house. We can begin by noting that the sequence contains a series of formulations and reformulations of Judy's actions. At lines 7-8 Don accuses Judy of preventing Wayne from being able to eat his 'tea' (a term used to denote an evening meal), implying that her questions concerning with whom he has been spending time are illegitimate and overbearing. He then formulates her questions as 'giving him the bloody (0.7) Spanish inquisition'. This idiomatic expression highlights the extreme and complainable nature of Judy's actions while moving to close the topic (Drew & Holt, 1988). At line 14 Judy emphatically rejects Don's implied accusation that her questioning is illegitimate by delivering a 'didn't do it' denial (Dersley & Wootton, 2000). Notably this is delegitimized by Wayne as he invokes the presence of the recording equipment as a basis for not talking about 'someone else's children' (i.e. with whom Wayne has been spending time). Judy's denial is also emphatically rejected by Don as he cuts into Wayne's turn with a further accusation 'yeah but yer juss spying on him'.

In the target turn Judy first denies this accusation ' :t spying_' and proceeds to reformulate her actions 'I'm just interested who he's ou-

who he's bin ou:t with. '. The second TCU removes the problematic, specific characterization of what kind of conversation is taking place as Judy invokes her intentional states and reformulates her enquiries as a normative action. There are two things to note about this sequence. First, following a second assertion of the complained-of action by Don, Judy heads off further pursuit by formulating an intentional state 'interested'. In this instance this is successful as following a lapse in the conversation (line 25) Jamie offers an ironic candidate answer 'Bob Marley.' which is further developed by Don ('has he got his wai:lers the:re'). A second observation is Judy's careful characterization of her actions as she formulates the object of her 'interest' as a way of managing an interactional dispute regarding motivation. Note the self repair at lines 20-21, as the projected 'who he's out with' which would suggest an ongoing, perhaps overbearing and illegitimate interest, is replaced with 'who he's bin ou:t with. ', specifying that her interest applies in this instance only. Also note that the choice of lexical description 'interested' is devoid of any notion of monitoring or 'spying'. 'Wanting' to know something invokes personal investment and a perhaps illegitimate interest, which is precisely the type of interest which the turn is working to refute. In contrast the term 'interested' is devoid of any notion of spying and orients to the topic of conversation, with whom Wayne has been spending time, as Wayne's business. While being 'interested' in what one's child has been up to is a legitimate action for a mother to be doing, 'wanting' to know and having a personal investment in doing so, may not be. We can see then that the choice of lexical description, Judy's formulation of her actions as 'interested' is sequentially specific and is a practical expression which is delivered within a sequential flow of interactional considerations.

In sum, in this section the analysis has shown how, following a formulation of their actions, speakers may respond by first delivering a 'didn't do it denial' and then proceeding to formulate an alternative sense of agency. The interactional import of the '*I'm not X, I just want Y*' structure in this environment is to decrease the likelihood of accusers responding with a further assertion of the complained-of action in third-turn position.

4. Summary and conclusions

This paper has identified a two-part structure in which speakers invoke intentions and motivation as they formulate their 'wants' and identified two environments where this structure is recurrently deployed. The first of these is to a reject proposal made by speaker A regarding speaker B's actions. The second is to undermine and refute a formulation of speaker B's actions made by speaker A.

This paper extends our understanding of sequences in which some aspect of another's conduct is specified as I began by examining speakers' uses of the device to reject a proposal regarding their actions. These proposals may be realised via directives, which are the prototypical action for directing another's actions, and account solicitations. Typically when recipients refuse to comply with directives, directors respond by delivering a second directive which upgrades the director's entitlement to deliver the directive and reduces the contingencies relevant to the recipient's compliance (Craven & Potter, 2010). Similarly, in third-turn position account solicitors may upgrade their challenging stance towards the accountable item (Bolden & Robinson 2011). Speakers may conceivably respond by delivering

the first TCU only. However doing so would leave these turns open to challenge. The use of a two-part structure in which speakers first reject the directive or proposal and then proceed to formulate an alternative, contrasting intention works to decrease the likelihood of further challenge. This is realised in two ways. First, when responding to multiunit turns, speakers normatively respond to the final TCU (Schegloff, 2007).

Delivering a rejection in the *first* TCU decreases the likelihood of further challenge.

Second, the formulation of an alternative sense of agency highlights that rather than carry out the proposed action, speakers are motivated to do some other thing.

In the second part of the analysis I examined speakers uses of the structure to reject a formulation of their motivations delivered in the preceding turn. This extends our understanding of complaint sequences by examining one practice for responding to a compliant implicative accusation. My analysis shows that complaint recipients may decrease the likelihood of further challenge in third turn position by first rejecting the formulation and proceeding to formulate an alternative motivation in the second TCU.

Two features of '*I'm not X, I just want Y*' constructions work in combination to head off a potential further challenge. First, speakers formulate an alternative sense of agency which implies that as speakers are motivated to do one thing, they are not motivated to do anything more. Second, the formulation of an alternative sense of agency in the second TCU following a rejection decreases the likelihood of a further challenge in third turn position.

Let us now consider the broader issue of the concept of intentional action based on agents' beliefs and desires. Intentional states are widely considered to be a priori cognitive entities that are expressed through communication and which can be used

to predict and explain behaviour. Within the field of social cognition intentions are understood as a function of an individual's beliefs and desires. That is, beliefs and desires are understood as pre-existing variables which may be used to explain an individual's behaviour. My analysis of speakers' *formulations* of their 'wants' as sequentially specific phenomena makes problematic the notion of the communication of pre-existing desires. Thus, rather than descriptions of pre-existing inner experiences, the 'I want' constructions examined here are best understood as formulations that are rhetorically organised to undermine and reject an alternative that is alive in the current interaction. With regards to the questions posed within Social Cognition and Developmental Psychology, rather than 'a referential challenge' (Slaughter, et al., 2009: 1058) as the child faces the impossible problem of describing 'internal, unobservable mental states' (ibid.) the child's task may be best understood as determining the appropriate uses of terms in interaction.

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