Privacy as personal resistance: exploring legal narratology and the need for a legal architecture for personal privacy rights

2.50
Hdl Handle:
http://hdl.handle.net/10545/210810
Title:
Privacy as personal resistance: exploring legal narratology and the need for a legal architecture for personal privacy rights
Authors:
Grace, Jamie
Abstract:
Different cultures produce different privacies – both architecturally and legally speaking – as well as in their different legal architectures. The ‘Simms principle’ can be harnessed to produce semi-constitutional privacy protection through statute; building on the work already done in ‘bringing rights home’ through the Human Rights Act 1998. This article attempts to set out a notion of semi-entrenched legal rights, which will help to better portray the case for architectural, constitutional privacy, following an examination of the problems with a legal narrative for privacy rights as they currently exist. I will use parallel ideas from the works of W.B. Yeats and Costas Douzinas to explore and critique these assumptions and arguments. The ultimate object of this piece is an argument for the creation of a legal instrument, namely an Act of Parliament, in the United Kingdom; the purpose of which is to protect certain notions of personal privacy from politically-motivated erosion and intrusion.
Affiliation:
University of Derby
Citation:
the crit [2011] Vol. 4, Issue 1
Publisher:
University of Idaho College of Law
Journal:
the crit: a critical legal studies journal
Issue Date:
2011
URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10545/210810
Additional Links:
http://thecritui.com/
Type:
Article
Language:
en
Appears in Collections:
The Law in Society Research Group; Derby Law School

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorGrace, Jamieen
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-15T14:32:50Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-15T14:32:50Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.citationthe crit [2011] Vol. 4, Issue 1en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10545/210810-
dc.description.abstractDifferent cultures produce different privacies – both architecturally and legally speaking – as well as in their different legal architectures. The ‘Simms principle’ can be harnessed to produce semi-constitutional privacy protection through statute; building on the work already done in ‘bringing rights home’ through the Human Rights Act 1998. This article attempts to set out a notion of semi-entrenched legal rights, which will help to better portray the case for architectural, constitutional privacy, following an examination of the problems with a legal narrative for privacy rights as they currently exist. I will use parallel ideas from the works of W.B. Yeats and Costas Douzinas to explore and critique these assumptions and arguments. The ultimate object of this piece is an argument for the creation of a legal instrument, namely an Act of Parliament, in the United Kingdom; the purpose of which is to protect certain notions of personal privacy from politically-motivated erosion and intrusion.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherUniversity of Idaho College of Lawen
dc.relation.urlhttp://thecritui.com/en
dc.titlePrivacy as personal resistance: exploring legal narratology and the need for a legal architecture for personal privacy rightsen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity of Derbyen
dc.identifier.journalthe crit: a critical legal studies journalen
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